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Responses to Setiya, Hussain, and Horty

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I am extremely grateful to my three commentators for the careful attention they have paid to my book, and for writing such penetrating comments. I am honoured that they took such trouble.

Rationality Through Reasoning opposes several dogmas that are prevalent in the philosophy of normativity, but it does not give much space to arguing against them. Widespread dogmas have widespread ramifications and come with many different variations. To argue against them, each variation has to be identified, accurately formulated, and then dealt with. Furthermore, dogmas are protected by complicated epicycles, and they use their own terminology that seems confused to an opponent. Arguing against them is consequently difficult and exhausting. My book contains two chapters opposing the dogma that rationality consists in responding correctly to reasons, or to beliefs about reasons. They were the hardest and least interesting chapters to write. So generally I tried to be constructive rather than destructive. I presented alternatives to the dogmas as well as I could, with the aim of making them more attractive than the dogmas.

One consequence is that, in saying what I believe, I may not have said clearly enough what I deny. So let me now express strongly my opposition to the dogma of the primacy of reasons. I oppose the view that normativity, rationality and reasoning are 'the domain of reasons', to use John Skorupski's illuminating phrase (Skorupski, 2010), or the view that 'the normativity of all that is normative consists in the way it is, or provides, or is otherwise related to reasons', as Joseph Raz puts it (Raz, 1999, 67). This dogma is not yet half a century old, and I think it will pass. My book takes care to distinguish between normativity, rationality, and reasoning—three things that are often lumped together. Reasons belong to normativity, but even there they

do not play the leading role. Rationality is not particularly concerned with reasons, and reasons have no part in my account of reasoning.

Setiya

Kieran Setiya complains that my theory 'obscures the close relation between reasons and reasoning'. But I do not obscure this relation; I deny it. As Setiya reports, I give an account of reasoning, and of the correctness of reasoning, that makes no reference to reasons. This is not an accident that needs to be remedied. Rather than arguing against the view that there is a close relation between reasons and reasoning, I argued for an opposing view instead. Now I shall take this opportunity to argue briefly against Setiya's view.

Setiya says 'It follows from the fact that you are reasoning correctly from true beliefs that the contents of those beliefs are reasons'. Narrowly and carefully interpreted, this claim may be true, but it does not represent a close relation between reasons and reasoning. It may be true that, if you reason correctly from true beliefs in some premises to a belief in a conclusion, the conjunction of the premises is a reason to believe the conclusion. I do not deny this claim, though I also do not affirm it. If it is true, it is a feature of this particular sort of reasoning, and it cannot be extended to reasoning in general.

If it is true, it is easy to explain why. Correct reasoning with beliefs takes you from believing some propositions to believing a proposition that can be inferred from them. The explanation of why this sort of reasoning is correct, when it is, is that necessarily, or at least normally, the conclusion is true if the premises are true. That makes it rational to believe the conclusion on the basis of your beliefs in the premises. This explanation involves truth and rationality, and it makes no reference to reasons. Separately, it may also be the case that a fact from which a proposition can be inferred is a reason to believe that proposition. I neither affirm nor deny this claim; it is a debated issue in epistemology. If it is true, putting it together with the explanation of correctness for this sort of reasoning explains why Setiya's claim is true for this sort of reasoning. The conjunction of the premises is a reason to believe the conclusion.

The claim does not generalize to reasoning with other attitudes besides beliefs. It does not apply to instrumental reasoning, for example. Suppose you intend to visit Venice, believe that buying a ticket is a means implied by doing so, and believe that buying a ticket is up to you. Suppose that, from this intention and belief you reason correctly to the intention of buying a ticket. The content of your premise-intention is the proposition that you will visit Venice. The contents of your premise-beliefs are the proposition that buying a ticket is a means implied by visiting Venice and that buying a ticket is up to you. The conjunctive fact, if it is a fact, that you will visit Venice, that buying a ticket is a means implied by doing so and that buying

a ticket is up to you may be a reason to believe you will buy a ticket. But it is not a reason for you to intend to buy a ticket. For example, it is perfectly consistent with this conjunctive fact that you hate the idea of visiting Venice, but expect your enemy to brainwash you into buying a ticket.

A more plausible view is that your attitudes themselves—in this case your intention to visit Venice and your beliefs—together constitute a reason to intend to buy a ticket. I answered this view that attitudes are reasons elsewhere in *Rationality Through Reasoning* (Broome, 2013, 81–2 and 184–5). In any case, it is not Setiya's claim.

In a note, Setiya says that his claim does extend to enkratic reasoning, which is reasoning that takes you from believing you ought to *F* to intending to *F*. He says that the content of your belief—that you ought to *F*—is, if true, a reason for you to *F*. That is not so. A reason to *F* is something that explains or contributes in a particular way to explaining why you ought to *F* (if you ought). The fact that you ought to *F* does not contribute to explaining why you ought to *F*, so it is not a reason for you to *F*.

In any case, this attempt of Setiya's to extend his claim only makes it obscure. When he says that the contents of your premise-beliefs are reasons, he cannot mean merely that they are reasons for something or other. Any fact could be a reason for just about anything. He must mean something more specific. In the case of reasoning to a conclusion-belief, he seems to mean that the contents of your premise-beliefs are a reason for believing the conclusion. That is to say, they are a reason for having the conclusion-belief. They cannot be reasons for the content of the conclusion-belief. The content could be just any proposition, such as the proposition that Paris is in France. This is not the sort of thing there can be a reason for. So the claim is that the contents of the premise-attitudes constitute a reason to have the conclusion-attitude. But in the enkratic case, Setiya does not claim the content of the premise-attitude—that you ought to *F*—is a reason for having the conclusion-attitude—an intention to *F*—but instead that it is a reason for your *F*ing. This is the content of the conclusion-attitude. So I cannot tell what Setiya's general claim can be.

I can see no generalization of Setiya's claim that supports the contention that there is a close connection between reasons and reasoning.

Part of my opposition to the primacy of reasons is that I think the property of being a reason can be reduced to the more fundamental normative property of ought. I think a reason is something that either explains an ought fact (such as the fact that you ought to be careful when crossing a road or that you ought to believe what you have good evidence for) or contributes to explaining an ought fact in a particular way that I specified in the book. Setiya complains that this account of a reason does not seem natural to him. When I spelt out the particular way in which reasons contribute to explaining ought, he found my account too complex and not adequately executed.

I think complexity is inevitable. The question is how reasons together determine what one ought to do, and a general theory of that is bound to be complex. Consider how the goodnesses of parts combine together to determine the goodness of a whole. It is well recognized in value theory that this is a complex relationship. We must expect just as much complexity for the combination of reasons. At one point Setiya says that 'When the fact that *p* is a reason for *N* to *F* and the fact that *q* is a reason for *N* to *F* then the fact that *p* & *q* is a reason for *N* to *F*'. This is too simple; it cannot be correct in general. It must be possible for two reasons to cancel each other out. Combining reasons is not so straightforward.

Setiya is certainly right that I did not give an adequate account of it myself. I do not consider that my job. It is a job for those who believe in the primacy of reasons. I prefer to combine goods rather than reasons. Rather than try to work out what determines the strengths of reasons for alternative acts, I think we do better to work out within value theory how the goodness of alternative acts is determined, and then work out how the goodness of acts contributes to determining which act ought to be done. I have done my bit for combining goods (Broome, 1991, 2004b). I leave combining reasons to those for whom it is important.

All I tried to do in my book was explain what people mean by 'reasons'. I think they often refer to what philosophers call 'pro tanto reasons', whose characteristic is that they can be weighed against each other. I tried to spell out what this metaphor amounts to. I agree with John Horty in his comment that it should be treated with caution. In the end it may even be analytically unsustainable.

The important thing for me is that reasons are things that have an explanatory role towards ought facts. To put it another way, they contribute to making it the case that a person ought to do something, believe something and so on. I find this a natural account of reasons.

Why do I think that when you ought to do something, there is always a reason for you to do it? Because I assume there is an explanation for almost everything. (I say 'almost' out of caution, because quantum physics may give some reason to think there are inexplicable events). Do I take this to be a brute fact, as Setiya suggests? I do not. I assume there is an explanation for this fact like almost every other. I would like to know what it is.

Setiya has a different explanation of why, when I ought to *F*, there is always a reason for me to *F*. It is because 'what I ought to do is what there is most reason to do'. We could use 'most reason' in a way that makes this a tautology: we could simply define what you have most reason to do as what you ought to do. But if we did that, Setiya would be explaining nothing. Evidently he means us to take 'most reason' in a more literal, quantitative sense. He must mean that, when you ought to do something,

there is always more reason to do it than to do something else. He says 'We should expect the entailment [that there is always a reason to do what you ought to do] to be explained by an account of ought, reason, and the relative weight of reasons'. This reinforces my interpretation: he thinks that ought is always given by the weighing of reasons.

This idea is part of the dogma of the primacy of reasons. This part I do not necessarily oppose. It may be right, but it should not be taken for granted. According to some deontic theories, there are oughts that are simply given by deontic rules, without any weighing of reasons. For example, some philosophers think there is a rule against having contradictory beliefs, which by itself makes it the case that you ought not to have contradictory beliefs. Even if you could achieve a great deal of good by having some pair of contradictory beliefs, this is no reason to have them. Since these philosophers think it is always the case that you ought not to have contradictory beliefs, we could say that, according to them, you always have most reason not to have contradictory beliefs. But that would be to use 'most reason' in the way that makes the conclusion tautologous. In the literal, quantitative sense of 'most reason', they do not think you have most reason not to have contradictory beliefs, even though you ought not to. They think that no quantitative sort of reason applies to the case. These philosophers may be wrong, but their thinking does at least raise a question about whether what you ought to do is always what you have most reason to do.

Setiya gives his own account of reasons and how they determine what you ought to do. We could argue about its details for a long time, but Setiya himself unerringly predicts the main objection I have to it. His account depends on the idea of 'motivation'. Motivations and also the strength of motivations are primitives for Setiya, on the basis of which we are supposed to understand reasons and the strength of reasons. But I find the idea of motivation mysterious.

It seems to depend on a model of psychology that is alien to me.[1] In so far as I manage to conduct my life deliberately, I try to assess the relative merits of various courses of action. This is a cognitive exercise, which may involve a lot of empirical judgements about consequences and other matters, and the weighing up of various considerations. For example, I may find myself trying to judge whether one reason is stronger than another. With luck, the cognitive exercise concludes in a judgement about what I ought to do. Then, going beyond the cognitive, I decide what to do. If all goes well, what I decide to do is what I conclude I ought to do. If all continues to go well, I do what I decide to do.

[1] Broome (2009) sets out this argument more thoroughly.

Sadly, the cognitive exercise does not always bring me to the judgement that I ought to do a particular one of the available options. It may bring me to a judgement that, for each one of them, it is not the case that I ought to do it. In a case like this, I choose among the options by a process that is not entirely clear to me.

Now Setiya's implicit model of psychology. As I understand it, it is essential to motivation that it is not a cognitive state. For instance, a motivation to *F* is not a belief that you have a reason to *F*; if it were, that would make Setiya's account of reasons circular. It is also essential to motivation that your motivations can conflict: you can be motivated to *F* and motivated not to *F* at the same time.

In the end, the resultant of your motivations actually brings you to act. By what process does this happen when your motivations conflict? Not by a cognitive process, since motivations are not cognitive states. So far as I can see, the process has no room for a judgement, such as the judgement that you ought to do one thing or another. Setiya's model seems to rely on some subpersonal process in which motivations work together or against each other. In at least one way it is analogous to a mechanical process, since the stronger motivations are supposed to win out. You do what you are most strongly motivated to do.

I admit that my psychology could contain a quasi-mechanical process. When I fail to form a judgement that I ought to do one of the options or another, I am not clear how it is determined what I actually do. It could be by a subpersonal process in which something analogous to the strongest force wins out. But only some of my actions are determined this way. Others are determined partly by a cognitive process in which I think out what I ought to do. Even those that are determined quasi-mechanically often follow a cognitive process that fails to reach a result. In Setiya's psychology, all of action is modelled quasi-mechanically. Cognitive processes are treated as quasi-mechanical. That is alien to me.

Hussain

My account of reasoning is a first-order account. You reason with your attitudes of belief and intention, but you do not reason about them. You reason about their contents. In particular, reasoning does not necessarily involve higher-order normative beliefs, such as the belief that you ought to intend something, or that you have a reason to intend it.

In *Rationality Through Reasoning* I introduced the first-order account by means of a chapter about theoretical reasoning, which is reasoning with beliefs. I said that my account could be generalized to reasoning with other attitudes. But some aspects of it cannot be generalized, and Nadeem Hussain has picked out an important one. It is the necessity of a linking

belief. I think a linking belief is necessary for theoretical reasoning, but I should have stressed that no linking belief is necessary for other sorts of reasoning. I am sorry I did not.

A linking belief is not an essential part of my account of theoretical reasoning; I simply took it to be a necessary consequence of my account. In the chapter on theoretical reasoning, I started with a broad description of the process of reasoning as a causal passage from some attitudes to a new attitude, and asked what further conditions are either necessary or sufficient for the process to be reasoning. I said that a necessary condition is that you have a first-order linking belief. This is a belief that the conclusion follows from the premises.

But this linking belief is necessary only because my account of reasoning entails that, if you reason from premises to a conclusion, you implicitly have the linking belief (Broome, 2013, 233–4). You believe the conclusion as a result of a reasoning process starting from your believing the premises. This shows you implicitly believe that the conclusion follows from the premises. This implicit belief is constituted by your disposition to derive the conclusion from the premises by a process of reasoning. Or so I assumed. I did not defend this assumption, and nothing in my argument turns on it.

As Hussain points out, there is no corresponding first-order linking belief in the case of reasoning with other attitudes. So no corresponding belief is necessary in other sorts of reasoning.

However, as Hussain also points out, there is a disposition that corresponds to the disposition that, in the case of theoretical reasoning, I assumed to constitute the implicit linking belief. My account of reasoning in general is that it is an operation on the marked contents of attitudes, following a rule. I take following a rule to be the manifestation of a certain complex disposition: the disposition to behave in a particular way (such as coming to have a belief or an intention) and for this to 'seem right'. Seeming right is in turn a certain sort of disposition; it is the disposition to change your behaviour in particular circumstances, for example if you were to check your reasoning and come to a different conclusion. The complex disposition corresponds to the linking belief that I assume to exist in the special case of reasoning to a belief. Indeed, in the special case of reasoning to a belief, this complex disposition actually is what I assume to be an implicit linking belief.

In other sorts of reasoning, the disposition does not constitute a linking belief; there is nothing that could be the content of a first-order linking belief. Hussain offers a potential content in his formula (1), but I definitely do not think that a belief with a content like (1) is necessary for reasoning. (1) is normative, whereas the content of a first-order linking belief is not normative.

I understand why Hussain offers me a belief with a normative content. In reasoning you follow a particular rule, and formula (1) is in effect the

proposition that it is permissible to follow this rule. Hussain's idea is that the disposition I described, which includes the disposition for your behaviour to seem right to you, entails implicitly believing that your behaviour is permissible. I assume Hussain takes seeming right to entail this implicit normative belief.

I need to be clear how I use 'normative'. Often this term means something like 'pertaining to a rule or norm'. Following a rule is obviously normative in that sense. But my sense of 'normative' is the one that is standard in moral philosophy: something like 'pertaining to reasons or ought'. Following a rule need not be normative in my sense.

Seeming right does not entail an implicit belief whose content is normative in this sense. The 'right' in 'seeming right' is only relative to the rule; it is not normative. You can follow a rule without believing it is permissible to do so. For example, when you walk down a street you might find yourself playing the childish game of not treading on the lines. You adjust your step a little to comply with the rule of not treading on the lines, and when you put your foot down clear of a line, that seems right to you. At the same time, you may think this whole performance is stupid, and that as an adult you should not be doing it.

There may be another strand to Hussain's thinking. When you follow a rule, in a sense the rule guides you. It is tempting to think that you could not be guided by a rule unless you have an implicit normative belief that you ought to follow the rule. (The content of this belief is stronger than Hussain's (1), which is merely that it is permissible to follow the rule.) What could guide you to follow a rule apart from a belief that you ought to? I did not adequately answer this question in *Rationality Through Reasoning*, but I have tried to do so in my subsequent paper 'Normativity in reasoning' (Broome, 2014). The guidance you get in following a rule is intentional rather than normative. It is not that you implicitly believe you ought to follow the rule, but that you implicitly intend to do so.

No normative belief need be implicit in reasoning. So the explanatory circularity that bothers Hussain does not arise.

It is important to me that, when you reason, your reasoning is something you do. It is not merely something that happens in you. It is like eating your food rather than digesting it. A common idea is that, when a piece of behaviour constitutes an act of yours, at least part of what makes it an act is that you endorse it in some way. Your endorsement is part of what makes the act yours. I accept this common idea for reasoning; I assume that, for reasoning to be an act of yours, you must endorse it in some way. And you do. I take reasoning to be a transition between attitudes. Merely tracing out what inferences would be valid is not reasoning, for example. So when you reason you end up with a new attitude: a new belief or intention, say. This is a sort of

commitment. Just having an attitude acquired by reasoning constitutes a sort of endorsement of the process. As well as that, when you reason, the result seems right to you. This adds a further sort of endorsement.

The disposition I described as constituting following a rule is a disposition to endorse the result of reasoning. In the special case of reasoning to a belief, the disposition constitutes a linking belief, so the linking belief gives your reasoning a sort of endorsement. But the disposition endorses your reasoning in the general case too, even when there is no linking belief. A linking belief is not necessary for endorsement.

Horty

John Horty expresses surprise at the changes in my views that have happened over the last ten or fifteen years. He says:

> One thing I thought I knew about Broome's work before reading this book was that he wanted to shift our focus, in thinking about normativity, from reasons to requirements. But as far as I can tell, the picture he offers is structurally identical to the more traditional picture according to which reasons—contributory considerations favoring one side or another—interact to support oughts. Broome's requirements seem likewise to be pro tanto, or contributory, considerations that interact to support oughts.

I think I detect a note of disappointment in Horty's surprise, and I am certainly disappointed that he reads me this way. He seems to take me as a supporter of the primacy of reasons, the very dogma I am most opposed to. So I had better explain where my thinking has changed.

The earlier work Horty refers to was about rationality. At the time I did not properly distinguish rationality from normativity, so I thought I was writing about normativity. Moreover, I described requirements of rationality using the normative term 'ought'. For example, I said 'You ought (to intend to *M* if you intend to *E* and you believe your *M*ing is a necessary means to your *E*ing)' (Broome, 2004a). Since then, I have come to see there is a real question of whether rationality is normative, and I now reject the view that, necessarily, if rationality requires you to *F*, you ought to *F*. I call this view 'Strong Normativity' in *Rationality Through Reasoning* (Broome, 2013, 192). Sometimes it can be very beneficial to be irrational (Parfit, 1984, 13), and in those cases it is implausible that you ought nevertheless to satisfy the requirements of rationality.

So now I speak of rational requirement rather than ought. But my substantive views about rationality have changed little. In particular, I take rational requirements to be strict, as I put it. If you fail to satisfy a rational requirement, you are definitely not entirely rational. A rational requirement is not at all like a pro tanto reason. It is not the case that a requirement might be outweighed by other requirements, so you might rationally fail to

satisfy a requirement. Moreover, reasons have no place in my account of rationality.

In *Rationality Through Reasoning* I also mentioned requirements that come from other sources besides rationality. For example, there are requirements of law, morality, fashion and prudence. It is true of them too that they are strict. If you fail to satisfy a moral requirement, you are definitely not entirely moral. If you fail to satisfy a legal requirement, you are definitely not entirely law-abiding, and so on.

I recognize that some sources might issue contradictory requirements. For example, there might be contradictory legal requirements, because legislators might make contradictory laws. But this does not stop legal requirements from being strict. It is still true that, if you fail to satisfy a legal requirement, you are not entirely law-abiding. It means instead that it is impossible to be entirely law-abiding. If legal requirements were like pro tanto reasons, so that they could be outweigh each other, they would not be requirements. In any case, I argued in chapter 8 that the requirements of rationality in particular are mutually consistent.

Rationality Through Reasoning is mainly about the domain of rationality and how rationality is achieved through reasoning. Requirements of rationality are nothing like reasons within their own domain. Nor are other requirements. In their own domain, requirements are like oughts. Indeed they are often described using 'ought': 'You morally ought to keep your promises', 'You rationally ought not to have contradictory beliefs', and so on.

I am less interested in normativity in general than Horty is. Still, my book does contain some thoughts about the structure of normativity in general. I take it that some sources of requirements are normative. This means that their requirements contribute to determining what you ought to do. As I define 'a reason', this means they are reasons. So outside their own domain, requirements that issue from normative sources are reasons.

This does not mean they are pro tanto reasons. That is a matter of how reasons from different sources combine together. They may not combine by weighing, as pro tanto reasons do. For example, some philosophers think that morality is overriding or dominant, so that when morality requires you to *F*, it follows that you ought to *F*.

I suggested, though I could not demonstrate it, that rationality itself is among the normative sources. This means that, when rationality requires you to *F*, that fact is a reason for you to *F*. But I definitely do not think it is a pro tanto reason. It seems implausible to me that it can be weighed against other reasons. If rationality requires you to *F* and, say, prudence requires you not to *F*, I would say there is no contest. You ought to do what prudence requires. If ever you ought to do what rationality requires, it will be when other normative sources of requirements are silent.

I am excited by Horty's suggestion that my principle Enkrasia can be used to assess putative principles of deontic logic. I agree with him that we should not leave this to linguistic intuitions. For one thing, the philosophy of normativity should not necessarily be bound by the ordinary meanings of words; we may sometimes need to sharpen or alter meanings for philosophical purposes. In my book I used Enkrasia as a means of picking out, from the various meanings 'ought' has in English, the one that is central in the philosophy of normativity. Can we do the same for other semantic features of 'ought', including its logic?

In drafts of the book, I did actually try out this idea on one question within deontic logic: can there be deontic conflicts? This is exactly one of Horty's examples too. Eventually, I deleted a piece of text from the final version of the book because the argument encounters a problem that I did not have a fix for. Now Horty makes me think I should have tried harder. I will use this excuse for printing the deleted text here, and then explaining the problem.

> Let us call a case where you ought to *F* and you ought not to *F* a 'deontic conflict'. There is a reason for thinking deontic conflicts do not exist.
>
> Oughts engage our practical rationality through the requirement Enkrasia: rationality requires you to intend to *F* if you believe you ought to *F*. If Enkrasia is correct, you could not be fully rational and believe you are facing a deontic conflict. Suppose you believe you ought to *G* and also believe you ought not to *G*. Then by Enkrasia, you are not fully rational unless you intend to *G* and intend not to *G*. But, separately, it is plain that you are not fully rational if you intend to *G* and also intend not to *G*. Therefore, whatever you intend or do not intend, so long as you believe you ought to *G* and believe you ought not to *G*, you are inevitably not fully rational.
>
> But suppose it was actually true that you ought to *G* and also ought not to *G*. It would be extraordinary if this were so but you could not have good evidence for it. So let us suppose also that you have good evidence that you ought to *G* and that you ought not to *G*. It must be possible to believe any pair of truths that you have good evidence for, and be fully rational; it cannot be that you are necessarily irrational just because you believe some truths that you have good evidence for. But I just argued that you cannot be fully rational if you believe you ought to *G* and believe you ought not to *G*. We have to conclude that it cannot be true that you ought to *G* and also that you ought not to *G*.

The problem is that Enkrasia ensures you are necessarily irrational if you *believe* you are facing a deontic conflict, not if it is only the case that you are actually facing one. Enkrasia can help to sort out deontic logic only if there is a good way of navigating across this gap. My argument did not navigate it well enough. Suppose you ought to *G* and you ought not to *G*, and you have good evidence for both of these truths, but this deontic conflict exists only because you are not fully rational. Then you could not

believe both those truths and be fully rational. Yet in my argument I asserted the opposite.

This looks to me like a fixable problem, but I did not fix it. Now that Horty points out the potential power of the method, I think perhaps I should try to.

In this application, Enkrasia might be used to support a standard principle of deontic logic, the principle that there are no deontic conflicts. Horty explains that in other applications it might oppose a standard principle, namely closure. In Horty's example, closure implies that you ought not to see a movie. Given that, Enkrasia implies that you are not rational unless you intend not to see a movie. As Michael Bratman explains, intending not to see a movie involves various counterfactual dispositions that would guide you towards not seeing a movie if circumstances changed (Bratman, 1987). In Horty's example it seems you might rationally not have these counterfactual dispositions. So something has to give. It could be closure or it could be Enkrasia.

Predictably, Horty is in favour of weakening Enkrasia, whereas I am in favour of giving up closure. This disagreement cannot be settled in a few lines. Horty has his arguments and I have mine. Objections to closure have been debated for decades. I shall give just one counterexample to it, which I hope will at least weaken whatever attraction you might feel for it. Suppose your kitchen is grungy, so you ought to buy a can of paint and paint your kitchen. Closure under logical inference implies that you ought to buy a can of paint. But suppose that, whatever happens, you are not going to paint your kitchen. If you buy a can of paint it will take up space and eventually congeal to worthless gunk. I find it very implausible that you ought to buy a can of paint.

Horty says I write as though practical reasoning moves in one direction only: from oughts to intentions. One sort of practical reasoning—enkratic reasoning—does indeed move only in this direction: it is correct to reason from believing you ought to F to intending to F, but it is not correct to reason from not intending to F to not believing you ought to F (Broome, 2013, 138–46). Other sorts of reasoning may be reversible. For example, theoretical reasoning by modus ponens may be reversible. You can correctly reason from believing p and believing that if p then q to believing q, or alternatively from believing not q and believing if p then q to believing not p (Broome, 2013, section 13.6). Possibly you might be able to reason correctly from not believing q and believing if p then q to not believing p (Broome, 2013, section 15.3). My book gives some space to reverse theoretical reasoning of this sort. But enkratic reasoning is not reversible.

Nor does Horty suggest it is. His point is that your intentions, which you may arrive at through enkratic reasoning, themselves affect what you ought

to do. Correct reasoning can follow this connection, so you can reason from beliefs about what you intend to a conclusion that is a belief about what you ought to do. This conclusion could itself feed into enkratic reasoning. I never meant to deny this, and I am sorry if I gave the impression that I did. Reasoning from beliefs about your intentions to beliefs about what you ought to do is theoretical, not practical reasoning by my classification.

Horty proposes a generalization of Enkrasia that I read as follows:

> Rationality requires of you that, if you believe you intend to *F*, and you believe that, if you intend to *F* you ought to *G*, then you intend to *G*.

This seems very plausible to me. It also seems only a small generalization. Anyone who satisfies requirements of rationality that are stated in my book, namely Enkrasia and the Modus Ponens Requirement, will satisfy this requirement. From there to its being an actual requirement is a small step.

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