Auxilia and Gymnasia: A Sicilian Model of Roman Imperialism*

JONATHAN R. W. PRAG

After the defeat of the Carthaginians, when the Sicilians had flourished in every way for sixty years, the slave war rose against them . . .

(Diod. Sic. 34/35.2.1)

Prima omnium, id quod ornamentum imperii est, provincia est appellata. Prima docuit maiores nostros quam praeclarum esset exteris gentibus imperare.

[Sicily] was the first of all to be entitled a province, the first such jewel in our empire. She first taught our ancestors how splendid it might be to rule foreign peoples.

(Cic., Ver. 2.2)

INTRODUCTION

A study of military manpower in Republican Sicily may not appear the most obvious way to reassess Roman imperialism and its socio-cultural consequences. It offers, however, both the prospect of a reappraisal of Republican imperialism through an examination of the Roman use of local manpower, and, in the light of that, a chance to reconsider the development of Rome’s first province, the island of Sicily, containing within it the important Hellenistic kingdom of Hieron II of Syracuse.1

Edouard Will once observed that, ‘Il subsiste dans les interstices et sur les marges des grands États territoriaux tout un monde politique qui n’aspire qu’à continuer à vivre selon les normes anciennes, et y réussit d’ailleurs dans une large mesure.’ In a footnote, he added that it is precisely in the study of these marginal areas that we might hope to gain a greater understanding of the Hellenistic world.2 In a recent study of Hellenistic warfare, John Ma

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1 The inspiration for both strands comes from Fergus Millar, who also first suggested the topic of Sicily to me. ‘The history of the later Greek city under Roman rule in the West […] and in Sicily is a major historical topic […] It need only be stressed, as regards the complex relations of the wider Greek world to Rome in the Hellenistic period, that this area, though certainly marginal, was never unknown or irrelevant’ (F. Millar, ‘The Greek city in the Roman period’, in M. H. Hansen (ed.), The Ancient Greek City-State (1993), 232–60, at 233). Equally, studying the role of auxilia externa under the Republic is important ‘to understand what being under Roman power meant’ (F. Millar, ‘The last century of the Republic. Whose history?’, JRS 85 (1995), 236–43, at 242).

has pursued this idea to elucidate the ‘frequency across the Hellenistic world of local military activities’. He observes that ‘empires tolerated local defence forces’ and even ‘periodically drew on local forces for their own purposes’. In passing, he notes that ‘the Roman Republic continued the practice’.1 In what follows, I argue that Roman rule in Sicily entailed the continuity, indeed the encouragement of traditional norms, in the form of local military activities and their institutional concomitants, in particular the gymnasium. In doing so, I shall consider the nature of Sicily under the Republic, the Roman use of auxilia externa in the middle/late Republic, and the relevance of the gymnasium to military activity. Roman rule in Sicily was fashioned upon, or by, the world which the Romans encountered there. A development which might traditionally be characterized as a lack of ‘Romanization’ on the island — or, vice versa, as the continuity of a vital Hellenistic civic culture — is, perhaps paradoxically, a direct consequence of Roman rule.

Historiographically, Sicily is the poor relation amongst the Hellenistic kingdoms. The tyrants of the fourth century occupy an uneasy position for historians of the Greek world, as they did for the Greeks themselves. Agathocles, first of the Western dynasts to claim the title of basileus, is marginalized not least because of the loss, from 302 B.C. onwards, of the continuous account in our only surviving source for the Western Greeks, Diodorus Siculus. The loss of Western Greek historiography is a major reason for Sicily’s minor role in post-Classical history; but no less important is the rise of Rome and Sicily’s early subordination to the new imperial power. Sicily only appears in text-books on the Hellenistic world within asides on Westerners.4 Hellenistic Sicily has, however, been the subject of a recent revival of interest;5 the problem, if that is the right word, lies in the disjunction between the study of Hellenistic Sicily and Roman Sicily.

The study of Roman Sicily is, above all, the study of Ciceronian Sicily, meaning Verres’ Sicily.6 The two great slave wars of the later second century B.C. and Cicero’s devastating critique of Caius Verres’ governorship in 73–71 B.C. encourage a negative assessment of the island under Roman rule. The almost total silence of the literary sources on Sicily after the Roman Civil Wars serves to confirm the presumption of torpidity and stagnation under the Empire. Marxist interpretations of the island’s Roman history have been particularly successful, and the story is often written from a Romanocentric perspective.7 It is instead in the non-literary sources, the archaeology, epigraphy, and numismatics of the island, that a rather different picture, with fewer discontinuities, needs to be sought. Studies of this sort have increasingly emphasized the Hellenistic aspects of Republican Sicily, and it is

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5 e.g., G. de Sensi Sestito, Gerone II (1977); S. N. Consolo Langher, Agatocle (2000); N. Bonacasa, L. Braccesi and E. de Miro (eds), La Sicilia dei due Dionisi (2002); B. Smarzyk, Timoleon und die Neugründung von Syrakus (2003); M. Caccamo Caltabiano, L. Campagna and A. Pinzone (eds), Nuove prospettive della ricerca sulla Sicilia del III sec. a.C. (2004); C. Lehmler, Syrakus unter Agathokles und Hieron II (2005).
6 See now S. Pritta and J. Duboulez (eds), La Sicile de Cicéron, lectures des Verrines (2007).
with this firmly in mind that I wish to concentrate attention on the ways in which the Romans maintained control of the island.8

There are two main reasons to focus on military manpower in Sicily. In the first place Roman soldiers, and no less importantly auxiliaries in the service of Rome, are an obvious and recognized mechanism for cultural interaction. The possibilities have been extensively studied for the Imperial period, both in the Eastern and Western parts of the Empire.9 With the partial exceptions of Spain and North Africa however, the subject has scarcely been considered for the Republic.10 Secondly, military presence is the most obvious face of imperialism. Important studies of Spain and the Greek East have greatly enhanced our understanding of the development of mid-Republican imperialism from more general models. Sicily, a ‘Greek’ province in the West, and the first provincia, offers real potential to develop these analyses further.11

‘After the Hannibalic war, Rome adopted a new mode of control, magistrates and standing armies, for the overseas territories which she acquired.’12 Much effort in recent years has gone into nuancing the development of this new mode of control. Besides the significant element of taxation, Harris identified the primary features of regular magistrates and the presence ‘when necessary’ of Roman garrisons.13 Richardson subsequently elaborated an important binary model of Republican imperialism: continuous military activity (e.g. Spain), or continuous diplomacy with occasional military activity (e.g. the Greek East).14 Kallet-Marx has elaborated the latter half of this model, bringing out the importance of Derow’s Polybian analysis of Roman imperialism.15 He emphasizes


9 Martin Millett posed the essential question, ‘What was the nature of the military presence in each territory, and how rapid was the conquest and subsequent demilitarization?’, in T. Blagg and M. Millett (eds), The Early Roman Empire in the West (1990), 35–41, at 39; cf. M. Millett, The Romanization of Britain (1990) for one set of answers. Important papers in A. Goldsworthy and I. Haynes (eds), The Roman Army as a Community in Peace and War (1999). Regional studies include R. Alston, Soldier and Society in Roman Egypt (1995); J. D. Creighton and R. J. A. Wilson (eds), Roman Germany (1999); N. Pollard, Soldiers, Cities, and Civilians in Roman Syria (2002).


12 M. H. Crawford, The Roman Republic (1992), 117; idem, op. cit. (n. 11) is fundamental.

13 W. V. Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327–70 B.C. (1979), especially 133: ‘The power acquired in Sicily and the other overseas territories presented problems of a new kind. No one wanted to settle colonies there, so a different form of control was needed. To some extent the other instruments of control already in use in Italy — treaty obligations and ties with the local elites — would serve the purpose. But the maintenance of power and the extraction of revenue required permanent and direct government. The features of an annexed province arc, besides taxation, subdivision of a defined area to a continuing series of designated magistrates (of consular or praetorian rank) and the presence when necessary of Roman garrison troops.’

the crucial role of the symbolic side of *imperium*, and gives it a priority (pre-Sulla) over and above any military presence. Indeed, while acknowledging the arrival of a regular military presence in first Macedonia and then Asia, he is quick to affirm that ‘Rome did not maintain a military garrison in the East that was sufficient to enforce oppression’. Nonetheless, the extent of Roman garrison forces remains a keystone of these debates. The notion that governors in the late Republic in several provinces, including Sicily, often had no more than local, allied troops is frequently recognized. But, as I argue in this paper, the practice goes back much earlier. What is all too little remarked upon is the simple oddity of a Roman magistrate being sent year on year, in the second century B.C., to hold a large and important *provincia* without any Roman soldiers to accompany him. The ‘fundamental emphasis upon command and obedience’ was no less, but troops both exist and are needed for more than oppression; indeed, Kallet-Marx’s assertion that the Roman troops in Macedonia were insufficient to enforce oppression is balanced by his belief that they were there for other purposes. The old idea that Rome sought to disarm her subjects to render them harmless and even to render Rome’s own need for armed forces superfluous has rightly been rejected. But the consequences of that, at least for the Roman Republic, have yet to be fully elucidated. Republican Sicily does not fit any of the existing models.

The discussion which follows divides into three broad sections. First, a survey of the Roman military presence in Sicily; second, a survey of the role played by Sicilians in the Roman military organization, both on and off the island; third, an examination of the evidence for *gymnasia* in Hellenistic Sicily, and of the *gymnasion*’s relevance to the military activity identified in the first two sections. The second section raises the problem of the Roman use of *auxilia externa* in the period before the mid-first century B.C.; the third looks also at the wider debate regarding the connection between the *gymnasion* and military training. In the final section the results of each of the preceding surveys are united, together with some additional types of evidence for Sicilian military activity, in order to establish the significance of the patterns elucidated for both Roman imperialism and Sicilian culture and identity.

I ROMAN SOLDIERS IN SICILY

Roman military presence on the island begins with the First Punic War in 264 B.C. However, the Roman armies which campaigned in Sicily during the first two Punic Wars (264–241, 218–201 B.C.) may be safely passed over in this discussion, on the grounds that they are primarily wartime expeditionary forces, already well documented, and not of immediate relevance to our purpose. On the other hand, we shall return in Section II to consider the presence of Sicilian soldiers in these two wars. One element may usefully be highlighted in passing, since it is too easily forgotten when considering the development of models of overseas control: although there is nothing remarkable about a Roman magistrate commanding an army in the field, in the period from 259 B.C. onwards commanders

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17 As, e.g., in A. Holm, *Geschichte siciliens im Alterthum* (1898), III, 364–5 n. 8, or V. Chapot, quoted in J. Harmand, *L’Armée et le soldat à Rome de 107 à 50 avant notre ère.* (1967), 213, that the Romans sought ‘à ruiner la marine des autres, pour rendre la leur superflue’. Rejected, e.g., by Brunt, op. cit. (n. 5).
regularly remained in the field over winter, only being replaced the following spring or summer.19

The period between the wars is more problematic and the subject of much debate: it has, for instance, recently been argued that Sicily’s establishment as a province was a natural extension of First Punic War garrisoning.20 The evidence in general is however much too tenuous; furthermore, the presence of a magistrate figure needs to be treated separately from the presence of a military force, as the former need not entail the latter. The only source for the period immediately after 241 B.C., Appian’s fragmentary Sikelika / On the Islands, ch. 2, asserts that a stratēgos was sent annually from 241 B.C., and that both tribute (phoros) and naval contributions (telē ta thalassia) were exacted. Even if we accept Appian’s account, which may be no more than a retrojection of later assumptions, the meaning of the term stratēgos is problematic. In 227 B.C., a third and a fourth praetor were created to be sent to Sicily and Sardinia; it is usually assumed that a praetor was sent annually to Sicily thereafter.21 It is however important to be clear that this is an argument from silence. We know of the activities of only three praetors in total for the years between 227 and 218 B.C. — the state of our sources is admittedly pitiful — and none of them were in Sicily.22 Livy (22.25.6) records a tribune’s claim, during a senatorial debate early in the Second Punic War, that Sicily had no need of a magistrate, at a moment when, post-218 B.C., they were certainly being sent regularly. The argument for an annual praetor in Sicily after 227 B.C. is based wholly upon second-century practice. If the stratēgos referred to by Appian existed, he cannot regularly have been a praetor prior to 227 B.C., and was not necessarily so afterwards. If he existed pre-227, then he was perhaps, as some scholars have speculated, a privatus cum imperio.23

At the same time, no Roman forces are attested on the island between 241 and 218 B.C., with the single exception of a reserve legion sent there in the tumulus of 225 B.C. (Polyb. 2.24.13).24 There is no reason to assume that it stayed there long. The overall situation on the island in this period is best inferred from the position of the praetor M. Aemilius Lepidus, sent to Lilybæum in 218 B.C. at the start of the Second Punic War. He was supported and advised by Hieron II from Syracuse, and in an emergency called out the socii navales and garrisoned the coast with local levies, which were under the supervision of his tribuni militum and legati (Livy 21.49–51).25 We shall return to these levies in Section II. After 218 B.C. and the start of the war, one or more Roman magistrates were assigned to the island as part of the war effort, together with supporting forces. Following the sack of Syracuse in 211 B.C. considerable energy was devoted to restoring the island to ‘normality’

19 Prorogation is first attested in 326 B.C. (Livy 8.23.11–12); the practice in the First Punic War is a significant step towards its regularization. R. Develin, ‘Prorogation of imperium before the Hannibalic War’, Latomus 34 (1975), 716–22 considers the instances prior to 217 B.C. to be of little importance.
22 Brennan, op. cit. (n. 21), II, 655–6 speculates on a possible fourth.
24 Presumably commanded by a praetor, but pace Brennan, op. cit. (n. 21), 95, not necessarily a ‘regular governor’. As will become apparent, the argument of this paper raises the question of whether we should actually assume that this ‘legion’ (stratopedon) necessarily consisted of Roman soldiers.
25 Richardson, op. cit. (n. 14), 7–8 and Brennan, op. cit. (n. 21), 89 do note the possibility of allied soldiers in the inter-war period. The former suggests Hieron II as a source; the latter merely confirms the absence of evidence for a force levied at Rome.
(Livy 27.8.18–19; 27.35.4), but it remained a crucial theatre in the on-going war, serving as the springboard for Scipio Africanus’ invasion of North Africa in 204 B.C. With the defeat of Hannibal at Zama in 202 B.C., however, and the war’s conclusion, Roman commitments were rapidly wound up. It is what follows that is of most interest here.

Two thousand of the troops deployed at Zama were briefly stationed in Sicily, prior to being dispatched to Macedon in 200 or 199 B.C. (Livy 32.3.3). The praetor assigned to Sicily for 200 B.C., Q. Fulvius Gillo, was ordered to enrol 5,000 Latin and Italian troops (socium ac nominis Latini) from the army previously active in Gaul and to employ this as the garrison (praesidium) of the Sicilian province (Livy 31.8.8). Two years later, the praetor M. Claudius Marcellus was ordered to enrol 4,000 infantry and 300 cavalry, again socium ac Latini nominis, with which to replace the ‘time-served infantry and cavalry’ (veteres pedites equitesque) of the province (Livy 32.8.5–8). A third such levy of c. 2,500 may have taken place in 193 B.C.26 Not counting the emergency levy of Sicilians in 192 B.C. (infra, Section II.1), which was dismissed in 188 B.C., the only subsequent evidence for the allocation of troops to the island requires an argument from silence: Livy (41.21.3), recording the provincial allocations for 174 B.C., writes that ‘Sicily was decreed to Lucius Claudius, without a supplement [of manpower]’ (sine supplemento decreta). This can be read to imply the existence of a force, which was on occasion renewed or reinforced; but as Brunt observed, ‘in default of evidence it is prudent to discount this possibility’.27

Two important points emerge from this evidence. Firstly, these troops are not full Roman legionaries, but Latins and Italian allies. Secondly, both their purpose and their precise destination in Sicily are unclear. The emergency levy of 192 B.C. offers some indication: its purpose was to strengthen the garrisons in the coastal towns against the feared invasion of Antiochus (Livy 35.23.9). There is a clear difference in both Roman intent and likely local reception between garrisons intended for coastal defence against an external enemy and those securing (or oppressing) towns in the interior. The latter are, by contrast, well attested during the Punic Wars themselves (e.g. Diod. Sic. 23.9.4–5; Livy 24.37–9). Already in 212 B.C. Marcellus had agreed not to install a garrison in Tauromenium (App., Sik. 5) and after 211 B.C. the disgrace of Cannae legions, on punishment detail in Sicily since 216 B.C., were ordered to winter in the field and not in the towns (Livy 26.1.10; 27.7.13). Livy records senatorial awareness as early as 215 B.C. of the strain faced by the island in supporting the Roman effort (23.48.7). Naturally the Romans had their own advantage in mind, with the resurrection of Sicilian agriculture and the tithe-based taxation system of Hieron II firmly in place, but the Sicilians’ desire to be relieved of supporting ‘friendly’ troops is nicely paralleled in the epigraphic evidence from the Greek East.28

The use of Latins and allies on the island after 200 B.C. — they were already in the majority after 209 B.C. (Livy 27.9.1) — suggests that it was not only the Sicilians who were feeling the pressure. Even the seemingly inexhaustible depths of Roman manpower were showing the strain by the end of the Second Punic War, despite which the Romans now

26 Liv. 14.66.7–8 records enrolment of allied troops by the consul Q. Minucius Thermus. It is possible that some of these were for the praetor assigned to Sicily, L. Cornelius Scipio. The passage may be read as leaving a surplus of 5,000 allied infantry and 100 cavalry, intended for the Sicilian and Sardinian praetors (i.e. what was left after troops had been assigned to the two Spanish praetors, if their troops came out of Minucius’ levy rather than being separate from that of Minucius). Brennan, op. cit. (n. 21), 309 n. 67 cites the passage as evidence of a Sicilian levy, presumably with this in mind.

27 Brunt, op. cit. (n. 18), 683.

28 The significance of such gestures is clearly brought out by honorific decrees from the Greek East in the following century, either thanking those who averted or defrayed such an event (e.g., P. Briant, P. Brun and E. Varingioli, ‘Une inscription incidée de Carie et la Guerre d’Aristonicos’, in A. Bresson and R. Descat (eds), Les Cités d’Asie Mineure occidentale au IIe siècle a.C. (2001), 241–59, at 242, lines 12–21; L. Robert and J. Robert, Claros (1989), I, 64, Menippus decrees, col. II, 7–18; or thanking garrison commanders for controlling their troops (e.g., TAM V.i, no. 528; I. Ilion, no. 73). This is also the context for the slightly earlier decree from western Sicily, Entella IV, perhaps of the First Punic War (SEG 30.1120).
undertook heavy commitments in both Spain and the Greek East.\textsuperscript{29} Sicily, seemingly peaceful, was low on the list of priorities and, as Brunt observed, the use of allies should come as 'no surprise'.\textsuperscript{30} Sardinia underwent similar treatment at this time.\textsuperscript{31} More interesting is the apparent attempt to do the same thing in Spain in 197 B.C. (Livy 32.28.11, cf. 33.26.3–5). In discussions of Spain this is usually treated as a unique aberration on the part of the Romans, since legions had to be sent back in almost immediately. More acutely, Rich has suggested that what we see there was an 'experiment [. . . which] may betoken an attempt to assimilate Spain to the model of Sicily and Sardinia'.\textsuperscript{32} The difference between Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain is that in Sicily the use of Latins and allies continued and, as far as our evidence permits, was phased out early in the second century, possibly as early as 188 B.C.

The only Roman garrison attested in Sicily after this date and prior to the Civil Wars was one of 600 men at Henna, recorded by Diodorus Siculus (36.4.3) in the period immediately preceding the outbreak of the Second Slave War in 104 B.C. Although it is always assumed that one or more of the magistrates sent to terminate the First Slave War had at least one legion with them, there is no explicit testimony to that fact: Diodorus merely writes of P. Rupilius concluding the war 'with a few picked men' (34/35.2.23).\textsuperscript{33} For the Second Slave War Diodorus records the sending of 14,000 Romans and Italians in 103 B.C. (36.8.1), understood by Brunt as a single legion with allies; but again, although a two-legion, consular army is usually assumed to have served under M. Aquillius in 101 B.C. there is no explicit testimony.\textsuperscript{34} The other evidence for the late Republic is even thinner: Sallust (Iug. 28.6) records troops staging in Sicily on their way to fight against Iugurtha, c. 111 B.C.,\textsuperscript{35} and Plutarch claims that when Cn. Pompeius (Magnus) brought troops to the island in pursuit of Cinna in 81 B.C. he ordered that they keep their swords sealed to maintain order (Pomp. 10.7). These temporary incursions aside, there is no known legionary presence in Sicily between the Second Punic War and the Civil Wars.

One other category of 'Roman' soldier does put in an appearance, however.Auxilia externa, that is units of non-Italians serving in the Roman army,\textsuperscript{36} are attested during the Second Slave War: Mauretanians in 104 B.C. (Diod. Sic. 36.5.4) and Bithynians, Thessalians, and Acarnanians in 103 B.C. (Diod. Sic. 36.8.1).\textsuperscript{37} Additionally, a fragment of

\textsuperscript{29} The extent of Roman military commitments in the first half of the second century B.C. is well documented, e.g. Brunt, op. cit. (n. 18), 422–6; J. Rich, 'Fear, greed and glory: the causes of Roman war-making in the middle Republic', in J. Rich and G. Shipley (eds), War and Society in the Roman World (1993), 38–68.
\textsuperscript{30} Brunt, op. cit. (n. 18), 681.
\textsuperscript{31} Noted by Brennan, along with Bruttium and Gaul, op. cit. (n. 21), 118–9, 144 n. 67.
\textsuperscript{32} Richardson, op. cit. (n. 14), 78 sees it as significant only because it implies 'a relatively weak garrison force'; W. V. Harris, 'Roman expansion in the West', in A. E. Astin et al. (eds), The Cambridge Ancient History VIII (1989), 107–62, at 122 considers it a 'serious mistake', with no reference to parallel actions elsewhere; J. Rich, review of Richardson, Hispangiae in JRS 78 (1988), 212–14, quotation at 213.
\textsuperscript{33} e.g., Brunt, op. cit. (n. 18), 429 infers a legion.
\textsuperscript{34} Brunt, op. cit. (n. 18), 431.
\textsuperscript{35} Plausibly associated with the praetorship of L. Hortensius, whom Cicero (Ver. 3.42) records as having levied an extra tithe on the island; cf. Brennan, op. cit. (n. 21), II, 908 n. 228.
\textsuperscript{36} For the term/category: Festus, Ep. 16 L, s.v. Auxiliares; Varro, L. 5.90; Livy 22.37.7–8.
\textsuperscript{37} Kallet-Marx, op. cit. (n. 15), 195 n. 49 discussing the use of local auxiliaries in Macedonia and Asia Minor in this period, suggests that these Bithynians 'may only have been the emancipated slaves'. This seems unwarranted for two reasons: firstly the general Roman reluctance to employ slaves in the army (note the refusal of the praetor to honour the emancipation of slaves at Morgantina in the Second Slave War, Diod. Sic. 36.4.8); and secondly, Kallet-Marx seems to have been taken in by Nicomedes' diplomatic feint to the Romans. Nicomedes' claim that the publicani had enslaved many of the Bithynians, reported by Diodorus (36.1.1) as part of the beginnings of the Second Slave War, whence presumably Kallet-Marx's assumption that many of the escaped Sicilian slaves were Bithynian, was presented by Nicomedes as a response to C. Marius' request for troops, as authorized by the Senate (on such acts, infra, Section II.i). The reality must be that the troops reported as present in Sicily from both North Africa and the Greek East reflect the success of Marius' requests for troops, and the stretching of Roman military resources in these years. Nicomedes presumably sent rather fewer troops than Marius hoped!
Sallust mentions the presence of African soldiers in Sicily, in an incident perhaps to be dated to 87 B.C. (P. Ryl. 473.1).38 The presence of such units confirms a Roman reluctance to commit legionaries; or, to put it more positively, a willingness to use other types of troops, as already witnessed with the Latins and Italians. We shall come back to this category of soldier in Section II.

In assessing the Roman military presence, we must briefly examine three other possible sources of evidence: veteran settlement, epigraphical and archaeological material. To put it simply, there is no archaeological evidence for Roman garrisons on the island, although this does reflect a wider curiosity, namely the absence of Roman camps within the Italian peninsula.39 By contrast, there is some evidence for a Carthaginian military presence during the First Punic War.40 Billeting in communities would no doubt render troops archaeologically invisible; on the other hand, the absence of evidence, if one may argue from silence, does run counter to the idea of a standing force.41 The epigraphical evidence only serves to reinforce this impression: a single, early Latin milestone, dating to the First Punic War (CIL 1.2877), and a very fragmentary inscription of the governor during the Social War, C. Norbanus, speculatively restored to record road-building activities (CIL 1.2951).42 None of this material suggests a significant, or long-term, Roman military presence. As for veteran settlement, although Sicily features in several of the abortive proposals for colonies by post-Gracchan tribunes,43 there is no evidence for any veteran or colonial settlement on the island prior to the foundations of Augustus in 21 B.C. (Res Gestae 28). The impact of those settlements on, for example, the epigraphic culture of the island is immediate and obvious — and there is nothing with which to compare it in the preceding period.44 As we shall see in Section II, there is no evidence for Sicilian veterans either.

As I highlighted in the Introduction, this absence of a military presence would appear to raise a serious question about the nature of our assumptions regarding Roman imperialism in its earlier stages. I have already suggested that those who argue for a standing force in the period between 241 and 218 B.C. do so purely a priori (or, in fact, a posteriori). The reality is that the presumption of a standing-force in the second century is
no less tenuous, and although its potential absence has been noted, the implications seem never seriously to have been considered. 45

II SICILIAN SOLDIERS

In sharp contrast to the minimal evidence for Roman military presence in Sicily after the Second Punic War, there is extensive evidence for Sicilian military activity throughout the Republican period. In discussing this material, I hope to demonstrate that we need to reassess the role of *auxilia externa* under the Republic. In this paper, however, I shall concentrate on the Sicilian material, which has a distinctive character of its own. 46 Military activity at the *polis* level, of the sort which Ma has highlighted for the Hellenistic East, can be seen in third-century B.C. Western Sicily through the Entella Tablets. 47 Although it is true that there is no evidence after this date for fighting in Sicily between *poleis*, there is, as we shall see, no shortage of evidence for *polis* soldiers. The frequent revolts and resistance on the part of individual Sicilian *poleis* down to 210 B.C. are strongly suggestive of a lively sense of independent political — and military — identity. 48 As I argue in the rest of this paper, the activity evidenced in post-210 B.C. Sicily is no less suggestive of such a lively sense of identity. For practical reasons, I divide the following section into literary evidence for (i) land troops and (ii) naval service, down to c. 80 B.C., (iii) the Ciceroan evidence, and (iv) the epigraphic material, before (v) assessing this in relation to *auxilia externa* more generally. In considering the impact of this activity upon local culture and identity, further archaeological, numismatic, and epigraphic evidence will be discussed in Section IV.

II.i Land Forces pre-80 B.C.

Although there is little evidence for the Carthaginian employment of Sicilian troops, already in 250 B.C. the Panhormitans can be seen fighting alongside the Romans (Polyb. 1.40.9, discussed further in Section iii). 49 In 218 B.C. the praetor M. Aemilius, at Lilybaeum, dispatched legati and *tribuni* to the surrounding *civitates* to oversee their defence (Livy 21.49.7–8: ‘ad curam custodiae intendere’), which would seem to imply the supervision of

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45 Brunt, op. cit. (n. 18), 412–1 and 452 records the absence. As one of the anonymous referees for *JRS* observed, the loss of Livy does partially expose me to an argument from silence at this point; I believe the positive arguments in the rest of this paper outweigh that difficulty. Brennan, op. cit. (n. 21), I, 138–9 describes the forces on the island after 200 B.C. as ‘just above the bare minimum necessary to control Sicily’ (what is the bare minimum?). But he has little to say on the fact that this ‘bare minimum’ is reduced to something approximating to zero after c. 188 B.C. There are too many assumptions implicit in his suggestion that subsequently the island ‘must have been genuinely settled so as not to need proper commanders’ (II, 482).

46 I am currently preparing a monograph on the larger topic of Republican *auxilia externa*. In what follows, the evidence cited for Sicily may be considered ‘exhaustive’, while that for wider Republican practice is merely adduced by way of example.

47 Ma, op. cit. (n. 3). The Entella Tablets are SEG 30.117–21, 35.999, with further discussion in C. Ampolo (ed.), *Da un’antica città di Sicilia: i decreti di Entella e Nakone* (2001); a full edition is now in preparation by Professor Ampolo.

48 Compare Ma’s example of the Tabenian cavalry who recklessly attacked Cn. Manlius Vulso’s army in 189 B.C. (Livy 38.13.11–13; Ma, op. cit. (n. 3), 339, 362).

49 For Sicilians fighting for Carthage, see S. F. Bondi, ‘Penetrazione fenicio-punica e storia della civiltà punica in Sicilia. La problematica storica’, in E. Gabba and G. Vallet (eds), *La Sicilia antica* (1979), 1.1, 178–225, at 184. This action by the Panhormitans is undoubtedly to be linked to the city’s privileged status of *immunis ac libera*, attested by Cicero (*Ver.*, 3.11); E. Wightman, ‘Soldier and civilian in early Roman Gaul’, in J. Fitz (ed.), *Limes. Akten des XI. internationalen Limeskongresses* (1977), 75–81, at 79–82 associated privileged status explicitly with the supplying of troops in a later Gallic context. Millar, op. cit. (n. 1), 242 raises the question of what the relationship between status and provision of troops might be; cf. Pinzone, op. cit. (n. 23), 23–8 suggesting that naval contributions should not always be seen in a wholly negative light (see infra, Section II.i).
local defence forces. Parallels from the Greek East are not hard to find. In 217 B.C. Hieron II sent 1,000 light troops to Rome (Livy 22.37.7–8). When we come to consider the Roman use of auxilia externa in the Republican period, we should note the observation attributed by Livy to Hieron on this occasion, that while he knew that the Romans used only Romans and Latins for their legions, 'he had seen foreigners also among the light-armed auxiliaries in the Roman camps' (‘levium armorum auxilia etiam extera vidisse in castris Romanis’). Roman levies of Sicilians, for service in Sicily, were carried out by the consul suffectus in 216/215 B.C. (Livy 23.25.10), and by M. Valerius Laevinus in 209 B.C. (Livy 27.8.14–16). In 210 B.C. Valerius had opportunistically transported 4,000 brigands from Agathyrnum in Sicily to Rhegium, for the purpose of attacking the Bruttii (Livy 26.40.16–18; 27.12.4–5; Polyb. 9.27.10–11). We may reasonably infer that the 3,000 archers and slingers sent by C. Mamilius from Sicily in 207 B.C. to face Hasdrubal in Italy were also levied in Sicily (Livy 27.38.12). By contrast, Marcellus agreed not to levy troops from Tauromenium in 212 B.C. (App., Sik. 5) and, in 205 B.C., P. Cornelius Scipio (Africanus), having initially levied 300 Sicilian cavalry for his African campaign, subsequently accepted training and equipment in their stead (Livy 29.1.1–11).

With the end of the Punic Wars in Sicily, however, the trend which emerges most clearly is that few Sicilians performed military service for Rome outside of Sicily. Such service was already rare during the Wars (only the 1,000 sent by Hieron in 217 B.C. and the 3,000 sent by Mamilius in 207 B.C.), but after 200 B.C. there is only a single example. In 193 B.C. the Senate authorized an emergency levy outside Italy (dielectus extra Italiam) by the praetor C. Flaminius, to provide troops for service in Spain (Livy 35.2.7–9). The Senate seems to have intended a levy from Spain itself, but Flaminius presumably sought to capitalize on his paternal clientela in Sicily, his father having been the first praetor in 227 B.C. (cf. Livy 33.42.8). Such senatorial decrees to levy auxilia externa are not uncommon, but they usually authorize levies from the region where the fighting is taking place, as for the wars in Spain (e.g. Livy 40.32.4, provincialis auxilia), or else direct the use of certain more renowned ethnic fighting bodies, such as Numidian cavalry and Cretan archers. The non-levying of Sicilians to fight abroad under the Republic continues with their

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51 Polyb. 3.75.7 records that he sent 500 Cretans also, presumably the 600 referred to in Livy 24.30.13 and captured by Hannibal at Trasmene.

52 Livy claims that this was Scipio’s intention from the beginning. It is a variation on the practice of accepting

53 In 191 B.C. for the consul assigned to Greece (Livy 36.1.8, 36.4); 171 B.C. for the consul P. Licinius (Livy 42.35.4–6); 114 B.C. for Scipio Aemilianus at Numantia (App., Iber. 14.44); c. 104 B.C. for C. Marius against the Cimbri (Diod. Sic. 36.3.1, discussed above); 67 B.C. for Cn. Pompeius under the Lex Gabinia (App., Mith. 94); 51 B.C. for M. Bibulus in Asia (Cic., Fam. 15.1.5 = SB 104); 51/50 B.C. for M. Cicero in Cilicia (Cic., Fam. 15.4 = SB 110).

54 Note Vell. Pat. 2.34.1 in praise of Cretan archers and, e.g., Liv. 42.35.4–6 for the presence of Cretan archers in the army in Greece in 171 B.C. In addition to this latter occasion and in the Punic Wars, Numidians were employed, e.g., at Numantia in 134/133 B.C. (Sall., Ing. 7–8) and in the Social War in 90 B.C. (App., B.Civ. 1.54.2); in detail Hamdoune, op. cit. (n. 10), especially 40–51. A different pattern may be suggested by the Greek contingents which crop up in the Roman campaigns of the second century, e.g., Achaeans serving against Gauls in the second century B.C. (SEG 12.214; transl. Sherk, op. cit. (n. 50), no. 11; cf. Kallet-Marx, op. cit. (n. 16), 152–3); Epirotes serving in Asia c. 129 B.C. (SEG 36.555; cf. R. Merkelsbach, ‘Epiroteische Hilfsstruppen im Krieg der Romer gegen Aristonicos’, ZPE 87 (1991), 132); Aetolians serving at Numantia, 114–113 B.C. (AE 1996–990). Whether all of these should be considered as mercenaries, as argued by J. A. Krassnikoff, ‘Mercenary soldiering in the West and the development of the army of Rome’, Analecta Romana Instituti Danici 23 (1996), 7–20, seems to me doubtful (cf. Diod. Sic. 29.6.1), but I shall discuss this in my forthcoming monograph.
(non)recruitment under the Empire: so far as I am aware, there is not a single Sicilian
veteran attested at any point in the Empire, nor any Sicilian unit. \textsuperscript{55} Imperial recruitment
generally followed the army and was primarily confined to those areas near the frontiers,
although the contrast with Sardinia, from where troops were frequently recruited, is
notable. \textsuperscript{56} Under the Principate however, unlike under the Republic, there is no evidence
for military activity on Sicily either. Sicily was essentially peaceful (but not irrelevant, as
Sextus Pompeius had demonstrated).

Returning to our survey of the Republican period, in 192 b.c. the Senate authorized L.
Valerius to levy 12,000 foot and 400 cavalry in Sicily and the surrounding islands, in order
to meet the anticipated invasion of Antiochus (Livy 35.23.3–9). A further supplement of up
to 2,000 infantry and 100 cavalry was authorized for C. Atinius Labeo when he took over
in 190 b.c. (Livy 37.2.8). These troops were dismissed in 188 b.c. (Livy 38.36.2). During the
First Slave War, the first praetor to engage the slaves, L. Plautius Hypsaeus, did so with
8,000 Sicilians (Diod. Sic. 34/35.2.18). In the Second Slave War, faced with a lack of
available troops from elsewhere, the praetor P. Licinius Nerva deployed a force of 10,000
Italiotai and soldiers ‘from Sicily’ for the opening phases of the conflict (Diod. Sic.
36.4.6). \textsuperscript{57} The forces deployed by C. Norbanus on the island during the Social War are not
specified (Diod. Sic. 37.2.14), but there is a probable reference in a fragment of Sallust
(P.Ryl. 473.1) to the use of local forces by his quaestor in the vicinity of Eryx, c. 87 b.c., in
resisting the Marians (cf. Plut., Marius 40.2–3). In the circumstances, it seems unlikely that
Norbanus had anything other than local levies available to him. \textsuperscript{58}

\textsection{ii} \textit{Naval Forces \textit{pre-80 b.c.}}

The evidence for Sicilian naval activity implies the same overall trend of minimal service
outside the island, although this will only become clear when we move on to the Cicero-
nian and non-literary evidence. As noted above (Section i), Appian (Sik. 2.2) claims that
naval obligations were imposed on the western Sicilians from 241 b.c. The defence of the
Sicilian coast in 218 b.c. was authorized for C. Atinius Labeo when he took over
Sicily (Diod. Sic. 34/35.2.18). In the Second Slave War, faced with a lack of
available troops from elsewhere, the praetor P. Licinius Nerva deployed a force of 10,000
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resisting the Marians (cf. Plut., Marius 40.2–3). In the circumstances, it seems unlikely that
Norbanus had anything other than local levies available to him. \textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{55} G. Forni, \textit{Il reclutamento delle legioni da Augusto a Diocleziano} (1914). 73, reconfirmed by the absence of Sicily
from J. C. Mann (ed. M. M. Roxan), \textit{Legionary Recruitment and Veteran Settlement during the Principate} (1983)
and, for the auxilia, by Sicily’s total absence from J. Spaul, \textit{Cohors} \textsuperscript{2} (2000). Manganaro, op. cit. (n. 44), to suggest
that this was due to island-wide \textit{usus Latii} rendering service unattractive; that status is however disputed, e.g. Wilson,
op. cit. (n. 7), 35–7. J. Patterson, \textit{Sanniti, Liguri e Romani} (1988), 179–80 has tentatively interpreted the abbreviation
\textit{SICI} or \textit{SICIL} in two funerary inscriptions (AE 1988.396; CIL IX.1625) as referring to a \textit{legio Sicilensis} from
the Civil War period, but it is otherwise wholly unattested (Sextus Pompeius certainly recruited in Sicily, but Octavian
seems unlikely to have perpetuated a Sicilian legion in the aftermath; Brunt, op. cit. (n. 18), 499–500).

\textsuperscript{56} I. Haynes, ‘The impact of auxiliary recruitment on provincial societies from Augustus to Caracalla’, in L. de
Bloiis (ed.), \textit{Administration, Prosopography, and Appointment Policies in the Roman Empire} (2001), 62–83; at 66;
on Sardinia, see Y. Le Bohec, \textit{La Sardaigne et l’armée romaine sous le Haut-Empire} (1990).

\textsuperscript{57} Brunt, op. cit. (n. 18), 431 observes that the Italiotai could be resident in Sicily.

\textsuperscript{58} For Norbanus, see Cic., \textit{Ver.} 5.8; SEG I.418 (and now \textit{Supplementa Italica} V (1989), 58–9 no. 11); CIL I. P.2951;
E. Badian, ‘Notes on provincial governors from the Social War down to Sulla’s Victory’, in idem, \textit{Studies in Greek
and Roman History} (1964), 71–104, at 84–6; Broughton, MRR III, 149, s.v. ‘C. Norbanus’ (correct ‘Africa’ to
‘Sicily’); Brennan, op. cit. (n. 21), II, 481, 836 n. 32. For the possible presence of \textit{African auxilia externa} also at the
Eryx incident, see above Section i.

\textsuperscript{59} On Sicilian \textit{socii navales}, see now Pinzone, op. cit. (n. 21), which reached me after I had first drafted this text; I
have endeavoured to indicate the main points of contact, and am happy to see that we are in frequent agreement.
Pinzone (12–13) argues that the mention of \textit{télé ta thalassa} in Appian refers to naval contributions after the fashion
of \textit{socii navales} rather than \textit{portoria}, with full bibliography for the debate. For the events of 218 b.c. Pinzone places
emphasis rather upon the naval help provided by Hieron II, but this is a different category of allied help, and Hieron
is never recorded as actually giving ships over to Roman service.
rather than ships. The Sicilian evidence for the period down to 80 B.C. is, however, more ambiguous than has usually been assumed, with regard both to manpower and to actual ships, and in particular the Ciceronian evidence suggests otherwise (infra, Section II.iii), as does evidence from the Greek East.

For the remainder of the Second Punic War, it is usually assumed that the fleets based around Sicily were partly manned by Sicilians, although the strongest evidence for this lies in the records of deserters, of whom the majority were from the socii navales and who are frequently mentioned as taking refuge in Syracuse (Livy 24.2.10; 24.27.7; 24.29.2; 24.30.6; 24.32.7; 25.25.1; 25.29.8). Likewise, it is assumed that the fleets which Livy records being employed by Rome, either around Sicily or elsewhere, down to 172 B.C. normally consisted of Roman ships alone, whether manned partly by Sicilians or not. Consequently Thiel finds the twelve ships sent overseas from Sicily in 172 B.C. (Livy 42.27.2) ‘very surprising indeed’, but that they must be a remnant of the presumably Roman fleet last attested off the island in 188 B.C. In general, the problem is one of a lack of explicit evidence, and in fact a number of examples of the employment of non-Roman ships in this period can be cited. As regards manpower, Brunt estimated Sicilian participation in Roman fleets in the period 200–149 B.C. at approximately 30,000 men. This is, however, based solely upon Livy’s record of 500 Sicilians amongst the socii navales serving in Macedonia in 169/168 B.C. (43.12.9); the Sicilians had deserted within the year (Livy 44.20.6). Other than a passing reference in Cicero to the presence of Tyndaritan sailors in Scipio Aemilianus’ fleet off Carthage in the Third Punic War (Ver. 5.125), there is no other evidence to support

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61 Livy 42.56.6–7 refers to ab sociis navales from Carthage, Heraclea Pontica, Chalcedon, Samos, and Rhodes for 171 B.C. (cf. 36.42.2 and 43.3.7 for Carthaginian contributions), Millar, op. cit. (n. 1), 242 points out that Cic., Ver. 1.86–90 records a squadron of ten ships built by Miletus as part of a classis populi Romani (other cities of Asia did likewise: ‘sicut pro sua quaeque parte Asiæ cetæ civitates’). Examples from the East: CIG 2501 (cf. Robert and Robert, op. cit. (n. 28), 30) records the contribution of a ship of c. 132 B.C., by Halicarnassus. I. Delos 1853–58, discussed below (Section II.ii), record contingents of Milesians and Smyrniotes serving under the legatus C. Valerius C.f. Triarius, c. 69 B.C., in the Aegean; the ships have Greek names and in one case the trierarch is from Smyrna, so presumably Miletus and Smyrna provided the ships. The SC de Asclepiaude of 78 B.C. (CIL I. 888 = R. K. Sheek, Roman Documents from the Greek East (1969), no. 22, transl. Sheker, op. cit. (n. 50), no. 66) thanks three men of Clazomenae, Carystia, and Miletus for their service ‘with their ships’ in the Social War a decade earlier. Memnon, FGrH 414, fr. 21, despite the author’s geographical confusion (placing Italic peoples in Africa) appears to describe the contribution of two ships by Heraclea Pontica to Roman forces in the Social War. Tac., Ann. 4.56 has Smyrnaeans envoy to the Senate in a.d. 26 invoke their past naval contributions in Rome’s foreign wars and the Social War. Less explicitly, Syll. 694 (now B. Le Guen, ‘Tribulations d’artistes pergamiens en 129 av. J.-C.’, Pallas 47 (1997), 73–96) and SEG 46.1563 both allude to trials by sea and not just land.
62 So, e.g., Brunt, op. cit. (n. 18), 421, 667, 669 and Thiel, op. cit. (n. 60), 77 n. 128, 195–8. As Pinzone, op. cit. (n. 23), 16 observes, the presumption that these deserters were all Sicilians is unfounded. However, Pinzone’s own inference that Sicilians were among the socii navales serving under T. Otacilius in 216 B.C. (Livy 23.21.5) is also unsupported.
63 Thiel, op. cit. (n. 60), 419–20, cf. 375 n. 699.
64 In 264 B.C. Rome used ships from Tarentum, Locri, Elea, and Neapolis to cross to Sicily, since she lacked her own fleet (Polyb. 1.20.14). Livy 26.35.9 is the only explicit testimony to an allied, rather than Roman fleet in the Second Punic War: Rhegium, Velia, and Paestum are named as providing ships in 210 B.C. Scipio did however expropriate merchant ships from Sicily for his African invasion in 204 B.C. (Livy 29.14.9, cf. 30.24.6). Pinzone, op. cit. (n. 23), 16 cites Livy 27.29.7–8 for a Sicilian-sourced fleet under Locutius in 207 B.C., but there is nothing in Livy to support this claim. In the second century B.C., while Livy’s text survives, South Italian contributions (as well as from Issa, Dyrrachium, Illyria, and Carthage) are more frequently mentioned: Livy 34.85.4 (195 B.C.); 35.16.3 (193 B.C.); 36.42.1 (191 B.C.); 42.48.7 (171 B.C.); cf. Lomas, op. cit. (n. 60), 83–4. Michael Crawford has drawn my attention to Polyb. 12.5.1–3, which indicates the regularity of such contributions for Locri in the second century.
Brunt’s estimate. Another ambiguous case is presented by the ships summoned from Sicily by Cinna and Carbo in 85 B.C. (App., B. Civ. 1.76.349) — were they Roman or Sicilian, and who manned them? For what it is worth, M. Antonius (pr. 74 B.C.) press-ganged slaves from Sicily into his fleet during a brief stop-over in 74/3 B.C.

11.iii Sicilian Military Service in Cicero’s Verrines

We reach clearer waters with the Ciceronian evidence. In the last of the Verrine orations, in which Cicero purports to be undermining Hortensius’ expected attempt to defend Verres on the basis of his military achievements, there is extensive evidence for Sicilian military and naval activity. Millar has highlighted Cicero’s claim, in the course of this speech, that:

Sumptum omnem in classem frumento stipendio ceterisque rebus suo quaeque nauarcho civitas semper dare solebat. [..] Erat hoc, ut dico, factitatum semper, nec solum in Sicilia sed in omnibus provinciis, etiam in sociorum et Latinorum stipendio ac sumptu, tum cum illorum auxiliis uti solebamus.

All expenditure on the fleet, for grain, pay, and everything else, each city has always entrusted to its own navarch, as a matter of habit. [..] This was done, as I say, repeatedly and always, not only in Sicily, but in all the provinces, and likewise for the pay and expenses of the allies and Latins at the time when we were accustomed to employ auxilia from them.

As Millar emphasized, this has significant implications for our understanding of the Roman use of auxilia externa under the Republic, ‘not only in Sicily, but in all our provinces’. We can make a start by examining the Sicilian evidence.

Cicero makes it clear that several communities were obliged by treaty to provide various forms of military assistance: Messana had to provide a bireme, armed and equipped (Ver. 5.49–59), as well as sailors and soldiers for naval and garrison duty (Ver. 5.51, cf. 4.21, 4.150); Tauromenium by contrast was explicitly exempted from providing a ship (Ver. 5.49–59); Netum’s treaty we know less about, but the city was expected to provide rowers, soldiers, and probably a ship (Ver. 5.133). These three were the only foederati in Sicily, but at least ten ships could be levied from communities across the island (Ver. 5.43; 5.63; 5.86; cf. 5.133), and not only coastal ones. There is an object lesson in Ciceronian trickery to be noted here: despite Cicero’s protestations that the people of inland Centuripae were the least suitable to guard a pirate (Ver. 5.70: ‘homines maxime mediterraneos, summos aratores’), we learn later that Centuripae provided a quadrireme, the fastest ship of the Sicilian fleet and on occasion its flagship (Ver. 5.88). Thiel noted long ago that socii navales do not need to be coastal communities. If one combines the named civitates of Ver. 5.86 (a fleet of five ships) and Ver. 5.133 (apparently a list of ship-contributing states), we arrive at a plausible list of eleven states from which came the ten ships mentioned at Ver. 5.63: Netum, Amestratus, Herbita, Henna, Agyrium, Tyndaris, Centuripae, Segesta, Heraclea, Apollonia, and Haluntium. Under any governor except Verres Messana would also belong to this list. These ships could be described as

65 Brunt, op. cit. (n. 18), 670. Pinzone, op. cit. (n. 23), 17 n. 22 suggests that Livy’s mention of desertion (44.20.6) is more of a literary topos than a useful report. The Ciceronian passage is frequently misunderstood to refer to the elder Scipio Africanus and the invasion of Africa 204–202 B.C. (most recently by Pinzone, op. cit. (n. 23), 16), but close reading of the surrounding chapters makes the Third Punic War context very clear.
67 Millar, op. cit. (n. 1), 241.
68 Thiel, op. cit. (n. 60), 197.
constituting a *classis populi Romani* (Ver. 5.91; cf. 1.87 for the same in the East), but also the *classis Sicilensis*.69 It may be no more than coincidence, but this is the same size as the fleet summoned from Sicily in 172 B.C., which we noted above. It is possible to raise the potential number of ship-contributing states to fifteen by assuming firstly that Tauro- meningium was in fact regularly called to contribute, as it was by Verres, despite its treaty, and secondly that the epigraphic evidence discussed below (Section II.iv) implies contributions also from Halaesa and Calacte. Furthermore, as Pinzone observes, the geographical distribution of these towns is mostly northern and eastern; perhaps we should infer a second squadron based upon Lilybaeum?70

Besides the ships, however, the towns were also required to provide the men to serve both as crew and soldiers, and the pay and supplies for those men. Contributions were due not only from the allied states of Netum and Messana, and a number of other states with no special status, but also from at least one of the five privileged *civitates immunes ac liberae* of Sicily — Segesta, which claimed kinship with Rome.71 The implication of the special exemption from providing a ship in Tauromenium’s treaty must be that for most cities contributions were the norm. The implication of Verres’ particular act of extortion on this occasion is that a formula of some sort existed to determine the numbers due from each *civitas* (Cic., Ver. 5.62; cf. Plut., *Crass*. 17.5). The men levied were not only deployed on board ship, but in garrisons and watch-stations. Cicero refers to the existence of watch-towers and a system of warning beacons (Ver. 5.93; Livy 21.49.8–10 for *specula* on the west coast in 218 B.C.), and specifically refers to a garrison established on Cape Pachynus in south-east Sicily (Ver. 5.87, 5.133; more generally 5.51, 5.137). These forces were levied for the duration of a summer campaign season (such is the implication of Ver. 5.62; compare the desertion within the year of the Sicilians sent to Macedonia in 168 B.C., above Section II.ii); and the governor’s summer tour seems to have been associated with the gathering of troops (Ver. 5.80). Once levied, they were then dispersed across the province — note the difficulties faced by the praetor P. Licinius Nerva in reassembling his scattered troops in 104 B.C. (Diod. Sic. 36.4.1).

Cicero also refers to two other military bodies in Sicily. He makes frequent reference to the infamous *servi Venerii*, the public slaves attached to the temple of Venus Erycina at Eryx, whom Verres appears to have employed in a variety of roles in support of his extortions. They feature principally in the context of tithe collection, by force (or so Cicero implies).72 It would be wrong to think of these in excessively military terms, but the readiest comparisons perhaps lie in the local police forces of the Greek East, employing public slaves in a *diogmetes* role, although one could also compare the Roman magistrate with his lictors.73 The other group is more definitely military, if also more honorific, and is described in more detail by Diodorus Siculus (Cic., Ver. 5.124; Diod. Sic. 4.83.7): a

69 *Classis sicilensis* (Ver. 5.42); *classis populi Romani* (1.13, 5.67, 5.82, 5.92, 5.100, 5.131, 5.137); *classis nostra* (5.63; 5.87); *classis pulcherrima*, *Siciliae praesidium propugnaculumque provinciae* (3.186). D. B. Saddington, ‘The origin and character of the provincial fleets of the early Roman Empire’, in V. A. Maxfield and M. J. Dobson (eds), *Roman Frontier Studies* 189 (1991), 397–9 does not consider the possibility that here we might have the origins of a ‘provincial fleet’.

70 Pinzone, op. cit. (n. 23), 20–4 discusses the potential contributors, arguing that Cicero’s rhetoric disguises the likelihood of Tauromenium’s more regular contribution, suggesting the existence of a second squadron at Lilybaeum, and noting the further apparent coincidence between Verres’ fleet of ten and the original Roman fleets of ten under the *duoviri navales* — but, as noted above, the Milesians also contributed ten ships, and ten is surely too standard a number for a squadron to allow us to place any faith in such coincidences.

71 As Pinzone observes, op. cit. (n. 23), 23–6 with reference to earlier discussion, it is important not to confuse the tax status of the Sicilian cities, set out in Cic., Ver. 2.12–13, with other aspects of a city’s legal position; the lack of distinction in their military obligations is telling in this regard.


garrison of 200 stationed at Eryx, for which the seventeen states ‘most loyal’ to Rome were responsible.74 More than one scholar has suggested that the body’s origins lie in an early attempt by Rome to establish a system of control in the area of Sicily outside of Hieron II’s kingdom in the period between the first two Punic Wars.75

ii. iv Epigraphic Evidence for Sicilian Military Activity

The Eryx garrison is also important as the inspiration for several pieces of epigraphic evidence for military activity in late Hellenistic Sicily, and this evidence is not only informative but also encourages parallels with material from elsewhere. Two late Hellenistic inscriptions — one Latin, one Greek — make explicit reference to the soldiers stationed at Eryx. The former, from Eryx itself, was probably a dedication to the goddess. The text is fragmentary, and although both a quaestor pro praetore in overall command and a tribunus militum in charge of the detachment of troops are indicated, their names are missing.76 The Greek inscription, from the town of Halaesa on the north coast, is a dedication to ‘all the gods’, set up by the soldiers who served in Eryx, in honour of their chiliarchos, one Herakleos Ka—], son of Diodoros.77 A third inscription, also Greek and from Eryx, records what is presumably another dedication to Venus Erycina, this time by a Segestan, Pasion Seisyrion, son of Dekkios, designated chiliarchos, and so, one assumes, another commander of the garrison.78 In this case too, the quaestor in overall command is named: one L. Caecilius L. f. Metellus, probably the son of the L. Caecilius Metellus who succeeded Verres in 70 B.C., and therefore quaestor c. 52 B.C. A fourth inscription, from Messana, bearing a list of names and a dedication to Aphrodite may also record this garrison. The stone is headed by the word ‘NAYPOI’. The term is unique, although the dedication of fasti to Aphrodite is attested elsewhere on Sicily.79 LSJ (9th edn rev.), s.v. nauros, suggests that this specific instance means ‘temple guard’, on the basis of a close parallel for


75 Lintott, op. cit. (n. 16), 206 n. 6; C. P. Jones, Kinship Diplomacy in the Ancient World (1999), 86.


79 E.g., at Acrae (IG XIV.208–12) and at Thermae Himeraeae (IG XIV.313).
the term in Hesychius. A dedication to Aphrodite, in the context of Eryx, would of course be unsurprising and Messana is perfectly plausible as one of the original seventeen cities. The epigraphic evidence extends also to naval actions: a second late Hellenistic inscription from Halaesa, again dedicated to ‘all the gods’, records honours for a presumably Roman officer, one Caninius Niger, on the part of those who served on board ship from Halaesa, Calacte, Herbita, and Amestratus. Two of these four towns appear among Cicero’s ship-contributing communities in the Verrines, and the other two may therefore also have contributed ships on occasion. There is one further inscription to consider, but before we do so (at the end of Section ii.v), it will be useful to pull together the various elements set out thus far.

ii.v Sicilian Auxilia

The epigraphic material, when combined with the literary evidence, especially that of Cicero, leads us in several directions. It is strongly indicative of local pride and identity, and this is a point to which I shall return at the end (infra, Section iv). Secondly, as we shall see in a moment, and as has already been hinted at above, it makes clear the need to consider the role of auxilia externa in Republican military activity, both in Sicily and in the wider Roman world. Thirdly, and more specifically, it sheds light upon the command structures employed for such military units, and it is to these I turn first, before moving to a wider consideration of auxilia externa, and from there to an elaboration of the specific situation in Republican Sicily.

Cicero’s evidence implies that the expectation was for such troops to have a Roman commander. He describes the Sicilian fleet in 71 B.C. under the command of P. Caesetius, a quaestor, and P. Tadius, a legatus (Ver. 5.63; 5.137). He works up a suitable level of outrage at Verres’ subsequent appointment of Cleomenes of Syracuse to the command (Ver. 5.82–4; 5.137). However, when he recounts Verres’ rewards to his subordinates for their actions against the pirates, he includes several Siculi potentissimi nobilissimi among the recipients (Ver. 3.186). Elsewhere Cicero is flexible in his use of praefectus and nauarchus in describing the Sicilian ships’ captains (e.g. Ver. 5.84; 5.91; 5.101). The Caninius Niger of the Halaesa inscription is assumed to be Roman, and so perhaps a legatus; the individual ships were presumably under native commanders. For the naval structure, it is useful to compare the dedications from Delos honouring C. Valerius C.f. Triarius, legatus, c. 69 B.C. (I. Délos 1855–8). In I. Délos 1856 the Milesians describe themselves as having served with Valerius, on the ship Athena, with Publius Junius P.F. sailing on board and set over them; in I. Délos 1857 the Smyrnians describe themselves as having served with Valerius, on the same ship Athena, with Nicomachus, son of

80 IG XIV.401. The stone, now lost, was recorded by Gualtherus. The reading of line 1 which is most often adopted, vou[klhp]p, is a conjecture of Wilamowitz, reported by Kaibel in IG. L. de Salvo, ‘A proposito di alcun’iscrizioni di naukleroi in Sicilia’, Archivo Storico Messinese, ser. 3, 30 (1979), 57–68, at 61–7 discusses in detail, arguing in favour of naukleroi since these are well attested in the Imperial period (e.g. IG XIV.404), while acknowledging the stone’s likely Hellenistic date, given the Hellenistic parallels cited in the previous note. Despite his objections, the rejection of the reported text on the grounds that it is a hapax seems to me to be no less methodologically unsound than the arbitrary emendation of the text in line with inscriptions of a later period. The philological arguments in support of nauros are plausible, while the association of Aphrodite with Eryx and the existence of the garrison are both historical facts and present safer ground than a generic association between Aphrodite and the sea, which de Salvo cites in favour of naukleroi.


82 Canini Niger are unknown, but Canini are known to have been active in Sicily, e.g., C. Caninius Rebilius, pr. 171 B.C.; cf. Scibona, op. cit. (n. 81), 7; Pinzone, op. cit. (n. 23), 22 n. 51.
Artemidorus, as trierarch. If one is to attempt to unravel this knot (the editors decline), presumably Valerius was in overall command, Publius Junius was in charge of either the ship, or a squadron, or even just the unit of Milesians, and the ship in question was provided by, and partly manned by, the Smyrnians, under the command of Nicomachus the trierarch.

The organization is no less variable on land. The epigraphic evidence cited above (Section II.iv) shows the Eryx garrison under the command of military tribunes or chiliarchoi, who in at least two cases (IG XIV.282, 355) are clearly Sicilian, not Roman. In two instances (CIL X.7258; IG XIV.282) the local (native) commander is then listed as subordinate to a quaestor. Perhaps unsurprisingly, in the third case (IG XIV.355), a local dedication at Halaesa, this element is omitted. Mommsen’s comment on the title chiliarchos deserves repetition: ‘The commander seems to have been acting in the role of tribune, which in turn the Greeks, in their usual smooth style of speaking, exaggerated somewhat.’83 The closest parallel he could find was the granting of the title and powers of a tribunus militum to the duumvir of a Roman colonia or his deputy (as in the Lex Coloniae Genetivae, ch. 103). The norm, at least in the Caesarian period, would have been the granting of the title of praefectus to a commander of auxilia, usually a Roman, but on occasion a native.84

Parallels from the Greek East are, however, increasingly plentiful for just these sorts of dedications and inscriptions. SEG 15.254 constitutes a very direct parallel, set up by troops of the Achaean league who had fought for a Roman consul, Cn. Domitius, under their own commander, Damon of Patrae.85 The troops provided by Bargylia (SEG 44.867) to serve firstly under the consul M’. Aquilius and subsequently under the legatus Q. Servilius Caepio (129/128 B.C.) presumably had their own commander but, with a different focus to the inscription, he is not recorded. The same Q. Servilius Caepio installed a garrison of Lydian troops under one Hephæstion of Sardis in a fort at Maëonia, c. 129 B.C. (BE 1963,220 = TAM V.i, no. 528). In IGR IV.134 Cyzicus honours Machaon, who was nominated as commander (stratēgos) for the auxiliary troops supplied by the polis for the Roman campaigns against Aristonicus, c. 129 B.C. The Claros decree in honour of Menippus records his appointment in charge of the hoplites, ‘in time of war and in the presence of the Roman armies’, i.e. during the campaign against Aristonicus.86 In the same context, a newly published inscription from Metropolis honours another local commander, Apollonius son of Attalus, who fell leading Metropolitan troops under Roman command at Thyateira, 131/130 B.C. (I. Metropolis, no. 1, A.19–34). Aphrodisias appointed one Artemidorus to command an auxiliary unit sent to the rescue of Q. Oppius, the proconsul in trouble in Laodicea in 88 B.C.87 OGIS 443 (= I. Ilion, no. 73) records Ilium’s thanks to Nicander of Poemanenon, appointed with a group of Poemaneni to act as a garrison at Ilium on the orders of the proconsul C. Claudius P.f. Nero, c. 80 B.C. Perhaps most directly relevant of all to our Sicilian chiliarchos is the inscription set up by the Chaeroneans to honour a Thracian cavalry commander installed with his troopers in the city by Sulla, probably over the winter of 87/86 B.C., and described as chiliarchos hippeōn. Like Mommsen in the Sicilian example, Holleaux who published the inscription was somewhat perplexed by the title: tribunus equitum is not Roman; the normal term would be praefectus equitum, which in Greek should be eparchos hippeōn. He concluded that either the Thracian had gained the title by special favour, or else ‘il est possible aussi

83 ‘[Videtur] dux pro tribuno fuisse, quod deinde Graeci ore rotundo ut solebant paullo inflatus extulerunt’, on CIL.10.7258, where the names are missing, and for which Mommsen assumed a local Sicilian in the role of tribunus militum, on the parallel of IG XIV.355 from Halaesa.
85 The exact date is uncertain: 196, 162, 122, and 96 B.C. are all possible. See Kallet-Marx, op. cit. (n. 15), 352–3.
86 Robert and Robert, op. cit. (n. 28), 64, col. II, lines 7–9.
qu’étant étranger, il ait porté un titre qui ne fût point conforme aux usages romains...’. 88

But when does ‘standard’ practice become standard?

What all these parallels suggest, prima facie, is that there is nothing unusual about our Sicilians. The inscriptions listed above are only the epigraphic examples that relate most directly to the Sicilian material and the issue of command. Undoubtedly more should be made of the great mass of evidence which exists for auxilia externa in the service of Rome during the Republic, as Millar suggested. Service in Gaul under Julius Caesar is relatively well discussed, as is the presence of non-Italian troops in the armies of the Civil Wars. 89

Attention is occasionally focused upon the role of clientela in such service, going back especially to the Scipiones, and most visible in the Civil Wars. 90 Numidian contributions to the Republican armies have recently been studied in detail, and the Spanish material has been considered several times. 91 There is no complete synthesis; but I reserve such a study for a forthcoming monograph. 92

On the other hand, I do not think that the Eastern examples just cited are a perfect parallel for the Sicilians. With the exception of the Achaeans serving under Cn. Domitius against the Gauls, these are all local communities caught up in ‘Big War’, to use Ma’s phrase, either against Aristonicus or Mithridates. The Achaeans, like the Epirotes in Asia, the Aetolians in Spain, or the Africans, Bithynians and others in Sicily, all cited previously, are different again, since they are engaged in service abroad, whereas the Sicilians remained at home. What battles were the Sicilians fighting? Why were they levied, and so frequently?

The inference to be drawn from Cicero’s account is that the primary role of such forces was the defence of the island against pirates and slave risings: Ver. 5.67 and 75 imply that pirates were a perennial problem on the island. 93 Cicero is quite explicit that it was normal practice for the governor to make a tour of the province at the time when the greatest number of slaves were in the fields (Ver. 5.29 ; 5.80 ), and the slave revolts of the previous two generations were clearly not forgotten (e.g. Ver. 2.27 ; 2.136 ; 3.66 ; 3.125 ; 4.112 ; 5.3 ; 5.5–18). Indeed, despite Cicero’s scorn (Ver. 5.3), there is some evidence to suggest that Verres was rather more competent and successful in securing the island against Spartacus than Cicero implies; the same is probably true of Norbanus’ activities at the time of the Social War. 94 There are also some grounds for believing that the incursion by the pirates into Syracuse harbour, which Cicero reports, was a rather more major event than he

92 The two most lucid summaries are G. L. Cheesman, The Auxilia of the Roman Imperial Army (1914), 7–11 and 11; and Ilari, op. cit. (n. 60), 25 n. 1.
94 Sall., Hist. 4.34 [M]: ‘C. Verres litora Italia proquinqua firmavit’ (with Sicilians presumably!); Schol. Gron. p. 324 (St.) states precisely that Verres was prorogued ‘propter fugitivos’; cf. Mattingly, op. cit. (n. 66), 1508; Plut., Crass. 10.3–4; Sall., Hist. 4.30–1 [M]; Brennan, op. cit. (n. 21), II, 489: ‘It stands to reason that Verres had some military competence in order to be prorogued for the year 71.’ On Norbanus (cf. supra), Diod. Sic. 37.2.14 (presumably with a Sicilian force) and SEG 1.418; contrast Cic., Ver. 5.8.
allows (Ver. 5.87–100). Verres’ successor, L. Metellus, seems to have won a considerable victory against the pirates, presumably with Sicilian forces. The existence of watchtowers and garrisons on the headlands such as Cape Pachynus is reminiscent of, for example, Hellenistic Cyprus, where such a network has left some archaeological traces. What is implied is a regular and well-established set-up, which has little to do with the supplying of troops to an imperial power for ‘Big War’, and far more to do with the regular defence of a prosperous, settled territory against pirates and brigands. Furthermore, the Sicilians were not acting in a supporting role to Roman soldiers; on Sicily, they were the only soldiers. Vice versa, by the second century B.C., the Sicilians were not supplying soldiers for service abroad, and were never to recommence the practice. I do not suggest that the ability of the cities in the Eastern Mediterranean to supply troops to Rome when requested necessarily reflects a particularly different situation. On the contrary, I think that their ability to do so arises, at least in part, out of the same context as that which I shall attempt to outline in the next section for Sicily. The difference lies only in the ways in which Rome used that ability.

One clue as to how we might understand the Sicilian situation is to be found in the final piece of epigraphic evidence for Sicilian military activity in the Hellenistic/Republican period. This is a Greek inscription from Soluntum, set up in honour of a gymnasiarch, Antallos Ornichas. The inscription was erected by three units of infantry, together with the ephesians. Most of those who have discussed the inscription have assumed that one should see in it a record of service abroad with the Roman army, or else during the Civil War with Sextus Pompeius. But the parallels discussed above would lead one to expect a reference to the Roman commander and/or the campaign in question if such service were being recorded. Furthermore, as we have seen, the evidence for this sort of service on the part of Sicilians is minimal. Likewise, to assume a date in the Civil Wars (i.e. 43–36 B.C.) is to assume that any military action must relate to known ‘Big Wars’. The same fallacy underlies attempts to explain an inscription of the second century B.C. from Centuripiae (BE 1953,279), in which paides are rewarded for their eutaxia with the shield (discussed further below, Section III): to suggest, as has been done, that this must reflect emergency training for one of the slave wars fails to grasp the absolute normality of such activity in the Hellenistic gymnasium. There is no need to assume that these inscriptions must

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95 Cic., Ver. 3.186 records a more serious military action than is implied by the account in Ver. 3 (J. Brennan, op. cit. (n. 21), II, 489). App., Mith. 93.423 appears to be an echo of this, while more explicit is Oros. 6.3.5, naming the pirate captain as Pyrganio, `qui pulsa classe Romana Syracusanum portum obnuerat'; also Florus 1.41.6. Sallust implies that Verres struck a deal with the pirates (Hist. 4.33 (M)); Verres also claimed the involvement of Sertorian elements (Cic., Ver. 5.72–3, 6.146–7, 5.141–2, see Mattingly, op. cit. (n. 66), 1504.

96 Livy, Per. 98: ‘L. Metellus praetor in Sicilia adversus piratas prospere rem gessit’, expanded in Oros. 6.3.5; cf. Brennan, op. cit. (n. 21), II, 493. IG XIV,336 = IGR 508 (the demos of Halaesa honours C. Vergilius C.f. Balbus, proquaeseta) may reflect these events: prorogation of quaestors is rare (see E. Badian, APB 104 (1983), 158), and this probably refers to L. Metellus’ quaestor of 69 B.C., prorogued for 68 in the face of special need. Perhaps we should assume further military participation on the part of Halaesans, under the proquaestor.


100 Professor Wilson informs me (pers. comm.) that he is now prepared to entertain a more general first-century B.C. date for this inscription; the use of marble, however, renders a date earlier than this unlikely for Sicily.

represent a particularly unusual occurrence. It is much simpler to assume that they belong to regular practice, and to elucidate the context.

III SICILIAN GYMNASICS

It is the presence of the ephebes and the gymnasiarch in the dedication by the Soluntine soldiers that offers a way forward. In this section, after considering the evidence for the association of military activity and gymnasiarchial culture in the Hellenistic world more generally, I shall briefly survey the relatively rich evidence for gymnasion in Hellenistic Sicily and the specific material which relates to the more military aspects of gymnasia culture. This section concludes with a survey of the other evidence for the vitality of gymnasiarchial culture in Sicily. I shall then proceed, in Section IV, to draw the various strands of this paper together, suggesting ways in which we might understand Roman imperial practice, Sicilian military service, and Sicilian gymnasiarchial culture as closely interlinked, with clear consequences for both Roman imperialism and Sicilian society and culture.

The links between the military and the gymnasion in the (Hellenistic) Greek polis have often been noted and discussed. Gauthier describes the Hellenistic gymnasion as ‘servant d’abord à la formation du citoyen-soldat, là où subsistait une armée civique’. There remains an unresolved debate over the extent to which the gymnasion developed out of the evolution of the hoplite, whether as an aristocratic reaction to that development, or to meet the needs of maintaining a citizen hoplite army. The discussion seems frequently flawed by an overly-strong dichotomy between ‘militarism’ and ‘sport’, which would seem to reflect modern schematization rather than any ancient conception. My concern here is specifically with the Hellenistic period, and although Plutarch already post-dates the Parthian campaign in 54/53 B.C. makes the necessary point: ‘[Crassus] made no estimate of the number of his troops, and instituted no athletic contests for them . . .’ (Plut., Crass. 17.5).

What is not in doubt is the range and extent of the exercises and agonistic events, which, in conjunction with the spread of teachers in disciplines such as hoplomachia, archery, the javelin, even stone-throwing and catapult shooting, clearly mark out the gymnasion and its associated agones in the Hellenistic period. One emergent theme in recent study of the gymnasion is a greater emphasis on the physical nature of the gymnasion, both in the Hellenistic period and down into the Imperial period, albeit alongside the gradual addition of ‘cultural activities’; although Gauthier has also repeatedly stressed the wide variability across the Greek world. In other words, the traditional view of the ‘decline’ of the gymnasion into what Mommsen described as the


104 See Kah, op. cit. (n. 102), esp. 82–90.

‘Bürger-Kasino’ needs considerable refinement.106 The contrast between Ma’s picture of the Hellenistic fighting polis and Forbes’ observation that, ‘In Hellenistic and Roman times, ordinary Greek cities must have thought preparations for warfare nonsensical and useless’, could not be stronger.107 More recent studies, such as those of Pleket, have emphasized that military training remained a normal part of gymnastic life at least down to the end of the second century B.C. Ma himself highlighted the potential of gymnasia to enable the existence of citizen soldiers, and they have been described by Gauthier and Hatzopoulos as ‘les pépinières’ of the civic militia.108

The picture has to some extent been skewed by the wealth of evidence coming out of Antigonid Macedonia: above all the Beroea gymnasiarch law and the still unpublished but much summarized ephebarch law from Amphipolis.109 Although there is little doubt about the extent of the military exercises undertaken in the Hellenistic gymnasion, as Hatzopoulos points out, what remains doubtful is the extent to which, outside of the exceptional case of Boeotia, the military training of the gymnasion actually prepared a field army for war: as centrally organized as the system was in Macedonia, and as closely tied as the gymnasion was to military recruitment, nonetheless even in Macedonia exercises followed the ‘standard’ regime, and did not directly prepare the hoplite-phalangist for battle. Explicitly quoting Vidal-Naquet’s classic structuralist portrait of the Athenian ephebate as an ‘anti-hoplite’, Hatzopoulos objects that ‘paradoxalement, l’éphébie était surtout une préparation à l’éphèbe même’.110 However, he also acknowledges that much of Hellenistic warfare now revolved around such skills, and not just those of the hoplite. We should also keep Gauthier’s point about variability in mind: in Cyrene, the ephebes (triakatitoi) seem to have fought as élite units alongside ‘ordinary’ peltasts, while in Boeotia the ephebe was the military service. Both Bugh and Tracy have recently reaffirmed the vitality and military relevance of the Athenian ephebate in the second century B.C.111 The apparent paradox of the Macedonian system should therefore serve to emphasize the near-universal place that the gymnasion had to come to occupy. The blunt fact that the gymnasion had strong links with the citizen fighting force seems undeniable. Launey’s summation, first penned over half a century ago, still has much to recommend it:

106 Mommsen’s view is criticized explicitly by Gauthier and Hatzopoulos, op. cit. (n. 105), 73. For Mommsen’s expression, quoted approvingly by C. A. Forbes, ‘Expanded uses of the Greek gymnasion’, CP 40 (1945), 32–42, at 42, see T. Mommsen, Römische Geschichte, V (1909), 326 n. 1 (English transl. The Provinces of the Roman Empire from Caesar to Diocletian (1899), 1, 383 n. 1); it is worth comparing his further comments at 2,46–7 (transl. 291–2) and 314–7 (transl. 392–6).
107 Ma, op. cit. (n. 3); C. A. Forbes, Neoi (1933), 50.
109 For the gymnasiarch law, see Gauthier and Hatzopoulos, op. cit. (n. 105). Note also the unpublished diagramma of Philip V (183 B.C.), of which the opening lines are transcribed in Gauthier and Hatzopoulos, op. cit. (n. 105), 110 n. 1, with a French translation on 160, and which contains an addition to the gymnasiarch law that surely confirms the Antigonid date and relevance of that law (Ergon 1984), 24; cf. BE 1987, 704, 1990, 485–6). The opening lines of the ephebarch law of 24/23 B.C. (Ergon 1984), 22–4, cf. BE 1987, 704) are transcribed in Gauthier and Hatzopoulos, op. cit. (n. 105), 161 n. 3 with a summary of the rest; a fuller summary now in Hatzopoulos, op. cit. (n. 102), 136–8. In this case, another fragment of an ephebarch law of the early second century B.C. (SEG 35, 705; revised edn in M. B. Hatzopoulos, Macedonian Institutions under the Kings (1996), II, no. 42) indicates the prior existence of a similar Hellenistic law.
Si, bien entendu, les exercises jusqu’ici étudiés n’épuisent pas le programme de l’instruction militaire, si, pendant l’éphèbe en particulier, est prévu un entraînement à la vie en campagne et au service des forteresses, il n’en est pas moins certain que le gymnase, par lequel passe la population mâle avant, pendant, après l’éphèbe, est étroitement associé, dans les souvenirs et l’existence même de chacun, avec les choses militaires.112

To support this claim, Launey began by citing the inscription from Soluntum (IG XIV.311) with which we ended the previous section.

By my own reckoning, up to twenty-one gymnasium are attested across Sicily in the Hellenistic period (sixteen may be considered certain, with a further five ranging from plausible to speculative).113 The evidence is epigraphical, archaeological, and literary.114 The existence of gymnasium in Sicily has been noted by several scholars in the past, but Delorme, in his classic study of the gymnasium, painted a very negative picture of the Sicilian situation, which has perhaps contributed to a general tendency to leave the island out of wider discussion.115 Manganaro, in a portrait of the Hellenistic character of Sicily in this period, was moved to write that ‘non c’era una città siceliota, nel I sec. a.C., per quanto piccola che non avesse un ginnasio’.116 We cannot quite prove that but, considering survival rates of evidence in general, and in particular the relatively weak nature of the Sicilian epigraphic habit, evidence for approximately twenty is impressive nonetheless. In the light of what can be added from the wider Hellenistic world, it seems eminently plausible that the conjunction of a lively gymnasial culture and a lively civic military culture is suggestive of the social structures and mechanisms by which the Sicilian military activity described above was sustained.

112 Launey, op. cit. (n. 102), 834.
113 Reasonably certain at Acrae, Aetna, Agrigentum, Bidis, Catania, Centuripiae, Halunitum, Helorus, Leonitini, Netum, Phintias, Segesta, Soluntum, Syracuse, Tauroomenum, Tyndaris; less certain at Cephaloedium, Lilybaenum, Megara Hyblaea; speculative at Halaea, Thermae Himeraeae. Additionally, Professor M. Bell III kindly informs me that, although original identification of a gymnasium on the north side of the agora at Morgantina (Sjöqvist, AFA 66 (1962), 136–7; Allen, AJA 74 (1970), 364) has since been rejected (Bell, Kokalos 30–1 (1984–5), 510–12; idem, AJA 92 (1988), 338 n. 77; cf. Wilson, op. cit. (n. 7), 360 n. 92), on-going excavations have identified at least one possible site for future investigation.
114 The majority of secure attestations are epigraphical, and much of that evidence will be considered below. Archaeologically, gymnasium have been identified at Agrigentum (G. Fiorentini, ‘Il ginnasio di Agrigento’, Kokalos 42 (1996), 5–14); Netum (V. La Rosa, ‘Per la Neaion ellenistica: un saggio di scavo nella zona del ginnasio’, Atti e Memorie dell’Istituto per la Salvaguardia e la Valorizzazione di Noto Antica 19–20 (1988–90), 75–104; cf. P. Orsi, NSc (1897), 70); and Soluntum (Campagna, op. cit. (n. 8), 30; the building originally claimed to be the gymnasium is a private house, see, e.g., R. J. A. Wilson, AR 42 (1996), 102); with closely related structures at Tauroomenium (P. Pelagatti, Il ‘ginnasio” di Tauroomenum: represa delle ricercche’, PP 52 (1997), 256–61). Possible remains at Catania were recorded prior to the eruption of 1669 (A. Holm, Catania antica (1925), 57; cf. G. Libertini, Scritti su Catania antica (1981), 26). A possible site for the gymnasium has been suggested at Tyndaris (G. F. La Torre, ‘Il processo di “romannizzazione” della Sicilia: il caso di Tindari’, Sicilia Antiqua (2004), 1, 129). Excavators at Halaea in the 1960s tentatively identified a possible gymnasium (G. Carettoni, NSc (1961), 303–11). A gymnasium or palaestra was identified at Megara Hyblaea (G. Vallet, F. Villard and P. Auberson, Megara Hyblaea (1983), III, 41–4). Giuseppe Nenci speculated on the site of the gymnasium at Segesta, but on-going excavation has not yet identified the site (G. Nenci, ‘Florilegio epigrafico segestano’, ASNP, ser. 3, 21 (1991), 920–9; at 925; I am grateful to Professor C. Ampolo for discussion). The supposed ‘ginnasio romano’ at Syracuse was also a misidentification (Wilson, op. cit. (n. 7), 106–11); however, the area around the great altar of Hieron II is not implausible as a palaestra (idem, 51–2). See further the excellent survey of Campagna, op. cit. (n. 8), 29–31.
116 Manganaro, op. cit. (n. 8), 445.
Inscriptions from Sicily indicate active groups of *ephéboi*, *neðteroi*, *neaniskoi*, and *aleiphomenoi*.\(^{117}\) In fact, *ephéboi* is a rare term in the Sicilian texts in comparison with some others, especially *neaniskoi*.\(^ {118}\) The latter term has proved ‘slippery and is hard to define’, despite having been studied on a number of occasions.\(^ {119}\) Its range of meaning is flexible and instances exist where it would seem to denote ages as low as fifteen and as high as forty-one. As Cantarella noted, in Classical Athens it seems to be applied to those making the transition between childhood and adulthood, aged *c*. fifteen to twenty-five. In the case of Hellenistic Thespiai in Boeotia, Roesch concluded that the term seems to denote those pre-ephebate, aged fifteen to seventeen. More often it appears equivalent to *ephéboi*, and Cordiano suggested that this was in general the case in Sicily.\(^ {120}\) In the gymnasiarth law of Beroea the three terms of *neoi*, *neaniskoi*, and *neðteroi* are deemed to be ultimately equivalent, designating ‘les jeunes gens qui fréquentent le gymnase’.\(^ {121}\) The *term’s most frequent usage is to denote young men post-ephebate, of between twenty and thirty.\(^ {122}\) Already in his 1933 study of *neoi*, Forbes conceded the term *neaniskoi* a degree of military significance which he was not prepared to allow to the more common *neoi*. Launey also saw *neaniskoi* as a distinctively military class, a view that was confirmed by Sacco, who sought to integrate more recent epigraphic discoveries to the earlier work of Poland, Forbes, and others. Roesch likewise concluded that *neaniskoi* often had a military role, and that in later documents the term takes the sense of ‘soldier’.\(^ {123}\) As several authors note, in Polybius it has three uses, viz. recruits, young men of military age, or simply soldiers. The most recent study of *neoi* confirms the picture.\(^ {124}\)

In the epigraphy of the wider Hellenistic world, the *neaniskoi* can be seen in a range of *polis*-based military activities. *Neaniskoi* appear as the soldiers of the *polis*,\(^ {125}\) and as

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\(^{117}\) *Ephéboi*: IG XIV.311 (Soluntum); IG XIV.256 (Phintias); and restored in SEG 46.1252 (Agrigentum). *Neðteroi*: restored in SEG 46.1252 (Agrigentum); IG XIV.256 (Phintias); and restored in Seg 46.1256 (Halantium); BE 1964.629 (Helorus); IG XIV.240 (Netum); IG XIV.422, 432 (Tauromentum). *Aleiphomenoi*: IG XIV.369 (Halantium); IG XIV.370 (Halantium); IG XIV.371 (Halantium); IG XIV.432 (Tauromentum); IG XIV.456 (Catania, now restored in *IMusCat* 2); Manganaro, op. cit. (n. 115), no. 58 (Syracuse, a restoration); IG XIV.349 (Cephaloedium, conjectural reading). Additionally, *trítrières* and *andres* are recorded in SEG 41.826 (Segesta); *paides* in BE 1953.279 (Centuripe); *apousomenoi* in IG XIV.256 (Phintias).

\(^{118}\) The latter term also has several literary attestations for Sicily: Plut., *Tim.* 31; Athen. 5.2066; Livy 24.21.12 (juvenis).

\(^{119}\) Forbes, op. cit. (n. 107), 61.


\(^{121}\) Gauthier and Hatzopoulos, op. cit. (n. 105), 177.


\(^{123}\) Forbes, op. cit. (n. 107), 65; Launey, op. cit. (n. 102), II, 859–62 (focusing on the Ptolemaic evidence); Sacco, op. cit. (n. 122); Roesch, op. cit. (n. 110), 318.


\(^{125}\) Examples: Araxa honoured Orthogoras, c. 180 b.c., appointed *apostaleis* of the *neaniskoi* for a campaign with the Lyceans against local tyrants (G. E. Bean, *JHS* 68 (1948), 46–56, no. 5, lines 39–41 = SEG 18.570 = BE 1950.183); Berenice honours Apollodorus for actions in the first quarter of the first century b.c., placed in command of the *neaniskoi* (J. Reynolds, SLSR 5 (1973–4), 19–24, lines 8–9 = BE 1976.792 = Laronde, op. cit. (n. 111), 463–72): Ilium honours Nicander of Poemanon, appointed by Rome to maintain a garrison in Ilium c. 80 b.c., and his soldiers (*stratititai*) are described as *neaniskoi* (OGIS 443 = 1. Ilion, no. 73, lines 2–3, 93; Metropolis honours Apollonius for his actions in 131/30 b.c., including leading the *neaniskoi* to fight under the Romans, and falling in that action (*I. Metropolis*, no. 1, A.19–34). See especially Sacco, op. cit. (n. 122) and Roesch, op. cit. (n. 110), 327–9.
territorial guards (reminiscent of the Athenian ephebate). Their connections to the gymnasium are also frequently visible. On occasion they appear as a corporate body, akin to the more common neoi. All of this can be detected in Sicily, whether in the iuventus (i.e. neaniskoi) who defended Adranorus in Syracuse in 213 B.C. (Liv. 24.21.12), or the Hieronian neaniskoi of the Netum gymnasium (IG XIV.240) who manned Hieron’s flagship, the Syrakosia (Athen. 206e). At the Tauromenium gymnasium they can be seen acting as a corporate body. Indeed, the term is most frequently to be observed in relation to the (former) kingdom of Hieron II, to which we return shortly (Helorus, Netum, Syracuse, and Tauromenium all fall within it). Several other Sicilian gymnasium inscriptions record the presence in the gymnasium of other classifications of youth beyond the ephebate, implying similar relationships between the ephebate and the post-ephebate youth of a city. Cicero’s repeated emphasis on the youth of the Sicilians manning and commanding the ships of Verres’ fleet is suggestive of the same age-group. As Gauthier and Hatzopoulos observed, the age group makes sense in relation to the common situation in which citizens became politically active from the age of thirty (and in several Sicilian towns, for which the Romans drew up constitutions, thirty was the minimum age for entry to the bouleuterion). They concluded that ‘ils formaient un réservoir de soldats’. One of the things that emerges very clearly from the Macedonian evidence is a centralized and organized system, geared up to the production of a citizen army. Not every city or state in the Hellenistic world, including those of the kings, either chose, or was able to rely upon mercenaries. As Launey observed, the decree of Lilaia erected at Delphi in

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126 e.g., a paraphulax and his orophulakes, described as neaniskoi, from Apollonia in Caria, dedicate a parthenon (Robert and Robert, op. cit. (n. 73), 281–3, no. 162; cf. Robert, op. cit. (n. 73), 106–8 and T. Reinaich, ‘Parthenônia’, BCH 32 (1908), 499–513). On peripoloi and local militia more generally, Robert, op. cit. (n. 73), 98–110 for Asia Minor; Robert and Robert, op. cit. (n. 73), 42; L. Robert, Hellenica X (1955), 283–92; and P. Cabanes, ‘Recherches épigraphiques en Albanie: peripolarques et peripolo en Grèce du nord-ouest et en Illyrie à la période hellénistique’, CRAI (1991), 197–221, especially 212–16 on the idea such duty is in particular ‘un service militaire imposé aux jeunes gens’, linked to the ephebate and rites of passage, with Epirote parallels (although note the caution offered by P. Amandry, ibid. 216–18, who nonetheless confirms the view that this is a civic service undertaken by neaniskoi, in Asia Minor at least).

127 See especially the Beroea gymnasialarchical law, side B, with Gauthier and Hatzopoulos, op. cit. (n. 105), 73, 77–8, 177 and the material collected by Roesch, op. cit. (n. 110), 329–30, 333–5.

128 e.g., at Larissa (IG IX.2.260, 261) and Phalanna (IG IX.2.1238) in Thessaly it is the neaniskoi who honour a gymnasarch (further examples in Roesch, op. cit. (n. 110), 335), while at Melos seats in the theatre were set aside for the neaniskoi (IG XII.3.1243). An inscription from southern Bithynia (Koerte, AM 24 (1899), 442 no. 37, cf. Robert, REG 48 (1935), 331) records a dedication to Zeus Bronton ‘on behalf of the kômē and the neaniskoi’. On decrees and dedications of neoi, see P. Gauthier, ‘Bienfateurs du gymnase au Létôon de Xanthos’, REG 109 (1996), 1–34, at 9–15. In the context of this discussion, note the clearly military context for the participation of the neoi of Ilium in honouring Cn. Pompeius Magnus (SEG 46.1365, 63/62 B.C.), and of the decree of the neoi in support of the demos of Methymna at the time of the revolt of Aristonicus, c. 129 B.C. (IG XII, Supp. no. 116); also the Sestos decree in honour of Menas the gymnasarch (I. Sestos, no. 1), recording crowning of the gymnasarch by the neoi, in the 120s B.C.

129 On the Netum neaniskoi, see Ferruti, op. cit. (n. 115), 191–2. Tauromenium: IG XIV.442, side I, line 6, with G. Manganaro, ‘Le tavole finanziarie di Tauromenion’, in D. Knoepfler (ed.), Comptes et inventaires dans la cité grecque (1988), 155–90, at 172 for a dogma neaniskón; cf. IG.XIV.432 for a fragmentary inscription, possibly a gymnasial law or foundation decree, with the terms neaniskoi and dogma appearing in conjunction.

130 At Phintias (IG XIV.236) and Agrigentum (SEG 46.1252) the ephêboi and neôteroi jointly set up dedications. In the case of Segesta, Nenci, op. cit. (n. 114), 921–2 no. 1 (SEG 41.826) hypothesized a pairing of andres and tritrières (those in the final year of the ephebate). For the neôteroi in the Sicilian context, Cordiano, op. cit. (n. 98), 86 suggested they were ‘giovani che prestavano il servizio di leva, a fondo essenzialmente ginnico-militare, alle dipendenze della città.’

131 Cic., Ver. 5.99 (‘Siculone milites, aratorumme liberos’); 5.108 (the nauphears are adolescentes); 5.119 (nauphears as filii, libert, adolescentes); 5.129.

honour of an Attalid garrison, installed c. 208 B.C., indicates quite clearly that approximately a fifth of that force was in fact made up of Pergamene citizens.133 This becomes relevant to Sicily when we observe the evidence concerning not just gymnasia, but also Hieron II’s role in the propagation of gymnasia. Cordiano noted the potential analogy between the Macedonian system and Hieron’s activities.134 Links between the military and the gymnasium at Syracuse are attested as far back as Agathocles (Diod. Sic. 19.6.4; cf. Polyæn. 5.3.8; Justinus 22.2.9–12), but Polybius is explicit that Hieron set out to reorganize the citizen military body as his future power-base, in contrast to the reliance of his predecessors on mercenaries (1.8.3–9.8; Hieron did, however, continue to enrol mercenaries as well). Cordiano plausibly argues that the cities of Hieron’s kingdom (Acrææ, Netum, Heloræ, and Tauromenium) all shared a common institutional structure in their gymnasia, the dual gymnasiarchy, reflecting Hieron’s influence. In this context, the frequency of the term neaniskos in relation to the apparently Hieronian gymnasia (compare the instances cited in the previous paragraph) encourages the hypothesis that this was a deliberate act on the part of Hieron to develop his civic manpower resources. It is tempting to suggest therefore that here we have another structure of Hieron’s kingdom, besides the famous taxation system (Cic., Ver. 3.14), that the Romans were all too ready to adopt. The ongoing vitality of the Sicilian gymnasia under Roman rule certainly encourages the idea.

In discussion of the gymnasium as a means to a citizen army, Ma raises one very valid objection: ‘I wonder how many youths among the poor, urban or rural, had time to participate in the gymnasium and learn how to discharge a catapult’.135 The simple answer must be ‘not many’. In the Beroea gymnasiarch law, those who work in the agora (among others) are excluded from the gymnasium.136 This is reinforced in a more prosaic fashion in the Amphipolis epharch law and a royal digramma of Philip V regarding military recruitment, in which census levels (and seemingly quite high ones) form a key part of recruitment.137 A striking echo of this may be seen in one particular Sicilian example. In Polybius’ account (1.40.9), when the Panhormitans fought alongside the Romans against the Carthaginians in 250 B.C., at a crisis point in the battle the Roman consul had to give orders ‘to the artisans from the agora’ (τοῖς δ’ έκ τῆς ἄγορας ἄρχοντας) to support the full soldiers. As in the Cyrene military catalogues, where the triakathoi (i.e. ephebes) are supported by a much greater number of plain peltasts, or the Boeotian league, where the ephebes on military service seem to have constituted a core element of the army, here too, perhaps, we should imagine the core of the Panhormitan citizen fighting body belonging to a certain (higher) social status.138 This is one possible answer to Ma’s concern, namely that those who regularly trained in the gymnasium may have constituted the core, or in some cases an elite element of a city’s fighting force; but they need not be assumed to be its only force. The Sicilian nauarchs recorded by Cicero offer another possibility, namely that this gymnasium-based elite provided the leaders for these city-based elements.139

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133 Launey, op. cit. (n. 102), I, 71–4.
134 Most of the argument in the rest of this paragraph is prefigured in Cordiano, op. cit. (n. 98), 95–112, 119, 129–30. The subject is reconsidered now by Ferruti, op. cit. (n. 115), 203–6, who levels several valid criticisms at Cordiano’s thesis, which, while technically not disproving it, well illustrate its purely speculative nature; for Ferruti the emphasis lies rather upon a Hieronian ideological concern with Hellenism. Ferruti notes also that Manganaro, op. cit. (n. 115), 67 no. 58 restores a Syracusan inscription to record the existence of a double gymnasiarchy in that city also; but the restoration can only be exempli gratia.
135 Ma, op. cit. (n. 3), 347.
137 Hatzopoulos, op. cit. (n. 102), 103–7, 137.
139 For the nauarchs see, e.g., Cic., Ver. 5.108, 5.119 and above, Section 11; cf. Pinzone, op. cit. (n. 23), 24 speculating on the social origins of the Sicilian levies.
Some crude numbers may help to put this in perspective. If the praetor of c. 134 B.C. levied 8,000 Sicilians (Diod. Sic. 34/35.2.18), how many of these could have come out of the ephebes or neaniskoi of the cities? On the very improbable assumption that the approximately sixty-five cities of the island in this period each had a gymnasion and contributed equally to such a levy, 126 men would be required per city.\footnote{The number of cities in this period is variously presented as 65 or 68, e.g., J. Carcopino, \textit{La Loi de Hiéron et les Romains} (1914), 207. Such figures are derived variously from Cic., \textit{Ver.} 1.100 (on the belief that Cicero genuinely details all the tithe-paying cities, but cf. 3.101), and/or Livy 26.40.14; Diod. Sic. 23.4; Plin., \textit{NH} 3.86–92. But this requires that such figures are equally comprehensive and mutually compatible. Only Cic., \textit{Ver.} 2.131 with 137 (on local censors) seems to me to imply any sort of reliable figure, \textit{viz.} 65.} If this entire levy came out of the neaniskoi (for the purposes of this calculation, the 20–29 age cohort), then a basic calculation from the Coale-Demeny model life table West level 3 female (age expectancy at birth of twenty-five years) gives one a baseline figure for the minimum total population of each city of 1,490.\footnote{I have done no more than follow T. G. Parkin, \textit{Demography and Roman Society} (1992), 146, table 8 for the Coale-Demeny figures, noting Parkin’s comments on applicability of ‘male’?female’ models (at 102–3) and on the problems of inferring the sex ratio for antiquity (at 98–9), for which I have erred on the side of conservatism by assuming a ratio of 100, and taking a life expectancy of twenty-five as a working average for the Roman Empire as a whole (cf. 84–5). According to Parkin’s table, the cohort of age 20–29 would amount to 16.91 per cent of such a model population; I therefore calculate 126 x 2 - 16.91 x 100 = 1,490.} This is obviously unacceptable in that it assumes the levying of the entire male cohort between twenty and twenty-nine, and it presumes that all of these participated in the gymnasion. However, several points may be made. Firstly, this equates to a minimum total free population across the sixty-five cities of 96,850. This figure is low on any existing estimate of the Sicilian population for this period.\footnote{G. Beloch, ‘La popolazione antica della Sicilia’, \textit{Archivio Storico Siciliano}, n.s. 14 (1889), 1–81, at 63 estimated a free population of 350,000 for the mid-first century B.C., which equates to 29,592.5 males in the 20–29 age cohort. Wilson, op. cit. (n. 7), 171 with 382 n. 80 estimates a total population of c. 600,000 for c. A.D. 200 (as did Beloch, op. cit., 64 for the Augustan period), and a total urban population of c. 120,000, on the basis that considerable urban decline occurred into the Imperial period, with a significant increase in rural population. This latter figure still generates 10,146 males aged twenty to twenty-nine within the urban population alone.} Secondly, while a levy of even one-in-three would seem unacceptably high, it should be recalled that this is seasonal, short-term, and predominantly local service, not full service in the Roman army.\footnote{On this, see W. Scheidel, ‘The demography of the Roman imperial army’, \textit{Measuring Sex, Age and Death in the Roman Empire} (1996), 93–138, at 93–4.} Furthermore, the levy of 134 B.C. was no doubt exceptional. By contrast a levy of 3,000 men would constitute only ten per cent of the 20–29 cohort if we follow Beloch’s population estimate, and in normal conditions such a figure seems far more plausible. Additionally, while allowing that by no means all of the sixty-five cities would have contributed, or have been able to do so on such a scale, some, such as Syracuse, must have been considerably larger (a population of 25,000 has within it 2,114 males aged twenty to twenty-nine). Despite all the inadequacies and dangers of such calculations, they do serve to indicate that the potential existed for a marked proportion of any such seasonal, local levy to come from precisely the age cohort which is most closely associated with the gymnasion.

The best indication of the vitality of the Sicilian gymnasia comes from Tauromenium, from where we have the remains of the fasti and accounts of the city’s gymnasiarchs, including a decree of the neaniskoi (IG XIV.422; a likely second set of fasti survives from Acrae, in IG XIV.213), civic accounts recording payments to the gymnasiarchs (IG XIV.430), and fragments of a gymnasion law (IG XIV.432).\footnote{On the Tauromenium inscriptions, see Manganaro, op. cit. (n. 129), and for the quantities cited later in the paragraph, idem, op. cit. (n. 8), 445 with n. 189; for IG XIV.432, see the text in L. Dubois, \textit{Inscriptions grecques dialectales de Sicile} (1989), no. 187; cf. Cordiano, op. cit. (n. 98), 80.} Famously, Tauromenium has also produced evidence for a Hellenistic library, almost certainly part of the same complex as the gymnasion and a rare piece of evidence from Sicily for the non-physical
side of gymnasium life. The Tauromenium accounts attest to a lively agonistic culture, with as much as 11,000 litres of olive oil and 45,000 Sicilian talents being expended in a single year on as many as forty-one separate agônes. Agônôtheliai are attested at Halantium, as are torch races (SEG 26.1060), while, as noted above, an inscription from Centuripae records the crowning of paiđes for their eutaxia (BE 1953.279). Also from Tauromenium comes an honorific statue base, probably one of a series along a Hellenistic pavement, erected by the demos of the Tauromenitani, to Olympia Mestos, son of Olympus, victor in the Pythia (IG XIV.434). Although there is some debate as to whether this refers to the crown Pythia or a local festival, it is worth noting that the Tauromenitans set up a dedication to Hieron II at Olympia (as did the Syracusans and Hieron’s sons). The Syracusans were swift to set up a Marcellia in their Roman conqueror’s honour (again, the Eastern parallels are obvious, but one should note the obvious Roman tolerance, encouragement even, of the gymnasiial structures), and Verres, as he swept through the province, transformed the festival into a Verria (Cic., Ver. 2.51–2 and 114). A fragment of Hesychius implies the existence of an argôn of some renown in the vicinity of Helorus also (another city formerly in Hieron’s kingdom). Cicero’s references to gymnaidia or palaestrae in Aetna, Tyndaris, Leontini, Syracuse, and Bidis, and to the palaestritae of Bidis and Syracuse further indicate their continuing vitality under the empire.

Sicilians are no less active in the wider Mediterranean agonistic environment. Although after 300 B.C. the number of attested Sicilian victors in the Olympics drops markedly,
this need not reflect a decline in agonistic behaviour (Sicilian involvement in the Olympic games in the fifth century b.c. has a ‘political’ dimension, at least in its advertisement). Sicilians are still attested competing outside the island:152 a victorious pentathlete at Delphi, probably from Sicilian Messana;153 a Syracuse at the youth games at Larissa, post-196 b.c.;154 a Catanian and a Centuripaean in the Amphitheatrum at Oropus in the early first century b.c.;155 and a Catanian at Smyrna.156 Additionally several Sicilians are recorded in non-athletic events: a Syracuse for tragedy at the Amphitheatrum at Oropus in the first century b.c.;157 a Tauromenian at the Dionysia on Cos in the third century b.c., for comic acting;158 and four or five Syracusans and a Messanian (Sicilian or Peloponnesian?) at the Delphic Soteria.159 A Syracuse, one Isidorus, son of Theon, made a benefaction to a gymnasium on Thera in the first century b.c.160 Quite apart from individuals, inscriptions from Cos, Magnesia-on-the-Maeander, and Delphi also imply Sicilian civic participation in agões across the Eastern Mediterranean in the late third and second centuries b.c.161

By contrast, there is very little material relating to Sicilian gymasia of the Imperial period. The clearest piece of evidence comes from a long double bench in the gymnasium of Agrigentum, which, with the recent discovery of the remainder of the inscription, can now be seen to be a dedication to Hermes and Heracles, in honour of Augustus (SEG 46.1252). The presence of the same duumvir on both this bench and a coin of the city (RPC I, no. 660) on which Augustus appears as pater patriae, indicates a date between 2 b.c. and a.d. 14. Besides the interesting evidence for the use of Greek in an official inscription of a municipium, this is rare evidence, in Sicily, for the survival of the gymnasialyche into the Principate.162 A lost Greek inscription from Centuripae apparently recorded a gymnasialyche by the name of Cornelius, and a fragmentary one from Lilybaeum can be restored to record a gymnasialyche called Tiberius L.f. Diognetus (IG XIV.275). But the former is undatable, and the latter, like the equally fragmentary inscription from Lilybaeum which might record the existence of a palaestra (IG XIV.276), is only a conjectural restoration.163

153 J. Bousquet, BCH 83 (1959), 185–8, cf. BE 1960.181. Messana is referred to as autonomos patris, which Bousquet suggests might imply 241–218 b.c. (i.e. after receiving its foedus from Rome and between the Punic Wars), since this is judged a third-century inscription.
154 IG IX.2.526, lines 7–8.
155 IG VII.1416, line 40; IG VII.1420, lines 46–7 (cf. 56–7, 62–3).
156 CIG II.4124, col. iii, line 33.
157 IG VII.1420, lines 28–9.
159 Syll², 489, lines 12–13; SEG 14.445, lines 8–12; SEG 1.187; SEG 3.399. On these, see F. P. Rizzo, La Sicilia e le potenze ellenistiche al tempo delle guerre puniche (1973), 84–8. Just outside this period are two Syracusans, victorious in poetic contests at Corinth in a.d. 3 and 42 or shortly after (Manganaro, op. cit. (n. 144), 58–9 with n. 292).
156 IG XII.3, suppl. 1300, line 16 (cf. Manganaro, op. cit. (n. 152), 430 with n. 88). Additionally, a series of five inscriptions from Syracuse, of the later first century b.c. record artistic associations, three of Dionysus (IG XIV.12 and 13; P. Orsi, RSA 5 (1900), 62 no. 41) and two of Aphrodite Hilara (B. Gentili, Archivio Storico Siracusano 7 (1961), 10 (non vidi)); one of the latter is in honour of M. Acilius Caninus, proconsul of Sicily in 46–45 b.c. All five are republished in Manganaro, op. cit. (n. 101), 47–61, and discussed by L. Moretti, RFIC 91 (1963), 38–45.
161 Camarina recognizes the asylia of the Asklepieon at Cos, c. 242 b.c. (Dubois, op. cit. (n. 144), no. 117); likewise the people of Gela (ibid., no. 160); Syracuse recognizes the asylia of the sanctuary of Artemis Leucophryene at Magnesia-on-the-Maeander, 207/206 b.c. (ibid., no. 97). All three texts include references to the accompanying agones. A Delphic list of theoro Rodokoi from the second century b.c. lists a significant number of east Sicilian communities: A. Plasart, BCH 45 (1921), 1–85 = SGDI 2382; Manganaro, op. cit. (n. 152), 419–49 revises the text of the Sicilian section (col. iv. 81–117); and again in idem, ‘Alla ricerca di poleis mikrat della Sicilia centro-orientale’, Orbis Terrarum 2 (1996), 129–44, at 131–8.
163 Centuripae inscription: Libertini, op. cit. (n. 101), 93–4; second-century a.d. evidence for a sphaeristerium at Centuripae need not be connected, despite the duumvirus responsible also having the name Cornelius (see CIL X.7004 = ILMusPal 4, and Wilson, op. cit. (n. 7), 152).
A single *agōnothetēs* is recorded from Catania in the late third or early fourth century A.D. (IG XIV.502 = I. Mus. Cat. 24). A very fragmentary Latin inscription from Syracuse almost certainly contains the word *gymnasion* (CIL X.7135). In contrast to Italy in the Second Sophistic, evidence for Sicilian participation in the agonistic world seems to fade away. This is perhaps not wholly surprising, in so far as it tallies well with the transformation of the island which seems to follow on from the Civil Wars and the imposition of half-a-dozen veteran colonies under Augustus.

### IV (Re)Guarding the *provincia*

From the three preceding sections, three basic conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, there was a minimal Roman military presence on the island throughout the second and first centuries B.C.; at the same time, a magistrate was sent to the *provincia* (or prorogued in the *provincia*) every year from at least 218 B.C. This is not a pattern of practice that our traditional assumptions about Republican *provinciae* would lead us to expect. Secondly, there is good evidence for Sicilian military activity, under Roman command, during this period, and the majority of that activity is restricted to the island, not to service abroad. Although this may be usefully compared with the extensive evidence from elsewhere for the use of *auxilia externa* under the Roman Republic, it is nonetheless unusual, in that much of the evidence does not relate to the calling out of troops to fight alongside Roman legions on a particular campaign, but rather to regular, small-scale activity, associated with the security of the island and its population, under the supervision of the annual magistrate and his appointed subordinates, both Roman and local. These first two conclusions considered together challenge the typical models of Republican imperialism which were outlined in the Introduction. Thirdly, there is good evidence for an extensive gymnasiazial culture on the island in this period. A growing body of evidence from across the Hellenistic world suggests ever more strongly the connections between gymnasiazial culture and civic military activity, and there seems little reason to doubt that such connections existed in Sicily. Indeed, a case can be made that Hieron II actively encouraged just such an institutional structure for the maintenance of his own military manpower, and in turn that this was continued under Rome. The evidence for this gymnasiazial culture, like the evidence for Sicilian military activity on the island, is excellent for the Republican period, but poor thereafter.

The implication of these conclusions seems inescapable: the Romans maintained the province of Sicily through the use of native troops and, normally, native troops alone. This was made possible, above all, by the existence across much of the island of an established civic culture which included the institution of the *gymnasion*, and which in turn sustained the existence of a civic militia that could support such Roman levies. Two aspects remain to be considered: we may legitimately speculate on what led the Romans to adopt this approach; and, although we have already seen one direct consequence, namely the vitality of the gymnasiazial culture itself, we should consider the wider implications of such imperialism for the island and its people.

Firstly, as alluded to in Section i, at the start of the second century B.C. the Romans were suffering considerable pressures on manpower, and the decision already in 199 B.C. to garrison the province with Latins and allies alone reflects this. The down-scaling of such a force leads in only one direction (unless, as in Hispania, revolt follows). John Rich has

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164 G. G. Fagan, ‘Gifts of gymnasia: a test case for reading quasi-technical jargon in Latin inscriptions’, ZPE 124 (1999), 265–75 speculates that in an Imperial Latin inscription in this part of the Roman world the term may signify only a benefaction, and not a *gymnasion* at all.

165 The contrast with Italy in this period is sketched in K. Lomas, ‘Between Greece and Italy: an external perspective on culture in Roman Sicily’, in C. Smith and J. Serrati (eds), *Sicily from Aeneas to Augustus* (2000), 161–73.
suggested that a moment such as 167 B.C. (Pydna) or 146 B.C. (Carthage and Corinth), rich with the elation of victory and the idea of peace, might have suggested such an action to the Romans.\(^\text{166}\) I am less concerned to identify a specific date, than to consider the rationale — although it will be apparent that I think this moment belongs earlier in the century. We should return to Cicero’s claim that the use of auxilia was a regular practice in every province, and the recognition that this was essentially an extension of Roman practice in Italy. Both Crawford and Pinzone have highlighted the way in which Roman actions in Sicily in the third century B.C. are suggestive of only a gradual move away from patterns of behaviour established in the Italian peninsula and towards something new and distinctive. We should remember that the idea of the provincia evolved slowly throughout the Republican period.\(^\text{167}\) Manpower and military presence is only one among a number of elements that may be considered neither necessary nor sufficient for a ‘province’ in the full, institutionalized sense of the word. As so often, Roman practice appears to be a subtle blend of the new and the old, Roman and non-Roman. The fact that the Roman magistrate sent to Sicily regularly levied troops would then not be so very different from the annual practice of any other magistrate entering office in Rome and levying troops for his provincia.

Secondly, Roman experiences of Sicily must have made the possibilities of Sicilian manpower very apparent from an early date. I have singled out the experience at Panhorus in 250 B.C., above (Sections II.i and III), but in over thirty years of warfare on the island during the third century B.C. the Romans can hardly have failed to notice how things worked in Sicily and who could do what. Livy’s history contains specific records of the gifts and troops contributed by the Romans in the war effort; they were clearly remembered.\(^\text{168}\) If such troops had their limitations, that was hardly a reason to send legionaries in their place when not strictly necessary. The reluctance to do so in both slave wars is to clear.

Thirdly, it is often noted that Republican imperialism seeks to support and to operate through local élites and more oligarchic constitutions.\(^\text{169}\) The potential role played by the Sicilian élite in the Republican province has frequently been highlighted.\(^\text{170}\) The Hellenistic gymnasion is not a particularly democratic institution, but rather one which, for all the (later) negative stereotypes of lazy, oil-soaked graeculi,\(^\text{171}\) would have appealed to the Roman political sensibility. The gymnasion was a focal point for the local élite (with limitations more or less formal on participation), now clearly demonstrated for the Imperial period in the East, an outlet for ambition and civic competition, and for the maintenance of the community.\(^\text{172}\)

\(^{166}\) J. Rich, pers. comm. and op. cit. (n. 32).

\(^{167}\) Crawford, op. cit. (n. 11); Pinzone, op. cit. (n. 11), 82–9; idem, op. cit. (n. 23), 30–2. On the concept of the provincia, Richardson, op. cit. (n. 14), 4–10; Lintott, op. cit. (n. 16), 22–7.


\(^{171}\) An apt example in Sil. 14.136–8, who has M. Marcellus exhorting his men against the Sicilians near Leontini: ‘Cowards stand before you, youths who have learnt to endure easy bouts of wrestling in the shade, and who delight to oil their limbs till they glisten; and those who conquer them in battle get little glory’ (Loeb transl., adapted). Cf. N. K. Petrochilos, Roman Attitudes to the Greeks (1974), 179. Note also the attack on Scipio Africanus by Cato the Elder, for affecting Greek habits in Sicily including the gymnasion, echoed against Verres by Cicero: Scipio: Livy 29.19.11–12; Val. Max. 3.6.1; Plut., Cat. mai. 3.7; Tac., Ann. 2.59; Verres: Gic., Ver. 4.54–5, 5.31, 5.40, 5.86, 5.137 (Petrochilos, op. cit., 31).

\(^{172}\) Van Nij, op. cit. (n. 105).
However seen from the Sicilian perspective, to which I turn in my final paragraphs, it is the maintenance of community which seems most important. If the gymnasium strengthened civic elite identities, so too did military activity. The latter could be a major source of civic pride and identity. I focus upon three sets of evidence which are most clearly tied in to the sort of military activity on the island that I have been discussing, and conclude by suggesting that the military activity encouraged by this particular application of Republican imperialism should be considered a direct contributor to the material and cultural vitality of the island of Sicily in the last two centuries B.C. that recent scholarship has highlighted.

In the town of Segesta, in north-west Sicily, on the southern hill of the acropolis, in a large private house dating to the later second century B.C. stood a room decorated with eight limestone ship’s prows. Each block, a metre long, was squared off at one end for insertion in the wall, and small holes on the proembolion and on the top of the prow were presumably for bronze fittings (a lamp or a nīke?). The type of prow and the triple-bladed ram is strongly reminiscent of later Hellenistic naval monuments, typified on the grand scale by the Nike of Samothrace, or the Cyrene naval monument. Parallel monuments from the Aegean especially, celebrating victories and/or naval power, both public and private, imply that something similar should be understood here. What was a member of the local elite, at the end of the second century B.C., doing with such a monumental ‘reception room’? This is, surely, the most concrete confirmation possible of precisely the sort of activity described by Cicero in the final Verrine oration, and of the sort of environment that I have been trying to describe. Several other, less well-published examples are attested elsewhere on the island.

If the so-called ‘House of the Nauarch’ is the most striking evidence for this aspect of Sicilian life under Rome, it is not the only evidence. Sling bullets from the island are a rather more brutal indicator of the existence of fighting units, and extend somewhat further down the social scale. Examples bearing the names of Roman magistrates survive from the slave wars (e.g. CIL X.2.8063.2), but so too do many examples naming individual

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173 As noted already in Ma, op. cit. (n. 3), 359–62.
174 See B. Bechtold, ‘Una villa ellenistico-romana sull’acropoli sud di Segesta’, Atti delle seconde giornate internazionali di studi sull’area elima (1997), I, 85–110; eadem, ‘Elementi architettonici e strutturali dall’abitato ellenistico di Segesta’, in H. P. Isler, D. Kaech and O. Stefani (eds), Wohnbauforschung in Zentral- und Westsizilien (1997), 131–9, at 135–9. The excavation is designated as SAS 9. The dating is confirmed both by the stratigraphy and the parallels from other sites such as Morgantina, Iaitas, ‘casa B’ in Piazza della Vittoria, Palermo, and ‘casa di Leda’ at Soluntum. Three blocks were found more or less intact, with fragments of a further four/five.
176 G. Nenci, ‘Novità epigrafiche dall’area elima’, in Atti delle seconde giornate internazionali di studi sull’area elima (1997), III, 1187–1202, at 1196–7 suggested identification of the house’s owner with the unfortunate Heraclius, nauarch of Segesta in Cicero’s account of naval defeat (Cic., Ver. 5.111, 5.120). Such a link can neither be proven, nor is it necessary.
177 Two examples from Tyndaris (modern Tindari, north-east Sicily), currently on display in the site’s antiquarium; these could be from either public or private contexts: (1) a stone rostrum, inv. no. 487, from the area of the so-called ‘basilica’ and dated to the second/first century B.C., apparently intended to project from a wall (approx. dimensions, 0.75 m long, 0.6 m high; see U. Spigio (ed.), Tindari. L’area archeologica e l’antiquarium (2005), 73–4, fig. 3); and (2) a free-standing stone replica of a ship’s prow (on display outside the antiquarium, approx. 0.7 m high, 1.4 m wide, 1.4 m long). Also, plaster relief decorations in the form of ships prows, from Soluntum, north-west Sicily, on display in the Museo Archeologico Regionale di Palermo ‘Antonino Salinas’, inv. nos NI 40938 and 40948. Their precise provenance is not recorded, but they are dated to the late second or early first century B.C.
Sicilian communities, and even sub-divisions of those communities.\textsuperscript{178} These attest to the strength of local community identity, sustained in military contexts, in a parallel fashion to inscriptions honouring local magistrates or garrison commanders (above, Section II.iv).

No less indicative of such communal identity is the plentiful bronze coinage from the island in the Republican period. Recent work on the material from the western end of the island suggests that the coinage, much of it significantly bearing a figure of a standing soldier on the reverse, was minted in the first half of the second century B.C., under the supervision of a Roman magistrate, in at least two centres, probably Panhormus and Lilybaeum.\textsuperscript{179} As Crawford commented two decades ago, such action ‘involved a deliberate encouragement of local autonomies’.\textsuperscript{180} One obvious purpose of such coinage would be to facilitate the payment of local troops.\textsuperscript{181} The possible parallels with the better known Iberian denarii should not be ignored. As the second century progresses it is interesting to see the explicit signs of Roman supervision fade away and the multiplication of local, civic issues across the island — as sure a testimony to the vitality of local civic life and identity as one could hope for.\textsuperscript{182}

These examples are merely the most obviously military amongst those which could be offered from the evidence for civic and local identity in Sicily in the late Hellenistic/Republican period. There is no shortage of other material to illustrate the strength of local identities.\textsuperscript{183} A case can also be made for a regional, Sicilian identity, fostered by similar processes.\textsuperscript{184} As was noted in the Introduction, the evidence is growing ever stronger for the vitality of Republican Sicily. Roman control of Sicily implies a more complex range of imperial practices than we have hitherto tended to assume. In Sicily Roman imperialism was inextricably bound up in local culture.

\textsuperscript{178} Lead examples survive with the names of Aetna, Catania, Leontini, ?Agryium, ?Hergetium, ?Heraclea, and ?Tauromenion, which could be associated with the slave wars, or at any rate the later Hellenistic period; examples referring to the leaders of the Second Slave War are also known. Ceramic examples, possibly of earlier date, are also known from Assorus, Henna, Troina (?=Engyium), Hadranum, Iaitas, and Montagna di Marzo (?=Herbessus), many of which appear to refer to civic/military groupings, in some cases probably lochrai rather than phratriai. On all these, see G. Manganaro, ‘Onomastica greca su anelli, pesi da telaio e glandes in Sicilia’, ZPE 113 (2000), 123–54, at 126–92.

\textsuperscript{179} Summary in S. Frey-Kupper, ‘Appendice I. I ritrovamenti monetali’, in B. Bechtold, \textit{La Necropoli di Lilybaeum} (1999), 394–457, at 411–14; also S. Frey-Kupper and J.-N. Barrandon, ‘Analisi metallurgiche di monete antiche in bronzo circolanti nella Sicilia occidentale’, in \textit{Quarte giornate internazionali di studi sull’area elima} (2003), 507–36, at 512–14; and most recently, Frey-Kupper, op. cit. (n. 8). In crude summary: Bahrfeldt’s group 1 (SNR 12 (1904), 337–84, head of Janus/wreath with name of Roman magistrate), may be attributed to Lilybaeum, while Bahrfeldt’s group 2 (SNR 12 (1904), 384–407, head of Jupiter/standing soldier with name of Roman magistrate), may be attributed to Panhormus; both groups may be dated approx. 180/170–150/140 B.C. Direct involvement of magistrates is suggested by issues such as Bahrfeldt, SNR 12 (1904), 346–8 nos 5–6, where the magistrate’s name, \textit{M. Acili(us)} is followed by Q, presumably for \textit{quaestor}. Full discussion in Frey-Kupper’s forthcoming publication of the M. Iato coin-finds in the series \textit{Studia letima}.

\textsuperscript{180} M. H. Crawford, \textit{Coinage and Money under the Roman Republic} (1985), 115.

\textsuperscript{181} Manganaro, op. cit. (n. 74), 448 with nn. 25 and 69 associated the coinage specifically with the Eryx garrison referred to above, suggesting ‘Questa monete, della fine del III e del II sec. a.C., debbono essere state emesse per coprire le spese necessarie alla leva e al mantenimento dei soldati forniti dalle città, i quali al pari dei Venerii di Erice finivano agli ordini del pretore.’ T. V. Butrey \textit{et al.}, \textit{Morganitina Studies II} (1989), 66 remarked of the distinctive local coinage from the site that, ‘The typology of the HISPANORVM coins is to a certain extent military, and their issue might have been intended in part as military pay’. I. Bitto, ‘Leggende monetali romane di Sicilia’, in M. I. Gulletta (ed.), \textit{Sicilia Epigraphica} (1999), I, 89–111, at 94 considers the identification of the magistrates to be unresolved, commenting ‘funzionari aventi il potere di coinare moneta, forse anche comandanti di truppe’.

\textsuperscript{182} Frey-Kupper and Barrandon, op. cit. (n. 179), 414: ‘Al posto di questa emissione voluta da Roma, subentrò una intensa attività emissiva delle singole città che, sicure di sé stesse, contraddissero le loro monete con \textit{yelbnikon} dei loro abitanti. Da questa attività risultò soprattutto nel I sec. a.C. un ampio panorama monetale’.

\textsuperscript{183} See especially Campagna, op. cit. (n. 8) and Wilson, op. cit. (n. 8) for the physical expression of this in urban centres; cf. Prag, op. cit. (n. 8), 260 with nn. 71–2 on epigraphic expressions of civic identity, and examples in Manganaro, op. cit. (n. 161), and idem, op. cit. (n. 115), 76–7.

Readers are warmly directed to an important forthcoming paper by Dr Elena Mango of the Archaeological Institute at the University of Zurich, of which I myself only became aware at a very late stage in the completion of this text. Dr Mango, in a paper delivered at the *Seste giornate internazionali di studi sull’area elima e la Sicilia occidentale* (2006), entitled ‘Il ginnasio in Sicilia — un caso particolare?’, and to be published in the forthcoming proceedings of that conference, has, wholly independently, reached strikingly similar conclusions, based principally on an archaeological study of the growing body of evidence for *gymnasia* in western Sicily. I am most grateful to Dr Mango for communicating this information, and must emphasize that her study will present a significant body of material not studied in this paper.

*Merton College, Oxford*
jonathan.prag@merton.ox.ac.uk