Partial Liability

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Abstract
Liability in tort law is all-or-nothing – a defendant is either fully liable or not at all liable for a claimant’s loss. By contrast, this paper defends a causal theory of partial liability. I’ll argue that a defendant should be held liable for a claimant’s loss only to the degree to which the defendant’s wrongdoing contributed to the causing of the loss. I ground this principle in a conception of tort law as a system of corrective justice, and use it to critically evaluate different mechanisms for ‘limiting’ liability for consequences of wrongdoing and for ‘apportioning’ liability between multiple wrongdoers.

1. Introduction

In most cases, liability in tort law is all-or-nothing – a defendant is either fully liable or not at all liable for a claimant’s loss. By contrast, this paper defends a causal theory of partial liability. I will argue that a defendant should be held liable for a claimant’s loss only to the degree to which the defendant’s wrongdoing contributed to the causing of the loss.

Some theorists are sceptical of talk of ‘degrees of causal contribution’ in the law. “[C]ausation . . . exists or it does not,” Pearson reminds us, “and if it does exist one does not speak of ‘degrees of causation.’”1 Wright agrees that [c]ausation . . . is not a

matter of degree,” since “[s]ome condition either was or was not a cause (in the proper scientific sense).”² Barker and Steele go as far as to describe “the idea [of] relative causal contributions to an injury that is indivisible” as “seemingly oxymoronic.”³ And the most recent Restatement of Torts is “quite explicit” in its opinion that “there are no degrees of factual cause.”⁴ Section 2 responds to this scepticism by defending a coherent metaphysics of causal contribution, according to which causation is a non-scalar relation to which multiple events can contribute to different degrees.

Section 3 uses this theory of causal contribution to critically evaluate different legal mechanisms for ‘limiting’ liability for consequences of wrongdoing, including the fraught legal concept of ‘proximate causation’. I challenge the pervasive view that “proximate cause’ is neither about cause nor proximity, as those two words are commonly understood.”⁵ A proximate cause of an effect, I argue, should be thought of as an event which contributed to a causing of the effect to a significant degree – a degree above some threshold. In sections 4 and 5, however, I argue that proximate causation doctrines ought after all to be abandoned in favour of a more fine-grained approach, one which recognises the possibility of partial liability for losses. I ground this approach in a conception of tort law as a system of corrective justice, according to which wrongful contributions to causings of harm trigger corresponding duties to contribute towards repairing the harm. I then use my theory of partial liability to defend a revisionary approach to the ‘apportionment’ of liability between multiple wrongdoers.

⁴ Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm §26 cmt. j (Am. Law Inst. 2009).
⁵ Id. §26 cmt. a.
2. Causal Contribution

It’s often natural to compare two events by describing one as *more of a cause* of an effect than the other. A teacher might describe a student’s lack of preparation as more of a cause of his poor exam performance than the difficulty of the questions, for example.\(^6\) Similar talk of ‘degrees of contribution’, of ‘causal potency’ or ‘causal efficacy’, and of ‘chief’, ‘main’ or ‘principal’ causes, is pervasive in many disciplines, including the natural and social sciences, history and the law. Yet these kinds of comparisons have received scant attention in the philosophy literature. In earlier work, I tried to remedy this by defending a novel metaphysics of causal contribution.\(^7\)

This section reviews the fundamental elements of my account, before turning to its potential applications to legal liability.

Let’s begin with an analogy. Consider the following sentence:

\[(1) \text{Alice and Bob surrounded the tree.}\]

(1) is ambiguous. Read *distributively*, it follows from (1) that Alice surrounded the tree and Bob also surrounded the tree. But the more natural reading is the *collective* one, according to which Alice and Bob surrounded the tree *together* (by joining hands around the tree, for example). These are distinct states of affairs. On the distributive reading the tree is surrounded twice; on the collective reading it is only surrounded once, even though it is surrounded by two people.

Exactly the same is true of (2):

\[(2) \text{The driver’s drunkenness and the rainstorm caused the car crash.}\]

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Read distributively, it follows from (2) that the drunkenness caused the crash and the rainstorm also caused the crash. On the more natural collective reading, however, the drunkenness and the rainstorm caused the crash together. These are distinct states of affairs. On the distributive reading, the crash was caused twice over – it was overdetermined, to put it another way – whereas on the collective reading the crash was only caused once, even though it was caused by two events. Causation relates pluralities to individuals, in general; and a plurality of events can collectively cause an effect without any one of the plurality individually causing it.

To be an author of a book is to be one of a plurality of people who collectively authored it. Similarly, to be a cause of an effect is to be one of a plurality of events that collectively caused it. ‘X caused Y’ and ‘X was a cause of Y’ are therefore not synonymous, notwithstanding a widespread tendency among philosophers to use them interchangeably. On the collective reading of (2) the rainstorm was a cause of the crash, but it didn’t cause it – what caused it was the rainstorm and the crash taken together.

Some relations are scalar. Take loving, for example: I can love someone a lot, and I can love one person more than I love another. But surrounding is not a scalar relation. Consider the following sentences, for example:

(3) #Alice surrounded the tree a lot.
(4) #Alice surrounded the tree more than Bob did.

(3) and (4) sound odd, even ungrammatical. How could Alice have surrounded the tree ‘a lot’? Either she surrounded it or she didn’t!

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There is perhaps a reading of (3) according to which Alice has surrounded the tree many times; but this clearly doesn’t show that surrounding is a scalar relation (compare: it doesn’t follow from the natural reading of ‘I love you a lot’ that I love you many times).
But now consider the following sentences:

(5) Alice contributed a lot to the surrounding of the tree.

(6) Alice contributed more than Bob to the surrounding of the tree.

(5) and (6) are perfectly grammatical; indeed, they would be true if Alice and Bob collectively surrounded the tree but Alice had longer arms, and therefore reached further around the tree, than Bob. So *surrounding* is all-or-nothing; but that’s perfectly consistent with the possibility of different people *contributing* to a surrounding to different degrees.

Michael Moore has recently argued that “[c]ausation is a scalar relation.” I think he is simply wrong about this. Consider the following sentences, for example:

(7) #The driver’s drunkenness caused the crash a lot.

(8) #The driver’s drunkenness caused the crash more than the rainstorm did.

(7) and (8) sound odd, even ungrammatical. How could the drunkenness have caused the crash ‘a lot’? Either it caused the crash or it didn’t!

But now consider the following sentences:

(9) The driver’s drunkenness contributed a lot to the causing of the crash.

(10) The driver’s drunkenness contributed more to the causing of the crash than the rainstorm did.

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(9) and (10) are perfectly grammatical. So causing is all-or-nothing; but this is perfectly consistent with the possibility of different causes contributing to a causing of an effect to different degrees.\(^\text{10}\)

Note that contributing to a causing of an effect is not the same as contributing to the effect. To causally contribute to an effect is to cause a part of that effect. Suppose I have a contract worth £100 with company A and a contract worth £400 with company B. A and B both breach the terms of their contract, leaving me £500 out of pocket. Then there's a sense in which B's breach contributed more to my total losses than A's breach, because B's breach caused a larger fraction of my total losses than did A's breach. This isn't what's going on in the car crash case. To say that the driver's drunkenness and the rainstorm collectively caused the crash is not to say that the driver's drunkenness caused one part of the crash and the rainstorm caused a different part of the crash. The drunkenness didn't cause the crash, nor did it cause a part of the crash; it contributed to a causing of the crash. Consider our surrounding analogy again: I can surround a tree by reaching all the way around it; I can surround part of a tree by reaching all the way around one of its branches; and I can contribute to a surrounding of the tree by joining hands with another person around the tree. These are all distinct states of affairs – so it is with causation.

These distinctions fit naturally with the familiar idea that causes are minimally jointly sufficient in the circumstances for their effects.\(^\text{11}\) Here's one way of cashing out this

\(^{10}\) Many causal verbs have the same structure. I can't author a book a lot, for example, but I can contribute a lot to the authoring of a book. One way I might do this is by authoring a large part of the book. But I might also have supplied the majority of the ideas or done the bulk of the research – in such a case, I would have contributed a lot to the authoring of a book, even though there is no part of the book that I (individually) authored. I use surrounding as opposed to authoring as an analogy, primarily because it is plausibly part of the meaning of 'author' that a single book can't be authored more than once, whereas it's generally agreed that an effect can be caused more than once (but see Peter Unger, The Uniqueness in Causation, 14 AM. PHIL. Q. 177 (1977)).

idea. Let $X_1, \ldots, X_n$ be a plurality of events; let $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ and $y$ be the propositions that $X_1, \ldots, X_n$ and $Y$, respectively, occurred; let $b$ be the conjunction of all relevant ‘background conditions’;¹² and let $P(p)$ be the function that returns the *objective chance* of $p$.¹³ Now consider the following necessary condition on causation:¹⁴

**MINIMAL SUFFICIENCY:** If $X_1, \ldots, X_n$ collectively caused $Y$, $P(y \mid x_1 \& \ldots \& x_n \& b) = 1$

and for all proper sub-pluralities $X_i, \ldots, X_j$ of $X_1, \ldots, X_n$, $P(y \mid x_1 \& \ldots \& x_j \& b) < 1$.¹⁵, ¹⁶

Notice how MINIMAL SUFFICIENCY captures the distributive/collective ambiguity in (2) above. If $D, R$ and $C$ are the events of the drunkenness, the rainstorm and the car crash, respectively, occurring, and $d, r$, and $c$ are the corresponding propositions that those events occurred, (2) on its distributive reading implies that $P(c \mid d \& b) = 1$ and

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¹² The ‘background conditions’ are, roughly speaking, the propositions we’re ‘holding fixed’ in the context. For example, if a short circuit occurs and a fire breaks out shortly after, the short circuit caused the fire only relative to a set of background conditions that includes the fact that there was oxygen in the atmosphere, the fact that there were flammable materials nearby, the fact that the world didn’t explode before the fire had a chance to develop, and so on. This simple explanation leaves many questions unanswered, of course: Do the background conditions vary with the conversational context? If so, how? And what are the right background conditions to use for the purposes of attributing liability? These are good questions, but I have addressed them elsewhere; see Alex Kaiserman, *Necessary Connections in Context*, ERKENNTNIS (forthcoming). See also note 56, below.

¹³ By ‘objective chance’, I just mean what we normally take ourselves to mean when we say that the chance of a fair coin landing heads is (slightly less than) 0.5. I don’t take this to be a fact about any actual agent’s credence function. Nor do I take it to imply indeterminism – the chance of a fair coin landing heads is 0.5, whether or not the laws of nature are deterministic. Probabilities of this kind are pervasive in science, most notably in statistical mechanics. How exactly they should be understood is controversial, but I won’t take a stance on that question here. For one influential perspective, see David Lewis, *A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance, in Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability* (Richard C. Jeffrey ed., 1980).

¹⁴ Some philosophers have tried to turn this principle into an *analysis of causation* by combining it with other necessary conditions; see, e.g., Michael Strevens, *Mackie Remixed, in Causation and Explanation* (Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke & Harry S Silverstein eds., 2007). I won’t attempt such a project here.

¹⁵ MINIMAL SUFFICIENCY doesn’t *quite* capture the idea that causes are minimally jointly sufficient for their effects, because if there are an infinite number of propositions, it could be that $P(y \mid x_1 \& \ldots \& x_n \& b) = 1$, even though $X_1, \ldots, X_n$ weren’t collectively sufficient for $Y$ in the circumstances, because the set of possible worlds in which $X_1, \ldots, X_n$ all occur, $b$ is true and $Y$ fails to occur might be non-empty but measure zero. (By analogy: The probability of me losing a lottery with an infinite number of tickets is 1, even though there is some possible world in which I win.) I’ll ignore this complication in what follows.

¹⁶ I’m assuming for the purposes of this paper that the laws of nature are deterministic. There are ways of amending MINIMAL SUFFICIENCY to deal with the alleged possibility of causation in an irreducibly indeterministic world, but I won’t consider them here.
\[ P(c \mid r \land b) = 1. \] On its collective reading, however, (2) implies only that \[ P(c \mid d \land r \land b) = 1, \] while \[ P(c \mid d \land b) < 1 \] and \[ P(c \mid r \land b) < 1. \]

If Alice and Bob collectively surround a tree, but Alice has longer arms, Alice contributes more than Bob to the surrounding of the tree. Intuitively, this is because, although neither Alice nor Bob individually surrounded the tree, Alice came closer to surrounding the tree by herself than Bob did. Similarly, although neither the drunkenness nor the rainstorm individually caused the car crash on the collective reading of (2), if \[ P(c \mid d \land b) > P(c \mid r \land b) \] – that is, if the probability (in the circumstances) of the crash occurring was greater conditional on the drunkenness occurring than it was conditional on the rainstorm occurring – then although neither the drunkenness nor the rainstorm individually caused the crash, the drunkenness in some sense came closer to causing the crash by itself than the rainstorm did, because it came closer to being individually sufficient for it. This, I think, is a situation in which it would be appropriate to say that the drunkenness contributed more to the causing of the crash.

Here’s a natural way of cashing out this thought. Let \( f(X_i, [X_1, \ldots, X_n] \rightarrow Y)^b \) be the function that returns \( X_i \)'s degree of contribution to the causing of \( Y \) by the plurality of events \( X_1, \ldots, X_n \), relative to the conjunction of background conditions \( b \). Then:

**CAUSAL CONTRIBUTION:** If \( X_1, \ldots, X_n \) collectively caused \( Y \) relative to \( b \), then

\[
f(X_i, [X_1, \ldots, X_n] \rightarrow Y)^b = \frac{p(y \mid x_1 \land b)}{\sum_{j=1}^{n} p(y \mid x_j \land b)}
\]

In words: An event's degree of contribution to a causing of an effect is equal to the probability of the effect occurring conditional on the cause occurring (and the background conditions obtaining), divided by the sum of the conditional probabilities for all the events involved in that causing. The denominator of this fraction is a
A renormalizing factor that ensures that degrees of contribution to a causing always sum to 1 (i.e. it follows from causal contribution that \( \sum_{i=1}^{n} f(X_i, [X_1, \ldots, X_n] \rightarrow Y)^b = 1 \).\(^{17}\)

Consider a car crash that was collectively caused (in the circumstances) by the driver’s drunkenness and a rainstorm. Which event contributed more to the causing of the crash, according to causal contribution? Well, that depends. Suppose first that the driver is really drunk. Although his drunkenness wasn’t by itself sufficient for the crash, any number of potential distractions would have been enough for him to lose control of his vehicle – a butterfly on the wing-mirror, a funny-shaped cloud, and so on. The rainstorm, meanwhile, was fairly mundane; it only contributed to the causing of the crash by impeding the driver’s vision, since he was too drunk to operate the windscreen wipers. On these facts, \( P(c \mid d \& b) \) is close to 1: conditional on the driver being in his inebriated state, it was very likely in the circumstances that the crash would have occurred one way or the other. On the other hand, since the rainstorm would have posed no danger to a sober driver, \( P(c \mid r \& b) \) is not much higher than \( P(d \& b) \), the unconditional probability in the circumstances of the driver being as drunk as he was. Suppose for the sake of argument that \( P(c \mid d \& b) = 0.9 \) and \( P(c \mid r \& b) = 0.2 \); then it follows from causal contribution that \( f(D, [R, D] \rightarrow C)^b \approx 0.82 \) and \( f(R, [R, D] \rightarrow C)^b \approx 0.18 \).

\(^{17}\)Two features of causal contribution are worth emphasising. Firstly, the probabilities here are not epistemic probabilities; in particular, \( P(y \mid x \& b) \) is not the epistemic probability that \( X \) caused \( Y \) relative to some body of evidence. If \( X \) in fact (individually) caused \( Y \), then causal contribution straightforwardly implies that \( X \)'s degree of contribution to the causing of \( Y \) by \( X \) is 1, regardless of how likely it is on our current evidence that \( X \) caused \( Y \). Relatedly, causal contribution isn’t committed to any analysis of what it is to be a cause of an effect. In particular, it doesn’t imply that \( X \) is a cause of \( Y \) if (or only if) \( X \) raises the probability of \( Y \) (i.e. if \( P(y \mid x \& b) > P(y \mid x \& b) \)). Causal contribution simply provides a way of determining, given that \( X \) is a cause of \( Y \), \( X \)'s degree of contribution to the causings of \( Y \) to which it contributes. If \( X \) isn’t a cause of \( Y \), then \( X \) didn’t contribute to any causing of \( Y \), and so its degree of contribution to every causing of \( Y \) is undefined by causal contribution, regardless of the value of \( P(y \mid x \& b) \).
Alternatively, suppose that the rainstorm was incredibly severe, so that any number of slight lapses in concentration would have been enough for the driver to lose control of the vehicle. The driver, meanwhile, was only slightly drunk; his drunkenness only contributed to the causing of the crash by reducing his reaction time by a few milliseconds. On these facts, \( P(c \mid r \land b) \) is close to 1: conditional on the rainstorm occurring, it was very likely that the crash would have occurred one way or the other.

On the other hand, since the drunkenness would have posed no danger to the driver in normal weather conditions, \( P(c \mid d \land b) \) is not much higher than \( P(r \land b) \), the unconditional probability in the circumstances of the rainstorm occurring. If the rainstorm was particularly unlikely in the circumstances – a freak occurrence, say – then \textsc{causal contribution} implies that the driver’s drunkenness contributed only a negligible amount to the causing of the crash.\(^{18}\)

I’ve argued that causation, though not a scalar relation, is a relation to which multiple events can contribute to different degrees. I’ve also motivated a probabilistic measure of an event’s degree of contribution to a causing of an effect. It’s now time to put these concepts to theoretical work.

\(^{18}\) Like most probabilistic analyses of causal concepts, \textsc{causal contribution} goes awry in cases involving so-called ‘spurious correlations’. Suppose, for example, that conditional on the drunkenness occurring, the crash is fairly likely to occur, not because of the drunkenness, but rather because the driver tends to drink more in winter, so that if he’s drunk it’s probably winter, and if it’s winter the road is probably icy, and icy roads lead to increased risks of accidents. As stated, \textsc{causal contribution} would assign a higher degree of contribution to the drunkenness in virtue of this ‘spurious’ correlation between the driver’s drunkenness and the risk of the crash. There are a number of ways of addressing this problem, however. One is to replace conditional probabilities, \( P(y \mid x \land b) \), with \textit{interventionist} conditional probabilities, \( P(y \mid \text{do}(X, Y) \land b) \), where \( \text{do}(X, Y) \) is the event of “lifting \( X \) from the influence of the old functional mechanism and placing it under the influence of a new mechanism . . . while keeping all other mechanisms [leading to \( Y \)] undisturbed.” JUDEA PEARL, \textsc{causality: models, reasoning, and inference} 70 (2000). \textit{See also} JAMES WOODWARD, \textsc{making things happen: a theory of causal explanation} (2003); Luke Fenton-Glynn, \textsc{a proposed probabilistic extension of the halpern and pearl definition of ‘actual cause’}, \textsc{british j. phil. science} (forthcoming). I’ll set these issues aside for the purposes of this paper.
3. A Causal Theory of ‘Proximate Causation’

What is tort law? According to the corrective justice theory, tort law is a mechanism for rectifying or correcting injustices inflicted by one person on another. The theory received its classic formulation in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics Book V, and forms the basis of many modern theories of tort.\(^\text{19}\) Agents, on this view, bear certain first-order duties to other agents, who, correlatively, have certain rights against those duties being breached. If D breaches a first-order duty she bears to C, C has thereby been wronged by D. This triggers a second-order duty on the part of D, a duty to correct or make right that wrong.\(^\text{20}\) The point of tort law, according to the corrective justice theory, is to provide a mechanism for enforcing these second-order duties.

The corrective justice theory is consistent with many possible views about the contents of these duties. But given the resources developed above, the standard view can be expressed as follows:

**Wrongful Contribution:** For all legal persons D and C:

- D bears a first-order duty to C not to wrongfully contribute to a causing of a loss to C, and
- if D breaches her first-order duty to C, D acquires a second-order duty to restore C to the state she would have been in, but for the loss.

Proponents of Wrongful Contribution disagree, both on what constitutes a loss,\(^\text{21}\) and on what it is to contribute wrongfully to a causing of a loss. But the basic idea is


\(^{20}\) For one account of the mechanism by which breaches of first-order duties trigger second-order duties, see John Gardner, What is Tort Law For? Part 1: The Place of Corrective Justice, 30 L. AND PHIL. 1 (2011).

\(^{21}\) To accord with actual practice, the category of ‘loss’ should at least include physical changes in a person’s body or property, reduction or non-receipt of financial assets, loss of freedom, mental suffering, and maybe even the loss of a valuable chance, see Sandy Steel,
easy to illustrate. If D recklessly runs a red light at a road junction and collides with C, injuring her, D has thereby breached his first-order duty to C not to wrongfully contribute to a causing of a loss to her. This triggers a second-order duty on the part of D to restore C to the state she would have been in, but for the loss – D is said to be liable for C’s loss, in such a case. Since D can’t magically cure C of her injury, he would normally be expected to discharge his liability through the paying of monetary damages to C to compensate her for medical costs, lost earnings, pain and suffering, and so on.\(^\text{22}\)

On the face of it, however, WRONGFUL CONTRIBUTION faces an important difficulty: it massively overgenerates second-order duties. Consider the classic Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.,\(^\text{23}\) wherein an employee of the defendant company negligently helped a man board a moving train. The man dropped a package which, unbeknownst to the train guard, contained fireworks. The package fell under the wheels of the train and exploded, sending shockwaves down the platform which tipped over a set of scales onto one Mrs. Palsgraf, injuring her. The employee’s action was a cause of Palsgraf’s injury. Moreover, that action was wrongful – in helping the man board the moving train, the employee failed to exercise the kind of care that might reasonably be

\[\text{\underline{PROOF OF CAUSATION IN TORT LAW 292-235 (2015), or interference with exclusive possession (c.f. the English tort of trespass).}}\]

\(^{22}\) WRONGFUL CONTRIBUTION is controversial, both as a descriptive account of what tort law is and as a normative account of tort law ought to be. Some theorists have argued that, at least in some cases, defendants should be held liable for losses arising from all harms caused by their actions, regardless of whether they were caused wrongfully; see, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, \textit{A Theory of Strict Liability}, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973). Others have argued that there are cases in which a defendant should be held liable for a claimant’s loss even in the absence of evidence that the defendant’s actions contributed to a causing of the loss; see, e.g., Alan Strudler, \textit{Mass Torts and Moral Principles}, 11 L. PHIL. 297 (1992). It has been argued, on these and other grounds, that the best way to understand tort law is not in conceptual, deontological terms, but rather in instrumentalist, utilitarian terms; see, e.g., ROBERT S. SUMMERS, \textit{INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY} (1982); Richard A. Posner & William M. Landes, \textit{The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law}, 15 GA. L. REV. 851 (1980). I’ll largely steer clear of these debates in what follows, though much of what I have to say will be compatible with different positions within them.

\(^{23}\) 248 N.Y. 339 (1928).
expected of him. By \textit{wrongful contribution}, then, it seems that the train company (as the guard’s employer) should be held liable for Palsgraf’s injury. Yet it’s not at all clear this is the right result – intuitively, the injury seems in some sense \textit{too removed} from the initial wrongdoing for a finding of liability to be appropriate. Call this the \textit{overgeneration problem}.

Cardozo’s C.J.’s celebrated solution to this problem, formulated in his majority opinion in \textit{Palsgraf}, was to insist on a \textit{relational} account of wrongfulness. An action isn’t wrongful \textit{simpliciter}, he argued, but only \textit{relative} to an outcome: “Negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do,” to quote Pollock’s well-known maxim.\footnote{Sir Frederick Pollock, \textit{The Law of Torts} 455 (11\textsuperscript{th} ed., 1920).} To wrongfully contribute to a causing of a loss, one must perform an action that was wrongful \textit{relative to that loss}; and although the action of the train guard was wrongful relative to any harms the holder of the package may have suffered, Cardozo argued that it wasn’t wrongful relative to Palsgraf’s injury, and hence the train guard didn’t breach his duty to Palsgraf not to wrongfully contribute to a causing of harm to her. “The conduct of the defendant’s guard, if a wrong in its relation to the holder of the package, was not a wrong in its relation to the plaintiff, standing far away. Relatively to her it was not negligence at all.”\footnote{\textit{Palsgraf}, 248 N.Y. at 341.}

What is it for an action to be wrongful \textit{relative} to a particular loss? Some theorists appeal to the concept of \textit{reasonable foreseeability};\footnote{ “[A] defendant is responsible for and only for such harm as he could reasonably have foreseen.” Hart & Honoré, \textit{supra} note 6, at 255. “[I]t would be wrong that a man should be held liable for damage unpredictable by a reasonable man . . . [I]t thus foreseeability becomes the effective test.” Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co. Ltd (The Wagon Mound (No. 1)), [1961] AV 388, 426 (JCPC).}
REASONABLE FORESEEABILITY: S’s φ-ing at t was wrongful relative to a loss L if and only if L was reasonably foreseeable by S at t.

Arguably, however, REASONABLE FORESEEABILITY is both too weak and too strong. To see why it’s too weak, suppose D acts in such a way that foreseeably causes a small loss to C, but only to avoid a much larger loss to herself. It follows from REASONABLE FORESEEABILITY that D acts wrongfully relative to (and hence should be held liable for) C’s loss; and at least some have argued that this is the wrong result.  

On the other hand, suppose D shoots blindly into a crowd of people. It was reasonably foreseeable by D that a death would result from her actions; but if a death in fact results, that particular death was not reasonably foreseeable by D at the time she shot her weapon, assuming she had no way of knowing which person in the crowd her bullet would strike. Foreseeing a harm is not the same as foreseeing that a harm of a certain kind will occur. Presumably, however, there would be no hesitation in this case in holding D liable for the death that in fact results. When a defendant “ought to have foreseen in a general way consequences of a certain kind, it will not avail him to say that he could not foresee the precise course or the full extent of the consequences, being of that kind, which in fact have happened.”

In light of these challenges, some theorists have advocated a more sophisticated definition of relational wrongfulness:

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27 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947), in which the wrongfulness of the defendant’s act was famously held to be a function of “the burden of adequate precautions,” id. at 173.

28 Compare with the distinction between seeing that a table exists and seeing a table; I can see that a table exists without seeing a table (I might read a newspaper article about tables, for example), and I can see a table without seeing that a table exists (I might lack the concept of a table). See Fred Dretske, Seeing and Knowing (1969).

HARM-WITHIN-THE-RISK: S’s φ-ing at t was wrongful relative to a loss L if and only if S’s φ-ing created an unjustified risk of a loss of type L occurring, of which L was an instance.

According to HARM-WITHIN-THE-RISK, D may be excused of liability for a foreseeable loss, so long as the risks her action created were justified. On the other hand, D can be held liable for an unforeseeable loss, according to HARM-WITHIN-THE-RISK, so long as her actions created an unjustified risk of a harm of some type occurring of which the loss was an instance – the loss need only be “within the risk that made [the defendant’s] action negligent.”

Hurd and Moore identify a number of “quite damning conceptual challenges” for HARM-WITHIN-THE-RISK, which they take to be “good grounds to suspect that [it] cannot be coherently defended.” But even setting aside their concerns, there is reason to think that HARM-WITHIN-THE-RISK cannot, by itself, solve the overgeneration problem. Consider the following case:

Fire

D negligently drops a lighted cigarette. The cigarette starts a fire which damages C’s car. C takes her car to the local garage to be repaired. Unfortunately, the garage is struck by lightning overnight, causing a fire that further damages C’s car.

C suffers two separate losses in Fire – call them $L_1$ and $L_2$ – neither of which would have occurred but for D’s negligent act (since had the first fire not occurred, C’s car wouldn’t have been in the garage when the lightning struck). Nevertheless, I take it that D should only be held liable for $L_1$, and not $L_2$ – in the relevant sense, $L_2$ is ‘too

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30 Petitions of the Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 720 (2d Cir. 1964).
32 Id. at 381.
removed’ from D’s initial wrongdoing for it to be reasonable to hold her liable for it. The problem is that it’s not at all obvious how HARM-WITHIN-THE-RISK can explain this, because both losses are of exactly the same type; if D is liable for $L_1$ in virtue of the fact that her dropping the cigarette created an unreasonable risk of fire damage to C’s car occurring, HARM-WITHIN-THE-RISK doesn’t preclude holding D liable for $L_2$ as well, for the very same reason. The problem is that HARM-WITHIN-THE-RISK “only asks after a logical relation between a type of harm (the one the risk of which made the defendant negligent) and a token of harm (the harm that actually happened),” and this logical relation “takes no notice” of the “freakishness” of the “causal route.”\(^{33}\)

In practice, the law deals with these kinds of cases by invoking the concepts of ‘proximate causation’ or ‘remoteness’.\(^{34}\) In Fire, for example, the idea is that D is liable for $L_1$ but not $L_2$ in virtue of the fact that, although his dropping the cigarette was a ‘factual cause’ of both losses, it was a ‘proximate cause’ of $L_1$ but not of $L_2$. This concept of proximate causation has been widely criticized, however.\(^{35}\) The current consensus seems to be that “proximate cause’ is neither about cause nor proximity, as those two words are commonly understood.”\(^{36}\) It can’t be about spatiotemporal proximity, because defendants are often rightly held liable for losses greatly removed both in

\(^{33}\) Id. at 405.

\(^{34}\) “[A] man is liable only for the . . . proximate consequence of his actions, and not for remote consequences.” Ward v. Weeks 7 Bing. 211, 212 (1830). The principle is often traced back to Bacon’s Maxims: “In jure non remota causa sed proxima spectator. It were infinite for the law to judge the causes of causes, and their impulsions one of another; therefore it contenteth itselfe with the immediate cause, and judgeth of acts by that, without looking to any further degree.” Francis Bacon, Maxims of the Law, in THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON VOLUME XIV 189, 189 (James Spedding et al. eds., 1819).

\(^{35}\) See Leon Green, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927); Hart & Honoré, supra note 6; Joseph H. Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 633 (1920); Henry W. Edgerton, Legal Cause, 72 U. Pa. L. Rev. 343 (1924); Fleming James & Roger F. Perry, Legal Cause, 60 Yale L. J. 761 (1951); Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 60 (1956); Jane Stapleton, Legal Cause: Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of Liability for Consequences, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 941 (2001); Wright, supra note 11.

\(^{36}\) Restatement (Third) of Torts: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM §26 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2009).
space and time from their wrongdoing. And it can’t be about causation either, the thought continues, because “[a] necessary condition for a relevant harm is a factual cause of that harm, without limitation” and “there are no degrees of factual cause.” Once it’s been established that the defendant’s wrongdoing was a cause of the claimant’s harm, it’s generally assumed that any further questions couldn’t possibly belong to any genuine causal inquiry.

But this assumption is mistaken. As I argued in section 2, once we’ve established that the defendant’s wrongdoing was a cause of the claimant’s harm, there is always a further question: the question of the degree of contribution the wrongdoing made to the causing of the harm. This suggests the following, causal theory of ‘proximate causation’: a ‘proximate cause’ of an effect is an event which contributed to a significant degree to a causing of the effect – a degree above some threshold. In other words, I propose to interpret tort law’s ‘proximate causation’ requirement as expressing a commitment to the following characterization of the duties of corrective justice:

37 In People v. Botkin 132 Cal. 231 (1901), for example, the defendant sent a box of poisoned candy from San Francisco to Dover, in Delaware. The victim ate the candy and died. Whether the defendant is liable for the claimant’s losses in this case clearly has nothing to do with the distance between San Francisco and Delaware or the time it took for the candy to arrive.

38 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM §26 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2009).

39 Moore has recently defended a similar view: “[T]he amount of causal contribution needed for an actor to be morally responsible for some harm is non-de minimis (or ‘substantial’).” MOORE, supra note 9, at 276. Unfortunately, however, Moore doesn’t explain what ‘causal contribution’ is, except to say that it “peters out over time, much as the ripples from a stone dropped in a pond diminish as they travel outward,” a metaphor which suggests that a defendant shouldn’t be held liable for losses which occur a long time after the wrongdoing, which as we’ve seen (and as Moore himself accepts) gets the wrong result in some cases. Id. See also Helen Beebee, Legal Responsibility and Scalar Causation, 4 JURISPRUDENCE 102 (2013).
THRESHOLD: Where D and C are legal persons:

- D bears a first-order duty to C not to wrongfully contribute to a causing of harm to C to a significant degree, and
- if D breaches her first-order duty to C, D acquires a second-order duty to restore C to the state she would have been in, but for the harm.

What counts as a ‘significant degree’ of contribution is a vague matter, of course, but an element of vagueness in the law should come as no surprise. Lawyers may well draw the line in different places in different contexts. But the basic idea is that the law’s reluctance to impose liability for losses that are ‘too remote’ should be understood as amounting to a reluctance to impose liability on defendants whose actions made only small contributions to causings of loss.

THRESHOLD, together with CAUSAL CONTRIBUTION, can explain the intuition in Fire. \(L_2\), let’s suppose, was collectively caused (in the circumstances) by D’s negligence and the lightning strike on the garage. The important fact here is that, conditional on D dropping the cigarette, the probability of \(L_2\) occurring was vanishingly small – something really unlikely had to happen in order for the car to be damaged by fire a second time, even given D’s negligent behaviour. Conditional on the lightning strike occurring, by contrast, the probability of \(L_2\) occurring was non-negligible – even if D hadn’t dropped his cigarette, there are many other reasons why C might have felt the need to take the car to the garage that day. Hence it follows from CAUSAL CONTRIBUTION that D’s dropping the cigarette made only a negligible contribution to the causing of the second loss – and that’s why D shouldn’t be held liable for it, according to THRESHOLD.

I think that THRESHOLD can make sense of many of the ways lawyers actually talk about ‘proximate causation’. In his dissent in Palsgraf, for example, Andrews J. lists “some
hints that may help us” in determining whether one event was a ‘proximate cause’ of another:

Was the one a substantial factor in producing the other? Was there a direct connection between them, without too many intervening causes? Is the effect of cause on result not too attenuated [sic]? Is the cause likely, in the usual judgment of mankind, to produce the result?40

Talk of ‘substantial factors’,41 ‘material contributions’42 or events which ‘overwhelm’43 or ‘eclipse’44 other causes, commonly found in judicial discussions of causation, can be naturally interpreted as referring to causes which contributed to a significant degree to a causing of the effect. It also makes sense to ask how many other events were involved in the causing of the effect, since it follows from CAUSAL CONTRIBUTION that the degree of contribution of an event to a causing of an effect decreases as the number of other causes increases, all other things being equal.45 And it straightforwardly follows from CAUSAL CONTRIBUTION that talk of the ‘likelihood’ of the effect occurring given that the cause occurred, together with other “[j]udicial expressions such as ‘abnormal’ and ‘coincidental’ on the one hand and ‘in the ordinary course of things’ and ‘natural and probable consequence’ on the other,”46 can be decent guides to whether the event made a significant contribution to the causing of the effect.

40 Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. at 354.
41 See Jerimiah Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 Harv. L. Rev. 103 (1911).
42 This terminology appears to have originated in Duke of Buccleuch v. Cowan (1866) 5 M. 214. See Sandy Steel & David Ibbetson, More Grief on Uncertain Causation in Tort, 70 C. L. J. 451 (2011).
44 See Emeh v. Kensington and Chelsea Westminster Area Health Authority [1984] 3 All ER 1044, 1049 (CA).
45 See also Michael S. Moore, Author’s Reply, 4 Jurisprudence 121 (2013).
Admittedly, the language of ‘proximate causation’ is used in a variety of different ways for different purposes in the law. At times it may well be used to express what would more accurately be described as a mismatch between the type of harm risked and type of harm caused, or even as an attempt to mask underlying disputes on questions of legal policy. But this section has argued that there is a legally indispensable concept of ‘proximate causation’, properly analysable in causal terms, which reflects the law’s reluctance to impose liability on defendants who make only small contributions to causings of loss.

4. Against All-or-Nothing Liability

THRESHOLD, just like WRONGFUL CONTRIBUTION, implies that liability is all-or-nothing. A defendant either breached a duty to the claimant not to wrongfully contribute to a significant degree to a causing of harm to him, or she didn’t. If she did, she is bound by a second-order duty to restore the claimant to the state he would have been in but for the harm, and so is fully liable for the claimant’s losses; if she didn’t, she bears no second-order duty to the claimant at all. In this section, however, I will argue that this all-or-nothing approach should in fact be abandoned in favour of a more fine-grained approach, one which recognises the possibility of partial liability for losses.

Start by considering the following case:

*Contributory Negligence*

Big Corp negligently fails to replace its outdated equipment. The equipment short circuits. At around the same time, Greta negligently drops a lighted cigarette nearby. Both events start small fires which, if either had occurred alone, would eventually have fizzled out.

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without causing much damage. Unfortunately, however, the two fires join together into one big fire, which burns down Greta’s house.

According to THRESHOLD, Big Corp in Contributory Negligence is either fully liable or not at all liable for Greta’s losses, depending on whether Big Corp’s negligence made a significant contribution to the causing of the damage. But neither of these options seems like the right result. Requiring Big Corp to absorb all of Greta’s losses seems too harsh, since, after all, the damage wouldn’t have occurred but for Greta’s own negligence. But excusing Big Corp of all liability seems too lenient, since, after all, the damage wouldn’t have occurred but for Big Corp’s negligence.

A number of legislative overhauls have sought to allow for more flexibility in such cases. The paradigm example is the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, which states that:

Where any person suffers damage as the result partly of his own fault and partly of the fault of any other person or persons...the damages recoverable in respect thereof shall be reduced to such extent as the court thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damage.48

The act allows a court to reduce the damages owed to the claimant, in principle by any fraction of the claimant’s total losses, so as to reflect the claimant’s own ‘share in the responsibility’ for the harm caused.49 But while this mechanism might achieve the intuitively correct result, it’s difficult to sense of it in terms of THRESHOLD. After all, if D has indeed committed a wrong that can only be corrected by restoring C to the state

48 Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, 8 & 9 Geo. 6 c. 28, §1, sch 1.
49 Similar reforms have since been introduced in the majority of Anglo-American jurisdictions. In the USA, so-called ‘comparative negligence’ rules have been gradually introduced by statute; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
she would have been in but for her loss, corrective justice presumably requires us to hold D liable for 100% of C’s losses, regardless of C’s own actions.

Now consider a slightly different case:

*Joint Negligence*

Big Corp and Little Corp both negligently fail to replace their outdated equipment. Both sets of equipment short circuit. Both events start small fires which, if either had occurred alone, would eventually have fizzled out without causing much damage. Unfortunately, however, the two fires join together into one big fire, which burns down Greta’s house.

As before, Big Corp and Little Corp in *Joint Negligence* are both fully liable for Greta’s losses, according to *Threshold*, so long as their actions each made a significant contribution to the causing of the damage. Hence Greta can choose to sue either Big Corp or Little Corp for 100% of her losses. But again, neither option seems like the right result. Since Big Corp and Little Corp both contributed to the causing of the damage, we would presumably want the costs to be shared between them.

In practice, the law gets around this problem by allowing whichever company Greta chooses to sue to then bring a separate claim against the other company for a contribution towards the damages paid, allegedly on grounds of ‘fairness’ or ‘unjust enrichment’.

But again, it’s hard to make sense of this practice in corrective justice terms. If Greta decides to sue Big Corp, it’s not clear what grounds Big Corp could possibly have to bring a claim against Little Corp — after all, Big Corp hasn’t been wronged by Little Corp just because Greta chose to sue the former over the latter, and so there’s no wrong such a claim could be interpreted as correcting.


51 Some jurisdictions have adopted systems of so-called ‘proportionate liability’ in cases with multiple wrongdoers, according to which “the liability of a defendant . . . is limited to an amount reflecting that proportion of the damage or loss claimed that the court considers just having regard to the extent of the defendant’s responsibility for the damage or loss.” Civil
A conclusion one could draw from all this is that tort law is not, after all, purely concerned with corrective justice. John Gardner for example claims that these apportionment of liability mechanisms “lack a corrective-justice rationale,” since “[c]orrective justice . . . knows only addition and subtraction,” and hence “has no room for division, which is the business of distributive justice.” But this is too quick. The problem is not that corrective justice can’t explain the outcomes in these cases – the problem is that THRESHOLD is not the correct characterization of the duties of corrective justice. Once we realise that contributions to causings come in degrees, we should also think of liability as coming in degrees. In other words, THRESHOLD should be replaced with the following principle:

**PROPORTIONALITY:** Where D and C are legal persons:

- D bears a first-order duty to C not to wrongfully contribute to a causing of harm to C (to *any* degree), and
- if D breaches her first-order duty to C by wrongfully contributing to a causing of harm to C *to degree* *x*, D acquires a second-order duty to *contribute to degree* *x* towards restoring C to the state she would have been in, but for the harm.

Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 35 sch 1 part a. These reforms extend the power of a court to reduce the damages owed to the claimant to reflect their ‘share of responsibility’ for the loss to *any* case involving multiple wrongdoers, regardless of whether one of them is the claimant herself. The clearest examples are the Australian jurisdictions, although most American states have also introduced a version of proportionate liability for some kinds of harm, retaining traditional ‘joint and several liability’ for others; see **RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY** (AM. LAW INST. 2000). These reforms have been controversial, however, and many scholars remain firmly opposed to them; see, e.g., Barker & Steele, *supra* note 3, at 67; Wright, *supra* note 2; William J. McNichols, **Judicial Elimination of Joint and Several Liability Because of Comparative Negligence – A Puzzling Choice**, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (1979). Note that what I mean by ‘proportionate liability’ here is very different from what might be called ‘probabilistic liability’, where liability is apportioned according to the *epistemic* probability that each defendant’s actions was a cause of the claimant’s harm; see **STEEL, supra** note 21, ch. 6. My view has nothing to say about how to proceed in cases where the causal facts are uncertain.

Partial Liability

Propportionality is, I hope, fairly intuitive on its face. It encodes a natural relationship between the contribution a defendant’s wrongdoing makes to the causing of a loss and the contribution she is thereby required to make towards repairing it. Defendants, according to Proportionality, should be held liable for claimants’ losses only to the extent to which their wrongdoing contributed to bringing those losses about.\textsuperscript{53} Threshold, by contrast, can be thought of as a \textit{coarse-grained} version of Proportionality, one which follows from imposing on Proportionality the unmotivated constraint that liability must be all-or-nothing. Whereas according to Threshold, a defendant’s degree of liability effectively jumps from 100\% to 0\% as the degree of contribution of her wrongdoing to the causing of the loss passes the threshold, Proportionality allows for degrees of liability to gradually decrease as a function of the wrongdoing’s degree of contribution to the causing of the loss.

Suppose, for example, that Big Corp contributes to the causing of Greta’s harm to degree 0.4 in \textit{Joint Negligence} (so that Little Corp contributes to degree 0.6, since degrees of contribution to causings always sum to 1). Then Big Corp, according to Proportionality, acquires a second-order duty to \textit{contribute to degree 0.4} towards restoring Greta to the state she would have been in but for the damage to her house. I’ll say that Big Corp is ‘liable to degree 0.4’, or ‘40\% liable’, for Greta’s losses in such a case. Plausibly, Big Corp would normally be expected to discharge its 40\% liability for Greta’s losses by paying monetary damages to Greta equal to 40\% of her losses.\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{53} Interestingly, a number of authors have defended similar principles for moral responsibility; see Sara Bernstein, \textit{Causal Proportions and Moral Responsibility}, in \textsc{Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Vol. 4} (David Shoemaker ed., forthcoming); Carolina Sartorio, \textit{A New Form of Moral Luck?}, in \textsc{Agency, Freedom and Moral Responsibility} (Andrei Buckareff et al. eds., 2015).

\textsuperscript{54} Note, however, that being 40\% liable for a claimant’s losses is \textit{not} the same as being liable for 40\% of the losses. D is \textit{liable for 40\% of C’s losses} just in case D’s wrongful conduct (individually) caused a harm to which 40\% of C’s total losses are directly attributable; D is \textit{40\% liable for C’s losses} just in case D’s wrongful conduct contributed to degree 0.4 to a causing of a harm to which 100\% of C’s total losses are directly attributable. These are different second-order duties, even if they can be discharged in the same way.
Thus if Greta were to successfully sue both Big Corp and Little Corp, she would recover 100% of her losses, 40% from one and 60% from the other.

Some might object at this point that PROPORTIONALITY, at least compared to THRESHOLD, seems strongly weighted in favour of defendants. Suppose Little Corp in Joint Negligence has no liability insurance and no assets, or it’s currently insolvent, or it no longer exists, or for some other reason it isn’t able to discharge its second-order duty to Greta. Under THRESHOLD, Greta can still recover 100% of her losses from Big Corp. But under PROPORTIONALITY, Greta can only sue Big Corp for 40% of her losses, and must absorb the remaining 60% herself. This seems unfair; after all, Big Corp is a large multinational corporation with a poor safety record for which 60% of Greta’s losses is mere small change, whereas Greta is an innocent victim who has lost everything she owns in a fire she neither caused nor could have prevented. It feels morally unacceptable to ask Greta to absorb even a fraction of her losses, given that they could so easily be absorbed by Big Corp (or, more likely, by Big Corp’s liability insurance provider).

I agree that there is something unjust about Greta having to absorb 60% of her losses in Joint Negligence. But this is a distributive injustice, not a corrective one. To illustrate, consider the following case:

Non-Causal Negligence

Big Corp fails to replace its outdated equipment. Luckily, the equipment doesn’t short circuit. Unfortunately, however, lightning strikes a tree nearby, starting a fire that burns down Greta’s house.

Both PROPORTIONALITY and THRESHOLD imply that Greta cannot recover her losses from Big Corp in this case, for the simple reason that Big Corp’s negligence played no

55 See Barker & Steele, supra note 3; Wright, supra note 2; McNichols, supra note 51; etc.
role in bringing about the damage. From a *distributive* perspective, it might seem unfair that Greta must absorb losses for which she is not responsible when they could so easily be absorbed by less deserving individuals, Big Corp included. But the duty to compensate Greta in *Non-Causal Negligence*, if there is one at all, falls not to Big Corp but to the state, or failing that, Greta’s community at large. If Greta is owed compensation in *Non-Causal Negligence*, it’s not because she has been *wronged*, but because one has a duty to distribute (and *redistribute*) resources in such a way as to alleviate the suffering of those harmed through no fault of their own. The fact that Greta’s loss can be alleviated at such a small cost to Big Corp is, of course, not irrelevant to the question of how to meet the demands of distributive justice in this case. But it’s of no relevance to the demands of corrective justice; and since tort law is a system of corrective justice, it shouldn’t be part of the remit of tort law to provide compensation to Greta in *Non-Causal Negligence*, no matter how deserving she might be.

This much, I take it, is fairly uncontroversial. But exactly the same considerations apply to *Joint Negligence*. Big Corp has wrongfully contributed to a causing of the damage to Greta’s house to degree 0.4. I’ve argued that this is a wrong for which contributing to degree 0.4 towards compensating Greta for her losses is the required remedy. Once Big Corp has discharged this duty, the demands of *corrective* justice have been met. How Greta ought to be compensated for the remainder of her losses, if at all, is an important question, but it’s a question of distributive justice, not corrective justice, and hence not a question to which tort law need provide an answer.

Accepted in full generality, *PROPORTIONALITY* admittedly has some fairly revisionary consequences for tort law as actually practiced, and not just in cases of insolvency. Suppose C’s loss was collectively caused (in the circumstances)\(^{56}\) by D’s negligence and

\(^{56}\)This case highlights the importance of choosing the right background conditions. If we include all facts about the weather as part of the background conditions, D’s negligence (individually) caused C’s loss, and so D is fully liable for the loss. If we don’t hold fixed the
a natural event, such as a lightning strike (like in Fire, above). According to
PERFORMANCE, D is either 100% liable or not at all liable for C's loss, depending on
whether the degree of contribution of D’s negligence to the causing of the loss is above
the threshold (i.e. whether D’s negligence can be considered a 'proximate cause' of the
loss). But PROPORTIONALITY allows for the defendant’s degree of liability to smoothly
vary as a function of her degree of contribution. If her negligence contributed to degree
0.6 to the causing of C’s loss, for example, PROPORTIONALITY would hold her 60% liable
for it. Since the other cause was a natural event, C in this case would only recover 60%
of her losses, once all wrongs had been corrected. How C ought to be compensated for
the remainder of her losses is an important question, but it’s a question of distributive
justice, not corrective justice, and hence not a question to which tort law need provide
an answer.

Some might insist that, even if it’s fundamentally a system of corrective justice, tort
law can still legitimately be used to pursue distributive goals, perhaps in order to pick
up some of the slack created by the state’s failure to address them.57 But the danger
with this approach is that we end up with a tort system which cannot be justified on
either corrective or distributive grounds. Suppose we hold Big Corp 100% liable for the
damage to Greta’s house in Joint Negligence. 40% of this liability can be justified on
corrective grounds, on my view, so the other 60% must be justified on distributive
grounds. We might appeal to the fact that Greta is deserving and poor, whereas Big

57 Coleman has consistently argued that “tort law is best explained by corrective justice,”
COLEMAN, supra note 19, at 9, but even he concedes that there are “other goals the state may
legitimately pursue within the tort system,” JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE
Corp is undeserving and rich, for example. But there are many deserving, poor people besides Greta – why should Big Corp pay extra money to Greta rather than these other people? There are also many undeserving, rich people (and many more undeserving, rich corporations) – why should Big Corp, rather than these other individuals, cover the remainder of Greta’s losses? It’s no use pointing to the causal connection between Big Corp’s negligence and Greta’s harm, because this fact is, at least on the face of it, simply irrelevant to the question of how to fairly distribute the costs of the damage.

For these and other reasons, I think that normative coherence in tort law can only be achieved by using it purely to pursue the demands of corrective justice, and this means replacing THRESHOLD with PROPORTIONALITY across the board. Holding everything else fixed, such a change would probably increase the level of distributive injustice in the world, since it would decrease the amount of compensation available to innocent victims through the tort system. Personally, I think this is more a reason for the state to face up to its distributive obligations than it is a reason to reject PROPORTIONALITY. But I accept that, in an imperfect world, it might be preferable, all things considered, to make do with an incoherent tort system. That doesn’t make it any less incoherent.

5. Overdetermination

Now consider yet another variant of case above:

*Overdetermining Negligence*

Big Corp and Little Corp both negligently fail to replace their outdated equipment. Both sets of equipment short circuit at the same time. Both events start large fires which spread independently and arrive at Greta’s house at the same time. Greta’s house is badly damaged.

In most jurisdictions, *Overdetermining Negligence* would be resolved in exactly the same way as *Joint Negligence* – Greta would have the option of suing either Big Corp or Little Corp for 100% of her losses, at which point whichever company she chose
would have a claim against the other company for a contribution towards the damages paid. But the two cases are treated very differently by proportionality. Whereas in *Joint Negligence* Big Corp’s negligence and Little Corp’s negligence collectively caused the damage, in *Overdetermining Negligence* they each individually caused the damage. Big Corp and Little Corp are therefore both fully liable (i.e. liable to degree 1) for the damage, according to proportionality. Hence in this case, Greta can choose to sue either company for 100% of her losses. Suppose she chooses Big Corp; what then happens to Little Corp? Little Corp, just like Big Corp, breached a first-order duty which gave rise to a second-order duty to restore Greta to the state she would have been in, but for the damage to her house. But once Big Corp pays up, Greta is already in the state she would have been in, but for the damage to her house (or as close as monetary compensation is likely to get her, at any rate). Hence I submit that Little Corp is not required to make any contribution towards Greta’s losses, according to proportionality – once Big Corp discharges its second-order duty of repair, Little Corp is relieved of its second-order duty of repair, on account of there being nothing left to repair. Moreover, Big Corp now has no right against Little Corp to recover any of the damages it paid to Greta – after all, Big Corp has not been wronged by Little Corp, and so there is no wrong such a settlement could be interpreted as correcting.

This might strike you as unfair. After all, Little Corp is just as much to blame for the damage to Greta’s house as Big Corp is. It seems wrong to allow Little Corp to get away with its actions just because Greta chose to sue someone else. I agree that there is something unfair about Little Corp getting away with its negligent behaviour. But this

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58 “Any person liable in respect of any damage suffered by another person may recover contribution from any other person liable in respect of the same damage (whether jointly with him or otherwise).” Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978, s1(1) (my emphasis).

59 Note that there’s a difference between someone’s being relieved of a duty and her discharging that duty – I can be relieved of a duty without actually discharging it.

60 Thanks to Sara Bernstein for pressing this objection.
is a retributive injustice, not a corrective one.\textsuperscript{61} To illustrate, consider Non-Causative Negligence again. In this case, Big Corp’s negligence could easily have caused damage to Greta’s house; but as it happened, Greta’s house was burnt down by a fire caused entirely by the lightning strike. From a retributive perspective, it might seem unfair to allow Big Corp to avoid financial penalty – it was clearly only a matter of luck, after all, that its negligence caused no harm. But tort law uncontroversially cannot deliver this punishment, because Big Corp’s negligence was not a cause of Greta’s loss.

I think exactly the same considerations apply to Overdetermining Negligence. It’s not part of the remit of tort law to ensure that Little Corp is punished Overdetermining Negligence, no matter how blameworthy it might be. Once Big Corp has compensated Greta for her losses, the demands of corrective justice have been met, and Little Corp is relieved of her second-order duty without having to discharge it. How Little Corp ought to be punished, if at all, for wrongfully causing Greta’s harm is an important question, but it’s a question of retributive justice, not corrective justice, and hence not a question to which tort law need provide an answer. Little Corp may well have committed a crime, as well as a tort, for which it may still be prosecuted, even after civil proceedings have come to an end – if so, it is the responsibility of the criminal justice system to ensure that retributive justice is done.

Again, some people might insist that, even if it’s fundamentally a system of corrective justice, tort law can still legitimately be used to pursue retributive goals, perhaps in order to pick up some of the slack created by the state’s failure to address them. Some jurisdictions, for example, allow claimants to sue for punitive damages, over and above ordinary damages, in cases where the defendant’s conduct is judged to be

\textsuperscript{61} One can also see this as a distributive injustice – the costs of repairing Greta’s house have been distributed unfairly. See above for my response to this worry.
particularly insidious. Punitive damages very obviously have nothing to do with meeting the demands of corrective justice. Rather, “an award of punitive damages expresses the community’s abhorrence at the defendant’s act [and] commutes our indignation into a kind of civil fine, civil punishment.”

But again, the danger with this approach is that we end up with a tort system which cannot be justified on either corrective or retributive grounds. Suppose that Big Corp’s negligence in Overdetermining Negligence was particularly insidious. Perhaps Big Corp had known all along about the risks its outdated equipment posed to Greta, but deliberately and cynically ignored them. Greta is awarded compensatory damages to cover her losses and an extra sum in punitive damages. The extra sum is justified on retributive grounds, because the compensatory damages were insufficient to properly punish Big Corp for its particularly blameworthy behaviour. But why should Greta receive the punitive damages? Her losses have already been repaid. There are many victims who can’t recover through the tort system at all; why shouldn’t the punitive award go to them instead? Some have suggested that “[p]unitive damages . . . are awarded to the injured party as a reward for his public service in bringing the wrongdoer to account.” But this is difficult to sustain; after all, members of the public who assist the police in bringing criminals to account tend not to receive million or billion dollar rewards for their efforts, except perhaps in exceptional cases.

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62 Punitive damages are established features of case law in the USA and to a lesser extent Canada. For guidelines, see BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 519 (1996); Whiten v. Pilot Insurance [2002] 1 SCR 595. They are much less common elsewhere, though they are allowed in exceptional cases, for lower sums, in Australia – see Gray v. Motor Accident Commission (1998) 196 CLR 1 – and New Zealand, despite the abolition of compensatory tort damages with the creation of the Accident Compensation Corporation – see Auckland City Council v. Blundell [1986] 1 NZLR 732.

63 Kemezy v. Peters 79 F. 3d 33, 35 (U.S. App. 1996). This judgement was explicit about the fact that one of the functions of punitive damages is to “relieve the pressures on the criminal justice system.” Id.

64 Neal v. Newburger Co. 154 Miss. 691, 700 (1929).
Normative coherence in tort law can only be achieved by using it purely to pursue the demands of corrective justice, and this means replacing threshold with proportionality across the board. Holding everything else fixed, such a change would probably increase the level of retributive injustice in the world, since some wrongdoers would receive less punishment than they deserve. Personally, I think this is more a reason for the state to face up to its retributive obligations than it is a reason to reject proportionality. But I accept that, in an imperfect world, it might be preferable, all things considered, to make do with an incoherent tort system. That doesn’t make it any less incoherent.

Imagine a tree surrounded by two fences made of vertical wooden planks. The fences intersect at two points (see fig. 1). Consider the plank of wood at one of the points of intersection. It contributes to two different surroundings of the tree, the surrounding by Fence 1 and the surrounding by Fence 2. Moreover, it contributes less to the surrounding by Fence 2 than it does to the surrounding by Fence 1, since Fence 2 is longer than Fence 1. A plank of wood can contribute to some degree to one surrounding of a tree and contribute to a different degree to another surrounding of that very same tree.
The same is true for causation\textsuperscript{65} – an event can contribute to some degree to one causing of an effect and contribute to a different degree to another causing of that very same effect. For example, suppose D\textsubscript{1}, D\textsubscript{2}, and D\textsubscript{3} are the members of the executive committee of a manufacturing company. They all vote in favour of not replacing their outdated equipment. The equipment later short-circuits, starting a fire that causes damage to C’s property. Let V\textsubscript{1}, V\textsubscript{2}, and V\textsubscript{3} be the events of D\textsubscript{1}, D\textsubscript{2}, and D\textsubscript{3}, respectively, voting in favour of the motion not to replace the equipment. Since two votes would have been sufficient for the motion to pass, there are three pluralities of events that were minimally jointly sufficient (in the circumstances) for the damage: [V\textsubscript{1}, V\textsubscript{2}], [V\textsubscript{1}, V\textsubscript{3}], and [V\textsubscript{2}, V\textsubscript{3}]. So according to MINIMAL SUFFICIENCY (see section 2, above), the damage was caused three times by three different pluralities of events. But the pluralities are overlapping – each event contributed to more than one causing of the damage. Depending on the values of the relevant conditional probabilities, then, it’s possible that these events contributed to different degrees to different causings of the damage. V\textsubscript{1}, for example, might have contributed to degree 0.3 to the causing by V\textsubscript{1} and V\textsubscript{2} and contributed to degree 0.5 to the causing by V\textsubscript{1} and V\textsubscript{3}.

This raises an important question – to what degree should D\textsubscript{1} be held liable for the damage to C’s property, in such a case? On the face of it, there are a number of options. One option would be to add the two degrees of contribution together, so that D\textsubscript{1}’s degree of liability for C’s loss is 0.5 + 0.3 = 0.8. Another option would be to take the average of the two values, so that D\textsubscript{1}’s degree of liability for C’s loss is \( \frac{0.5 + 0.3}{2} = 0.4 \). I think neither of these strategies is ultimately correct. Instead, D\textsubscript{1} should be held liable for C’s loss to degree 0.5 – the larger of the two values.

\textsuperscript{65} See Kaiserman, supra note 7, at 392.
To see this, suppose first that Nina poisons Oscar’s lunch. But she wants to make sure of his death – so at just the moment when Oscar is about to succumb to the poison, she fatally shoots him. Oscar’s death is overdetermined by the shooting and the poisoning. In this case, then, Nina performed two actions, each of which individually caused a death. But it surely wouldn’t be right to charge Nina with two counts of murder. To do so would intuitively involve some objectionable double-counting, since it was the same death caused twice over.

Now consider a slightly different case. As before, Nina poisons Oscar’s lunch, and also shoots him at just the moment he is about to succumb to the poison. But this time, her gunshot wounds Oscar non-fatally. However, at the same time, Patrick also shoots Oscar non-fatally, in such a way that the two gunshots were collectively (but not individually) sufficient in the circumstances for Oscar’s death. As before, Oscar’s death was caused twice – once by the poisoning and once by the two gunshots. Suppose Nina’s gunshot contributed to degree 0.5 to the latter causing. Hence in this case, Nina contributed to degree 1 to one causing of Oscar’s death and also contributed to degree 0.5 to a different causing of Oscar’s death.

I think the right reaction in this case is again to charge Nina with a single count of murder. To punish her separately for her contributions to both causings of Oscar’s death would involve the same kind of objectionable double-counting as in the case above. But on the other hand, it would be absurd to reason that, since her average contribution to causings of Oscar’s death was 0.75, she should be punished less than if she had merely murdered Oscar by poisoning alone.

These cases aren’t exactly analogous to the voting case, since Nina in both cases performs two separate actions, each of which contributes to a different causing of Oscar’s death; whereas in the voting case, D₁ performs a single action which itself contributes to two different causings of C’s injury. Nevertheless, I think, similar
considerations apply. To hold D₁ liable to a degree equal to the sum of the two degrees of contribution would involve some objectionable double-counting, because it’s the same injury being caused twice over. To take the average of the two degrees of contribution, on the other hand, would be to let D₁ off too lightly. So we should take the larger of the two degrees of contribution, and ignore the other. This means that D₁ should be held liable to degree 0.5 for C’s loss; and this means that C could sue D₁ for up to 50% of his loss, depending on how much she has already recovered from the other defendants.

5. Conclusion

In this paper, I have defended a causal theory of partial liability – a defendant should be held liable for a claimant’s losses only to the degree to which the defendant’s wrongdoing contributed to the causing of the claimant’s harm. Though this view has some revisionary consequences, I’ve argued that they can be defended, at least on a conception of tort law as a system of corrective – and not distributive or retributive – justice.

Some people might agree with everything I’ve said in theory, but worry that, in practice, adopting proportionality across the board would lead to chaos. “Causation itself is difficult enough; degrees of causation would really be a nightmare.” 66 Determining degrees of causal contribution is difficult and time-consuming, and different judges and juries might come to entirely different conclusions. Defendants and claimants who know the law might still therefore be ignorant of the likely outcome of legal action. This threatens the principle of the rule of law, the idea that the outcome

of a legal dispute should be determined by the law and not by the arbitrary decisions of the officials presiding over it.

I have some sympathy for these concerns. There is the question of how things ought to be in a perfect world (‘ideal theory’), and then there is the question of how things ought to be, holding fixed the various imperfections of the world we live in (‘non-ideal theory’). This paper has been an exercise in ideal theorizing. I have defended a vision of what tort should aim to be. I invite others more qualified than I to discuss any consequences my arguments may have for the more practical question of how things ought to be, holding fixed the limitations on resources and time and evidence that govern actual tort cases.

References


