Contents

 

                Acknowledgements and contributors

                Abbreviations and signs used

                1. General introductions to the philosophy of science

                2. Scientific explanation

 

                Pre-Hempel

                The deductive-nomological model

                Alternative models

                Statistical explanation

                Pragmatics in explanation

                Narrative explanation

                3. The nature of scientific theories

                4. Idealization

                5. Verisimilitude

                6. Meaning and reference of scientific terms

               

                                Positivist approaches: operationalism, eliminitivism, and the dual language model

                                Post-Positivist approaches: holism, incommensurability, and direct reference.

                7. Theory and observation

                8. Confirmation

                9. Underdetermination

                10. The Quine/Duhem thesis

                11. Conventionalism and the role of convention

                12. Epistemic values and theoretical virtues

                13. Realism and anti-realism

                14. Inference to the best explanation

                15. Laws of nature

                16. The nature of probability

                17. Experimentation

                18. Thought experiments

                19. Models and analogies

                20. Measurement

                21. History of science (Pre-20th Century)

                General Studies

                Copernicus

                Galileo

                The chemical revolution

                Faraday and electromagnetism

 

                22. Logical positivism

 

                23. Karl Popper

                24. Thomas Kuhn

                Collections

                Criticism

                Case studies

                25. Paul Feyerabend

                26. Imre Lakatos

                27. Theories of scientific change

                28. The social study of science

                29. Non-epistemic values and their presence in science

                30. The Leibniz-Clarke Debate

 

General reading

The relational theory of time

The notion of absolute space

The identity of indiscernibles

The principle of sufficient reason

Kinds of necessity and kinds of liberty

Leibnizian physics

                31. The philosophy of biology

General texts and collections

Darwin’s arguments

Analogical reasoning in Darwin’s Origin of Species

Adaptionism, natural selection theory, and evolutionary explanations

Models in biology

The concept of fitness

The units of selection

The evolution of altruism, eusociality, and sex

Species concepts and the units of evolution

Phylogenetic inference

Reduction of Mendelian genetics to molecular genetics

Sociobiology and Evolutionary Psychology

Creationism

 

                32. The philosophy of physics

General Philosophy of Physics

Philosophy of Classical Mechanics: the meaning of Newton's laws

The Philosophy of Statistical Mechanics

Philosophy of Spacetime and Relativity

(a) General texts

(b) The meaning of Einstein's 1905 postulates

(c) How special relativity explains

(d) The conventionality of distant simultaneity

(e) The twins 'paradox'

(f) Conventionality of geometry

(g) Substantivalism and the New Leibnizian (Hole) argument.

(h) Mach's principle

(i) The causal theory of spacetime

(j) Black holes, time travel

Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics

(a) General texts

(b) The measurement problem (Schrodinger's cat)

(c) Nonlocality: Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox and the Bell theorem

(d) Hidden variables theories

(e) Many worlds and many minds interpretations

(f) Bohr and the Copenhagen interpretation

(g) Collapse (Dynamic Reduction) Models

(h) Consistent histories, decoherence.

(i) Modal interpretations

Philosophy of Quantum Field Theory

                33. The philosophy of psychology

General resources and collections

Reductionism and levels of explanation

Modularity

Double dissociation and cognitive neuropsychology

Tacit knowledge

Connectionism

Consciousness and qualia

Attention

Folk psychology and mental simulation

Rationality and irrationality

Evolutionary psychology

Behaviorism

                34. The philosophy of social science

Introductions

Collections

Interpretation and explanation

Objectivity and values

Functional explanation

Rational choice theory

Reductionism and individualism

Realism and social facts

Rationality, relativism, and translation

 


 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS

 

 

                We would like to thank Tony Atkinson, Harvey Brown, Paul Castell, Helena Cronin, Martin Davies, Dorothy Edgington, Elizabeth Frazer, Miranda Fricker, James Logue, Ana Nettel, John Preston, John Roche, Simon Saunders, Tom Stoneham, Maricio Suarez, and Adam Swift for their help in compiling this bibliography.

 

 


ABBREVIATIONS AND SIGNS USED

 

* Important or central reading

 

JOURNALS AND PERIODICALS

APQ American Philosophical Quarterly

Bio&Phil Biology and Philosophy

BJPS British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

HistPhilSci Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science

ISPS International Studies in the Philosophy of Science

JPhil Journal of Philosophy

MinnStud Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science

PASS Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society

PhilQuart Philosophical Quarterly

PhilRev Philosophical Review

PhilSci Philosophy of Science

PSA Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association

 

PUBLISHING HOUSES

OUP Oxford University Press

CUP Cambridge University Press

HUP Harvard University Press

PUP Princeton University Press

UCP University of Chicago Press

 


1. GENERAL TEXTS AND INTRODUCTIONS TO

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

 

Chalmers, A.F. (1982) What is this thing called Science? Milton Keynes: Open University Press.

Collins, H.M. (1985) Changing Order, London: Sage.

Fetzer, J. (1993) Philosophy of Science, N.Y.: Paragon House.

Hacking, I. (1983) Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: CUP.

Harré, R. (1981) Great Scientific Experiments, Oxford: Phaidon.

Harré, R. (1985) The Philosophies of Science, Oxford: OUP. (2nd enlarged ed.).

* Hempel, C. G. (1966) The Philosophy of Natural Science, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.

* Kuhn, T. (1970) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: UCP.

Kyburg, H.E. (1990) Science & Reason, Oxford: OUP.

Lambert, K. & Brittain, G. C. (1987) An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, Ridgeview: Atascadero, 3rd edn.

* Newton-Smith W.H. (1981) The Rationality of Science, London: Routledge.

Pap, A. (1963) An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, London: Eyre & Spottiswoode.

Papineau, D. (1995) ‘Methodology: The Elements of the Philosophy of Science’ in A. Grayling (ed.) Philosophy: A Guide Through the Subject, Oxford: OUP.

Quine, W.V.O. & Ullian, J. (1970) The Web of Belief, N.Y.: Random House.

Salmon, M. ed. (1992) Introduction to Philosophy of Science, Englewood Cliffs NJ, Prentice-Hall.

Toulmin, S. (1967) The Philosophy of Science, London: Hutchinson.


2. SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION

 

Pre-Hempel

Aristotle Posterior Analytics, 93a-96a.

Duhem, P. (1954) The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, Princeton: PUP.

Mill, J.S. A System of Logic, Book III Chapters IV and V.

 

Collections and general studies

Knowles, D. (1990) Explanation and Its Limits, Cambridge: CUP.

Pitt, J.C. (1988) Theories of Explanation, Oxford: OUP.

Ruben, D.-H. (1990) Explaining Explanation, London: RKP

Salmon, W.S. (1984) ‘Scientific Explanation: Three General Conceptions’ PSA Vol. 2, pp. 293-305.

* Salmon, W.S. (1990) Four Decades of Scientific Explanation, Minneapolis, Univ. of Minnesota Press. [Repr. from MinnStud Vol XIII, (eds.) P. Kitcher & W. Salmon.]

 

The deductive-nomological model

Achinstein, P. (1983) The Nature of Explanation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Chs. 1 to 5.

Ackermann, R. (1965) ‘Discussion: Deductive Scientific Explanation’, PhilSci. 32, pp. 155-167.

* Armstrong, D. (1983) What is a Law of Nature?, Cambridge: CUP, pp. 40ff.

Braithwaite, R. (1953) Scientific Explanation, Cambridge,: Cambridge University Press, 1953.

Cupples, B. (1977) ‘Three Types of Explanation’, PhilSci, 44, pp. 387-408.

Cupples, B. (1980) ‘Four types of Explanation’, PhilSci, 47, pp. 626-29.

Davidson, D. (1980) ‘Causal Relations’, in his Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: OUP. [Originally JPhil 1967]

Dietl, P. (1966) ‘Paresis and the alleged symmetry between explanation and prediction’, BJPS 17, p. 313-318.

Eberle, R., Kaplan, D. & Montague, R. (1961) ‘Hempel and Oppenheim on Explanation’, PhilSci 28 , pp. 418-28.

* Feyerabend, P.K. (1962) ‘Explanation, Reduction, and Empiricism’, MinnStud Vol. 3.

Goodman, N. (1983) ‘The Problems of Counterfactual Conditionals’, in Goodman, N, Fact, Fiction and Forecast, London: Harvard University Press, 4th edition.

* Hempel, C. (1965) Aspects of Scientific Explanation, New York: The Free Press, & London: Collier-Macmillan, (esp. essay 12 ‘Aspects of Scientific Explanation’, essays 8 to 11 are also relevant.)

Irzik, G. (1990) ‘Singular Causation and Law’ PSA Vol.1, p. 537-543.

Jobe, E. (1985) ‘Explanation, Causality and Counterfactuals’, PhilSci 52, pp. 357-89.

Kaplan, D. (1961) ‘Explanation Revisited’, PhilSci 28, pp. 429-36.

Miller, R.W. (1988?) Fact and Method, Part I esp. Ch 1-3.

Nagel, E. (1961) The Structure of Science, London: Routledge (esp. Chs. 2 & 3).

Ruben, D.-H. (1990) Explaining Explanation, London: Routledge

* Scriven, M. (1962) ‘Explanations, Predictions, Laws’, in MinnStud Vol. III, Minneapolis; University of Minnesota Press, pp. 170-230.

Scriven, M. (1963) ‘New Issues in the Logic of Explanation’ in Hook, S (ed.), Philosophy and History, New York: New York University Press.

 

Alternative models

Brown, J. (1988) ‘Platonic Explanation’, ISPS.

Cartwright, N. (1983) ‘The Simulacrum Account of Explanation’, in How the Laws of Physics Lie, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Dray, W. (1957) Laws and Explanations in History, Oxford: OUP.

Dray, W.H. ed. (1966) Philosophical Analysis and History, London: Harper & Row.

* Friedman, M. (1974) ‘Explanation and Scientific Understanding’, JPhil.

Garfinkle, A. (1981) Forms of Explanation, New Haven: Yale.

Glymour, C. (1984) ‘Explanation and Realism’, in Leplin, J (ed.), Scientific Realism, Berkeley: University of California Press. [Repr. in Churchland, P & Hooker, C (eds.) Images of Science, Chicago: UCP, 1985]

* Kitcher, P. (1981) ‘Explanatory Unification’ PhilSci 48, pp. 507-531.

Kitcher, P. (1985) ‘Two Approaches to Explanation’, JPhil, LXXXII. pp. 632-39

Körner, S. ed. (1975) Explanation, Oxford: Blackwell.

* Lewis, D. (1986)                                                ‘Causal Explanation’, in his Philosophical Papers Vol. II, Oxford: OUP.

Pitt, J. ed. (1988) Theories of Explanation, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rescher N. (1970) Scientific Explanation, New York: The Free Press.

* Salmon, W. C. (1984) Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World, Princeton: PUP.

Sintonen, M. (1990) ‘How to Put Theories to Nature’, in D. Knowles (ed.) Explanation and Its Limits, Cambridge: CUP.

Sober, E. (1984) ‘Common Cause Explanation’ Phil.Sci. 51, p. 212-241.

Sober, E. (1985) ‘A Plea for Pseudo-Processes’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66, pp. 303-9.

Sober, E. (1988) ‘Equilibrium Explanation’ Philosophical Studies 43, p. 201-210.

van Fraassen, B. (1985) ‘Salmon on Explanation’, JPhil, LXXXII, pp. 639-51

Von Wright, G.H. (1971) Explanation and Understanding, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

 

Statistical explanation

Asquith, P D & Nickles, T eds. (1982) PSA,Vol. 2, Part IV, pp. 179-223, (papers by Salmon, Hanna, Fetzer & Humphreys).

Fetzer, J H (1981) Probability and Explanation’. Synthese 48, pp. 371-408

* Hempel, C G (196??) ‘Deductive-Nomological vs. Statistical Explanation’, in Feigl, H & Maxwell, G (eds.), MinnStud, vol. 3, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 98-169.

* Hempel, C G (1965) Aspects of Scientific Explanation, New York: The Free Press, & London: Collier-Macmillan.

Hempel, C.G. (1968) ‘Maximal Specificity and Lawlikeness in Probabilistic Explanation’, PhilSci 35, pp. 116-33.

Niiniluoto, I (1981) ‘Statistical Explanation Reconsidered’ Synthese 48, pp. 437-72

Niiniluoto, I. (1982) ‘Statistical Explanation’, in Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey, vol. 2, Floistad, G (ed.), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, pp. 157-87.

Railton, P (1978) ‘A deductive-Nomological Model of Probabilistic Explanation’, PhilSci, 45, pp. 206-26.

Railton, P. (1978) ‘A Deductive-Nomological Model of Probabilistic Explanation’, PhilSci 45, pp. 206-226.

* Salmon, W C (1971) Statistical Explanation and Statistical Relevance, USA: University of Pittsburgh Press.

* Salmon, W. C. (1970) ‘Statistical Explanation’, in Colodny, R (ed.), The Nature and Function of Scientific Theories, USA; University of Pittsburgh Press.

Salmon, W.C. (1965) ‘The Status of Prior Probabilities in Statistical Explanation’, PhilSci 32, pp. 137-46.

Salmon, W.C. (1988) in J. Pitt (ed.) Theories of Explanation, Oxford: OUP.

 

Pragmatics in explanation

Achinstein, P. (1983) ‘The Pragmatic Character of Explanation’ PSA Vol.2, p. 275-92.

Achinstein, P. (1983) The Nature of Explanation, Oxford: OUP.

* Bromberger, S. (1962) ‘An Approach to Explanation’ in R.S. Butler (ed.) Analytical Philosophy--Second Series, Oxford: Basil-Blackwell.

* Bromberger, S. (1966) ‘Why-Questions’, in Colodny, R G (ed.), Mind and Cosmos, USA: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Bunzl, M. (1993) The Context of Explanation, Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Kitcher, P. & Salmon, W. C. (1987) ‘van Fraassen on Explanation’, JPhil, LXXXIV pp. 315-30.

Lipton, P. (1990) ‘Contrastive Explanation’ in Explanation and Its Limits (ed.) D. Knowles, Cambridge: CUP.

Putnum, H. (1978)                                                Meaning and the Moral Science, London: Routledge (lecture III).

* van Fraassen, B. (1980) The Scientific Image, Oxford: Clarendon Press (Ch. 5).

 

Narrative explanation

Goudge, T.A. (1961) The Ascent of Life, Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, pp. 70ff.

Hull, D. (1975) ‘Central Subjects and Historical Narratives’, History and Theory 14, p. 253-274.

Roth, P. (1988) ‘Narrative Explanations: The Case of History’ History and Theory 27, p. 1-13.

Ruse, M. (1971) ‘Narrative Explanation and the Theory of Evolution’ Canadian JPhil, p. 59.


3. THE NATURE OF SCIENTIFIC THEORIES

 

Aronson, J., R. Harre & E. Way (1994) Realism Rescued, London: Duckworth, Ch. 3-5.

Baur, M. (1990) ‘The Aim of Scientific Theories in Relating to the World: A Defense of the Semantic View’, Dialogue, p. 323.

* Braithwaite, R. (1953) Scientific Explanation, Cambridge: CUP, Ch. 2.

Carnap, R. (1956) ‘The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts’ MinnStud Vol. I, Minneapolis: Univ. Minnesota Press, p. 38.

Churchland, P.M. (1990) ‘On the Nature of Theories: A Neurocomputational Perspective’, MinnStud XIV, Minneapolis: Univ. Minnesota Press, pp. 59-101.

de Costa, N.C.A., & S. French (1990) ‘The Model-Theoretic Approach in the Philosophy of Science’, Phil. Sci. 57, pp. 248-265.

Downes, S. (1992) ‘The Importance of Models in Theorizing: A Deflationary Semantic View’, PSA Vol 1, p. 142.

* Giere, R. (1988) Explaining Science, Chicago: UCP, Ch. 3.

* Hempel, C. (1972) ‘Formulation and Formalization of Scientific Theories: A Summary Abstract’ in F. Suppe (ed.) The Structure of Scientific Theories, Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press.

* Nagel, E. (1960) The Structure of Science, London, RKP, Ch. 5.

Redhead, M. (1980) ‘Models in Physics’ BJPS 31, pp. 145-163.

Redhead, M. (1980) ‘Models in Physics’, BJPS 31, pp. 145-163.

Richardson, R. (1986) ‘Models and Scientific Explanation’ Philosophica 37, p. 59.

Suppe, F (1972) ‘What’s Wrong With the Received View on the Structure of Scientific Theories?’ PhilSci 39, p. 1.

Suppe, F. (1988) The Semantic Conception of Theories and Scientific Realism, Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press.

Suppes, P. (1969) Studies in the Methodology and Foundations of Science, Dordrecht: Kluwer. [Papers: ‘A Comparison of the Meaning and Uses of Models in Mathematics and the Empirical Sciences’ and ‘Models of Data’.]

* van Fraassen, B. (1980) The Scientific Image, Oxford: OUP, Ch. 3.

van Fraassen, B. (1987) ‘The Semantic Approach’ in N. Nersessian (ed.) The Process of Science, Dordrecht: Nijhoff, pp. 105-124.

Wartofsky, M.W. (1974) Models: Representation and the Scientific Understanding, Dordrecht: Reidel.

 

[See also ‘Models vs. axioms in evolutionary theory’ in The Philosophy of Biology section.]


4. IDEALIZATION

 

Barr, W.F. (1971) ‘A Syntactic and Semantic Analysis of Idealizations in Science, PhilSci 38, p. 258.

Barr, W.F. (1974) ‘A Pragmatic Analysis of Idealizations in Physics’ Phil Sci 41, p. 48.

* Cartwright, N. (1983) How the Laws of Physics Lie, Oxford: OUP, Essay 6.

Cartwright, N. (1995) ‘False Idealization: A Philosophical Threat to Scientific Method’ Philosophical Studies 77, pp. 339.

* Giere, R. (1988) Explaining Science, Chicago:UCP, Ch. 3.

Laymon, R. (1985) ‘Idealizations and the Testing of Theories by Experimentation’, in Observation Experiment and Hypothesis in Modern Physical Science, P. Achinstein and O. Hannaway (eds), Cambridge Mass: The MIT Press.

Laymon, R. (1995) ‘Experimentation and the Legitimacy of Idealization’, Philosophical Studies 77.

McMullin, E. (1985) ‘Galilean Idealization’, HistPhilSci 16, p. 247.

Nowak, L. (1972) ‘Laws of Science, Theories, Measurement: Comments on E. Nagel’s The Structure of Science’ PhilSci. 39, p. 533.

Scwartz, J.R. (1978) ‘Idealizations and Approximations in Physics’ PhilSci 45, p. 595.

Shrader-Frechette, K.S. (1989) ‘Idealized Laws, Anti-Realism, and Applied Science: A Case Study in Hydrogeology’ Synthese 81, p. 329.

Worrall, J. (1982) ‘Scientific Realism and Scientific Change’, PhilQuart 32, p. 210.


5. VERISIMILITUDE

 

Aronson, J., R. Harré, & E. Way (1994) Realism Rescued, London: Duckworth, Ch. 6.

Brink, C. (1989) ‘Verisimilitude: Views and Reviews’ , History and Philosophy of Logic 10, pp. 181-201.

Cohen, L.J. (1980)                                                ‘What Has Science to Do With Truth?’ Synthese 45, p. 489.

Kuipers, T. A. F. (1982) ‘Approaching Descriptive and Theoretical Truth’, Erkenntnis 18, pp. 343-378.

Laymon, R. (1985) ‘Idealizations and the Testing of Theories by Experimentation’, in Observation Experiment and Hypothesis in Modern Physical Science, P. Achinstein and O. Hannaway (eds), Cambridge Mass: The MIT Press.

Miller, D. (1978) ‘The Distance Between Constituents’ Synthese 38, p. 197-212.

Mortensen, C. (1983) ‘Relevance and Verisimilitude’ Synthese 55 (1983) p. 353-364.

Newton-Smith, W.H. (1981) The Rationality of Science, London: RKP, Ch. ??

Niiniluoto, I. (1987) Truthlikeness, Dordrecht: Reidel.

Niiniluoto, I. (1989) ‘Corroboration, Verisimilitude, and the Success of Science’, in Imre Lakatos and Theories of Scientific Change, K. Gavroglu, Y. Goudaroulis and P. Nicolacopoulos, Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Oddie, G. (1978) ‘Verisimilitude and Distance in Logical Space’ Acta Philosophica Fennica 30.

Oddie, G. (1979) ‘Verisimilitude Reviewed’ BJPS 32, p. 237.

Popper, K. (1959) Logic of Scientific Discovery, London: Hutchinson, Ch. ??.

Popper, K. (1963) Conjectures and Refutations, London: RKP, Ch. ??

Popper, K. (1972) Objective Knowledge, London: RKP, Ch. ??.

Resnik, D.B. (1992) ‘Convergent Realism and Approximate Truth’, PSA Vol. 1, pp. 421-434.

Tichy, P. (1976) ‘Verisimilitude Redefined’ BJPS 27, pp. 25-42.

Urbach, P. (1983) ‘Intimations of Similarity: The Shaky Basis of Verisimilitude’ BJPS 34, p. 266-273.


6. MEANING AND REFERENCE OF SCIENTIFIC TERMS

 

Positivist approaches: operationalism, eliminitivism, and the dual language model

Benjamin, A.C. (1955) Operationism, Springfield: Thomas.

Bridgman, P.W. (1960) The Logic of Modern Physics, New York: Macmillan.

* Carnap, R. (195?) ‘The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts’ in Feigl & Scriven (eds.) MinnStud, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp.38-76.

Cornman, J.W. (1972) ‘Craig’s theorem, Ramsey-sentences and Scientific Instrumentalism’, Synthese, 25, pp.82-126.

Craig, W. (1956) ‘Replacement of Auxiliary Expressions’, PhilRev, 65, pp.38-55.

Gillies, D.A. (1972) ‘Operationalism’, Synthese, 25, pp.1-24.

* Hempel, C. (1965) ‘The Theoretician’s Dilemma’ in his Aspects of Scientific Explanation, New York: Free Press [orig. in MinnStud Vol 2]

Hesse, M. (1952) ‘Operational definition and analysis in physical theory’, BJPS pp.281-94.

* Lewis, D. (1970) ‘How to Define Theoretical Terms’, JPhil 67 pp. 427-46 [Repr. in his Philosophical Papers Vol. 1, Oxford: OUP (1987)]

Putnam, H. (1965) ‘Craig’s Theorem’, repr. in Mathematics, Matter and Method, Philosophical Papers Vol. 1, Cambridge: CUP, pp.228-236.

* Putnam, H. (1965) ‘What theories are not’ reprinted in his Mathematics, Matter & Method, Phil. Papers Vol. 1, Cambridge: CUP 1975, pp. 215-227.

* Ramsey, F.P. (1931) ‘Theories’ in Foundations of Mathematics and other Logical Essays, London & New York: Humanities.

 

Post-Positivist approaches: holism, incommensurability, and direct reference

Boyd, R. (1979) ‘Metaphor and Theory Change: What is “Metaphor” a Metaphor For?’, in A. Ortony (ed.) Metaphor and Thought, Cambridge: CUP.

Cummisky, D. (1992) ‘Reference Failure and Scientific Realism: A response to the meta-induction’, BJPS, 43, 1, 21-40.

Devitt, M. (1979) ‘Against Incommensurability’, Australasian JPhil, 57, pp. 29-50.

Feyerabend, P. (1965) ‘On the ‘Meaning’ of Scientific Terms’, JPhil 62, pp. 266-74.

Field, H. (1973) ‘Theory Change and the Indeterminacy of Reference’, JPhil 70, pp. 462-81.

* Fine, A. (1975) ‘How to Compare Theories: Reference and Change’, Nous, 9, pp. 17-32.

Hacking, I. (1983) Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: CUP, ch.6.

* Hesse, M. (1974) The Structure of Scientific Inference, Basingstoke: Macmillan, Chs. 1,2.

Kitcher, P. (1978) ‘Theories, Theorists & Theoretical Change’, PhilRev, 87, pp. 519-547.

Kripke, S. (1972) Naming and Necessity, Oxford: Blackwell, esp. Lecture III.

* Kuhn, T. S. (1970) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: UCP, 2nd edn., esp. Sec. 5, 10.

Kuhn, T. S. (1982) ‘Commensurability, Comparability, Communicability’, PSA Vol. 2, pp. 669-688.

Kuhn, T.S. (1990) ‘Dubbing and Redubbing: The Vulnerability of Rigid Designation’ in Wade Savage (ed.) MinnStud XIV, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 298-318.

Leplin, J. (1988) ‘Is Essentialism Unscientific?’, PhilSci, 55, pp. 493-510.

Levine, M. (1979) ‘On Theory-Change and Meaning-Change’, PhilSci, 46, pp. 407-424.

Muhlholzer, F. (1995) ‘Science without Reference?’, Erkenntnis, 42, 2, pp. 203-222.

Nersessian, N. (1984) Faraday to Einstein: Constructing Meaning in Scientific Theories, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.

Nersessian, N. J. (1987) ‘A cognitive-historical approach to meaning in scientific theories’, in Nersessian (ed.) The Process of Science, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.

* Newton-Smith, W.H. (1981) The Rationality of Science, London: Routledge, ch.7.

Nola, R. (1980) ‘Fixing the Reference of Theoretical Terms’, PhilSci., 47, pp. 505-531.

Papineau, D. (1979) Theory and Meaning, Oxford: OUP, chs.1, 2 & 5.

Pearce, G. & Maynard, P. (eds.) (1973) Conceptual Change, Dordrecht: Reidel.

Putnam, H. (1978) Meaning and the Moral Sciences, London: Routledge, Lectures I-VI.

* Putnam, H. (1979) Mind, Language and Reality, Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge: CUP, (esp. ‘The Meaning of Meaning’).

Salmon, N. U. (1982) Reference and Essence, Oxford: Blackwell, esp. Ch. 4.

Sampson, C. (1975) ‘Theory Change in a Two-Level Science’, BJPS 26, pp. 303-17.

Sankey, H. (1991) ‘Translation Failure between theories’, HistPhilSci, pp. 223-236.

Sankey, H. (1994) The Incommensurability Thesis, Avebury: Brookfield.

Shapere, D. (1966) ‘Meaning and Scientific Change’, in Colodny, R. (ed.), Mind and Cosmos, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 41-85.

Shapere, D. (1982) ‘Reason, Reference and the Quest for Knowledge’, Phil.Sci., 49, pp. 1-23.

Shapere, D. (1989) ‘Evolution and Continuity in Scientific Change’, Phil.Sci., 56, pp. 419-437.


7. THEORY AND OBSERVATION

 

Achinstein, P. (1968) Concepts of Science, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, Chs. 5&6.

Achinstein, P. and O. Hannaway (1985) Observation, Experiment and Hypothesis in Modern Physical Science, Cambridge Mass: MIT Press. [See papers by Sklar, Shapere, and Boyd]

Bogen, J. & Woodward, J. (1988) ‘Saving the Phenomena’, PhilRev, 97, pp. 303-52.

* Brown, H. I. (1987) Observation and Objectivity, New York: OUP.

Brown, H.I. (1987) ‘Naturalizing Observation’ in Nersessian, N.J. (ed.) The Process of Science, Dordrecht: Kluwer.

* Churchland, P. (1979) Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind, Cambridge: CUP (Chs. 1 &2).

Churchland, P. (1985) ‘The Ontological Status of Observables: in Praise of Superempirical Virtues’, in Churchland, P. & Hooker, C. (eds.), Images of Science, Chicago: UCP.

Fodor, J. (1984) ’Observation Reconsidered’, PhilSci 51, pp. 23-43.

Hacking, I. (1983) Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: CUP, ch.10.

Hanson, N. R. (1958) Patterns of Discovery, Cambridge: CUP.

* Hesse, M. (1970) ‘Is there an independent observation language?’, in Colodny (ed.) The Nature and Function of Scientific Theories, Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press.

Hesse, M. (1974) The Structure of Scientific Inference, Basingstoke: Macmillan, Chs. 1,2.

Kordig, C. (1971) The Justification of Scientific Change, Dordrecht: Reidel, ch.1.

* Maxwell, G. (1962) ‘The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities’, in MinnStud, vol. 3, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Nagel, E. (1981) The Structure of Science, London: Routledge, ch.5.

Nagel, E., Bromberger, S. & Grünbaum, A. (eds.) (1971) Observation and Theory in Science, Baltimore & London: John Hopkins Press.

Newton-Smith, W. H. (1981) The Rationality of Science, London: Routledge, ch.2.

Papineau, D. (1979) Theory and Meaning, Oxford: OUP, ch.1.

Putnam, H. (1975) ‘What Theories are Not’, in Mathematics, Matter and Method, Collected Papers Vol. 1, Cambridge: CUP.

Quine, W.V.O. (1970) ‘Grades of Theoreticity’ in Foster, L. & Swanson, J.W. (eds.), Experience and Theory, Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, pp.1-18.

Quine, W.V.O. (1990) Pursuit of Truth, Harvard: HUP, Pt.1.

* Quine, W.V.O. (1993) ‘In Praise of Observation Sentences’, JPhil, 90 (3), pp.107-116.

Scheffler, I. (1963) The Anatomy of Inquiry, New York: Knopf, pp.164ff.

Sellars, W.F. (1963) ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’, in Science, Perception and Reality, London: Routledge, pp.127-196.

Shapere, D. (1982) ‘The Concept of Observation in Science and Philosophy’, PhilSci, 49, pp. 485-52.

Sklar, L. (1985) ‘Modestly Radical Empiricism’, reprinted in his Philosophy and Space-Time Physics, Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.

* van Fraassen, B. (1980) The Scientific Image, Oxford: OUP, ch.2.

Wright, C. (1993) ‘Scientific Realism and Observation Sentences’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 1, 2, pp.231-254.


8. CONFIRMATION

 

* Achinstein, P. (ed.) (1983) The Concept of Evidence, Oxford: OUP (esp. papers by Salmon, Goodman, Carnap, Achinstein and Glymour.)

Ayer, A. J. (1972) Probability and Evidence, London: Macmillan, Pt. I.

Black, M. (1966) ‘Notes on the Paradoxes of Confirmation’, in Hintikka, J & Suppes, P (eds.), Aspects of Inductive Logic, Dordrecht: Reidel.

Blackburn, S. (1973) Reason and Prediction, Cambridge: CUP

Carnap, R. (1950) Logical Foundations of Probability, Chicago: UCP, Ch. 1, 2, 7.

Carnap, R. (1968) ‘Inductive Logic and Inductive Intuition’ in Lakatos, I. (ed.) The Problem of Inductive Logic, Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp.258-314.

Chihara, C. (1987) ‘Some Problems for Bayesian Confirmation Theory’, BJPS 38, pp.551-560.

Cohen, L.J. (1970)                                                The Implications of Induction, London: Methuen

Earman, J (ed.) (1983) Testing Scientific Theories, MinnStud Vol 10, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Earman, J. (1992) Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, esp. Ch. 1-3, 6.

* Glymour, C. (1980) Theory and Evidence, Princeton: PUP, esp. Ch. 1-3.

* Goodman, N. (1983) Fact, Fiction and Forecast, Harvard: HUP (4th ed.), Ch. 3.

* Hempel, C G. (1948) ‘Studies in the Logic of Confirmation’ reprinted in Aspects of Scientific Explanation, New York: The Free Press, & London: Collier-Macmillan, 1965.

Hintikka, J. & Suppes, P. (eds.) (1966) Aspects of Inductive Logic, Dordrecht: Reidel (esp. papers by Black and Suppes).

Horwich, P. (1982) Probability and Evidence, Cambridge: CUP, esp. Ch. 1-4.

* Howson, C. & Urbach, P. (1989) Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach, La Salle: Open Court, esp. Ch. 1-4.

Lakatos, I. (1968) ‘Changes in the Problem of Inductive Logic’ in Lakatos (ed.) The Problem of Inductive Logic, Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp.315-417.

* Mackie, J. L. (1963) ‘The Paradox of Confirmation’, BJPS 13, pp. 265-77.

Maher, P. (1993) Betting on Theories, Cambridge: CUP.

Miller, R W. (1987) Fact and Method, Princeton: PUP.

Popper, K. & Miller, D.W.(1983) ‘A Proof of the Impossibility of Inductive Probability’, Nature 302, pp.687-688.

Putnam, H. (1963) ‘Probability and Confirmation’ reprinted in Mathematics, Matter and Method: Collected Papers Vol. 1 (2nd ed.), Cambridge: CUP, pp.293-304.

Quine, W.V.O. (1969) ‘Natural Kinds’, reprinted in Ontological Relativity, New York: Columbia University Press.

Redhead, M. (1985) ‘On the Impossibility of Inductive Logic’, BJPS 36, pp.185-191.

Reichenbach, H. (1961) Experience and Prediction, Chicago: UCP, Ch. 5.

Rosenkrantz, R.D. (1981) Foundations and Applications of Inductive Probability, Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Press.

Swinburne, R.G. (1971) ‘The Paradoxes of Confirmation--A Survey’, APQ 8.

Swinburne, R.G. (1973) An Introduction to Confirmation Theory, London: Metheun, esp. Ch. 1-3.

van Fraassen, B. (1988) ‘The Problem of Old Evidence’, in Austin, D.F. (ed.) Philosophical Analysis, Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Vickers, J. (1988) Chance and Structure, Oxford: Clarendon Press

Watkins, J. W.N. (1984) Science and Scepticism, London: Hutchinson, Pt. I.


9. UNDERDETERMINATION

 

Ben-Menahem, Y. (1990) ‘Equivalent Descriptions’, BJPS 41, pp.261-279.

* Bergström, L. (1984) ‘Underdetermination and Realism’, Erkenntnis 21, pp.349-365.

Bergström, L. (1990) ‘Quine on Underdetermination’, in Barrett, R. & Gibson, R. (eds.)Perspectives on the Philosophy of Quine, Oxford: Blackwell.

Bergstrom, L. (1993) ‘Quine, Underdetermination and Skepticism’, JPhil 90, 7, pp.331-358.

* Boyd, R. (1973) ‘Realism, Underdetermination, and a Causal Theory of Evidence’ Nous, 7, pp. 1 -12.

Earman, J. (1993) ‘Underdetermination, Realism and Reason’, in French, Uehling & Wettstein (eds.) Midwest Studies in Philosophy Vol. 18, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, pp.19-38.

Hoefer, C. & Rosenberg, A. (1994) ‘Empirical Equivalence and Systems of the World’, PhilSci 61, 4, pp.592-607.

Horwich, P. (1982) ‘How to Choose between Empirically Indistinguishable Theories’, JPhil 79, pp.61-77.

Jardine, N. (1986) The Fortunes of Inquiry, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Kukla, A. (1994) ‘Non-empirical theoretical virtues and the argument for underdetermination’, Erkenntnis 41, 2, pp.157-170.

* Laudan, L. (1990) ‘Demystifying Underdetermination’ in Wade-Savage (ed.) MinnStud, Vol. 14, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 267-297.

Leplin, J. & Laudan, L. (1991) ‘Empirical Equivalence and Underdetermination’, JPhil, 88, pp.449-472.

Newton-Smith, W. H. (1978) ‘The Underdetermination of Theory by Data’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. vol. 52, pp. 71-91.

Newton-Smith, W. H. (1981) The Rationality of Science, London: Routledge, Ch. 2.

* Quine, W. V. O. (1975) ‘On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World’, Erkenntnis, 9, pp. 313-28.

Quine, W. V. O. (1979) ‘Comments on Newton-Smith’, Analysis, 39, pp. 66-67.

Quine, W.V.O. (1990) ‘Three Indeterminacies’, in Barrett, R. & Gibson, R. (eds.) Perspectives on the Philosophy of Quine, Oxford: Blackwell.

* van Fraassen, B. (1980) The Scientific Image, Oxford: OUP, ch.3.

Wilson, M. (1980) ‘The Observational Uniqueness of Some Theories’, JPhil 77, pp.208-33.

Worrall, J. (1982) “Scientific Realism and Scientific Change” PhilQuart 32


10. THE QUINE/DUHEM THESIS

 

Barrett, R. (1969) ‘On the Conclusive Falsification of Scientific Hypotheses’, PhilSci 36, pp.363-374.

Bremner, A.A. (1990) ‘Holism a Century Ago: The Elaboration of Duhem’s Thesis’, Synthese, 83, 3, pp.325-336.

* Duhem, P. (1962) The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, New York: Atheneum, Ch. 6-7.

Duhem, P. (1969) To Save the Phenomena, Chicago: UCP.

Glymour, C. (1980) Theory and Evidence, Princeton: PUP.

* Grünbaum, A. (1966) ‘The Falsifiability of a Component of a Theoretical System’, in Feyerabend & Maxwell (eds.) Mind, Matter and Method, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Grünbaum, A. (1971) ‘Can we ascertain the falsity of a scientific hypothesis?’, in Nagel, Bromberger and Grünbaum (eds.) Observation and Theory in Science, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, pp.69-129.

Harding, S. (ed.) (197?) Can Theories be Refuted? Essays on the Duhem/Quine Thesis, Dordrecht: Reidel.

Krips, H. (1982) ‘Epistemological Holism: Duhem or Quine?’, HistPhilSci 13, pp.251-264.

Laudan, L. (1965)                                                 ‘On the Impossibility of Crucial Falsifying Experiments: Grünbaum on ‘The Duhemian Argument’’ PhilSci 32, pp.295-299.

* Quine, W.V.O. (1953) ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, reprinted in From a Logical Point of View, Harvard: HUP.

Quine, W.V.O. (1990) Pursuit of Truth, Harvard: HUP, ch.1.

Quinn, P. (1969) ‘What Duhem Really Meant’ in Boston Studies in Philosophy of Science, Vol. XIV, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp.33-56.

Quinn, P.L. (1969)                                                ‘The Status of the D-thesis’, PhilSci 36, pp.381-399.

Vuillemin, J. (1986) ‘On Duhem’s and Quine’s Theses’ in Hahn, L.E. & Schillpp, P.A. The Philosophy of W.V. Quine, La Salle: Open Court, pp.595-618.

* Wedeking, G. (1969) ‘Duhem, Quine and Grünbaum on Falsification’, PhilSci 36, pp.375-380.

Worrall, J. (1993) ‘Falsification, Rationality and the Duhem Problem: Grünbaum versus Bayes’, in Earman, J. et. al. (eds.) Philosophical Problems of the Internal and External Worlds, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, pp.329-370.

Yoshida, R.M. (1975) ‘Discussion: Five Duhemian Theses’, PhilSci 42, 1, pp.29-45.


11. CONVENTIONALISM AND THE ROLE OF CONVENTION

 

Angel, R (1980) Relativity: The Theory and its Philosophy, Oxford: Pergamon Press, ch.5.

Ellis, B. & Bowman, J. (1967) ‘Conventionality in Distant Simultaneity’, PhilSci 34, pp. 116-136.

Friedman, M. (1972) ‘Grünbaum on the Conventionality of Geometry’; Synthese, 24, pp.219-235.

Giedymin, J (1982) Science and Convention, Oxford: Pergamon Press, esp. Ch. 1, 3, 4.

Glymour, C. (1972) ‘Physics by Convention’, PhilSci 39, pp.322-340.

Grünbaum, A (1973) Philosophical Problems of Space and Time, Dordrecht: Reidel, 2nd enlarged edn., Part 1.

Grünbaum, A. (1961) ‘Law and Convention in Physical Theory’, in Feigl, H & Maxwell, G, (eds.) Current Issues in the Philosophy of Science, New York: Holt, Rinehardt & Winston.

Horwich, P. (1975) ‘Grünbaum on the Metric of Space and Time’, BJPS 26, pp.199-211.

Horwich, P. (1986) ‘A defence of conventionalism’ in McDonald, G. (ed.) Fact, Science and Morality, Oxford: Blackwell, pp.163-187.

Nerlich, G. (1976) The Shape of Space, Cambridge: CUP, Chs. 5-9.

Poincaré, H (1952) Science and Hypothesis, New York: Dover Publications, esp. Ch. 3-5.

Poincaré, H. (1958) The Value of Science, New York: Dover Publications, Pt. 3.

* Putnam, H (1975) ‘The Refutation of Conventionalism’, in Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge: CUP.

Quine, W.V.O. (1935) ‘Truth by Convention’, reprinted in The Ways of Paradox and other essays, Harvard: HUP (1966) pp.77-106.

Redhead, M. (1993) ‘The Conventionality of Simultaneity’ in Earman et. al. (eds.) Philosophical Problems of the Internal and External Worlds, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Reichenbach, H. (1950) The Philosophy of Space and Time, New York: Dover Publications, esp. Ch. 1.

Salmon, W.C. (1969) ‘The Conventionality of Simultaneity’, PhilSci 36, pp.44-63.

* Sklar, L. (1974) Space, Time and Spacetime, Berkeley: California University Press, Ch. 2.

Sklar, L. (1985) Philosophy and Spacetime Physics, Berkeley: University of California Press,ch.3.

Suppes, P (ed.) (1973) Space, Time and Geometry, Dordrecht: Reidel (papers by Vuillemin, Glymour, & Friedman).

Swinburne, R. (1980) ‘Conventionalism about Space and Time’, BJPS 31, pp. 255-272.

Winnie, Earman, Glymour, Salmon &

Malament (1977) Symposium on Space and Time, Nous 11, 3.


12. EPISTEMIC VALUES AND THEORETICAL VIRTUES

 

Adler, J.E. (1990) ‘Conservativism and Tacit Confirmation’ Mind, pp. 559-70.

Bunge, M. (1963) The Myth of Simplicity, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

Foley, R. (1983) ‘Epistemic Conservativism’ Philosophical Studies 43.

Friedman, K ‘Empirical Simplicity as Testability’. BJPS 23, 1972, pp. 25-33.

Goldman, A. (1979) ‘Varieties of Cognitive Appraisal’ Nous 13, pp. 23-38.

Goodman, N. (1972) Problems and Projects, New York: Bobbs-Merrill. Ch. VII.

Hesse, M The Structure of Scientific Inference, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1974, Ch. 10.

Hesse, M. (1967) ‘Simplicity’ in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (ed.) Paul Edwards, N.Y. Macmillan.

* Kuhn, T. (1977) ‘Objectivity, Value Judgement, and Theory Choice’ in The Essential Tension, Chicago: UCP.

Kukla, A. (1994) ‘Non-Empirical Theoretical Virtues and the Argument from Underdetermination’ Erkenntnis 41:2.

Kvanvig, J.L. (1989) ‘Conservativism and Its Virtues’ Synthese 79.

* McMullin, E. (1982) ‘Values in Science’ PSA Vol. 2.

Newton-Smith, W.H. (1981) The Rationality of Science, London: RKP, pp. 112-117 and Ch. IX.

Popper, K. (1959) The Logic of Scientific Discovery, London: Hutchinson and Co., Ch. VII.

Quine, W.V.O. (1976) ‘On Simple Theories of a Complex World’, in Ways of Paradox, Cambridge Mass: Harvard Univ. Press.

Sklar, L. (1975) ‘Methodological Conservativism’ PhilRev 84, p. 398.

* Sober, E. (1991) Reconstructing the Past: Evolution, Parsinomy, and Inference, Cambridge: MIT Press, Ch. 2-3.

Sober, E. (1975) Simplicity, Oxford: Clarendon Press, Ch. 1, 5.

Sober, E. (1990) ‘Contrastive Empiricism’ MinnStud Vol. XIV (ed.) C. Wade Savage.

Sober, E. (1990) ‘Let’s Razor Ockham’s Razor’ in Explanation and Its Limits (ed.) Dudley Knowles, Cambridge: CUP.

Swinburne, R. (1973) An Introduction to Confirmation Theory, London: Methuen & Co., Ch. VII.

* van Fraassen, B. (1980) The Scientific Image, Oxford: OUP, pp. 87-96.

van Fraassen, B. (1983) ‘Glymour on Explanation and Evidence’ in MinnStud Vol. X (ed) J. Earman. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

van Fraassen, B. (1984) ‘Empiricism in the Philosophy of Science’ in Images of Science (ed.) P. Churchland and C. Hooker, Chicago: UCP, Pt. 1.

van Fraassen, B. (1989) Laws and Symmetry, Oxford: OUP, Pt. 1


13. REALISM AND ANTI-REALISM

 

Collections

Hooker, C. A. & Churchland, P. M., eds. (1985) Images of Science, Chicago: UCP (esp. papers by Boyd, Churchland, Ellis, Hooker, Musgrave, and van Fraassen).

Leplin, J., ed. (1984) Realism, Berkeley: University of California Press, (esp. papers by McMullin, Boyd, Fine, & Leplin).

Nola, R., ed. (1988) Relativism and Realism in Science, Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Papineau, D., ed. (1996) Philosophy of Science, Oxford: OUP.

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Aronson, J., Harré, R. & Way, E. C. (1993) Realism Rescued, London: Duckworth.

Blackburn, B. (1993) ‘Truth, Realism and the Regulation of Theory’, in Essays on Quasi-Realism, Oxford: OUP.

Boyd, R. (1973) ‘Realism, Underdetermination and a Causal Theory of Evidence’, Nous 7, pp. 1-12.

Boyd, R. (1980) ‘Scientific Realism and Naturalistic Epistemology’, PSA Vol. 2, pp. 613-662.

Boyd, R. (1989) ‘What Realism Implies and What It Does Not’, Dialectica 43.

Boyd, R. (1990) ‘Realism, Approximate Truth, and Philosophical Method’ in C. Wade Savage (ed.) Scientific Theories, MinnStud.

Brown, J. R. (1982) ‘The Miracle of Science’, PhilQuart 32, pp. 232-44.

Brown, J. R. (1985) ‘Explaining the Success of Science’ Ratio 27, pp. 49-66.

* Brown, J.R. Smoke and Mirrors, London: Routledge.

Carrier, M. (1991)                                                 ‘What is Wrong with the Miracle Argument?’, HistPhilSci 22, pp. 23-36.

* Cartwright, N. (1983) How the Laws of Physics Lie, Oxford: OUP (esp. essays 2-5).

Cartwright, N. (1994) ‘Fundamentalism vs. the Patchwork of Laws’ PASS 93.

Churchland, P. M. (1979) Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind, Cambridge: CUP.

Devitt, M. (1991) Realism and Truth, Oxford: Blackwell.

Devitt, M. (1991) ‘Aberrations of the Realist Debate’ Philosophical Studies 61.

Fine, A. (1986) ‘Unnatural Attitudes: Realist and Instrumentalist Attachments to Science’, Mind 95, pp. 149-79.

* Fine, A. (1986) The Shaky Game, Chicago: UCP.

Fine, A. (1991) ‘Piecemeal Realism’, Philosophical Studies 6, pp. 79-96.

Giere, R. N. (1988)                                                Explaining Science, Chicago: UCP.

* Hacking, I. (1983) Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: CUP, Ch. 1, 16.

Harré, R. (1986) Varieties of Realism, Oxford: Blackwell.

Hellman, G. (1983) ‘Realist Principles’, PhilSci 50, pp. 227-49.

Hendry, F. R. (1995) ‘Realism and Progress: Why Scientists Should be Realists’ in Fellows, R. (ed.) Philosophy and Technology, Cambridge: CUP.

Horwich, P. (1991) ‘On the Nature and Norms of Theoretical Commitment’, PhilSci

Horwich, P. (1982) ‘Three Forms of Realism’, Synthese 52, pp.181-201.

Jardine, N. (1986) The Fortunes of Inquiry, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Kitcher, P. (1993) The Advancement of Science, Oxford: OUP, Ch.5.

Kukla, A. (1994) ‘Scientific Realism, Scientific Practice and the Natural Ontological Attitude’, BJPS 45, pp.955-975.

Laudan, L. (1977)                                                 Progress and its Problems, Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.

* Laudan, L. (1984) ‘A Refutation of Convergent Realism’ in Leplin, J., ed.

Leeds, S. (1994) ‘Constructive Empiricism’, Synthese 101, pp. 187-221.

Leplin, J. (1992) ‘Realism and Methodological Change’, PSA Vol. 2, pp. 435-445.

Levin, M. (1990) ‘Realisms’, Synthese 85.

McAllister, J. W. (1993) ‘Scientific Realism and the Criteria for Theory Choice’, Erkenntnis 38, 2, pp.203-222.

McMichael, A. (19??) ‘van Fraassen’s Instrumentalism’ BJPS 36.

McMullin, E. (1984) ‘The Goals of Natural Science’, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association 58.

McMullin, E. (1991) ‘Comment: Selective Anti-Realism’ Philosophical Studies 61.

Musgrave, A. (1992) ‘Discussion: Realism About What?’ PhilSci 58.

Musgrave, A. (1989) ‘NOA’s Ark—Fine for Realism’ PhilQuart 39.

Newton-Smith, W. H. (1981) The Rationality of Science, London: Routledge, Chs. 2, 8.

Newton-Smith, W.H. (1988) ‘Modest Realism’ PSA.

Papineau, D. (1987) Reality and Representation, Oxford: Blackwell.

Psillos, S. (1995) “Is Structural Realism the Best of Both Worlds?” Dialectica 49.

Putnam, H. (1982) ‘Three Kinds of Scientific Realism’, PhilQuart 32, pp. 195-200.

Putnam, H. (1982) Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge: CUP.

Putnam, H. (1987) The Many Faces of Realism, La Salle: Open Court.

Sellars, W. (1963) Science, Perception and Reality, London: Routledge, Ch. 1, 4.

van Fraassen, B. (1976) ‘To Save the Phenomena’ JPhil 73.

* van Fraassen, B. (1980) The Scientific Image, Oxford: OUP, Ch. 2-3

van Fraassen, B. (1985) ‘Empiricism in the Philosophy of Science’, in Churchland & Hooker (eds.).

Worrall, J. (1989) ‘Structural Realism: the Best of Both Worlds?’ in Dialectica 43.

Worrall, J. (1982) ‘Scientific Realism and Scientific Change, PhilQuart 32, pp. 201-231.

Wylie, A. (1986) ‘Arguments for Scientific Realism: The Ascending Spiral’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 23, pp. 287-97.


14. INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION

 

Achinstein, P. (1992) ‘Inference to the Best Explanation: Or, Who Will Win the Mill-Whewell Debate’, HistPhilSci 23, p. 349.

Ben-Menahem, Y. (1990) ‘The Inference to the Best Explanation’ Erkenntnis, pp. 319-344

Brown, J.R. (1985) ‘Explaining the Success of Science’ Ratio 27, p. 49.

Cartwright, N. (1983) ‘When Explanation Leads to Inference’ How the Laws of Physics Lie, Oxford: OUP, Essay 5.

Day, T. & Kincaid, H. (1994) ‘Putting Inference to the Best Explanation in its Place’ Synthese 98.

Fine, A. (1984) ‘The Natural Ontological Attitude’, in J. Leplin (ed.) Scientific Realism, Berkeley: Univ. California Press. [Repr. in his The Shaky Game (1986).]

* Fine, A. (1986) ‘Unnatural Attitudes: Realist and Instrumentalist Attachments to Science’ Mind 45, p. 149.

* Harman, G. (1965) ‘The Inference to the Best Explanation’, PhilRev 74.

* Lipton, P. (198 ) Inference to the Best Explanation, London: RKP, esp Ch. 4.

Marino, M. (1988) ‘Inference to the Best Explanation: van Fraassen and the Case of the ‘Fifth Force’’, ISPS 3, p. 35.

McMullin, E. (1987) ‘Explanatory Success and the Truth of Theory’ in N. Rescher (ed.) Scientific Inquiry in Philosophical Perspective, N.Y.: Univ. Press of America.

Newton-Smith W.H. (1987) ‘Realism and Inference to the Best Explanation’, Fundamenta Scientiae 7.

Psillos, S. (1996) ‘On van Fraassen’s Critique of Absolute Reasoning’, PhilQuart 46.

Ruben, D-H (1982) ‘Causal Scepticism or Invisible Cement’, Ratio 24, p. 161.

Thagard, P. (1978) ‘The Best Explanation: Criteria for Theory Choice’ JPhil 75.

van Fraassen, B. (1980) The Scientific Image, Oxford: OUP, Ch. 2

van Fraassen, B. (1989) Laws and Symmetry, Oxford: OUP, Part II.


15. LAWS OF NATURE

 

Achinstein, P. (1971) Law and Explanation, Oxford: Clarendon Press,chs.1-3.

* Armstrong, D (1983) What is a Law of Nature?, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

* Ayer, A J (1963) ‘What is a Law of Nature?’, in The Concept of a Person, London: Macmillan.

Bigelow, J. & Pargetter, R. (1990) Science and Necessity, Cambridge: CUP, Ch. 5.

Braithwaite, R. B (1959) Scientific Explanation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ch.9.

Carroll, J.W. (1994) Laws of Nature, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cartwright, N. (1983) How the Laws of Physics Lie, Oxford: Clarendon Press, Ch. 1, 4

Cartwright, N. (1989) Nature’s Capacities and their Measurement, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Cartwright, N. (1994) ‘Fundamentalism vs. the Patchwork of Laws’ PASS 93.

* Dretske, F. I (1977) ‘Laws of Nature’, Philosophy of Science, 44, pp. 248-68.

Goodman, N (1983) Fact, Fiction and Forecast, London: Harvard University Press, 4th ed., Ch. 1.

Harré, R (1970) The Principles of Scientific Thinking, London: Macmillan, Ch. 4.

Harré, R. (1993) Laws of Nature, London: Duckworth.

Lewis, D. (1973) Counterfactuals, Oxford: Blackwell.

Lewis, D. (1987) ‘Network for a Theory of Universals’, Australasian JPhil 61.

Lewis, D. (1994) ‘Human Supervenience Debugged’ Mind Vol. 103.

Mellor, D H (ed.) (1980) Science, Belief and Behaviour, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (esp. essays 5 & 6).

Nagel, E (1961) The Structure of Science, London: Routledge, Ch. 4.

Ramsey, F. (1931) ‘General Propositions and Causality’, in the Foundations of Mathematics, London: RKP.

Swartz, N (1985) The Concept of Physical Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tooley, M. (1977) ‘The Nature of Laws’, Canadian JPhil, 7, pp.667-698.

Tooley, M. (1977)                                                ‘The Nature of Laws’, Canadian JPhil, 7, pp. 667-98.

Urbach, P (1988) ‘What is a Law of Nature?’, BJPS 39, pp. 193-209.

Vallentyne, P. (1988) ‘Explicating Lawhood’, PhilSci 55, pp.598-613.

van Fraassen, B. (1989) Laws and Symmetry, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Pt. 2.

Woodward, J. (1992) ‘Realism about Laws’, Erkenntnis, 36, pp.181-218.


16. THE NATURE OF PROBABILITY

 

General and History

Daston, L. (1988) Classical Probability in Enlightenment, Princeton: PUP.

Gigerenzer, G. et al. (1989) The Empire of Chance, Cambridge: CUP.

Hacking, I. (1975) The Emergence of Probability, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Shapiro, B. (1983) Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England: A Study of the Relation between Natural Science, Religion, History, Law, and Literature, Princeton: PUP.

Skryms, B. (1986—3rd ed.) Choice and Chance, Belmar CA: Wordsworth, Ch. 5-7

von Plato, J. (1994) Creating Modern Probability, Cambridge: CUP

Weatherford, R Philosophical Foundations of Probability Theory, London, Routledge, 1982

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Ayer, A.J. (1957) ‘The Conception of Probability as a Logical Relation’ in Observation and Interpretation: Proceedings of the Ninth Symposium of the Colston Research Society, S. Körner (ed.), Butterworth: London.

Benenson, F.C. (1982) Probability, Objectivity, and Evidence, London: Routledge.

Carnap, R. (1952) The Continuum of Inductive Methods, Chicago: UCP.

Carnap, R. (1962) The Logical Foundations of Probability, London, Routledge.

Christensen, D. (1991) ‘Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs’, PhilRev 100.

de Finetti, B. (1964) ‘Foresight: Its Logical Laws, Its Subjective Sources’ in Studies in Subjective Probability, H.E. Kyburg Jr. & H.E. Smokler (eds.), New York: Wiley. [Originally written 1937.]

de Finetti, B. (1969) ‘Initial Probabilities: A Prerequisite for any Valid Induction’, Synthese 20.

de Finetti, B. (1974) Theory of Probability, New York: Wiley.

de Finetti, B. (1989) ‘Probabilism’, Erkenntnis 31. [Originally written 1931.]

Earman, J. (1992) Bayes or Bust?, Cambridge: CUP.

Ellis, B. (1968) Basic Concepts of Measurement, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Ch. XI

Giere, R.N. (1973)                                                 ‘Objective Single Case Probabilities and the Foundations of Statistics’ in Logic, Methodology and the Philosophy of Science IV, P. Suppes & L. Henkin (eds.).

Giere, R.N. (1980) ‘Causal Systems and Statistical Hypotheses’, in Cohen, L J & Hesse, M (eds.), Applications of Inductive Logic, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Gillies, D.A. (1973) An Objective Theory of Probability, London: Methuen & Co.

Hacking, I. (1967) ‘Slightly More Realistic Personal Probability’, Philosophy of Science, 34, pp. 311-25

Hacking, I. (1971) ‘Equipossibility Theories of Probability’, BJPS, 22, pp. 339-355

Hesse, M. (1974) The Structure of Scientific Inference, London: Macmillan, Ch. 7.

* Horwich, P. (1982) Probability and Evidence, Cambridge: CUP.

Howson, C. & P. Urbach (1989) Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach, La Salle: Illinois: Open Court.

Jeffrey, R. (1970) ‘Dracula Meets Wolfman: Acceptance vs. Partial Belief’, Induction, Acceptance, and Rational Belief, M. Swain (ed.) D. Reidel: Dordrecht.

Jeffrey, R. (1983—2nd ed.) The Logic of Decision, Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.

* Jeffrey, R. (1992) Probability and the Art of Judgment, Cambridge: CUP, Ch. 4. [Reprinted from Observation, Experiment, and Hypothesis in Modern Physical Science, P. Achinstein & O. Hannaway (eds.) Boston: MIT Press.]

Jeffreys, H. (1939) Theory of Probability, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Keynes, J.M. (1957) A Treatise on Probability, New York: Macmillan

Kyberg, H.E. (1970) Probability and Inductive Logic, London: Collier-Macmillan.

* Kyburg, H. and H.E. Smokler (1964) Studies in Subjective Probability, New York: J.Wiley. [esp paper by de Finetti]

* Lewis, D. (1980)                                                ‘A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance” in R. Jeffrey (ed.) Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability Vol. II, Berkeley: Univ. of California Press [repr. in Lewis’ Philosophical Papers Vol 2].

Logue, J. (1995) Projective Probability, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Lucas, J.R. (1970) The Concept of Probability, Oxford: Clarendon Press, Chs. II & IV.

Luckenbach, S.A. (1972) Probabilities, Problems and Paradoxes, Vencino CA: Dickenson.

* Mackie, J.L. (1973) Truth, Probability and Paradox, Oxford: Clarendon Press, Ch. 5

Mellor, D.H. (1971) The Matter of Chance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pap, A. (1963) An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, London: Eyre and Spottiswode, Ch. 11.

Popper, K. (1959) ‘The Propensity Theory of Probability’, BJPS, 10, pp. 25-42.

* Ramsey, F. (1931/ new edn. 1978) The Foundations of Mathematics, Braithwaite, R B (ed.), London: Routledge, essays VII & VIII.

Reichenbach, H. (1949) The Theory of Probability, Berkeley: University of California Press.

* Salmon, M.H. et. al. (1992) Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, pp. 66-100.

Salmon, W.C. (1966) The Foundations of Scientific Inference, USA: University of Pittsburgh

Savage, L.J. (1971) ‘Probability in Science: A Personalistic Account’ in Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science IV, P. Suppes & L. Henkin (eds.).

Savage, L.J. (1972) Foundations of Statistics, New York: Dover

* Sklar, L. (1970) ‘Is Probability a Dispositional Property?’ JPhil LXVII.

Swinburne, R. (1973) An Introduction to Confirmation Theory, London: Methuen.

Swinburne, R.G. (1971) ‘The Probability of Particular Events’, Philosophy of Science, 38, pp. 327-43

van Fraassen, B. (1980) The Scientific Image, Oxford: Clarendon Press, Ch. 6

van Fraassen, B. (1984) ‘Belief and the Will’ JPhil 81.

* von Mises, R. (1957—2nd ed.) Probability, Statistics, and Truth, New York: Macmillan.

White, A.R. (1972) ‘The Propensity Theory of Probability’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 23, pp. 35-423.

Zabell, S.L. (1988) ‘Symmetry and its Discontents’ in Causation, Chance, and Credence Vol. 1, B. Skyrms & W.L. Harper (eds.), Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Zabell, S.L. (1989)                                                ‘The Rule of Succession’ Erkenntnis 31.


17. EXPERIMENTATION

 

Achinstein, P. & Hannway, O eds. (1985) Observation, Experiment and Hypothesis in Modern Physical Science, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. [esp. papers by Laymon and Galison]

Brown, J.R. (1988) ‘The Experimenter’s Social Circle’, Philosophy of Social Sciences 18, pp. 101-6.

Brown, J.R. (1989) The Rational and the Social, London: Routledge, Ch. 4.

Campbell, N.R. (1957) Foundations of Science: The Philosophy of Theory and Experiment, New York: Dover.

Collins, H. (1985) Changing Order, London: Sage.

Franklin, A. (1987) The Neglect of Experiment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Galison, P. (1987) How Experiments End, Chicago: UCP.

Galison, P. (1988)                                                 ‘Philosophy in the Laboratory’, JPhil LXXXV, pp. 525-7.

Gooding, D. (1990) Experiment and the Making of Meaning, Dordrecht: Kluwer, esp. Part I.

Hacking, I (1988) ‘On the Stability of the Laboratory Sciences’, JPhil, LXXXV, pp. 507-14.

Hacking, I. (1983) Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Part B).

Harré R. (1981) Great Scientific Experiments, Oxford: Phaidon.

Heelan, P.A. (1988) ‘Experiment and Theory’, JPhil, LXXXV, pp. 515-24.

Latour, B. & Woolgar, S. (1979) Laboratory Life, Los Angeles: Sage.

Shapere, D. (1982) ‘The Concept of Observation, in Science and Philosophy’, PhilSci 49, pp. 485-525

Swenson, Loyd S. (1979) The Etherial Aether: A History of the Michelson-Morley Experiment, Texas: Austin.


18. THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS

 

Bohr, N (1949) ‘Discussions with Einstein on Epistemological Problems in Atomic Physics’, in Schillpp, P A (ed.), Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, La Salle: Open Court.

* Brown, J R (1986) ‘Thought Experiments Since the Scientific Revolution’, ISPS 1, pp. 1-15.

Brown, J.R. (1991) The Laboratory of the Mind: Thought Experiments in the Natural Sciences, London: Routledge.

Cole, D. (1984) ‘Thought and Thought Experiments’, Philosophical Studies, 45, pp.431-444.

Hacking, I. (1992) ‘Do Thought Experiments have a life of their own?’ PSA 2, pp.302-308.

Horowitz, T. & Massey, G.J. (eds.) (1991) Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Humphreys, P. (1993) ‘Seven Theses on Thought Experiments’, in Earman, J. et. al. (eds.) Philosophical Problems of the Internal and External World, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Koyré, A (1968) ‘Galileo’s Treatise De Motu: The Use and Abuse of Imaginary Experiment’, in Metaphysics and Measurement, London: Capman and Hall.

Kuhn, T S (1977) ‘A Function for Thought Experiments’, reprinted in The Essential Tension, Chicago: UCP.

Mach, E (1960) The Science of Mechanics, La Salle: Open Court, pp. 588ff.

Mach, E (1976) ‘On Thought Experiments’, in Knowledge and Error, Dordrecht: Reidel.

Popper, K (1959) The Logic of Scientific Discovery, London: Hutchinson, (Appendix XI).

Hull, D., M. Forbes & K. Okruhlike (1992) PSA 2 Part IX, Thought Experiments: The Theoretician’s Laboratory, papers by Brown, Gooding, Nersessian and Hacking.

Rehder, W. (1980) ‘Thought Experiments and Modal Logics’, Logique et Analyse,23, pp.407-417.

Rescher, N. (ed.) (forthcoming) Thought Experiments.

* Sorensen, R.A. (1992) ‘Thought Experiments and the Epistemology of Laws’, Canadian JPhil, 22, pp.15-44.

Sorensen, R.A. (1992) Thought Experiments, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wilkes, K W (1988) Real People: Personal Identity Without Thought Experiments, Oxford: Oxford University Press.


19. MODELS AND ANALOGIES

 

Achinstein, P. (1964) ‘Models, Analogies, and Theories’, PhilSci 31, p. 328-350. [Articles also by Hesse and Agassi.]

Achinstein, P. (1968) Concepts of Science, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, Chs. 7 & 8.

Black, M. (1962) Models and Metaphors, Ithaca NY:

Bunge, M. (1973) Method, Model and Matter, Dordrecht: D.Reidel, Chs. V, VI, VII.

* Cartwright, N. (1980) How the Laws of Physics Lie, Oxford: Clarendon Press, Ch. 3.

Duhem, P. (1954) The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, Princeton: PUP, Ch. 4.

Giere, R. (1984) Understanding Scientific Reasoning (2nd Ed.), NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Giere, R. (1988) Explaining Science, Chicago: UCP, Ch. 3.

Harré, R. (1970) The Principles of Scientific Thinking, London: Macmillan, Ch. 2.

Harré, R. (1976) ‘The Constructive Role of Models’, in Collins, L (ed.), The Use of Models in the Social Sciences, London: Tavistock.

Hempel, C. (1965) ‘Aspects of Scientific Explanation’ in Aspects of Scientific Explanation, NY: Free Press, Sec. 6.

Hesse, M. (1966) Models and Analogies in Science, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Hesse, M. (1974) The Structure of Scientific Inference, Basingstoke: Macmillan, Ch. IX, XI.

Leatherdale, W.H. (1974) The Role of Analogy, Model and Metaphor in Science, NY: A.M. Elsevier.

Roper, J.E. (1982)                                                 ‘Models and Lawlikeness’, Synthese 52, pp. 313-323.

Weitzenfeld, J. (1984) ‘Valid Reasoning by Analogy’, PhilSci 51, pp. 137-49.

Wylie, A. (1988) ‘’Simple’ Analogy and the Role of Relevance Assumptions’, International Studies in Philosophy, 2.2, pp. 134-50.

 

[See also ‘Analogical reasoning in Darwin’s Origin of Species’ in The Philosophy of Biology section.]


20. MEASUREMENT

 

Adams, E.W. (1966) ‘On the Nature and Purpose of Measurement’, Synthese 16, pp. 125-69.

Campbell, N.R. (1957) Foundations of Science: The Philosophy of Theory and Experiment, New York: Dover, Part II.

Ellis, B. (1968) Basic Concepts of Measurement, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Falmagne, J.C. (1966) ‘A Probabilistic Theory of Extensive Measurement’, Synthese, 16, pp. 125-69.

Hacking, I. (1983) Representing and Intervening, Cambridge,: Cambridge University Press, Ch. 4.

Holman, E.W. (1974) ‘Extensive Measurement without an Order Relation’, Philosophy of Science 41, pp. 361-73

Johnson, P. (1997) Constants of Nature.

Kanger, S. (1972) ‘Measurement; An Essay in the Philosophy of Science’, Theoria, XXXVIII, pp. 1-44

Körner, S. (1972) Experience and Theory, London: Routledge, Ch. X.

Krantz, D.H., Luce, R.D., Suppes, P. & Tversky, A. (1971) Foundations of Measurement, New York: Academic Press.

Kuhn, T.S. (1961) ‘The Function of Measurement in Modern Physical Science’, Isis 52, pp. 161-93. [Reprinted in The Essential Tension, Chicago: UCP, 1977.]

Kyberg, H.E. (1968) Philosophy of Science: A formal Approach, New York: Macmillan, Ch. 3.

Kyburg, H.E. (1984) Theory and Measurement, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lucas, J.R. (1984) Space, Time and Causality, Oxford: Clarendon Press, Ch. VI.

Narens, L. (1974) ‘Measurement without Archimedean Axioms’, Philosophy of Science 41, pp. 374-93.

Suppes, P. (1957) Introduction to Logic, Princeton: Van Nostrand, Chs. 8-12.

 

[See also ‘The measurement problem’, in The Philosophy of Physics section.]


21. THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE (PRE-2OTH CENTURY)

 

General studies

Crombie, A.C. (1970) Augustine to Galileo, London.

Crombie, A.C. (1994) Styles of Scientific Thinking in the European Tradition, London: Duckworth.

Dreyer, J.L.E. (1976) A History of Astronomy from Thales to Kepler, Dover.

Hall, A.R. (1983) The Revolution in Science 1500-1790, London.

Olby, R.C. et.al, eds. (1990) Companion to the History of Modern Science, London.

 

Copernicus

Copernicus (1976) On the Revolutions, A.M. Duncan (trans.), Newton Abbot.

Westman, R.S. (1975) The Copernican Achievement, Berkeley: U. of California Press.

 

Galileo

Entry on Galileo in Dictionary of scientific biography (1972-1980), 16 vols., New York.

Drake, S., ed. (1957) Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo.

Drake, S. (1990) Galileo, Pioneer Scientist, Toronto: U. of Toronto Press.

Galileo (1953) Dialogue Concerning the Two Principal Systems of the World, S. Drake (trans.), Berkeley: U. of California Press.

Galileo (1974) Discourse on Two New Sciences, S. Drake (trans.), Madison: U. of Wisconsin Press.

Geymonat, L. (1965) Galileo Galilei, New York.

 

The chemical revolution

Entry on Lavoisier in Dictionary of scientific biography (1972-1980), 16 vols., New York.

Brock, W.H. (1992) The Fontana History of Chemistry, London: Fontana, Ch. 2 & 3.

Guerlac, H. (1961) Lavoisier, the Crucial Year: The background and origin of his first experiments on combustion in 1772, Ithaca: Cornell U. Press.

Holmes, F.L. (1989) Eighteenth-Century Chemistry as an Investigative Enterprise, Berkeley: U. of California Press.

 

Faraday and electromagnetism

Entries on Michael Faraday, James Clerk Maxwell, and William Thomson (Lord Kelvin), in Dictionary of scientific biography (1972-1980), 16 vols., New York.

Faraday, Michael (1855) Experimental Researches in Electricity, London.

Niven, D. ed. (1890) The Scientific Papers of James Clerk Maxwell, Cambridge: CUP.

Swenson, L. (1972) The Ethereal Aether, Austin: U. of Texas Press.

Whittaker, E.T. (1989) A History of the Theories of Aether and Electricity, Dover.

Williams, L.P. (1965) Michael Faraday: A biography, London.


22. LOGICAL POSITIVISM

 

Achinstein, P. & S. Hooker, eds. (1969) The Legacy of Logical Positivism, Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.

Ayer, A.J. ed. (1959) Logical Positivism, New York: Free Press.

Ayer, A.J. (1962) Language, Truth and Logic, London: Victor Gollanz.

Carnap, R. (1963) ‘Carnap’s Intellectual Autobiography’ in Schillpp, P (ed.) The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, (The Library of Living Philosophers), La Salle: Open Court.

Carnap, R. (1967) The Logical Structure of the World, London: Routledge.

Hanfling, O., ed. (1981) Essential Readings in Logical Positivism, Oxford: Blackwell.

Kebel, T.E. (1996) ‘Anti-Foundationalism and the Vienna Circle’s Revolution in Philosophy’’, BJPS 47.

McGuiness, B. ed. (1985) Moritz Schlick, Dordrecht: D.Reidel. [Reprint from Syntheses, Vol. 64, No. 5.]

Neurath, Carnap & Morris, eds. (1955) International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Vols. I & 2, Chicago: UCP (esp. articles by Neurath and Carnap).

Neurath, O. (1973) Empiricism and Sociology, (Vienna Circle Collection, Vol. 1), Dordrecht: D.Reidel, esp. Ch. 9.

Neurath, O. (1983) Philosophical Papers 1913-46, (Vienna Circle Collection, Vol. 16), Dordrecht: D.Reidel.

Reichenbach, H. (1959) The Rise of Scientific Philosophy, Berkeley: U. of California Press.

Schlick, M. (1974)                                                General Theory of Knowledge, Vienna & New York: Springer-Verlag.

Schlick, M. (1979) Philosophical Papers, Two Vols.; Vol. 1, 1909-22, Vol. 2, 1925-36 (Vienna Circle Collection, Vol. 11), Dordrecht: D.Reidel.


23. KARL POPPER

 

* Popper, K. (1959) The Logic of Scientific Discovery, London: Hutchinson, (esp. Chs. 1 to 6).

Popper, K. (1963) Conjectures and Refutations, London: Routledge.

Popper, K. (1973) Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, Oxford: Clarendon Press, corrected edn.

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Achermann, R (1976) The Philosophy of Karl Popper, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.

Curtis, R (1986) ‘Are Methodologies Theories of Scientific Rationality?’, BJPS, 37, pp. 135-61.

Feyerabend, P. (1985) ‘Popper’s Objective Knowledge’ & ‘The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes’, in Problems of Empiricism, Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2, Cambridge: CUP.

Feyerabend, P. (1975) Against Method, London: New Left Books, esp. Ch. 15.

* Gillies, D. (1993) Philosophy of Science in the Twentieth Century: Four Central Themes, Cambridge: Blackwell.

Grünbaum, A. (1976) ‘Ad Hoc Auxiliary Hypotheses and Falsification’. BJPS 27, pp. 329-62.

Grünbaum, A. (1976) ‘Is Falsifiability the Touchstone of Scientific Rationality? Karl Popper versus Inductivism’, in Cohen, R.S., Feyerabend, P.K. & Wartofsky, M. (eds.) Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp.213-252.

Grünbaum, A. (1976) ‘Is the Method of Bold Conjectures and Attempted Refutations Justifiably the Method of Science?’, BJPS 27, pp. 105-36.

Lakatos, I. (1970) ‘Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes’, in Lakatos, I & Musgrave, A, (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge: CUP.

Lakatos, I. (1978) Mathematics, Science and Epistemology, Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2, Cambridge: CUP.

Miller, D. (1983) A Pocket Popper, London: Fontana.

* Newton-Smith, W.H. (1981) The Rationality of Science, London: Routledge, ch.3.

* O’Hear, A. (1980) Karl Popper, London: Routledge.

* O’Hear, A. (ed.) (1995) Karl Popper: Philosophy and Problems, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 39, Cambridge: CUP.

Schillpp, P (ed.) (1974) The Philosophy of Karl Popper, La Salle: Open Court (esp. paper by Putnam).


24. THOMAS KUHN

 

* Kuhn, T.S. (1962/70) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: UCP, 2nd enlarged edn. 1970

Kuhn, T.S. (1977) The Essential Tension, Chicago: UCP.

Kuhn, T.S. (1982) ‘Commensurability, Comparability, Communicability’, PSA Vol. 2, pp. 669-88, (see also papers by Kitcher, Hesse)

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Collections

* Gutting, G. ed. (1980) Paradigms and Revolutions, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Hacking, I. ed. (1982) Scientific Revolutions, Oxford: OUP.

Harré, R. ed. (1975) Problems of Scientific Revolutions, Oxford: Oxford University Press (esp. paper by Popper).

* Horwich, P. ed. (1993) World Changes, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. [See esp papers by Hacking, McMullin, and afterword by Kuhn.].

Lakatos, I & Musgrave, A eds. (1970) Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (esp. papers by Feyerabend, Kuhn & Watkins).

 

Criticism and commentary

Doppelt, G. (1978) ‘Kuhn’s Epistemological Relativism’, Inquiry, 21, pp. 33-86.

Giere, R.N. (1985) ‘Philosophy of Science Naturalized’, Philosophy of Science, 52, pp. 331-56.

Fleck, L. (1935/English ed. 1979) Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact, Chicago: UCP.

Hesse, M. (1972) ‘In Defence of Objectivity’, Proceedings of the British Academy.

Hollis, M .& Lukes, S. eds. (1982) Rationality and Relativism, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Hoyningen-Huene, P. (1993) Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: UCP.

Kitcher, P. (1993) The Advancement of Science, Oxford: OUP, Ch. 6.

Kordig, C.R. (1971) The Justification of Scientific Change, Dordrecht: D.Reidel.

Laudan, L. (1977) Progress and its Problems, London: Routledge.

Laudan, L. (1984) Science and Values: The Aims of Science and their Role in Scientific Debate, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Laudan, L. (1986) ‘Scientific Change: Philosophical Models and Historical Research’, Synthese, p. 69

Laudan, L. (1987) ‘Relativism, Naturalism and Reticulation’, Synthese, 71, pp. 221-34.

Longino, H. (1990) Science as Social Knowledge, Princeton NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, Ch. 2.

Malone, M. (1993) ‘Kuhn Reconstructed: Incommensurability Without Relativism’ HistPhilSci 24, p. 69.

McAllister, J.M. (1986) ‘Theory Assessment in the Historiography of Science’, BJPS 37.

* Newton-Smith, W.H. (1981) The Rationality of Science, London: Routledge, Ch. V.

Newton-Smith, W.H. (1989) ‘Rationality, Truth, and the New Fuzzies’ in Dismantling Truth: Reality in the Postmodern World, L. Appignanesi and H. Lawson (eds.) London: Weidenfield and Nicolson.

Rorty, R. (1980) Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Ch. 7.

Salmon, M.H. et.al. (1992) Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Ch. 5.

Sankey, H. (1993) ‘Kuhn’s Changing Concept of Incommensurability’ BJPS 44, p. 759.

Scheffler, I. (1967) Science and Subjectivity, Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, esp. Ch. 1

Shapere, D. (1964) ‘The Structure of Scientific Revolutions’, PhilRev, XXIII, pp. 383-94.

Stone, M. (1981) ‘A Kuhnian Model of Falsifiability’ BJPS, p. 177.

Worrall J. (1990) ‘Scientific Revolutions and Scientific Rationality: The Case of the Elderly Holdout’, MinnStud XIV, Minneapolis, Univ. Minnesota Press.

 

Case studies [entries under ‘Collections’ above also include case studies]

Baumberger, J. (1977) ‘No Kuhnian Revolution in Economics’, Journal of Economic Issues 11, pp. 1-20

Beardsley, P. (1974) ‘Political Science: The Case of the Missing Paradigm’, Political Theory 2, pp. 46-61

Crane, D. (1980) ‘An Exploratory Study of Kuhnian Paradigms in Theoretical High-Energy Physics’, Social Studies of Science, 10, pp. 23-54

Crowe, M. (1975) ‘Ten “Laws” Concerning Patterns of Change in Mathematics’, Historica Mathematica 2, pp. 161-6

Dooley, P. (1982) ‘Kuhn and Psychology: the Rogers-Skinner, Day-Giorgi Debates’, Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 12, pp. 272-290

Fang, J. (1973) ‘Is Mathematics and ‘Anomaly’ in the Theory of Scientific Revolutions?’, Philosophica Mathematics 16, pp. 92-101

Harvey, M.E. & Holly, B.P. (1981) ‘Paradigm, Philosophy and Geographic Thought’, in Themes in Geographic Thought, London; Croom Helm, (Ch. 1)

Peterson, G. (1981) ‘Historical Self-Understanding in the Social Sciences: the use of Thomas Kuhn in Psychology’, Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 11, pp. 1-30

Ruse, M. (1970) ‘The Revolution in Biology’, Theoria 36, pp. 1-22

Urbach, P. (1974) ‘Progress and Degeneration in the ’IQ Debate’’, BJPS 25, pp. 99-135 & 235-59


25. PAUL FEYERABEND

 

Feyerabend, P.K. (1962) ‘Explanation, Reduction, and Empiricism’ in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science Vol. III, H. Feigl & G. Maxwell (eds.) Minneapolis: U. Minnesota Press.

Feyerabend, P.K. (1975) Against Method, London: New Left Books.

Feyerabend, P.K. (1977) ‘Changing Patterns of Reconstruction: review of W. Stegmüller: Theorienstrukturen und Theoriendynamik’, BJPS 28.

Feyerabend, P.K. (1978) Science in a Free Society, London: New Left Books.

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Couvalis, S.G. (1989) Feyerabend’s Critique of Foundationalism, Aldershot: Avebury Press.

Gunaratne, R.D. (1980) Science Understanding and Truth, Sri Lanka: Ministry of Higher Education Publications.

Laudan, L. (1989)                                                 ‘For Method: or, Against Feyerabend’, in J.R. Brown & J. Mittelstrass (eds.) An Intimate Relation, Dordrecht: Kluwer.

McEvoy, J.G. (1975) ‘A ‘Revolutionary’ Philosophy of Science: Feyerabend and the Degeneration of Critical Rationalism into Scepticial Fallibilism’ PhilSci 42.

Machamer, P. (1973) ‘Feyerabend and Galileo: The Interaction of Theories, and the Reinterpretation of Experience’, HistPhilSci 4.

Maia Neto, J.R. (1991) ‘Feyerabend’s Scepticism’ HistPhilSci 22.

Munévar, G. (eds.) Beyond Reason: Essays on the Philosophy of Paul Feyerabend, Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Newton-Smith, W.H. (1981) The Rationality of Science, London: RKP.

Preston, J.M. (1997) Feyerabend: Philosophy, Science and Society, Cambridge: CUP.

Worrall, J. (1978) ‘Against Too Much Method’, Erkenntnis 13.

Worrall, J. (1978) ‘Is the Empirical Content of a Theory Dependent on its Rivals?’ in I. Niiniluoto & R. Tuomela (eds.) The Logic and Epistemology of Scientific Change, Acta Philosophica Fennica 30.


26. IMRE LAKATOS

 

Lakatos, I. (1971) ‘History of science and its rational reconstructions’ in Buck, R. C. and Cohen, R. S. (eds.) Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, VIII.

* Lakatos, I. (1978) Philosophical Papers Vols. 1, 2, Worrall and Currie (eds.), Cambridge: CUP.

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Breck & Yourgrau eds. (1970) Physics, Logic and History, New York: Plenum.

Cohen, R.S., P.K. Feyerabend & M. Wartofsky, eds. (1976) Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos, Dordrecht: Reidel.

Feyerabend, P. (1981) Problems of Empiricism: Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge: CUP.

Feyerabend, P. (1988) ‘Imre Lakatos’, BJPS 26, pp. 1-18.

* Hacking, I. (1979) ‘Imre Lakatos’ Philosophy of Science’, BJPS 30, pp. 381-410.

Hacking, I., ed. (1981) Scientific Revolutions, Oxford: OUP [esp. papers by Lakatos and Hacking].

Kuhn, T. S. (1970) ‘Notes on Lakatos’, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science VIII, pp. 137-146.

Mayo, D. (1991) ‘Novel Evidence and Severe Tests’, PhilSci., 58, pp. 523-552.

Musgrave, A. (1988) ‘Is there a Logic of Scientific Discovery?’ LSE Quarterly 2:3, Autumn Issue.

Newton-Smith, W.H. (1981) The Rationality of Science, London: RKP.

Worrall, J. (1985) ‘Scientific Discovery and Theory-Confirmation’ in Pitt, J. C. (ed.) Change and Progress in Modern Science, Dordrecht: Reidel.

Zahar, E. (1973) ‘Why did Einstein’s Programme Supersede Lorentz’s?’ BJPS 24, pp. 95-123 & 2323-262.


27. THEORIES OF SCIENTIFIC CHANGE

 

Feyerabend, P. (1963) ‘Explanation, Reduction, and Empiricism’ Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science Vol. III, Minneapolis: Univ. of Minn. Press.

Hull, D (1988) Science as a Process, Chicago: UCP.

* Kitcher, P. (1993) The Advancement of Science, Oxford: OUP, Ch. 3 and 4.

* Kuhn, T.S. (1962/70) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: UCP, 2nd enlarged edn. 1970

Lakatos, I. (1970) ‘Falsification and the Methodology of Research Programmes’ in Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds.) Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge: CUP.

* Laudan, L. (1977) Progress and its Problems, London: RKP

Laudan, L. (1984) Science and Values: The Aims of Science and their Role in Scientific Debate, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Laudan, L. (1984) ‘A Confutation of Convergent Realism’, in Leplin, J., ed. Realism, Berkeley: University of California Press [Repr. from PhilSci 48.]

Laudan, L. (1986) ‘Scientific Change: Philosophical Models and Historical Research’, Synthese, p. 69

Popper, K. (1959) The Logic of Scientific Discovery, London: Hutchinson, (esp. Chs. 1 to 6).

Popper, K. (1962) ‘Truth, Rationality, and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge’, in his Conjectures and Refutations, New York: Basic Books.

Shapere, Dudley (1966) ‘Meaning and Scientific Change’, in R.G. Colodny (ed.) Mind and Cosmos:  Essays in Contemporary Science and Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh Press. [Repr. in I. Hacking (ed.) Scientific Revolutions, Oxford: OUP, 1981.]

Shapere, Dudley (1980) ‘The Character of Scientific Change’, in T. Nickles (ed.) Scientific Discovery, Logic and Rationality, Dordrecht: Reidel.

Stegmüller, Wolfgang (1975)                ‘Structures and Dynamics of Theories’, Erkenntnis 9, pp. 75-100.

Stegmüller, Wolfgang (1977)                 ‘Accidental (‘Non-substantial’) Theory Change and Theory Dislodgment’ in R.E. Butts and J. Hintikka (eds.) Historical and Philosophical Dimensions of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Dordrecht: Reidel.


28. THE SOCIAL STUDY OF SCIENCE

 

Barnes, B. (1974) Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory, London: Routledge.

Barnes, B. (1982) T S Kuhn and Social Sciences, London: Macmillan.

* Bloor, D. (1976) Knowledge and Social Imagery, London: Routledge, Ch. 1-3 and Afterword (in 2nd Edition)

Brannigan, G. (1981) The Social Basis of Scientific Discoveries, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

* Brown, J.R. (1989) The Rational and the Social, London: RKP.

Brown, J.R. ed. (1984) Scientific Rationality, the Sociological Turn, Dordrecht: D.Reidel.

* Collins, H.M. (1985) Changing Order, London: Sage.

Collins, H.M. and S. Yearley (1992) ‘Epistemological Chicken’, in A. Pickering (ed.) Science as Practice and Culture, Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.

Engelhardt, H.T. & Caplan, A.L. (1987) Scientific Controversies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Farley J. and G. Geison (1974) ‘Science, Politics, and Spontaneous Generation in Nineteenth-Century France: The Pasteur-Pouchet Debate’ Bulletin of the History of Medicine 48, pp. 161-198.

Fleck, L. (1986) Cognition and Fact: Materials on Ludwig Fleck, R. Cohen and T. Schnelle (eds.) Dordrecht: D. Reidel, especially Fleck’s essays from 1929, 1935, and 1936.

Forman, P. (1971) ‘Weimar Culture, Causality and Quantum Theory’, Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences 3 (ed.) R. McCormmach, pp. 1-116.

Fuller, S. (1989) Philosophy of Science and its Discontents, Colorado: Westview Press, Ch. 1.

Gilbert, G.N. & M. Mulkay (1982) ‘Warranting Scientific Belief’ Social Studies of Science 12, pp. 383-408.

Gilbert, G.N. & M. Mulkay (1984) Opening Pandora’s Box, Cambridge: CUP.

Hessen, B. (1971) ‘The Social and Economic Roots of Newton’s Principia’, in Bukharin, N. (ed.), Science at the Crossroads, London: Cass, pp. 146-212

* Kitcher, P. (1990) ‘The Division of Cognitive Labor’ JPhil, pp. 5-22.

Kitcher, P. (1993) The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity Without Illusions, Oxford: OUP, Ch. 8.

Labinger, J. (1995) ‘Science as Culture: A View from the Petri Dish‘ Social Studies of Science 25, pp. 285-306

Lakatos, I. (1981) ‘History of Science and its Rational Reconstructions’, in I. Hacking (ed.) Scientific Revolutions, Oxford: OUP.

* Latour, B. & S. Woolgar (1979) Laboratory Life: the Social Construction of Scientific Facts, Los Angeles: Sage, esp. Ch. 4, 2, 3.

Latour, B. (1988) Science in Action, Harvard: Harvard University Press.

McMullin, E. (1982) ‘Values in Science’, PSA Vol. 2, pp. 3-28.

McMullin, E. ed. (1988) Construction and Constraint, Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press.

Newton-Smith, W.H. (1981) The Rationality of Science, London: Routledge, Ch. 10.

Niininluoto, I. (1991) ‘Realism, Relativism, and Constructivism’ Synthese 89, pp. 135-62.

Papineau, D. (1988) ‘Does the Sociology of Science Discredit Science?’ in R. Nola (ed.) Realism and Relativism in Science, Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Ravetz, J.R. (1971) Scientific Knowledge and its Social Problems, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

* Shapin, S. & S. Schaffer (1985) Leviathan and the Air Pump, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Shapin, S. (1975) ‘Phrenological Knowledge and the Social Structure of Early Nineteenth-Century Edinburgh’ in Annals of Science 32, pp. 219-243.

Shapin, S. (1982) ‘History of Science and its Sociological Reconstructions’, in History of Science 20, pp. 157-211.

* Sismondo, S. (1993) ‘Some Social Constructions’, in Social Studies of Science 23, pp. 515-554. [Response by K. Knorr-Cetina.]


29. NON-EPISTEMIC VALUES AND THEIR PRESENCE IN SCIENCE

 

Bleier, R. (1984) Science and Gender: A Critique of Biology and its Theories on Women, Elmsford NY: Pergamon.

Bleier, R. ed. (1986) Feminist Approaches to Science, Elmsford NY: Pergamon.

* Brown, J.R. (1989) The Rational and the Social, London: RKP, Ch. 1-3.

Fausto-Sterling, A. (1985) Myths of Gender:  Biological Theories About Women and Men, NY: Basic Books.

Gould, S.J. (1992) The Mismeasure of Man, London: Penguin.

Harding, S. & Hintikka, M. eds. (1983) Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectivies on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Dordrecht: Reidel. [Articles by Keller, Hubbard, and Hartstock.]

Harding, S. (1986) The Science Question in Feminism, Ithaca NY: Cornell Univ. Press.

* Harding, S. (1991) Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?, Milton Keynes: Open University Press, Ch. 1-7.

Harding, S. (1993)                                                ‘Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What is Strong Objectivity?’, in Feminist Epistemologies (eds.) L. Alcott and E. Potter, London: RKP.

Hubbard, R. (1990) The Politics of Women’s Biology, New Brunswick: Rutgers Univ. Press.

* Keller, E.F. & H. Longino eds. (1996) Feminism and Science, Oxford: OUP.

Keller, E.F. (1983) A Feeling for the Organism: The Life and Work of Barbara McClintlock, NY: W.H. Freeman.

Keller, E.F. (1985) Reflections on Gender and Science, New Haven Conn: Yale Univ. Press.

Kuhn, T. (1977) ‘Values and Criteria for Theory-Choice’ in his The Essential Tension, Chicago: The Univ. of Chicago Press

Lewontin, R.C., S. Rose, & L.J. Kamin (1984) Not in Our Genes, N.Y.: Pantheon.

Longino, H. & R. Doell (1983) ‘Body, Bias, and Behaviour: A Comparative Analysis of Reasoning in Two Areas of Biological Science’ Signs:  Journal of Women and Culture 9:2.

* Longino, H. (1990) Science As Social Knowledge, Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, Ch. 1, 4, 5.

Longino, H. (1992) ‘Taking Gender Seriously in the Philosophy of Science’ PSA Vol. 1.

Longino, H. (1993) ‘Essential Tensions--Phase Two: Feminist, Philosophical, and Social Studies of Science’, in A Mind of One’s Own--Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity (eds.) C. Witt and L.M. Antony, Colorado: Westview Press.

Martin, J.R. (1988) ‘Science in a Different Style’ 25:2, pp. 129-140.

Martin, J.R. (1989) ‘Ideological Critiques and the Philosophy of Science’, PhilSci 56:1, pp. 1-22.

McMullin, E. (1982) ‘Values in Science’ PSA Vol. 2, pp. 3-28.

* Richardson, R. (1984) ‘Biology and Ideology: The Interpretation of Science and Values’ PhilSci 51:2, pp. 396-420.

Rooney, P. (1992) ‘On Values in Science: Is the Epistemic/Non-Epistemic Distinction Useful?’ PSA Vol. 1, pp. 23-35.

Schiebinger, L. (1989) The Mind Has No Sex? Women in the Origins of Modern Science, Cambridge Mass: Harvard Univ. Press.

Tuana, N. ed. (1989) Feminism and Science, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

van Fraassen, B. (1980) The Scientific Image, Oxford: OUP, pp. 87-96.

van Fraassen, B. (1984) ‘Empiricism in the Philosophy of Science’ in Images of Science (ed.) P. Churchland and C. Hooker, Chicago: UCP, Pt. 1.


30. THE LEIBNIZ--CLARKE DEBATE

 

General reading

Alexander, H.G., ed. (1956) The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, Mancester: Mancester U. Press.

Broad, C.D. (1975) Leibniz: An Introduction, Cambridge: CUP.

Koyre, A. (1956) From the Closed World of the Infinite Universe, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, Ch. 11 & 12. [Reprinted as ‘Leibniz and Newton’ in Leibniz, H.G. Frankfurt (ed.), New York: Anchor Books.]

Ray, C. (1991) Time, Space, and Philosophy, London: RKP.

Russell, B. (1937) A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, London: George Allen and Unwin.

Smith, Q. & L.N. Oaklander (1995) Time, Change and Freedom, London: RKP.

Swinburne, R. (1968) Space and Time, London: Macmillan.

van Fraassen, B.C. (1970) An Introduction to the Philosophy of Space and Time, New York: Random House.

 

The relational theory of time

Barbour, J. (1994) ‘The Emergence of Time and its Arrow from Timelessness’, in J. Halliwell et.al. (eds.) Physical Origins of Time Asymmetry, Cambridge: CUP.

Forbes, G. (1993) ‘Time, Events and Modality’ in The Philosophy of Time, Oxford: OUP, R. LePoidevin & M. MacBeath (eds.).

Hooker, C.A. (1971) ‘The Relational Doctrines of Time and Space’, BJPS.

Shoemaker, S. (1969) ‘Time Without Change’, JPhil LXVI.

van Fraassen, B.C. (1970) An Introduction to the Philosophy of Space and Time, New York: Random House, Ch. 2 Sec. 1-2, Ch. 3 Sec. 1-2..

 

The notion of absolute space

Arthur, M. (1994) ‘Space and Relativity in Newton and Leibniz’, BJPS 45.

Barbour, J. (1989) Absolute or Relative Motion? Vol. I, Cambridge: CUP, 11.4-11.6.

Brown, J.R. (1991) The Laboratory of the Mind, London: RKP, Ch. 1, 2.

Burtt, E.A. (1924) The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science, London: RKP, Ch. 7.

Lacey, H.M. (1970) ‘The Scientific Intelligibility of Absolute Space’, BJPS.

Laymon, R. (1978) ‘Newton’s Bucket Experiment’ Journal of the History of Philosophy, pp. 399-413.

Maudlin, T. (1993) ‘Buckets of Water and Waves of Spaces: Why Spacetime is Probably a Substance’, BJPS 60.

Nagel, E. (1961) The Structure of Science, London: RKP, Ch. 8 Pt. 1.

Ray, C. (1991) Time, Space, and Philosophy, London: RKP, Ch. 5, 6.

Rynasiewicz, R. (1996) ‘By their properties, causes, and effects: Newton’s Scholium on Time, Space, Place, and Motion—I. The Text; II. The Context’ HistPhilSci 26, pp. 133-153 and 295-321.

Sklar, L. (1974) Space, Time, and Spacetime, Berkeley: U. of California Press, Ch. 3, Sec. A, B, C.

Swinburne, R. (1968) Space and Time, London: Macmillan, Ch. 3.

Teller, P. (1991) ‘Substance, Relations, and Arguments about the Nature of Space-Time’, PhilRev 100.

 

The identity of indiscernibles

Ayer, A.J. ‘Names and Descriptions’ in his The Concept of a Person, and ‘The Identity of Indiscernibles’ in his Philosophical Papers.

Black, M. (1952) ‘The Identity of Indiscernibles’, Mind.

Broad, C.D. (1975) Leibniz: An Introduction, Cambridge: CUP, Ch. 2.

Dummett, M. (1973) Frege: Philosophy of Language, London: Duckworth, Ch. 16 esp. pp. 543-4.

Hacking, I. (1975) ‘The Identity of Indiscernibles’ JPhil.

Pears, D. (1955) ‘The Identity of Indiscernibles’, Mind.

Strawson, P.F. (1959) Individuals, London: RKP, Part 1 Ch. 4.

 

The principle of sufficient reason

Barbour, J. (1982) ‘Relational Concepts of Space and Time’, BJPS 33.

Broad, C.D. (1975) Leibniz: An Introduction, Cambridge: CUP, Ch. 2.

Parkinson, G.H.L. (1995) ‘Philosophy and Logic’, in the Cambridge Companion to Leibniz, N. Jolly (ed.) Cambridge: CUP.

Russell, B. (1937) A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, London: George Allen and Unwin, Ch. 3.

 

Kinds of necessity and kinds of liberty

Brown, S. (1984) Leibniz, Brighton: Harvester, Ch. 9.

Leibniz, G.W. (1686) Discourse on Metaphysics, Ch. 13.

Mates, B. (1986) The Philosophy of Leibniz: Metaphysics and Language, Oxford: OUP, Ch. 4, 5, 6.

 

Leibnizian physics

Broad, C.D. (1975) Leibniz: An Introduction, Cambridge: CUP, Ch. 3.

Buchdahl, G. (1969) Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science, Oxford: OUP, Ch. III (‘Leibniz: Science and Metaphysics’).

Garber, D. (1995) ‘Leibniz, Physics, and Philosophy’, in the Cambridge Companion to Leibniz, N. Jolly (ed.) Cambridge: CUP.

Papineau, D. Ch. 9 of Leibniz: Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science, (ed.) R.S. Woolhouse.

Russell, B. (1937) A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, London: George Allen and Unwin, Ch. 7.

 


31. THE PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY

 

General texts and collections

Ayala, F. & Dobzhansky, T. eds. (1974) Studies in the Philosophy of Biology, London: Macmillan.

Grene, M. (ed.) (1983) Dimensions of Darwinism, Cambridge: CUP.

Maynard Smith, J. (1972) On Evolution, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, Ch. 1, 2, 6, 7.

Mayr, E. (1988) Towards a New Philosophy of  Biology, Harvard: HUP.

Ridley, M. (1985) The Problems of Evolution, Oxford: OUP.

Ridley, M., ed. (1998) Evolution, Oxford: OUP.

Rosenberg, A. (1985) The Structure of Biological Science, Cambridge: CUP.

Ruse, M. (1988) Philosophy of Biology Today, New York: SUNY Press.

Ruse, M. (ed.) (1989) The Philosophy of Biology, New York: Macmillan.

Sober, E. (1993) Philosophy of Biology, Oxford: OUP.

Sober, E. (1994) Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary Biology, Mass.: MIT Press [2nd ed.].

 

Darwin’s arguments

Darwin, C. (1964) On the Origin of Species by means of Natural Selection, London: Penguin, Ch. 1-4, 5-7, 14.

Lloyd, E. (1983) ‘Darwin's Support for the Theory of Natural Selection’, PhilSci 50, p.112-129.

Recker, D. (1987) ‘Causal Efficacy: The Structure of Darwin's Argument Strategy in the Origin of Species’, Phil.Sci 54, p. 147-175.

Ruse, M. (1982) Darwinism Defended, Chapter 2.

Thagard, P. (1978) ‘The Best Explanation: Criteria for Theory Choice’, JPhil 75, p. 76-92.

 

Analogical reasoning in Darwin’s Origin of Species

Evans, L.T. (1984) ‘Darwin’s Use of the Analogy Between Artificial and Natural Selection’ Journal of the History of Biology 17, pp. 113-140.

Ruse, M. (1973) ‘The Value of Analogical Models in Science’ Dialogue 12, pp. 246-253.

Waters, C. Kenneth (1986) ‘Taking Analogical Inference Seriously: Darwin’s Argument From Artificial Selection’, PSA Vol. 1. pp. 502-513.

Young, R.M. (1971) ‘Darwin’s Metaphor: Does Nature Select?’, The Monist 5, pp. 442-503.

 

Adaptionism, natural selection theory, and evolutionary explanations

Bowler, P.J. (1977) ‘Darwinism and the argument from design: suggestions for a reevaluation’, J. of the History of Biology 10.

Cain, A.J. (1964) ‘The Perfection of Animals’, in Carthy, J.D. and Duddington, C.L. (eds.) Viewpoints in Biology 3, London: Butterworth.

Cronin, H. (1992) The Ant and the Peacock:  Altruism and sexual selection from Darwin to today, Cambridge: CUP, pp. 7-35, 53-100 passim, 328-335, 344-347.

Dawkins, M.S. (1986) Unravelling Animal Behaviour, Essex: Longman, pp. 131-146.

Dawkins, R. (1986) The Blind Watchmaker, Essex, Longman, Ch. 1 and 3.

Dawkins, R. (1982) ‘Universal Darwinism’, in Bendall, D. (ed.) Evolution from Molecules to Men, Cambridge: CUP.

Dennett, D. C. (1995) Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York: Simon & Schwester, Ch. 8-10.

* Gould, S. & Lewontin, R. (1979) ‘The spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian paradigm - a critique of the adaptationist programme’, Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B 205, pp.581-598 [Repr. in Sober (ed.) Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary Biology.]

Griffiths, P. E. & Gray, R. D. (1994) Developmental Systems and Evolutionary Explanation, JPhil 91, pp. 277-304.

Lewontin, R.C. (1978) ‘Adaption’, Scientific American 239 (3).

Lewontin, R.C. (1979) ‘Fitness, survival, and optimality’ in Horn, Stairs, and Mitchell (eds.)

Lewontin, R.C. (1983) ‘The Organism as the Subject and Object of Evolution’, Scientia 118.

Lloyd, E. (1988) The Structure and Confirmation of Evolutionary Theory, Princeton NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.

Maynard Smith, J. (1976) ‘Evolution and the theory of games’, American Scientist 64.

Maynard Smith, J. (1982) Evolution and the Theory of Games, Cambridge: CUP.

Maynard Smith, J. (1984) ‘Game theory and the evolution of behaviour’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7.

Maynard Smith, J. (1994) ‘Optimization Theory in Evolution’, in Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary Biology, Mass.: MIT Press [2nd ed.].

Maynard Smith, J. & E. Szathmáry The Major Transitions in Evolution.

Resnik, D. (1989) ‘Adaptionist Explanations’, HistPhilSci 20, p. 193.

Ridley, M. (1985) ‘More Darwinian Detractors’, Nature 318, pp. 124-125.

* Sober, E. (1984) The Nature of Selection, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

Wallace, A.R. (1889) Darwinism, London: Macmillan [3rd Edition], Ch. 1, 2, 5.

Williams, G.C. Plan and Purpose in Nature, New York: Harper Collins.

Williams, G. C. (1992) Natural Selection: Domains, levels, and challenges, Oxford: OUP.

Williams, G.C. (1966) Adaptation and Natural Selection: A critique of some current evolutionary thought, Princeton NJ: PUP.

 

Models in biology

Beatty, J. (1980) ‘What’s Wrong With the Received View of Evolutionary Theory?’ PSA Vol. 2, p. 410.

Collier, J. (1992) ‘Critical Notice of Paul Thompson’s The Structure of Biological Theories’, Canadian JPhil 22, p. 287.

Ereshefsky, M. (1991) ‘The Semantic Approach to Evolutionary Theory’ Bio&Phil, p. 59.

Lloyd, E. (1988/1994) The Structure and Confirmation of Evolutionary Theory, Princeton NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, esp. Ch. 2.

Sloep, P, & van der Steer, W.J. (1987) ‘The Nature of Evolutionary Theory and the Semantic Challenge’, Bio&Phil 2, p. 1.

Thompson, P. (1989) The Structure of Biological Theories, Albany: SUNY Press.

 

The concept of fitness

Brandon, R. & J. Beatty (1984) ‘Discussion: The Propensity Interpretation of “Fitness”—No Interpretation is No Substitute’ PhilSci 51.

Byerly, H.C. & R.E. Michod (1991) ‘Fitness and Evolutionary Explanation’ Bio&Phil 6 [Also see the responses to this article in the same issue.]

Ettinger, L., E. Jablonka, & P. McLaughlin (1990) ‘On the Adaptions of Organism and the Fitness of Types’ PhilSci 57.

Flew, A.G.N. (1959) ‘The Structure of Darwinism’ New Biology No. 28

Keller, E.F. (1987) ‘Reproduction and the Central Project of Evolutionary Theory’ Bio&Phil 2

Manser, A. (1956) ‘The Concept of Evolution’ Philosophy 40

* Mills, S. & J. Beatty (1979) ‘The Propensity Interpretation of Fitness’ PhilSci 46

Rosenberg, A. (1982) ‘On the Propensity Definition of Fitness’ PhilSci 49

* Rosenberg, A. (1983) ‘Fitness’, JPhil 80, pp. 457-473.

van der Steen, W.J. (1994) ‘New Ways to Look at Fitness’ History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 16 (3)

Waters, C. Kenneth (1986) ‘Natural Selection Without Survival of the Fittest’ Bio&Phil 1

 

The units of selection

Brandon, R.N. and R.M. Burian, eds. (1984) Genes, Organisms, Populations: Controversies over the units of selection, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press

Dawkins, R. (1986) The Extended Phenotype, Longman.

* Dawkins, R. (1989) The Selfish Gene, Oxford: OUP, 2nd ed.

Sober, E. (1984) The Nature of Selection, Massachusetts: MIT Press, Pt. II.

Sober, E. (1993) Philosophy of Biology, Boulder Colo.: Westview Press, Ch. 4.

Sterelny, K. & Kitcher, P. (1988) ‘The Return of the Gene’, JPhil 85, pp.339-361.

 

The evolution of altruism, eusociality, and sex

Axelrod, R. & Hamilton, W.D. (1981) ‘The Evolution of Cooperation’, Science 211, pp. 1390-96. [Repr. in J. Maynard Smith, Evolution Now (1982).]

Clutton-Brock, T.H. & P. Harvey (1978) Readings in Sociobiology, Section 1.

* Cronin, H. (1991) The Ant and the Peacock, Cambridge: CUP.

Darwin, C. (1871) The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex, Princeton: PUP [facsimile reproduction of first edition], i, pp. 253-63.

Maynard Smith, J. (1958) The Theory of Evolution, Cambridge: CUP Canto, Ch. 12, ‘Altruism, Social Behaviour, and Sex’.

Sober, E. (1988) ‘What is Evolutionary Altruism?’ in Philosophy and Biology (ed.) M. Matthen and B. Linsky.

Stearns, S.C. ed. (1987) The Evolution of Sex and its Consequences, Basel: Birkhauser, Ch. 1-2.

Trivers, R. (1985) Social Evolution, Menlo Park CA: The Benjamin/Cummings Publishing Co., Inc.

 

Species concepts and the units of evolution

Brandon, R. & Burian, R. (1984) Genes, Organisms, and Populations, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

Ereshefsky, M. (ed.) (1992) The Units of Evolution: Essays on the Nature of Species, Mass.: MIT Press.

Ghiselin, M. (1966) ‘On Psychologism in the Logic of Taxonomic Controversies’, Systematic Zoology.

* Ghiselin, M. (1974) ‘A Radical Solution to the Species Problem’, Systematic Zoology 23.

Ghiselin, M. (1987) ‘Species Concepts, Individuality, and Objectivity’ Bio&Phil 38

Hull, D. (1976) ‘Are Species Really Individuals?’ Systematic Zoology 25.

* Hull, D. (1978) ‘A Matter of Individuality’, PhilSci 45.

Hull, D. (1965) ‘The Effect of Essentialism on Taxonomy’, BJPS 15.

* Kitcher, P. (1984) ‘Species’, PhilSci 51, pp. 308-311.

* Mayr, E. (1969) ‘The Biological Meaning of Species’ Biology Journal of the Linnean Society 1, pp. 311-320

Mayr, E. (1994) ‘Species Concepts and Their Applications’, in Sober's Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary Biology.

 

Phylogenetic inference

* Sober, E. ed. (1994) Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary Biology, Cambridge Mass: MIT Press. [See sec. VII, esp. paper by W. Hennig.]

Sober, E. (1988) Reconstructing the Past: Parsinomy, Evolution, and Inference, Cambridge Mass.: The MIT Press.

Wiley, E.O. (1981) Phylogenetics: The Theory and Practice of Phylogenetic Systematics, New York: John Wiley.

 

Reduction of Mendelian genetics to molecular genetics

* Kitcher, P. (1984) ‘1953 and All That: A Tale of Two Sciences’, PhilRev, 93, pp. 335-373.

Rosenberg, A. (1994) Instrumental Biology or the Disunity of Science, Chicago: UCP.

Schaffner, K. (1969) ‘The Watson-Crick Model and Reductionism’, BJPS 20: 325-348.

* Schaffner, K., & Hull, D. (1974) Respective articles in PSA 1974.

Waters, C.K. (1990) ‘Why the Antireductionist Consensus won’t Survive the Case of Classical Mendelian Genetics’, in E. Sober (ed.) Conceptual Issues Evolutionary Biology (2nd ed.).

Waters, C.K. (1994) ‘Genes Made Molecular’ PhilSci 61, pp. 163-185.

 

Sociobiology and Evolutionary Psychology

Barkow, J.H., Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J., eds (1992) The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture, Oxford: OUP.

Buss, D.M. (1994) The Evolution of Desire: Strategies of human mating, New York: Basic Books.

Caplan, A., ed. (1978) The Sociology Debate, New York: Harper &Row.

Kitcher, P. (1987) Vaulting Ambition: Sociobiology and the Quest for Human Nature, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

Lewontin, R, S. Rose, & L. Kamin (1984) Not in Our Genes: Biology, Ideology, and Human Nature, New York: Pantheon Books.

Pinker, S. (1994) The Language Instinct: How the mind creates language, London: Allen Lane.

Ridley, M. (1993) The Red Queen: Sex and the evolution of human nature, London: Viking Penguin.

Rosenberg, A. (1988) Sociobiology and the Preemption of Social Science, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.

Wilson, E. O. (1975) Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, Harvard: HUP.

Wright, R. (1994) The Moral Animal: Evolutionary psychology and everyday life, London: Little, Brown.

 

Creationism

Futuyma, D. (1982) Science on Trial: The Case for Evolution, Pantheon Books.

Gish, D. (1979) Evolution? The Fossils Say No!, Creation-Life Publishers.

Hume, D. (1779) Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.

Kitcher, P. (1982) Abusing Science: The Case Against Creationism, Mass.: MIT Press.

Montagu, A. (1984) Science and Creationism, Oxford: OUP [esp. readings by Gallant, Ruse, Overton.].

Paley, William (1802) Natural Theology or Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity, Charlottesville VA: Lincoln-Rembrandt Publishing.

Ruse, M. (1988) But is it Science? Prometheus Books.

 


32. PHILOSOPHY OF PHYSICS

 

General Philosophy of Physics

Earman, J. (1986) A Primer on Determinism, Dordrecht: Reidel

Sklar, L. (1992) Philosophy of Physics, Oxford: OUP.

Saunders, S. & H.R. Brown, eds. (1991) The Philosophy of Vacuum, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

 

Philosophy of Classical Mechanics: the meaning of Newton's laws

* Barbour, J. (1989) Absolute or Relative Motion? Vol 1: The discovery of dynamics pp. 19-29.

Lindsay, R. & H. Margenau (1936) Foundations of Physics, New York: John Wiley and Sons, pp. 85-98.

Hanson, N.R. (1965) ‘Newton's First Law; A Philosopher's Door into Natural Philosophy’, in R.G. Colodny (ed.), Beyond the Edge of Certainty, Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press.

Earman, J. & M. Friedman (1973) ‘The meaning and status of Newton's law of inertia and the nature of gravitational forces’, PhilSci 49, 329-359.

Nagel, E. (1961) The Structure of Science. Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, pp. 174-192.

 

The Philosophy of Statistical Mechanics

Batterman, R.W. (1990) ‘Irreversibility and Statistical Mechanics: A new approach’, PhilSci 57.

Clark, P. (1987) ‘Determinism and Probability in Physics’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Association.

Denbigh, K. & Denbigh, J. (1985) Entropy in Relation to Incomplete Knowledge, Cambridge: CUP.

Dougherty, J.P. (1993) HistPhilSci 24.

* Ehrenfest, P. & Ehrenfest, T. (1990) The Conceptual Foundations of the Statistical Approach in Mechanics, New York: Dover.

Farquhar (1964) Ergodic Theory in Statistical Mechanics, New York: Wiley.

* Khinchin, A.I. (1949) Mathematical Foundations of Statistical Mechanics, New York: Dover.

Lavis, D. (1977) ‘The Role of Statistical Mechanics in Classical Physics’, BJPS 28.

Malament, D. & S. Zabell (1980) ‘Why Gibbs Phas Averages Work—The Role of Ergodic Theory’, PhilSci 47.

Prigogine, I. (1980) From Being to Becoming, W.H. Freeman: San Francisco.

Reichenbach, H. (1956) The Direction of Time, Berkeley: U. of California Press.

* Sklar, L. (1992) Philosophy of Physics, Oxford: OUP, Ch. 3.

* Sklar, L. (1993) Physics and Chance. Philosophical Issues in Foundations of Statistical Mechanics, Cambridge: CUP.

Penrose, O. (1979) ‘Foundations of statistical mechanics’, Reports in the Progress in Physics 42, 1937-2006.

 

Philosophy of Spacetime and Relativity

(a) General texts (in alphabetical order; A for advanced)

Angel, R. (1980) Relativity: The Theory and its Philosophy, Pergamon.

Barbour, J. (1989) Absolute or Relative Motion? Vol. 1: The discovery of dynamics, Cambridge: CUP.

Earman, J. (1990)A                                                World Enough and Spacetime, Absolute versus Relational Theories of Space and Time, Cambridge Mass: MIT Press.

Friedman, M. (1983)A Foundations of Spacetime Theories, Princeton: PUP.

Lucas, J. & P. Hodgson (1990) Spacetime and Electromagnetism, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Nerlich, G. (1994) What Spacetime Explains: Metaphysical Essays on Space and Time, Cambridge: CUP.

Reichenbach, H. (1958) Philosophy of Space and Time, Dover.

Sklar, L. (1974) Space, Time and Spacetime, Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.

Torretti, R. (1983)A Relativity and Geometry, Pergamon.

van Fraassen, B. (1985—2nd ed.) Introduction to the Philosophy of Space and Time, New York: Columbia University Press.

(b) The meaning of Einstein's 1905 postulates

Brown, H.R. & R. Sypel (1995) ‘On the meaning of the relativity principle and other symmetries’, ISPS 9, 233-251.

Nugaev, R.M. (1988) ‘Special relativity as a stage in the development of quantum theory’, Historia Scientarum 34, 57-79.

Williamson, R.B. (1977) ‘Logical Economy in Einstein’s “On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies”’, HistPhilSci 8, 49-60.

(c) How special relativity explains

Bell, J.S. (1987) ‘How to teach special relativity’, in The Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics, Cambridge: CUP, pp. 67-80.

Brown, H.R. (1993) ‘Correspondence, invariance and heuristics in the emergence of special relativity’, in S. French and H. Kaminga (eds.), Correspondence, Invariance and Heuristics; Essays in Honour of Heinz Post, Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 227-260.

Friedman, M. (1983) Foundations of Spacetime Theories, Princeton: PUP. Ch IV.

Torretti, R. (1983)A Relativity and Geometry, Pergamon, Sec. 4.1-4.2.

 (d) The conventionality of distant simultaneity

Anderson, R. & G. Stedman (1997) Physics Reports.

Malament, D. (1977) ‘Causal Theories of Time and the Conventionality of Simultaneity’ Nous 11, 293-300.

Reichenbach, H. (1958) Philosophy of Space and Time, Dover, Section 27.

(e) The twins 'paradox'

Salmon,W. (1975) Space Time and Motion, A Philosophical Introduction, Encino, CA: Dickinson, Ch IV.

Sklar, L. (1974) Space, Time and Spacetime, Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, pp. 261-272.

(f) Conventionality of geometry

Poincare, H. (1955) Science and Hypothesis, Dover, Ch 3.

Torretti, R. (1983)A Relativity and Geometry, Pergamon, pp. 230-247.

(g) Substantivalism and the New Leibnizian (Hole) argument.

Bartels, A. (1994) ‘What is spacetime, if not a substance’, in U. Majer and H-J. Schmidt (eds.) Semantical Aspects of Spacetime Theories, B.I. Wissenschaftsverlag, pp. 41-51.

Butterfield, J. (1989) ‘The Hole Truth’, BJPS 40, 1-28.

Earman, J. & J. Norton (1987) ‘What Price Spacetime Substantivalism? The Hole Story’, BJPS 38, 515-525.

(h) Mach's principle

Barbour, J. & H. Pfister, eds. (1995) Mach's Principle: From Newton's Bucket to Quantum Gravity, Birkhauser.

Earman, J. (1990)A                                                World Enough and Spacetime, Absolute versus Relational Theories of Space and Time, Cambridge Mass: MIT Press. Ch. 4-5.

(i) The causal theory of spacetime

Lucas, J. & P. Hodgson (1990) Spacetime and Electromagnetism, Oxford: Clarendon Press, Ch. 3.

Nerlich, G. (1994) What Spacetime Explains: Metaphysical Essays on Space and Time, Cambridge: CUP, Ch. 3

Robb, A.A. (1914) A Theory of Time and Space, Cambridge: CUP.

Torretti, R. (1983)A Relativity and Geometry, Pergamon, Sec. 4.6

Winnie, J.A. (1977) ‘The causal theory of space-time’, in J. Earman et al. (eds.) MinnStud Vol. 8, Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press.

(j) Black holes, time travel

Deutsch, D. & M. Lockwood (1994) ‘The quantum physics of time travel’, Scientific American, March, p. 68.

Deutsch, D. (1997) The Fabric of Reality, Allen Lane: The Penguin Press, Ch 12.

Weingard, R. (1979) ‘General relativity and the conceivability of time travel’, PhilSci 46, 328-332.

Weingard, R. (1979) ‘Some philosophical aspects of black holes’, Synthese 42, 191-219.

 

Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics

(a) General texts

Albert, D. (1994) Quantum Mechanics and Experience, Cambridge Mass: HUP.

Bell, J.S. (1987) Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics, Cambridge: CUP.

Busch, P. et al., eds. (1991) The Quantum Theory of Measurement, Springer-Verlag.

Clifton, R.K. ed. (1996) Perspectives on Quantum Reality, Dordrecht: Kluwer.

d'Espagnat, B. (1995) Veiled Reality, Addison-Wesley.

Hughes, R.I.G. (1989) Structure and Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, Cambridge Mass: HUP.

Omnès, R. (1994) The Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, Princeton N.J.: PUP.

Primas, H. (1983-2nd Ed.)A Quantum Mechanics, Chemistry and Reductionism, Berlin: Springer.

Rae, A. (1986) Quantum Physics: Illusion or Reality?, Cambridge: CUP.

Redhead, M.L.G. (1989) Incompleteness, Nonlocality and Realism, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Squires, E. (1990) Conscious Mind in the Physical World, Adam Hilger.

Whitaker, A. (1996) Einstein, Bohr and the Quantum Dilemma, Cambridge: CUP.

(b) The measurement problem

Albert, D. (1994) Quantum Mechanics and Experience, Cambridge Mass: HUP, Ch. 4.

Bell, J.S. (1990) ‘Against “Measurement”’, Physics World 3.

Redhead, M.L.G. (1989) Incompleteness, Nonlocality and Realism, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 51-59

Squires, E. (1990) Conscious Mind in the Physical World, Adam Hilger, Ch 11.

Wheeler, J. & W. Zurek, eds. (1983) Quantum Theory and Measurement, Princeton: PUP [An important collection of seminal papers]

(c) Nonlocality: Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox and the Bell theorem

Bell, J.S. (1987) Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics, Cambridge: CUP, Chs. 2, 4, 7 and 16

Brown, H. (1992) ‘Bell's other theorem and its connection with nonlocality. Part I’, in A. van der Merwe et al. (eds.) Bell's Theorem and the Foundations of Modern Physics, World Scientific, pp. 104-116.

Butterfield, J. (1992) ‘Bell's theorem: what it takes’, BJPS.

Fine, A. (1986) The Shaky Game: Einstein, Realism and the Quantum Theory, Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.

Maudlin, T. (1994) Quantum Mechanics and Relativity, Oxford: Blackwell.

Redhead, M.L.G. (1989) Incompleteness, Nonlocality and Realism, Oxford: Clarendon Press, Chs 3,4.

(d) Hidden variables theories

Albert, D. (1994) Quantum Mechanics and Experience, Cambridge Mass: HUP, Ch. 7.

Belinfante, F. (1973) A Survey of Hidden-Variables Theories, Pergamon.

Bell, J.S. (1987) Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics, Cambridge: CUP, Chs. 1 & 17.

Bohm, D. & B. Hiley (1993) The Undivided Universe: An Ontological Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, London: Routledge.

Cushing, J.T. et al., eds. (1996) Bohmian Mechanics and Quantum Theory: An Appraisal, Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Holland, P. (1993) The Quantum Theory of Motion, Cambridge: CUP.

Shimony, A. (1984) ‘Contextual Hidden Variables Theories and Bell’s Inequalities’, BJPS 35.

(e) Many worlds and many minds interpretations

Albert, D. (1994) Quantum Mechanics and Experience, Cambridge Mass: HUP, Ch. 6.

Bell, J.S. (1987) The Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics, Cambridge: CUP, Chs 15 and 20

Deutsch, D. (1997) The Fabric of Reality, Allen Lane: The Penguin Press.

Lockwood, M. (1989) Mind, Brain and the Quantum, London: Blackwell.

Lockwood, M. (1996) Special issue of BJPS Vol. 47: essay by Lockwood and replies by various authors.

Saunders, S. (1996) ‘Relativism’, in R. Clifton (ed.) Perspectives on Quantum Reality, Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 125-142.

(f) Bohr and the Copenhagen interpretation

Cushing, J.T. (1994) Quantum Mechanics: Historical Contingency versus the Copenhagen Hegemony, Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press

Mudoch, D. (1987) Niels Bohr's Philosophy of Physics, Cambridge: CUP

Scheibe, E. (1970) Logical Analysis of Quantum Mechanics, Pergamon, Ch. 1.

Shimony, A. (1963) ‘Role of the Observer in Quantum Theory’, American J. of Physics 31.

(g) Collapse (Dynamic Reduction) Models

Ghirardi, G.C. & Pearle, P. (1990) ‘Dynamical Reduction Theories: Changing Quantum Theory so the Statevector Represents Reality’, PSA 1990, Vol. II.

Ghirardi, G.C. & Pearle, P. (1990) ‘Elements of Physical Reality, Nonocality and Stochasticity in Relativistic Dynamical Reduction Models’, PSA 1990, Vol. II.

Percival, I.C. (1995) ‘Quantum spacetime fluctuations and primary state diffusion’, Proceedings of the Royal Society 451, 503-513.

Shimony, A. (1990) ‘Desiderata for a Modified Quantum Dynamics’, PSA 1990, Vol. II.

Whitaker, A. (1996) Einstein, Bohr and the Quantum Dilemma, Cambridge: CUP, pp. 305-308.

(h) Consistent histories, decoherence.

Dowker, F. & A. Kent (1994) ‘On the consistent histories approach to quantum mechanics’, J. of Statistical Physics 82, 1575-1646.

Zurek, W.H. (1991) ‘Decoherence and the transition from quantum to classical', Physics Today, October, pp. 36-44. [See also the replies to Zurek's paper in the April 1993 issue of the same journal.]

(i) Modal interpretations

Bacciagaluppi, G. & M. Hemmo (1996) ‘Modal Interpretations, Decoherence, and Measurements’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 27B.

Bub, J. (1997) Interpretating the Quantum World, Cambridge: CUP.

Healey, R. (1989) The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics; An Interactive Interpretation, Cambridge: CUP.

Kochen, S. (1985) ‘A New Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics’, in P. Lahti & P. Mittleastaedt (eds.) Symposium on the Foundations of Modern Physics 1985, Singapore: World Scientific.

van Fraassen, B. (1991) Quantum Mechanics: An Empiricist View, Oxford: OUP, Pt. IV.

Vermaas, P. & D. Dieks ( 1995) ‘The modal interpretation of quantum mechanics and its generalization to density operators’, Foundations of Physics 25, 145-158.

(j) Quantum logic

Hooker, C.A. (1975) The Logico-Algebraic Approach to Quantum Mechanics Vol. 1: Historical Evolution, Dordrecht: Reidel. [Contains the papers below.]

Hughes, R.I.G. (1989) Structure and Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, Cambridge Mass: HUP, Ch. 7.

Jauch, J.M. & C. Piron (1969) ‘On the Structure of Quantal Proposition Systems’, Helvetica Physica Acta 43.

Specker, E.P. (1960) ‘The Logic of Propositions which are not Simultaneously Decidable’, Dialectica 14. [In German. Translated to English in Hooker (1975).]

van Fraassen, B. (1974) ‘The Labyrinth of Quantum of Logics’, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13.

 

Philosophy of Quantum Field Theory

Auyang, S.Y. (1995) How is Quantum Field Theory Possible?, Oxford: OUP.

Brown, H.R. & R. Harre, eds. (1988) Philosophical Foundations of Quantum Field Theory, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Huggett, N. & R. Weingard (1994) ‘Interpretations of Quantum Field Theory’ PhilSci 61, 370-388.

Huggett, N. & R. Weingard (1994) ‘On the field aspect of quantum fields’, Erkenntnis 40, 293-301.

Huggett, N. & R. Weingard (1995) ‘The renormalization group and effective field theories’, Synthese 102, pp. 171-194.

Huggett, N. & R. Weingard (1996) ‘Review of ”An Interpretive Introduction to Quantum Field Theory”’, PhliSci

Saunders, S. & H.R. Brown, eds. (1991) The Philosophy of Vacuum, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Teller, P. (1995) An Interpretive Introduction to Quantum Field Theory, Princeton: PUP.


33. PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY

 

General background and collections

Block, N. (1980) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology Vols. 1 and 2, Cambridge Mass: HUP.

Bruce, V. ed. (1996) Unsolved Mysteries of Mind, Sussex: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Churchland, P.M. (1988) Matter and Consciousness: A contemporary introduction to the philosophy of mind [revised ed.], Cambridge Mass: MIT Press.

Churchland, P.S. (1986) Neurophilosophy:  Toward a unified science of the mind/brain, Cambridge Mass: MIT Press.

Flanagan, Owen (1990) The Science of the Mind [2nd ed.], Cambridge Mass: MIT Press.

Gardner, H. (1985) The Mind’s New Science: A history of the cognitive revolution, NY: Basic Books.

Lycan, W.G. ed. (1990) Mind and Cognition: a reader, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Macdonald, C. and Macdonald, G. eds. (1995) The Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on psychological explanation, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Rosenthal, D. ed. (1991) The Nature of Mind, Oxford: OUP.

Weiskrantz, L. ed. (1988) Thought Without Language, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

 

Reductionism and levels of explanation

Bechtel, W. & Abrahamsen, A. (1991) Connectionism and the Mind: An introduction to parallel processing in networks, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Ch. 8.

Block, N. (1990) ‘The Computer Model of Mind’, in D.N. Osherson and E.E. Smith (eds.) An Invitation to Cognitive Science Vol. 1: Thinking, Cambridge Mass: MIT Press.

Charles, D. & Lennon, K. (1992) Reduction, Explanation, and Realism, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Churchland, P.S. (1986) Neurophilosophy: Toward a unified science of the mind/brain, Cambridge Mass: MIT Press, Ch. 7 and 9.

Clark, A. (1990) ‘Connectionism, Competence, and Explanation’, in M. Boden (ed.) The Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence, Oxford: OUP.

Cummins, R. (1983) The Nature of Phychological Explanation, Cambridge Mass: MIT Press.

Fodor, J.A. (1974) ‘Special Sciences (or: the disunity of science as a working hypothesis)’, Synthese 28, pp. 97-115.

Fodor, J.A. (1989)                                                ‘Making Mind Matter More’ Philosophical Topics 17, 59-80.

Marr, D. (1982) Vision, NY: W.H. Freeman and Co., Ch. 1, 7.

Peacocke, C. (1986) ‘Explanation in Computational Psychology: Language, Perception, and Level 1.5’, Mind and Language 1, p. 101-123.

Stelreny, K. (1990) The Representational Theory of Mind: An introduction, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, esp. Ch. 3.

 

Modularity

Fodor, J. (1983) The Modularity of Mind, Cambridge Mass: MIT Press.

Fodor, J. (1985) Precis of The Modularity of Mind, Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 8, pp. 1-42.

Garfield, J.L. (1994) ‘Modularity’, in Guttenplan, S. (ed.) A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell.

Garfield, J.L. (ed.) (1987) Modularity in Knowledge Representation and Natural Language Understanding, Mass.: MIT Press.

Sterelny, K. (1990) The Representational Theory of Mind: An Introduction, Oxford: Blackwell, ch.4.

 

Double dissociation and cognitive neuropsychology

Coltheart, M. (1985) ‘Cognitive neuropsychology and the study of reading’, in Posner & Marin (eds.) Attention and Performance XI (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum).

Glymour, C. (1994) ‘On the Methods of Cognitive Neuropsychology’, BJPS 45, 815-35.

Shallice, T. (1988) From Neuropsychology to Mental Structure, Cambridge: CUP, Part 3.

Stone, T. & Davies, M. (1993) ‘Cognitive neuropsychology and the philosophy of mind’, BJPS 44, 589-622.

 

Tacit knowledge

Chomsky, N. (1990) ‘Language and Problems of Knowledge’ in Martinich, A. P. (ed.) The Philosophy of Language, Oxford: OUP.

Chomsky. N. (1965) Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Mass.: MIT Press, ch.1.

Davies, M. (1989) ‘Tacit Knowledge and Subdoxastic States’, in George, A. (ed.) Reflections on Chomsky, Oxford: Blackwell.

Quine, W. V. O. (1972) ‘Methodological Reflections on Current Linguistic Theory’, in Davidson and Harman (eds.) Semantics of Natural Language, Dordrecht: Reidel.

Stich, S. (1978) ‘Beliefs and Subdoxastic States’, PhilSci, 45, pp. 499-518.

 

Connectionism

Bechtel, W. & Abrahamsen, A. (1991) Connectionism and the Mind, Oxford: Blackwell.

Clark, A. (1989) Microcognition: Philosophy, cognitive science, and parallel distributed processing, Cambridge Mass: MIT Press.

Davies, M. (1989) ‘Connectionism, Modularity and Tacit Knowledge’, BJPS 40, pp. 541-55.

Fodor, J. & Pylyshyn, Z. (1988) ‘Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture’, Cognition.

Horgan, T. & Tienson, J. eds. (1991) Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind, Dordrecht: Kluwer.

McDonald, C. & McDonald, G. eds. (1995) Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation, Oxford: Blackwell.

Pinker, S. & Prince (1988) ‘On Language and Connectionism’, Cognition.

Sterelny, K. (1990) The Representational Theory of the Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, ch.8.

 

Consciousness and qualia

Crick, F. & Koch, C. (1992) ‘The Problem of Consciousness’, Scientific American, September.

Davies, M. & Humphreys, G. W. eds. (199??) Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays, Oxford: Blackwell.

Dennett, D. (1988) ‘Quining Qualia’ in A.J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.) Consciousness in Contemporary Science.

Dennett, D. (1991) Consciousness Explained, Boston: Little Brown & Co.

Jackson, F. (1982)                                                ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’ PhilQuart 32, pp. 127-136.

Levine, J. (1983) ‘Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64, pp. 354-361.

Marcel, A.J. & Bisiach, E. eds. (1988) Consciousness in Contemporary Science, Oxford: OUP.

McGinn, C. (1991) The Problem of Consciousness, Oxford: OUP.

Nagel, T. (1974) ‘What is it like to be a bat?’ PhilRev 83, p. 435-450. [Repr. in his Mortal Questions.]

Young,. A.W. & Block, N. (1996) ‘Consciousness’, in V.Bruce (ed.) Unsolved Mysteries of Mind.

 

Attention

Allport, A. (1980) ‘Attention and Performance’, in G. Claxton (ed.) Cognitive Psychology: New Directions, London: RKP.

Allport, A. (1993) ‘Attention and Control: Have we been asking the wrong questions? A Critical Review of 25 Years’ in S. Kornblum & D.E. Meyers (eds.) Attention and Performance XIV: A Silver Jubilee, Cambridge Mass: MIT Press.

James, W. (1890) The Principles of Psychology, NY: Holt.

Johnston, W.A. & Dark, V.J. (1986) ‘Selective Attention’, Annual Review of Psychology 37.

Navon, D. (1984) ‘Resources--a theoretical soup stone?’ Psychological Review 91.

Neumann, O. (1987) ‘Beyond Capacity: a functional view of attention’, in H. Heuer & A.F. Sanders (eds.), Perspectives on Perception and Action, Hillsdale NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Norman, D.A. & Shallice, T. (1986) ‘Attention to Action: Willed and automatic control of behavior’, in R.J. Davidson, G.E. Schwartz, & D. Shapiro (eds.) Consciousness and Self-Regulation:  Advances in research Vol. 4, NY: Plenum Press.

Posner, M.I. & Rothbart, M.K. (1992) ‘Attentional mechanism and conscious experience’, in A.D. Milner & M. Rugg (eds.) The Neuropsychology of Consciousness, London: Academic Press.

Treisman, A.M. & Gelade, G. (1980) ‘A feature-integration theory of attention’, Cognitive Psychology 12.

Underwood, G. (1982) ‘Attention and awareness in cognitive and motor skills’, in G. Underwood (ed.) Aspects of Consciousness Vol. 3, London: Academic Press.

van der Heijden, A.H.C. (1992) Selective Attention in Vision, London: RKP.

 

Folk psychology and mental simulation

Bennett, M. ed. (1993) The Child as Psychologist, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Carruthers, P. & Smith, P. K. eds. (1996) Theories of Theories of Mind, Cambridge: CUP.

Davies, M. & Stone, T. eds. (1995) Folk Psychology: The Theory of Mind Debate, Oxford: Blackwell.

Davies, M. & Stone, T. eds. (1995) Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications, Oxford: Blackwell.

 

Rationality and irrationality

Cohen, L. J. (1981) ‘Can Human Irrationality be Experimentally Demonstrated?’, Behavioural and Brain Sciences 4, pp. 317-331.

Foley, R.. (1988) ‘Some Different Conceptions of Rationality’, in McMullin, E. (ed.) Construction and Constraint, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Kahneman, D., Slovic, P. & Tversky, A. (1982) Judgment Under Uncertainty, Cambridge: CUP.

Nisbett, R. & Ross, L. (1980) Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgement, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

Stich, S.P. (1984) ‘Could Man Be an Irrational Animal? Some Notes on the Epistemology of Rationality’, Synthese 64: 1. [Much of this article is reprinted in The Fragmentation of Reason, Oxford: OUP.]

 

Evolutionary psychology [Also see ‘Sociobiology’ section under Philosophy of Biology]

Clark, A. (1989) Microcognition: Philosophy, Cognitive Science, and Parallel Distributed Processing, Cambridge Mass: MIT Press, Ch. 4.

Cosmides, L. & Tooby, J. (1994) ‘Beyond intuition and instinct blindness: toward an evolutionary rigorous cognitive science’ Cognition 50, pp. 44-77.

Sterelny, K. (1992) ‘Evolutionary explanations of human behavior’, Australian JPhil 70, p. 156-173.

Symons, D. (1992) ‘On the Use and Misuse of Darwinism in the Study of Human Behavior’, in Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby (eds) The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture, Oxford: OUP.

Tooby, J. & Cosmides, L. (1995) ‘Introduction’, and ‘Mapping the evolved functional organization of mind and brain’ in Gazzaniga, M.S. (ed.) The Cognitive Neurosciences, Mass.: MIT Press.

 

Behaviorism

Chomsky, M. (1959) Review of B.F. Skinner’s Verbal Behavior, Language 35, p. 26-58. [Repr. in N. Block (ed.) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology Vol. 1.]

Dennett, D.C. (1975) ‘Why the Law of Effect will not go away’, J. of the Theory of Social Behaviour 5, 169-176. [Repr. in his Brainstorms.]

Dennett, D.C. (1978) ‘Skinner Skinned’, in Dennett’s Brainstorms.

Hull, C. (1943) Principles of Behavior.

Skinner, B.F. (1953) Science and Human Behavior, London: Macmillan.

Skinner, B.F. (1971) Beyond Freedom and Dignity, NY: Alfred Knopf.

Watson, J.B. (1930) Behaviorism [revised edition], NY: W.W. Norton.


34. THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

 

Introductions

Elster, J. The Cement of Society (1989), or Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (1989), Cambridge: CUP.

Fay, B. & J.D. Moon (1977) ‘What Would an Adequate Philosophy of Social Science Look Like?’, Philosophy of Social Science 7. [Also in M&M (see below under Collections.]

Hollis, M. (1994) The Philosophy of Social Science: An Introduction, Cambridge: CUP.

Hughes, J. (1990) The Philosophy of Social Research, London: Longman.

Manicas, P.T. (1987) A History and Philosophy of the Social Sciences.

Machlup, F. (1961) ‘Are the Social Sciences Really Inferior’, Southern Economic Journal 17. [Also in M&M.]

Rosenberg, A. (1988) Philosophy of Social Science, Colorado: Westview Press.

Ryan, A. (1970) The Philosophy of the Social Sciences,

Trigg, R. (1985) Understanding Social Science:  A Philosophical Introduction to the Social Science, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

 

Collections

Brodbeck, M. ed. (1968) Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences,

Hollis, M .& Lukes, S. eds. (1982) Rationality and Relativism, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Martin, M. & L.C. McIntyre eds. (1994) Readings in the Philosophy of Social Science, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. [Abbreviated in this section as M&M.]

Ryan, A. ed. (1973) The Philosophy of Social Explanation, Oxford: OUP.

 

Laws in social explanation

Fay, B. (1983) ‘General Laws and Explaining Behaviour’ in Changing Social Science (eds.) D. R. Sabia & J. Wallulis, Albany: SUNY Press. [Also in M&M.]

Hempel, C. (1942) ‘The Function of General Laws in History’, JPhil 39. [Also in M&M.]

Kincaid, H. (1990) ‘Defending Laws in the Social Sciences’, Philosophy of Social Science 20. [Also in M&M.]

McIntyre, L. (1993) ‘“Complexity” and Social Scientific Laws’, Synthese 97. [Also in M&M.]

Nagel, E. (1961) The Structure of Science, New York: Harcourt, Ch. 13.

Romanos, G. (1973) ‘Reflexive Predictions’, PhilSci 40. [Also in M&M.]

Scriven, M. (1956) ‘A Possible Distinction between Traditional Scientific Disciplines and the Study of Human Behavior’, MinnStud 1. [Also in M&M.]

 

Interpretation and explanation

Dray, W. (1957) Laws and Explanation in History, Oxford: OUP, pp. 118-131. [Also in M&M as ‘The Rationale of Action’.]

Follesdal, D. (1979) ‘Hermeneutics and the Hypothetico-Deductive Method’, Dialectica 33, pp. 319-336.

Giddens, A. (1976) New Rules of Sociological Method.

MacIntyre, A. (1973) ‘Is a Science of Comparative Politics Possible?’, in A. Ryan (ed.) The Philosophy of Social Explanation.

Martin, J.R. (1969) ‘Another Look at the Doctrine of Verstehen’, BJPS 20, pp. 53-67.

Martin, M. (1994) ‘Taylor on Interpretation and the Sciences of Man’, in M&M.

Schutz, A. ‘Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences’ in D. Emmet & A. MacIntyre (eds.) Sociological Theory and Philosophical Analysis.

* Taylor, C. (1971) ‘Interpretation and the Sciences of Man’ Review of Metaphysics 25, pp. 3-51. [Also in M&M.]

Weber, M. (1949) The Methodology of the Social Sciences, New York: Macmillan, Ch. 3.

* Winch, P. (1972) ‘Understanding a Primitive Society’ in Ethics and Action, London: RKP (1972).

Winch, P. (1958) The Idea of a Social Science (2nd ed.), London: RKP.

 

Rationalizing explanations/rational choice theory

Davidson, D. (1980) ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’ in his Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: OUP.

Elster, J. Rational Choice (1986) London: Blackwell, The Cement of Society (1989) Cambridge: CUP, or Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (1989), Cambridge: CUP.

Elster, J. (1985) ‘The Nature and Scope of Rational-Scope Explanation’, in E. LePore and B. McLaughlin (eds.) Actions and Events: Perspectives on Donald Davidson, Oxford: OUP. [Also in M&M.]

Follesdal, D. ‘The Status of Rationality Assumptions in Interpretation and in the Explanation of Action’, Dialectica 36. [Also in M&M.]

Henderson, D. (1989) ‘The Role and Limitations of Rationalizing Explanation in the Social Sciences’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19.

Hollis, M. (1987) The Cunning of Reason, Cambridge: CUP.

Mansbridge, J.J. (1990) Beyond Self-Interest, Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, Pts. I, II, III.

Pettit, P. (1978) ‘Rational Man Theory’, in Action and Interpretation (eds.) C. Hookway and P. Pettit, Cambridge: CUP.

Rosenberg, A. (1983) ‘If Economics Isn’t Science, What Is It?’ Philosophical Forum 14, pp. 296-314.

Sen, A.K. (1976-77) ‘Rational Fools’, in Philosophy and Public Affairs 6, pp. 317-344. [Repr. in F. Hahn & M. Hollis (eds.) Philosophy and Economic Theory]

Taylor, C. (1985) ‘What is Human Agency?’ in Human Agency and Language  

 

Translation, rationality and relativism

Davidson, D. (1983) ‘Belief and the Basis of Meaning’ and ‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’ in his Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford: OUP.

Geertz, Clifford (1983) ‘From the Native Point of View’, in The Interpretation of Culture, New York: HarperCollins.

Gellner, Ernest (1985) Relativism and the Social Sciences, Cambridge: CUP, esp. ‘Relativism and Universals’.

Harding, Sandra (1986) The Science Question in Feminism, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, esp. Ch. 6, 7.

Henderson, D. (1987) ‘The Principle of Charity and the Problem of Irrationality (Translation and the Problem of Irrationality)’ Synthese 73, pp. 225-252. [Also in M&M.]

Hollis, M. (1970) ‘Reason and Ritual’ and ‘The Limits of Rationality’ in B. Wilson (ed.) Rationality, Oxford: Blackwell.

Lukes, Steven (1994) ‘Some Problems about Rationality’ in Martin, M. & L.C. McIntyre (eds.).

* MacIntyre, A. (1970) ‘The Idea of a Social Science’ in B. Wilson (ed.) Rationality, New York: Harper and Row. [Also in A. Ryan (ed.) The Philosophy of Social Explanation.]

Quine, W.V.O. (1970) ‘On the Reasons for the Indeterminacy of Translation’, JPhil 67.

Taylor, C. (1982) ‘Rationality’ in S. Lukes & M. Hollis (eds.) Rationality and Relativism, Oxford: OUP.

* Winch, P. (1972) ‘Understanding a Primitive Society’ in Ethics and Action, London: RKP (1972).

 

Objectivity and values

Comstock, D. (1982) ‘A Method of Critical Research’, E. Bredo & W. Feinberg (eds.) Knowledge and Values in Social and Educational Research, Philadelphia: Temple U. Press. [Also in M&M.]

Habermas, J. (1968) Knowledge and Human Interests, Appendix. [Also see R. Bernstein (1976) The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory, and T. McCarthy (1978) The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas, Ch. 2.]

Hesse, M. (1978) ‘Theory and Value in the Social Sciences’ in C. Hookway and P. Pettit (eds.) Action and Interpretation, Cambridge: CUP.

Martin, M. (1977) ‘The Philosophical Importance of the Rosenthal Effect’, J. for the Theory of Social Behavior 7. [Also in M&M.]

Nagel, E. (1961) The Structure of Science, New York: Hackett, pp. 485-503. [Also in M&M as ‘The Value-Oriented Bias of Social Inquiry’.]

Oppenheim, F. (1981) Political Concepts, Ch. 8 and 9.

Papineau, D. (1978) For Science in the Social Sciences, Ch. 7.

Runciman, W.G. (1983) A Treatise on Social Theory Vol. 1: The Methodology of Social Theory, Ch. 1 and 5.

* Taylor, C. (1973) ‘Neutrality in Political Science’ in A. Ryan (ed.) The Philosophy of Social Explanation and in Taylor’s Collected Papers Vol. II. [Also in M&M.]

* Weber, M. (1949) ‘“Objectivity” in Social Science and Policy’, in The Methodology of the Social Sciences, New York: Macmillan Press. [Also in M&M.]

Weisstein, N. (1971) ‘Psychology Constructs the Female’ Social Education 35. [Also in M&M.]

Wyle, A. (1992) ‘Reasoning about Ourselves: Feminist Methodology in the Social Sciences’, in E. Harvey & K. Okruhik (eds.) Women and Reason, Ann Arbor: U. of Michigan Press. [Also in M&M.]

 

Functional explanation

* Cohen, G.A. (1978) Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defense, Princeton: PUP, Ch. 9, 10. [Also in M&M.]

Cohen/Elster (1986 and 1989) Contributions to J. Roemer (ed.) Analytical Marxism and A. Callinicos (ed.) Marxist Theory.

Dore, R.P. (1961) ‘Function and Cause’ Sociological Review 16, pp. 843-853. [Also in M&M.]

Elster, J. (1983) ‘Functional Explanation’ in Explaining Technical Change, Cambridge: CUP, pp. 55-68. [Also in M&M.]

Elster, J. (1986) An Introduction to Karl Marx, Cambridge: CUP, pp. 21-34.

* Hempel, C. (1965) ‘The Logic of Functional Analysis’, in his Aspects of Scientific Explanation, New York: Macmillan. [Also in M&M.]

Kincaid, H. (1990)                                                ‘Assessing Functional Explanation in the Social Sciences’, PSA 1990 Vol. I, pp. 341-54. [Also in M&M.]

Merton, R.K. (1957) Social Theory and Social Structure, NY: Free Press, Ch. I pp. 19-66.

Nagel, E. (1961) The Structure of Science, New York: Hackett, Ch. 12 & 14 (second part).

* Rosenberg, A. (1988) Philosophy of Social Science, Oxford: Clarendon Press, Ch. 5.

Taylor, C. (1964) The Explanation of Behaviour, London: RKP, Ch. 1

van Parijs, P. (1981) Evolutionary Explanation in the Social Sciences, Ch. 2 and 3.

 

Reductionism and individualism

Bhargava, R. (1992) Individualism in Social Science, Oxford: Clarendon Press.  

Garfinkel, A. (1981) Forms of Explanation: Rethinking the Questions in Social Theory, New Haven, Conn: Yale Univ. Press, Ch. 2, 3.

Kincaid, H. (1986)                                                ‘Reduction, Explanation and Individualism’ PhilSci 53, pp. 492-513. [Also in M&M.]

Lukes, S. (1968) ‘Methodological Individualism Reconsidered’, British J. of Sociology 19, 119-129. [Also in M&M.]

Macdonald, G. and P. Pettit (1981) Semantics and Social Science, London: Routledge, Ch. 3.

Miller, R. (1978) ‘Methodological Individualism and Social Explanation’ PhilSci 45, pp. 387-414. [Also in M&M.]

Popper, K. (1957) The Poverty of Historicism, London: Routledge, Sec. 23, 28-29.

Rosenberg, A. (1988) Philosophy of Social Science, Oxford: Clarendon Press, Ch. 6.

Taylor, C. (1985) ‘Atomism’, in his Philosophy and the Human Sciences, Cambridge: CUP.

Watkins, J. (1957)                                                ‘Historical Explanations in the Social Sciences’ BJPS 8, pp. 104-117. [Also in M&M.]

Watkins, J. (1968)                                                ‘Methodological Individualism Reconsidered’, Brodbeck, M. (ed.) Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences.

 

Realism and social facts

Benton, T. (1977) Philosophical Foundations of the Three Sociologies, London: Routledge.

Berger, P. & T. Luckmann (1984) The Social Construction of Reality, Pelican Books.  

Bhaskar, R. (1979) The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Sciences (2nd ed), Harvester Press, esp Ch. 3.

Durkheim, E. (1952) Suicide, London: Routledge, Preface and Introduction.

* Durkheim, E. (1938) ‘Social Facts’, in The Rules of Sociological Method, Ch. 1. [Also in M&M.]

Mandelbaum, M. (1955) ‘Social Facts’, in British J. of Sociology 6. [Repr. in Ryan.]

Outhwaite, W. (1987) New Philosophies of Social Science, Basingstoke: Macmillan, esp Ch. 4, 6, 7.

Ruben, D-H. (1985) The Metaphysics of the Social World, London: RKP, Ch. 1, 4.

Searle, J.R. (1995) The Construction of Social Reality, London: Penguin.