My interests are in philosophical logic and the philosophy of language, as well as metaphysics and epistemology.
I was born and raised in Hong Kong, which was a British colony until 1997, but has since been returned to China.
Contra deflationists and other monist truth theorists, pluralists hold that there are distinct, domain-specific truth properties—where the relevant domains are individuated on the basis of subject matter, logical complexity, or type-theoretic complexity.
However, logical and metaphysical orthodoxy seems to presuppose monism. A central issue is the extent to which pluralists can maintain standard accounts of the logical operators and logical consequence. A related issue is the extent to which they can do without a generic truth property.
In my dissertation, I investigate how pluralists can develop their view in a way that systematically meets key logical and metaphysical challenges.
“Epistemic modals and sensitivity to contextually-salient partitions” (under review)