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www.friedrich.poeschel.info |
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Friedrich Poeschel Marie-Curie Early Stage Researcher at CEIS, University of Rome “Tor Vergata” |
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Doctoral thesis: Signalling and efficiency in two-sided matching markets. D.Phil. thesis, Department of Economics, University of Oxford. The thesis has been submitted on January 7th, 2010. Chapter: Assortative matching through signals (job market paper) Abstract: We model signalling in two-sided sequential search with heterogeneous agents and transferable utility. Search via meetings is time-consuming and thereby costly due to discounting. Search via signals is costless, so that agents can avoid almost all search costs if only the signals are truthful. We show that signals will indeed be truthful if the match output function is sufficiently supermodular. The unique separating equilibrium is then characterised by perfect positive assortative matching despite the search frictions. In this equilibrium, agents successfully conclude their search after a single meeting, and overall match output is maximised. These results continue to hold when explicit search costs are introduced in addition to discounting. Abstract: In a labour market model with frictions where workers search for jobs and perfectly informed firms set wages, Diamond found equilibrium wages so low that workers cannot even recoup their search costs. Workers in theory then choose not to search at all but do search in practice (the Diamond paradox). We introduce effort and advertisements as choices for workers and firms, respectively. As such, neither resolves the Diamond paradox. The solution we propose combines efficiency wages with wage advertisements. As workers would not exert effort after a firm reneged on its advertisement, sufficiently patient firms can credibly advertise wages that make participation worthwhile for workers. By requiring a certain sign-up bonus or base wage, workers can ensure that only sufficiently patient firms participate. In equilibrium, workers then do engage in search and may earn positive rents. These results do not depend on a commitment assumption or on any form of competition. Abstract: We look at long-run changes in labour market matching over the period 1984 to 2004. While previous studies suggested that matching has become less efficient, we hypothesise that some occupational and educational groups have benefited more than others from new technologies used in matching, in particular the internet. Faced with the almost complete lack of macro-level data for such groups, we first construct matches and stocks of job seekers from a rich set of German administrative data on individual employment histories. We then use some vacancy data for the aggregate level to calibrate an imputation procedure that also returns measures of vacancies for disaggregate levels. Our method identifies all parameters of the matching functions of educational and occupational groups. Some first results suggest that matching has generally become more efficient during the internet revolution. Other papers: Signalling in two-sided search: a model of the marriage market. M.Phil. thesis. 2006 Das Strohfeuer-Problem. Winning entry to the competition “Deutscher Studienpreis”. 2005 The impact of the world economic crisis on the Free City of Danzig. Undergraduate thesis. 2004 The CAP Reinvented? Winning entry to the competition “Economics Essay Competition” of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 2002
Articles in newspapers: A Language for Europe. The Beaver, 2004 Wie weit reicht Europa? Winning entry to the competition “Jugend baut Europa”. Rheinischer Merkur, 1999
Education: Since 2006 D.Phil. Economics, University of Oxford 2008 Visiting student, Ecole normale supérieure Paris 2004-2006 M.Phil. Economics, University of Oxford 2001-2004 B.Sc. Economics and Economic History, LSE (First Class Honours) Until 2000 Grammar school: Altes Gymnasium Oldenburg (Abitur 1.0)
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friedrich.poeschel “at” uniroma2.it
Friedrich Poeschel Via Columbia 2 00133 Roma
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