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Brasenose College, Oxford

 

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Friedrich Poeschel

Marie-Curie Early Stage Researcher im CEIS, Universität Rom “Tor Vergata”
Doktorand in VWL, Universität Oxford

Dissertation:

Signalling and efficiency in two-sided matching markets. Dissertation, Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Universität Oxford.
Betreuer: Professor Godfrey Keller und Professor Fabien Postel-Vinay. Unterstützung durch den ESRC.

Die Dissertation ist am 7. Januar 2010 eingereicht worden.

Kapitel: Assortative matching through signals

Zusammenfassung: We model signalling in two-sided sequential search with heterogeneous agents and transferable utility. Search via meetings is time-consuming and thereby costly due to discounting. Search via signals is costless, so that agents can avoid almost all search costs if only the signals are truthful. We show that signals will indeed be truthful if the match output function is sufficiently supermodular. The unique separating equilibrium is then characterised by perfect positive assortative matching despite the search frictions. In this equilibrium, agents successfully conclude their search after a single meeting, and overall match output is maximised. These results continue to hold when explicit search costs are introduced in addition to discounting.

Kapitel: Directed Search and the Diamond Paradox

Zusammenfassung: In a labour market model with frictions where workers search for jobs and perfectly informed firms set wages, Diamond found equilibrium wages so low that workers cannot even recoup their search costs. Workers in theory then choose not to search at all but do search in practice (the Diamond paradox). We introduce effort and advertisements as choices for workers and firms, respectively. As such, neither resolves the Diamond paradox. The solution we propose combines efficiency wages with wage advertisements. As workers would not exert effort after a firm reneged on its advertisement, sufficiently patient firms can credibly advertise wages that make participation worthwhile for workers. By requiring a certain sign-up bonus or base wage, workers can ensure that only sufficiently patient firms participate. In equilibrium, workers then do engage in search and may earn positive rents. These results do not depend on a commitment assumption or on any form of competition.

Kapitel: Labour Market Performance During the Internet Revolution (Zusendung auf Anfrage)

We look at long-run changes in labour market matching over the period 1984 to 2004. While previous studies suggested that matching has become less efficient, we hypothesise that some occupational and educational groups have benefited more than others from new technologies used in matching, in particular the internet. Faced with the almost complete lack of macro-level data for such groups, we first construct matches and stocks of job seekers from a rich set of German administrative data on individual employment histories. We then use some vacancy data for the aggregate level to calibrate an imputation procedure that also returns measures of vacancies for disaggregate levels. Our method identifies all parameters of the matching functions of educational and occupational groups. Some first results suggest that matching has generally become more efficient during the internet revolution.

Andere Arbeiten:

Signalling in two-sided search: a model of the marriage market. Masterarbeit. 2006

Das Strohfeuer-Problem. Prämierter Beitrag zum Wettbewerb “Deutscher Studienpreis”. 2005

The impact of the world economic crisis on the Free City of Danzig. Bachelorarbeit. 2004

The CAP Reinvented? Prämierter Beitrag zum Wettbewerb “Economics Essay Competition” des Britischen Außenministeriums. 2002

 

Beiträge in Zeitungen:

A Language for Europe. The Beaver, 2004

Wie weit reicht Europa? Prämierter Beitrag zum Wettbewerb “Jugend baut Europa”. Rheinischer Merkur, 1999

 

Ausbildung:

Seit 2006      D.Phil. Economics, University of Oxford

2008             Gaststudent, Ecole normale supérieure Paris

2004-2006     M.Phil. Economics, University of Oxford

2001-2004     B.Sc. Economics and Economic History, LSE (First Class Honours)

Bis 2000        Altes Gymnasium Oldenburg (Abitur 1,0)

friedrich.poeschel “at”  uniroma2.it

 

 

Friedrich Poeschel
CEIS

Via Columbia 2

00133 Roma

 

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