Forthcoming in Analysis.

Abstract: Stage theory holds that the objects of ordinary discourse are instantaneous stages of four-dimensionally extended objects. This view contrasts with worm theory, according to which the objects of ordinary discourse are themselves four-dimensionally extended. This paper presents an argument that the way we experience time is more consistent with our being instantaneous objects than with our being temporally extended throughout our entire lifetimes. By argument to the best explanation therefore, experiencing subjects – persons – are stages; since persons are among the objects of ordinary discourse, worm theory is false.

Updated 9 May 2013: thanks for some pointers from Brad Skow.

Abstract: An imperative conditional is a conditional in the imperative mood (by analogy with “indicative conditional”, “subjunctive conditional”). What, in general, is the meaning and the illocutionary effect of an imperative conditional? I survey four answers: the answer that imperative conditionals are commands to the effect that an indicative conditional be true; two versions of the answer that imperative conditionals express irreducibly conditional commands; and finally, the answer that imperative conditionals express a kind of hybrid speech act between command and assertion.

Abstract: I offer a simple-minded analysis of presupposition in which if a sentence has a presupposition, then both that sentence and its negation logically entail the presupposition; and in which sentence with failed presuppositions are neither true nor false. This account naturally generates an analysis of what it takes to disagree and what it takes to be at fault in a disagreement. A simple generalisation gives rise to the possibility of disagreements in which no party is at fault, as is be required by leading theories on predicates of taste.

There is a podcast of me giving the talk at the Aristotelian Society.

Updated 13 April 2013: final draft

Parsons, Josh. 2013. “Presupposition, disagreement, and predicates of taste.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society forthcoming (April 13). http://www.aristoteliansociety.org.uk/pdf/parsons.pdf‎.

This is the main statement of my current (2010-2012) project on imperative logic. See also Preposcription semantics and KDDc4.

Abstract: An argument is usually said to be valid iff it is truth-preserving – iff it cannot be that all its premises are true and its conclusion false. But imperatives (it is normally thought) are not truth-apt. They are not in the business of saying how the world is, and therefore cannot either succeed or fail in doing so. To solve this problem, we need to find a new criterion of validity, and I aim to propose such a criterion.

Parsons, Josh. 2013. “Command and consequence.” Philosophical Studies forthcoming (March 1). doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0094-x. http://www.joshparsons.net/draft/imperassertion7/.

This is reading list for a 4-session seminar on mereology. We will be covering philosophical rather than formal issues, but I will assume acquaintance with first order predicate logic.