Andy Yu

I'm a graduate student in philosophy at Oxford.

My interests are in philosophical logic and the philosophy of language, as well as metaphysics and epistemology.

In 2014–2015, I was a visiting student in philosophy at NYU.

Before coming to Oxford, I studied philosophy at McGill.

I was born and raised in Hong Kong.



  • My dissertation, Fragmented Truth, is supervised by Timothy Williamson and Volker Halbach.

    • I examine a view I call fragmentalism, according to which “true” either expresses distinct concepts or distinct properties. In chapter 1, I propose a logic and semantics that shows how alethic pluralists, who maintain that there are distinct properties of truth, can answer the central logical challenges for their view. In chapter 2, I motivate and develop a modal account of propositions, according to which the concepts proposition and so propositional truth are indefinitely extensible, and show that the account provides satisfying solutions to the intensional paradoxes. In chapter 3, I provide independent motivation for the proposal that “true” is polysemous, and show that this neglected proposal provides satisfying solutions to the semantic paradoxes.


  • Epistemic modals and sensitivity to contextually-salient partitions” (forthcoming) DOI
    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy
    • Expressivists and relativists about epistemic modals often motivate their view by arguing against contextualist treatments of certain cases. However, I argue that even expressivists and relativists should consider being a kind of contextualist. Specifically, data involving mixed disjunctions motivate taking epistemic modals to be sensitive to contextually-salient partitions, and thus context-sensitive.


Please get in touch for drafts of the following papers:

  • Can alethic pluralists maintain compositionality?” (under review)
    • The challenge for alethic pluralists to maintain a standard, truth-functional account of the logical operators has received some attention. In this paper, I consider a related but more fundamental challenge, to maintain a compositional account of the logical operators, which has received much less attention. I argue that, given natural assumptions, pluralists cannot answer this challenge.

  • Logic for alethic pluralists” (under review)
    • Although the twin challenges for alethic pluralists to maintain standard accounts of the logical operators and of logical consequence were first posed in Williamson (1994); Tappolet (1997, 2000), there have been few attempts to answer them in a sufficiently systematic and precise way. In this paper, I propose a semantics on behalf of pluralists that answers both challenges in a systematic and precise way. Crucially, the semantics also accommodates mixed atomics, and its first-order extension also accommodates mixed generalizations. Accordingly, pluralists can answer all the distinctively logical challenges for their view.

  • The indefinite extensibility of proposition” (under review)
    • In this paper, I motivate and develop a modal account of the indefinite extensibility of the concept of proposition on the basis of an iterative conception of proposition. As an application, I suggest that the account provides a satisfying solution to the Russell-Myhill paradox. The account is in the spirit of recently-developed modal accounts of the indefinite extensibility of the concept of set motivated on the basis of the iterative conception of set.

  • ‘True’ as polysemous” (in progress)
    • In increasing order of controversiality, it has been suggested that the semantic paradoxes show that the predicate “true” of sentences is vague, context-sensitive, or ambiguous. In this paper, I propose that the semantic paradoxes show that “true” is polysemous, which I take to be a kind of ambiguity.