My interests are in philosophical logic and the philosophy of language, as well as metaphysics and epistemology.
I was born and raised in Hong Kong, which was a British colony until 1997, but has since been returned to China.
A common view about truth is alethic monism, according to which there is exactly one, generic truth property. But a rival view that has recently been gaining more attention is alethic pluralism, according to which there are distinct, domain-specific truth properties.
One motivation for pluralism is the thought that claims about different subject matters can accordingly be true in different ways—contra deflationism and other monist truth theories. Another motivation is the thought that it is the correct response to the semantic (and perhaps set-theoretic) paradoxes.
However, logical and metaphysical orthodoxy seems to presuppose monism. A central issue is the extent to which pluralists can maintain standard accounts of the logical operators and logical consequence. A related issue is the extent to which they can do without a generic truth property.
In my dissertation, I undertake a sustained investigation into how pluralists might develop their view in a way that meets key logical and metaphysical challenges.
“Epistemic modals and sensitivity to contextually-salient partitions” (under review)
Expressivists and relativists about epistemic modals often motivate their view by arguing against contextualist treatments of certain cases. However, I argue that even expressivists and relativists should consider being a kind of contextualist. Specifically, data involving mixed disjunctions motivates taking epistemic modals to be sensitive to a contextually-salient partition, and thus context-sensitive.
“Models and logical consequence”
- Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, Cambridge (Jul 2014)
- Southwest Graduate Conference, Arizona State (Apr 2014)
- “Epistemic modals: Contextualism for expressivists”
“Compositionality for alethic pluralists”
- Oxford-Bristol Graduate Workshop in Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics, Oxford (Jun 2014)
- Graduate Conference in Theoretical Philosophy, VU Amsterdam (May 2014)
“Diagrams, proofs, and diagrammatic proofs”
- Philosophy of Mathematics: Objectivity, Cognition, and Proof, Vita-Salute San Raffaele (May 2014)
- Deductive and Mathematical Cognition, Bristol (Apr 2014)