

Exorbitant privilege and economic sanctions*

Maxim Chupilkin
University of Oxford[†] and EBRD[‡]

Beata Javorcik
University of Oxford[§], EBRD and CEPR[¶]

Aleksandra Peeva
Humboldt University of Berlin^{||}

Alexander Plekhanov
EBRD

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Abstract

This paper documents a substantial change in the use of currency of invoicing in Russian import transactions, precipitated by the war on Ukraine and the subsequent introduction of trade sanctions on Russia. Over the course of 2022, the share of Russia's imports invoiced in renminbi (CNY) increased by 17% points. The use of renminbi as a vehicle currency increased on average by an extra 4% points among trading partners that have an active renminbi swap line. This effect is found only for third countries that did not impose economic sanctions on Russia. The share of CNY invoicing increased differentially more for trade in internationally sanctioned dual-use and industrial-capacity goods and for trade in goods originating in sanctioning economies or traded under Western trademarks. The number of importing firms in Russia dealing with CNY invoices increased sharply, while the numbers of importers dealing with USD and EUR invoicing dropped, likely reflecting the rising fixed costs of clearing such payments under sanctions. Thus while dominance of the US dollar (USD) makes international sanctions more effective, as payments denominated in USD need to be cleared through the US banking system, economic sanctions may encourage a shift away from USD as a vehicle currency thus eroding the USD dominance.

Keywords: sanctions, international trade, currency of invoicing, vehicle currency, China, Russia

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*Chupilkin email: chupilkm@ebrd.com; Javorcik email: beata.javorcik@economics.ox.ac.uk; Peeva email: peeveale@hu-berlin.de; Plekhanov email: plekhana@ebrd.com. The views are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the institutions they are affiliated with. The authors are grateful to Antoine Berthou, Ralph de Haas and Volker Nitsch for valuable comments and suggestions.

[†]Department of Politics and International Relations, Manor Rd, Oxford OX1 3UQ, United Kingdom

[‡]European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 5 Bank St., London, E14 4BG, United Kingdom

[§]Department of Economics, University of Oxford, 10 Manor Rd, Oxford OX1 3UQ, United Kingdom

[¶]33 Great Sutton St, London, EC1V 0DX, United Kingdom

^{||}Unter den Linden 6, 10117, Berlin, Germany

1 Introduction

International trade is disproportionately denominated in US dollars (Gopinath and Stein (2020), Boz et al. (2022)), contributing to the demand for US dollars and the dollar's exorbitant privilege, that is, low interest paid on US liabilities compared with return on US dollar assets (Gourinchas et al. (2010)). The prevalence of US dollar use in trade between third countries reflects to a large extent the size of the US market and firms' efforts to keep their prices in line with those of competitors as well as input suppliers and take into consideration exchange rate risks and the dominant role of the US dollar as a store of value (Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2005), Goldberg and Tille (2008), Goldberg and Tille (2016), Amiti et al. (2022), Gopinath and Stein (2020)). For these reasons, the rising importance of China and other emerging markets as trading partners and the declining share of the US in global trade may not by themselves lead to the decline in the US dollar share of invoicing (Georgiadis et al. (2021), Mukhin (2022)).

The dominance of the US dollar makes international sanctions more effective, as firms engaged in international trade overwhelmingly require payments to be cleared through the US banking system. At the same time, the use of economic sanctions, which is becoming increasingly widespread (Felbermayr et al. (2020)), may over time reduce attractiveness of the US dollar as a vehicle currency and hence its dominance (see, for instance, Bianchi and Sosa-Padilla (2023)). Empirical evidence on such shifts is scarce, in part due to limited application of economic sanctions in the past.

This study sheds light on the impact of trade sanctions on the choice of currencies used to denominate international trade transactions. Our analysis focuses on the sanctions imposed on Russia by the European Union (EU), the United States and a number of other advanced economies in the aftermath of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022.

Comprehensive economic sanctions imposed on Russia by the EU and other Western economies in response to the war on Ukraine present a unique case for studying the changes in the choice of invoicing currency. This episode stands out in terms of its size, comprehensive nature and the size of the targeted economy (see Chupilkin et al. (2023b)). Russia's GDP at market exchange rates in 2021 amounted to US\$1.8 trillion making Russia 11th largest economy in the world. Sanction packages imposed restrictions on exports of various goods to Russia as well as on certain imports from Russia. They limited financial services that could be provided to Russian entities and discontinued access of some major Russian banks to SWIFT, the dominant system for cross-border payments. A major part of assets of the Russian Central Bank were frozen, and sanctions further covered transactions with more than 1,200 individual entities. In response, the BRICS economies (Brazil, China, India, Russia and South Africa) announced their intention to develop an alternative cross-border payments system, BRICS pay.

Our analysis exploits transaction-level data on Russia's imports between January 2016 and December 2022, covering the period before and after the start of the sanctions regime. Each record includes the value of goods and information about their quantity or weight, product description and its HS code, importing firm (identified by a unique number), name of the exporting firm, country of origin of goods, currency of invoicing and the date of customs clearance.

Some remarkable shifts are already visible in summary statistics. Prior to March 2022, up to 80 percent of Russia's imports had been invoiced in US dollars (USD) or euros (EUR). Most of these imports were coming from third countries. The shares of trade denominated in various currencies had been fairly stable over time. After Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the imposition of economic sanctions by the EU, US and a number of other advanced economies, Russian imports became increasingly invoiced in renminbi (CNY). By the end of 2022, invoices in renminbi accounted for 20 percent of Russia's imports, up from 3 percent a year earlier, while the share of the US dollar and the euro declined to 67 percent.

Only part of this shift reflects a drop in exports from the sanctioning economies and the rise of Russia's trade with China and other neutral partners (see Chupilkin et al. (2023b), Steinbach (2023)). Renminbi invoices accounted for 63 percent of imports from China by end-2022, up from 23 percent a year earlier, having displaced primarily the US dollar as well as the Russian rouble (RUB) as the currency of choice. In trade with third countries (i.e., other than those using the US dollar or the euro as producer currency), the share of renminbi went up from less than 1 percent before February 2022 to more than 5 percent by the end of the year.

Our econometric analysis focuses on the share of Russia's imports from a given country, invoiced in a given currency in a given month and follows a difference-in-difference approach comparing (i) Russia's imports before versus after the imposition of economic sanctions; (ii) Russia's trade with sanctioning economies versus other economies, referred to in the paper as "neutral" economies. In some exercises, we further focus on specific groups of neutral economies, for example, those with swap lines with the People's Bank of China.

Our interest in the impact of having an active currency swap line with the People's Bank of China (PBOC) stems from the fact that such swap lines make it easier for an exporter to use renminbi received from, say, a Russian importer (see Bahaj and Reis (2020)). We show that the use of renminbi as a vehicle currency increased by an extra 4 percentage points, on average, for trading partners that have an active currency swap line with the PBOC, such as Mongolia or Tajikistan. This effect is found only for third countries that did not impose economic sanctions on Russia. The data also show that the use of currencies of other "neutral" exporters, such as the Turkish Lira and Indian rupee, has also

increased, albeit has remained much more limited overall.

An event-study analysis shows no differential trends in the use of producer currency or US dollar in individual countries' trade with Russia before March 2022, including China's trade. This gives us confidence that the patterns captured by our analysis have indeed been precipitated by the war and the subsequent sanctions.

We extend the analysis to focus on trade with neutral exporters and add a further difference-in-difference comparison between trade in product where exports from the EU are subject to sanctions versus other products. The results suggest that the share of CNY and producer-currency invoicing increased differentially more for trade in goods under EU sanctions. For instance, for internationally sanctioned dual-use and industrial-capacity goods the renminbi shares increased by an extra 3 percentage points, compared with non-sanctioned goods. We similarly show that the shares of trade with neutral economies invoiced in CNY or producer currency were higher for goods originating in sanctioning economies or traded under "Western" trademarks, that is, in cases where a paper trail linking trades to sanctioning economies potentially exists. The shares of trade invoices in US dollars were correspondingly lower for internationally sanctioned goods and for "intermediated" trade in goods of Western origin.

In the final part of the analysis, we zoom in on importing firms operating in Russia. We show a sharp increase in the number of firms dealing with CNY invoices and a drop in the numbers of importers dealing with USD and EUR invoices. The consolidation of business dealing with USD/EUR payments likely reflects the rising fixed costs of clearing such payments under sanctions. When it comes to rouble invoicing, we document a high turnover of firms: more firms started working with rouble invoicing even as the share of rouble invoicing declined, while many firms have exited the business of rouble invoicing.

Our paper contributes to several strands of the economic literature. First, we contribute to the literature on the choice of invoicing currency (Goldberg and Tille (2008), Gopinath et al. (2010)) by showing how trade sanctions may fundamentally affect this choice. We complement evidence in Berthou (2023) by looking at vehicle currencies other than the US dollar. We also contribute to the growing literature on factors supporting the rise of international currencies, and in particular China's, by documenting the interplay between policies to promote internationalisation of renminbi through the use of currency swap lines and an exogenous shock to trade flows arising from Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine (Clayton et al. (2022)), Bahaj and Reis (2020)).

We contribute to the literature on the effectiveness of economic sanctions (for instance, Crozet and Hinz (2020), Tyazhelnikov et al. (2023)) by showing that the effectiveness of sanctions is attenuated, among other things, by the endogenous choice of currency of invoicing of imports and exports, which

diminishes the ability of sanctioning economies to monitor and restrict trade in sanctioned goods. This switching reinforces and is, in turn, reinforced by diversion of trade to neutral trading partners (Yang et al. (2009), Chupilkin et al. (2023b), Babina et al. (2023)), rerouting of trade and financial flows from the sanctioning economies via third jurisdictions (Efing et al. (2023), Besedeš et al. (2017), Chupilkin et al. (2023b), Crozet et al. (2021)) and misclassification of goods at customs (Chupilkin et al. (2023b)).

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets the stage by outlining the economic sanctions imposed on Russia in 2022, presenting the data sources and describing the broad patterns found in the data. Section 3 lays out our empirical approach, while Section 4 presents the results and discusses their implications. The last section concludes.

2 Setting and Data

2.1 Sanctions on the Russian economy: An overview

Prior to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, a narrow set of sanctions was already in place, predominantly targeting specific companies and individuals. Those earlier sanctions were introduced in response to the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine that started in the same year. In response, Russia introduced a number of trade restrictions, notably a ban on import of various food products from the EU, the US and the UK (see Peeva (2019) for an overview). Those sanctions and counter-sanctions resulted in a broad-based reduction in Russia's trade with the sanctioning countries (Crozet and Hinz (2020)), an increase in prices of the affected goods (Hinz and Monastyrenko (2022)), weaker performance of sanctioned companies (Ahn and Ludema (2020)) and possibly an increased popular support for the government (Peeva (2019)).

The EU expanded its sanctions first on 23 February 2022 and then in subsequent ten waves, with most export restriction being put in place already by 15 March 2022 when luxury goods were added (as part of the fourth package) to technology-related and dual-use goods. Overall, export prohibitions have covered arms, advanced and dual-use technology, quantum computing, advanced semiconductors, sensitive machinery, transportation and chemicals, goods for use in the oil industry and maritime navigation and goods seen to enhance Russia's industrial production capacity as well as luxury products (see Chupilkin et al. (2023b)).

In addition to exports, sanctions have also applied to investments in a number of sectors; use of public funds; imports from Russia of certain goods such as coal, iron and steel, and wood; aviation, Russian freight operators; and restrictions on financial services including transactions with Russia's Central

Bank. As a result, part of foreign assets (reserves) of the Bank of Russia were frozen. Sanctions also included travel bans and financial measures targeting more than 1,200 individuals and 100 companies.

Under targeted provisions, transactions with a number of major Russian banks, including state-owned ones, were restricted (and some banks were effectively disconnected from SWIFT, an international messaging system for clearing payments). At the same time, transactions with other banks, including some major subsidiaries of international banking groups in Russia as well as certain state-owned banks remained outside the scope of sanctions (see Drott et al. (2023) for a detailed discussion and evidence that these measures were fairly effective in excluding the targeted Russian banks from clearing payments via Target2 payment system).

In addition to the members of the European Economic Area, Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Switzerland, Taipei China, the UK and the US adopted their own sanction packages incorporating some form of trade sanctions, typically closely aligned with those of the EU (in particular, as far as dual-use technology and industrial goods are concerned) as well as some form of financial-sector sanctions. Overall, our analysis includes 45 sanctioning trading partners (see Annex Table A1 for a list). At the same time, China, Turkiye, India and the UAE are among Russia's main trading partners that did not impose economic sanctions on Russia.

2.2 Data on imports

Our analysis draws on transaction-level data of imports and exports going through Russia's customs. In 2022, it contains more than 12 million import records associated with more than 74,000 unique importing firms. Over the years, the data tracks closely Russia's aggregate international trade, whether reported by Russia or by its trading partners via UN Comtrade, both on the import side and on the export side (see Figure 1). Similar data were used, for instance, by Korovkin and Makarin (2023) to analyze Ukraine-Russia trade after 2014 and by Babina et al. (2023) to examine exports of oil products from Russia in 2022-23.

Each import record has information on the product (using the Harmonized System of classification, HS), its value, quantity or weight, the sending (exporting) country, the trading company acting as a seller (and its location, referred to as trading country hereafter), the recipient of goods in Russia as well as the currency of invoicing. The data only systematically cover transactions with counterparts outside the Eurasian Economic Union – a customs-free bloc comprising Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Russia (see Isakova et al. (2016) for a discussion of the union).

In our analysis, trading partners are defined by the location of trading company, as this location seems

most relevant for the choice of currency of invoicing. Where trading country is not available, it is imputed using information about the sending country (from which goods are dispatched). In around 40 percent of cases, traders are located in the country of origin of goods. However, Hong Kong and Switzerland are more common as a location of a trading company than a location of origin. Table 1 summarizes descriptive statistics for Russia’s imports aggregated to a partner-country-month level.

To identify products or product groups, on which the EU introduced sanctions on exports to Russia after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, we follow the approach of Chupilkin et al. (2023b)). It is based on the information from the EU Council Regulation 833/2014 and its subsequent amendments as well as on the EU list of dual-technology products. We focus on the 6-digit level of disaggregation, the highest level at which HS codes used by different countries are fully aligned.

In some cases, sanctions cover HS6 codes only partially. For example, exports of ”luxury” sports equipment or clothing with prices in excess of a certain threshold (typically €300) are subject to sanctions, while cheaper items belonging to the same product code may not be subject to restrictions. Numerous other exemptions may apply, for instance, in relation to goods required by Russia to fulfil its contractual obligations with respect to deliveries of gas and oil to Europe or on health and environmental grounds. For each 6-digit HS product, we record the date when sanctions enter into force and define the subsequent month as the first period when a given product is under sanctions (for instance, April 2022 for sanctions adopted in the mid-March 2022).

The list of product groups partially covered by the sanctions is an eclectic mix of 2,182 HS6 codes (as of December 2022) combining: weapons (HS 9301), semi-conductor media (852352), engines and pumps (8412, 8413), containers (860900), aircraft and parts (88), ammonia (281420), steel pipes for oil pipelines (730411), navigation instruments (9014), ski suits (611220), and others. As in Chupilkin et al. (2023b), we distinguish between three major groups of sanction products: (i) luxury goods, (ii) goods critical for industrial capacity and (iii) dual-use and military technology goods.

2.3 First look at the data: Broad patterns

When looking at the currency of invoicing, we distinguish between contracts invoiced in the local currency of the importer (in our case, the Russian Rouble, RUB), producer currencies (the currencies of partner countries) and vehicle currencies (i.e., currencies not used as domestic currencies by either the exporter or the importer). Among vehicle currencies, we focus on the US dollar and the euro (historically accounting for the bulk of Russia’s trade and global trade) as well as CNY, the currency that has been gaining share of central banks’ international reserves over the past two decades (Arslanalp et al. (2022)).

Prior to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the shares of Russia's imports invoiced in each major currency were fairly stable (see Figure 2, right panel). After March 2022, the share of Chinese renminbi (CNY) in imports started rising, up from around 3 percent of total before the war to around 20 percent by the end of 2022. This trend is similar whether shares are calculated by volume of trade or by number of transactions invoiced in each currency. The increased use of CNY is found both in exports from China (CNY as producer currency) as well as in exports from third countries (CNY as vehicle currency). Although these trends are more pronounced when looking at the shares of trade by currency, they are mirrored in trends in terms of volumes of trade invoiced in a given currency as well (see Figure 2, top left panel).

The rise of CNY was most notable in payments for goods coming from China, where renminbi overtook the US dollar in the second half of 2022. However, CNY also started being used for settling trades with third countries, such as Mongolia (where the share of CNY rose to 18 percent from nil in 2021), Taipei, China, the Philippines, Malaysia, the UAE, Thailand, Japan, Tajikistan and Singapore (see Annex Figure A1). A small percentage of trades with the EU, US and UK (1-2 percent by volume or by number of transactions) also started using CNY as a vehicle currency.

This trend is also observed for Russia's exports, albeit to a lesser extent given the dominance of oil, gas, coal and other commodities typically traded in US dollars in Russia's export mix. Trading partners paying for Russia's exports in CNY are geographically more diverse, with top emerging users including Costa Rica, El Salvador, Cote d'Ivoire, Thailand, the UAE, Cameroon, Colombia and Nicaragua. Among the top users of CNY, all economies except Guatemala, El Salvador and the Philippines had currency swap lines in place with the PBOC (see Annex Table A2).

We also observe an increased use of producer currencies in Russia's imports from major neutral trading partners, including India, Türkiye and the UAE. The amounts are considerably more modest than in the case of CNY, both in absolute terms and in relative terms (amounting to 5-15 percent of bilateral trade, see Figure 3) and those currencies are rarely, if at all, used as vehicle currencies.

In the case of China, the rapid rise in imports invoiced in CNY coupled with stable imports invoiced in USD resulted in CNY displacing the US dollar in terms of the trade share (see Annex Figure A5, top panels). In the case of imports from India and Türkiye, trade denominated in all currencies increased rapidly over the course of 2022, with the rupee and the Turkish lira claiming market share primarily from the US dollar (see Annex Figure A5, middle and bottom panels).

3 Empirical specification

The purpose of our analysis is to shed light on the determinants of currency choice in invoicing of Russia’s import transaction. We are interested in factors driving invoicing in producer currencies, the local currency (the rouble) or vehicle currencies (especially the use of renminbi as a vehicle currency).

Our analysis will typically focus on the shares of Russia’s imports from a particular trading partner i in a given month t that are denominated in a particular currency. We will tend to consider each currency or type of currency separately. The share of imports will be typically calculated in terms of value, though we will also consider shares calculated in terms of the number of transactions. We will also contrast the results for shares with the results for volumes. Where trade diversion following imposition of sanctions is strong, the volume of trade denominated in a given currency may increase even as the share of that currency in trade in question declines (or vice versa).

We will follow a difference-in-difference approach:

$$Currency_{it} = \sum_k \beta_k Sanctions_t * Group_{ki} + \alpha_t + \alpha_i + \epsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

We will distinguish between the pre-sanction and the post-sanction period (the latter defined from March 2022 onwards) by means of an indicator variable $Sanctions_t$. We will consider several groups of trading partners, indexed k : for example, the sanctioning countries, neutral countries that condemned the invasion of Ukraine at the UN vote; neutral countries that did not condemn the invasion at the UN (included individually) and so on.

Ninety-six countries voted alongside the 45 sanctioning economies in favour of a UN resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (resolution ES 11/1 of 2 March 2022). These economies represent the baseline group for various comparisons. China as well as 34 other countries abstained, including South Africa and Uzbekistan. Nicaragua, North Korea and Syria joined Belarus and Russia in voting against the resolution. A further 12 countries did not vote (for example, Azerbaijan and Iran). Those economies (typically more strongly geo-politically aligned with Russia than with the US or the EU) are aggregated in a ”non-condemning” group. For country groupings, see Annex Table A1.

The same framework will be used to look at further groupings of trading partners, for instance, economies that have established currency swap lines with China and those that have not.

The specification includes country fixed effects (α_i) accounting for the typical use of various currencies in bilateral trade with Russia. The month fixed effects (α_t) capture shifts in the overall use of currencies over time.

4 Results

4.1 Is there a shift to invoicing producer currencies?

The broad trends, discussed in section 2.3, pointed to an increased usage of exporter currencies by China, UAE, India and Turkey. Thus, we start our analysis by testing this question more formally. We focus on the share and the volume of trade invoiced in producer or in local currency and present the two sets of results in the left and the right hand side panels of Table 2, respectively. We allow for differential effects for various individual countries or country groupings. The omitted category are countries that voted for condemning Russia's invasion of Ukraine but are not participating in sanctions (see columns (2) and (3) in Annex Table A1).

In the case of Russian imports from China, the use of producer currency (CNY) increased by an extra 29 percentage points after the invasion (relative to pre-invasion trade and to trade with other economies). This effect is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. In terms of trade volumes, the effect is much larger as the increase in the share of CNY is further amplified by the rise in China-Russia trade (see Figure 4).

Statistically significant differential increases in the use of producer currencies are observed for selected other neutral partners including India and the UAE (as well as for volumes of imports from Turkiye). Such increases are not systematically observed, however, for countries that did not condemn the invasion of Ukraine at the UN. Notwithstanding geopolitical alignment, for many of those economies currency convertibility and the ability to clear cross-border payments may be limiting factors.

The use of the euro or the US dollar in trade with the US and the euro area, respectively, is in line with the previous trends, with no differential patterns in terms of shares of the US dollar or the euro used as producer currencies.¹

Moving on to columns (3) and (4), there is some indication that the use of local currency (the rouble) became less common after the invasion, which is consistent with Figure 2. However, this was not the case for the neighbouring economies in Central Asia and the Caucasus (CCA) as well as Belarus and

¹USD and EUR will also be producer currencies for a handful of other economies where they are legal tender, such as Ecuador or Montenegro.

Moldova, all with traditionally stronger economic links with Russia. These countries seem to have increased invoicing in RUB.

4.2 Vehicle currencies: Is there a shift away from the USD?

Next, we consider the share of imports invoiced in the USD and the EUR, which have traditionally been used as vehicle currencies.² The results are presented in the left and the right hand side panels of Table 3, respectively. An interaction term ($Sanctions_t * USDproducers_i$ and $Sanctions_t * EURproducers_i$, respectively) captures the use of these currencies by trading partners for whom they are the legal tender (i.e., producer currency).

The share of the USD-denominated imports from China dropped by around 30 percentage points more than could be otherwise expected in the post-invasion period (see Table 3 column(1)), even while the volume of trade invoiced in USD increased (see column (2)). The USD share also dropped by an extra 7-17 percentage points in trade with other neutral economies, India and Turkiye being two prominent examples. All these effects are statistically significant at the 5 percent (or higher) level. At the same time, the volume of Russia's imports from neutral economies has increased significantly owing to diversion of trade in sanctioned goods. As a result, the overall share of the US dollar in Russia's trade remained broadly constant in 2022 (see Figure 2).

The share of the EUR-denominated imports increased by an additional 6-8 percentage points in trade with a number of neutral economies. These exclude China but include the neighbouring economies in Central Asia and the Caucasus, India, Turkiye, the UAE and, more generally, neutral economies that did not condemn the invasion of Ukraine at the UN. In many of these cases, the euro displaced the use of the rouble, and in some instances it also gained market share from the US dollar.

4.3 Zooming in on imports from China: Event study analysis

Our setting lends itself well to an event-study analysis given the mostly-unanticipated nature of the war and the clear-cut timing of the introduction of the sanctions. The underlying econometric specifications are similar to those considered earlier, except for an additional battery of interaction terms between the groups of countries and the indicator variables for each month before and after the introduction of sanctions (see Equation 2). January 2022 serves as the base (omitted) period.

²Vehicle currencies other than USD, EUR and CNY accounted for less than 0.5 percent of third-country trade with Russia.

$$Currency_{ijt} = \sum_t \sum_i \beta_{ij} Month_t * Group_i + \alpha_{tj} + \alpha_{ij} + \epsilon_{ijt} \quad (2)$$

While monthly trade is volatile, a number of distinctive patterns emerge from this analysis (see Figure 5). Up until February 2022, there had been no differential trends in the use of CNY and USD in Russia’s imports from China relative to Russia’s imports from other countries. The share of CNY has been increasing very slowly, if at all, with no clear trend for the US dollar. However, between March and December 2022, the estimated ”excess” share of CNY started rising steadily from month to month, as payment systems and mechanisms were being set up. This gradual increase in the use of CNY is mirrored by an equally gradual and significant decline in the share of US dollar in China-Russia trade relative to what could be expected based on broad import patterns. The next subsection further zooms in on the use of CNY as a vehicle currency in Russia’s imports.

4.4 Is CNY gaining ground as a vehicle currency?

Prior to 2022, the use of CNY as a vehicle currency in Russia’s imports was very uncommon (see Figure 2). Over the course of 2022, the share of CNY-denominated imports with third countries increased from 0.7 percent in January to 5.3 percent in December (see Annex Figure A2). What drivers were behind this trend?

Motivated by the work of Bahaj and Reis (2020) who argue that swap lines can be instrumental to jump-starting an international currency and by the earlier observation that the top users of CNY tend to have swap lines with the People’s Bank of China, we further investigate this question in a difference-in-difference setting. Swap lines make it easier for an exporter in a third country to use renminbi received from, say, a Russian importer. We update a list of swap lines in Bahaj and Reis (2020) using information from the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) website (see Annex Table A2 for a list).

In the analysis, we focus on the share of trade invoiced in CNY. The share is calculated either in terms of value or the number of transactions. We distinguish between China, economies with a swap line with PBOC, and economies without such a swap line. Among economies with a swap line, we further distinguish between those that imposed trade sanctions on Russia (a total of 31 economies) and neutral economies (a total of 25 jurisdictions).³ The specifications include a set of respective indicator variables as well as their interactions with the sanctions period (March 2022 onwards). Although the

³The ECB-PBOC swap line is assigned to all euro zone countries.

establishment of swap lines is not random as far as China's trade patterns are concerned, it is arguably unrelated to Russia's trade with third countries.

The results are summarized in Table 4. After the invasion, the share of Russia's CNY-denominated imports from economies with a CNY swap line was around 1.8 percentage points higher than could otherwise be expected (Column 1). No impact of having a swap line is visible prior to the invasion. In part, this may reflect the fact that this effect is identified only based on a relatively small subset of economies where a swap line was introduced after 2016 (for almost four fifth of economies, pre-existing swap lines are subsumed in the country fixed effect).

In column 3, we distinguish between countries participating in sanctions versus other countries (see Annex Table A2). The effect of a swap line on the currency of invoicing in the post-sanction trade with Russia is only observed for economies that did not impose trade sanctions themselves. For these economies, the effect is larger, at 4.3 percentage points (Column 3). For the sanctioning economies, the corresponding effect is a fairly precisely estimated zero (this effect is defined by the sum of coefficients on the interaction term between the swap line and the post-war period and the triple interaction term which also includes a dummy for the sanctioning economies).

The results are thus consistent with an interplay of the sanctions regime and the existence of CNY swap lines nudging exporters towards contracts invoiced in CNY.

The combined effect of PBOC swap lines and trade sanctions can also be traced in an event study format (see Figure A6, noting that the left panel (sanctioning economies) and the right panel (neutral economies) are on different scales).

4.5 Is USD used less in intermediated trade?

The introduction of trade sanctions on exports to Russia resulted in a dramatic drop of European exports to Russia and a rise of intermediated trade, that is trade routed via neutral countries (see Chupilkin et al. (2023b) and Chupilkin et al. (2023a)). Is such trade more likely to be invoiced in particular currencies? This is the question to which we turn next.

Intermediated trade involves exports of goods with paperwork that in some way involves sanctioning economies: these goods either originate in a sanctioning economy (for example, Komatsu machinery manufactured in Japan and exported from China) or are traded under a trademark registered in a sanctioning economy (for example, Apple products manufactured in China and exported by a trader in the UAE in lieu of the usual distributor registered in Ireland). In contrast, neutral trade involves goods originating in neutral economies under neutral brands exported by traders in neutral jurisdictions (for

instance, Lenovo laptops). To distinguish between neutral and intermediated trade we use information on trademarks provided as part of import transaction and follow the approach in Chupilkin et al. (2023a) to identify Western trademarks as trademarks that were majority-exported by traders in sanctioning jurisdictions in 2016-21.

As we want to abstract from changes in trade from countries imposing sanctions, in what follows we focus on Russia’s imports from neutral economies.

Our estimating strategy is as follows:

$$Currency_{pint} = \beta Intermediated_n * Sanctions_t + \alpha_{pit} + \alpha_{pin} + \epsilon_{pint} \quad (3)$$

where the dependent variable is the share of a given currency in imports of HS6 product p from partner country i in month t purchased either in an intermediated or a neutral way (this ‘trade type’ is denoted by n). The variable of interest is the interaction term between an intermediated trade and the post-sanction period. The specification includes a battery of fixed effects: product-country-time fixed effects and product-country-trade-type fixed effects. The former fixed effects allow for a differential reliance on a particular invoicing currency in trade of particular products (eg sanctioned goods) from a particular partner country after the introduction of sanctions. The latter set of fixed effects controls for any differences in the use of currencies of invoicing for intermediated as opposed to neutral trade for any type of goods and trading partners. The estimation results are presented in Table 5.

These results point towards a flight away from using US dollars in transactions involving intermediated trade (Column 2), with greater use of producer currencies, including the CNY, and the euro for these types of trade. The share of US dollar in intermediated trade invoicing is estimated to have declined by 4.3 percentage points after the introduction of sanctions while the share of CNY increased by 1.8 percentage points.

4.6 Do trade sanctions matter for currency of invoicing?

The dramatic drop of European exports to Russia was partially compensated for by an increase in exports from China and Turkiye. This effect was particularly pronounced in for goods subject to the EU sanctions, though it is worth noting that neither China or Turkiye participates in sanctions (Chupilkin et al. (2023b)). Does the choice of currency of invoicing the depend on the type of goods traded? This is the question to which we turn next. As in the previous section, we focus on Russia’s

imports from neutral economies.

Consider China’s exports to Russia first. Although the share of CNY-invoiced imports in Russia’s total imports has increased for goods not under EU sanctions, the increase appears to be larger in the case of sanctioned goods (see Figure 4 which distinguishes between four types of trade, depending on the use of CNY or other currency of invoicing and whether the goods were on the EU sanctions list or not).

Our estimating equation is similar to the one used in the previous exercise. We restrict the sample to exports from neutral economies and calculate the shares of trade invoiced in each major currency for every combination of HS6 product group, exporting country, month and trade type (intermediated or neutral trade, indexed n). These shares represent our dependent variables. We include country-trade-type-time and product-country-trade-type fixed effects, as shown below:

$$Currency_{pint} = \beta Sanctions_t * Treated_p + \alpha_{int} + \alpha_{pin} + \epsilon_{pint} \quad (4)$$

where the treated indicator captures products under various types of sanctions (dual use, goods enhancing industrial capacity, and luxury goods). The results are presented in Table 6. They suggest that the share of trade invoiced in USD declined by an additional 2-3 percentage points in case of neutral economies’ trade in industrial and dual-use goods as compared with trade involving non-sanctioned goods. The corresponding shares of CNY as a vehicle currency and producer currencies increased by 2 percentage points, with a larger increases observed for CNY as producer currency. These effects are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

4.7 Zooming in on importing firms

Our data allow us observe individual firms acting as importers in Russia. Around 80 percent of importers deal with invoices in a single currency only, while a very small minority deal with four or more currencies (see Annex Figure A3). Historically, the numbers of firms dealing with invoices in a given currency in a given month (USD, EUR, CNY or RUB) have been fairly stable over time (see Figure 6). However, after the introduction of sanctions, the number of firms dealing with invoicing in CNY started to increase rapidly, while the numbers dealing with USD and EUR declined. Many of these firms were newly established (see Annex Figure A4). In fact, the entry rate among firms dealing with invoicing in CNY has far exceeded the entry rate for importers dealing with other currencies.

When it comes to rouble invoicing, we document a high turnover of firms: more firms started working

with rouble invoicing even as the share of rouble invoicing declined. while many firms have exited the business of rouble invoicing.

4.8 Russia-China trade: What kind of firms invoice imports in CNY?

We extend the regression analysis to shed light on the choice of the invoicing currency by different types of firms. Our analysis is conducted at the level of imports of HS6 product p by a given firm f taking place in a given month t via intermediated or neutral trade n . We restrict our attention just to imports from China. The dependent variable, as before, is defined as the share of invoicing in a given currency. Our estimating equation takes the following form:

$$Currency_{fpint} = \beta Sanctions_t * Firmtype_f + New_{ft} + \alpha_{pint} + \alpha_{fpin} + \epsilon_{fpint} \quad (5)$$

We control for other factor that matter for invoicing under sanctions - exporting country, product, intermediated trade type and time - through inclusion of fixed effects. The variable of interest is the interaction term between the post-sanction period and the indicator for various firm types.

We measure firm size with the logarithm of total firm-level imports, taking the maximum value across calendar years. We identify 1,186 state-owned firms in our sample (those with state ownership in excess of 25 percent) based on information about ultimate owners in Bureau van Dijk's Orbis database. We identify 705 privately-owned importers that appear on the list of systemically important (strategic) firms published by the Russia's Ministry of Economic Development. The enterprises on this list are important producers and employers in their industry, their region or their market (as defined by the competition authority) or if they important for national defence, advanced technologies, information and telecommunication technologies or transport connectivity (the list also includes an additional 167 state-owned systemic importers). We define new firms as firms that are neither state-owned nor systemic and first appear in the dataset within the 12-month window preceding the transaction (for example, firms appearing between February 2019 and January 2020 for the first time are counted as new in January 2020).

We investigate whether the shift towards the use of renminbi and other alternative currencies after the introduction of sanctions was led by large, systemically important and (or) state-owned enterprises or new firms.

The results, presented in Table A5, suggest that it is the firm size, rather than its systemically

important or SOE status that is the best predictor of invoicing imports in CNY. The coefficients on the interaction term between the systemic-firm dummy and the sanctions period is small and not statistically significant. The same holds for the interaction terms involving the state-owned dummy and the new firm dummy. In other words, the patterns of use of currency of invoicing in trade with China did not change significantly in 2022 for these firms. As for the new firms, they are more likely to deal with CNY invoicing and less likely to work with US dollars, but this was roughly equally true both before and after the imposition of sanctions.

In contrast, the coefficient on the interaction term between firm size and the sanctions-period dummy is negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level when it comes to invoicing in CNY. It is positive and statistically significant for the share of US dollar invoices. In other words, under the sanctions, smaller firms disproportionately shifted towards paying for imports in CNY and away from paying in US dollars. These results are consistent with increasing fixed costs and complexity of making cross-border payments in currencies of the sanctioning economies (notably in US dollars) pushing smaller firms more strongly towards alternative currency arrangements.

4.9 Discussion

Overall, the analysis suggests that the imposition of trade sanctions on Russia was followed not only by rapid changes in the geography of trade flows (as documented, for instance, in Chupilkin et al. (2023b), Steinbach (2023)) but also by significant changes in the currency of invoicing. In broad terms, the use of US dollar as a (dominant) vehicle currency in Russia's imports has declined, while the use of producer currencies of neutral economies has become more widespread. Renminbi has become increasingly used as a vehicle currency.

The increases in the use of CNY were significantly more pronounced in the case of trade in industrial goods and dual-use technology goods covered by the trade sanctions imposed on Russia by Western economies; in the case of goods originating in sanctioning economies or traded under Western trademarks and in the case of Russia's trading partners that have established swap lines with the PBOC.

The results are consistent with the use of trade sanctions gradually weakening the exorbitant privilege enjoyed by the US dollar and leading to the fragmentation of international payment systems, with the emergence of alternative global currencies such as CNY.

4.10 Robustness checks

We conduct a number of robustness checks. First, we repeat the analysis of the choice of invoicing currency and CNY swap lines, looking at the countries of origin of exports rather than trading countries. This acts as a semi-placebo test: whether a country of origin has a swap line with China should not matter for the analysis, except to the extent that countries of origin and trading countries often coincide (in around 40 percent of cases). The respective coefficients are indeed close to zero and not statistically significant, as reported in Annex Table A3.

Throughout the analysis, the shares of each currency of invoicing were calculated using volumes of trade in a given month. The results are similar if the shares are calculated by the number of transactions using a given currency of invoicing in a given month (see Table 4 Columns 2 and 4 showing an example for swap line analysis and Annex Table A4 looking at bilateral China-Russia trade in sanctioned and non-sanctioned goods).

We also look at differential patterns in invoicing of sanctioned and non-sanctioned goods in bilateral monthly trade between China and Russia in a difference-in-difference setting, mirroring the general exercise and dropping the distinction between intermediated and neutral trade. In this case trade shares are calculated by product-month irrespective of whether trade involves Western trademarks or countries of origin. We find that the share of industrial and dual-use goods invoiced in CNY increased by an extra 6-8 percentage points after the invasion of Ukraine relative to what could be expected otherwise. These estimates are qualitatively similar to those obtained for neutral economies in general (see Annex Table A4).

Baseline regressions looking at the volume of trade invoiced in a given currency fail to pick up shifts on the extensive margin: the use of new currencies of invoicing under the sanctions regime that were previously not used in bilateral trade. To account for both the intensive margin (increased use of a currency) and the extensive margin, we use the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the values of trade, $\log(x + \sqrt{x^2 + 1})$ (see MacKinnon and Magee (1990)). The results are qualitatively similar.

5 Conclusions

Using transaction-level data on Russia's international trade, we document a number of striking patterns with respect to the choice of currency of invoicing in the aftermath of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The share of Russia's imports denominated in renminbi increased by 17 percentage points. The use of renminbi as a vehicle currency increased by an extra 4 percentage points, on average, for trading

partners that have an active renminbi swap line. This effect, however, is present only for third countries that did not impose economic sanctions on Russia. The increase in CNY invoicing was more pronounced for trade in internationally sanctioned dual-use and industrial-capacity goods. And a number of Russian importing firms working with renminbi invoices has increased sharply, mirrored by a drop in numbers of firms dealing with USD and EUR invoicing, reflecting the rising fixed costs of clearing such payments under sanctions.

The analysis covers a relatively small part of international trade – bilateral transactions of the 11th largest economy in the world. At the same time, by revealing rapid shifts in the choice of currency of invoicing in response to trade and financial sanctions imposed on Russia, the paper invites further research into ways in which the use of major international currencies responds to sanctions.

It also illustrates a broader point: rising geopolitical tensions in general, and the use of trade sanctions in particular, may reduce the attractiveness of the use of US dollar as a vehicle currency in international trade and facilitate the rise of new international currencies as well as greater use of producer or importer currency to settle trades. This, in turn, might lead to a greater fragmentation of global payment systems.

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
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Figure 1: Russia’s imports: Transaction-level data, Russia’s aggregate statistics and mirror aggregate statistics




Source: Authors’ calculations based on Russia customs data and UN Comtrade.
 Note: Aggregate imports as reported in the transaction-level dataset and UN Comtrade. Mirror data refers to exports to Russia as reported by trading partners excluding the members of the Eurasian Economic Union. Transaction-level data are aggregated bottom-up from customs dataset.

Figure 2: Share and volume of import transactions, by currency of invoicing




Source: Authors' calculations.
 Note: The shares and volumes are calculated by month, by number of transactions.

Figure 3: Share of selected producer currencies of invoicing in Russia's bilateral imports




Source: Authors' calculations.
 Note: The shares are calculated using bilateral imports in question, by month.

Figure 4: Russia’s imports from China, by type of goods and currency of invoicing



Source: Russia customs data and authors’ calculations.
 Note: Sanctioned goods refer to EU sanctions that apply at least partially to a given HS6 code.


Figure 5: Event study estimates



Source: Authors’ calculations.

Note: The plots show regression coefficients on interaction terms between China dummy and dummy variables for each month. Linear regressions of the share of Russia’s imports in bilateral trade in a given month denominated in producer currency and in USD, respectively, on month and country fixed effects. 95 percent confidence intervals are based on standard errors clustered two-way.

Figure 6: Number of importers dealing with invoicing in each currency



Source: Russia customs data and authors’ calculations.

Note: Importers are identified by their unique tax id.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics

<i>Variables</i>	Mean	Median	St. dev.	Min	Max
Producer currency share, by volume	0.13	0.00	0.28	0.00	1.00
Local currency share, by volume	0.13	0.00	0.24	0.00	1.00
USD currency share, by volume	0.61	0.79	0.40	0.00	1.00
EUR currency share, by volume	0.24	0.05	0.33	0.00	1.00
CNY currency share, by volume	0.005	0.00	0.04	0.00	1.00
Producer currency share, by frequency	0.14	0.00	0.29	0.00	1.00
Local currency share, by frequency	0.12	0.00	0.23	0.00	1.00
USD currency share, by frequency	0.60	0.77	0.40	0.00	1.00
EUR currency share, by frequency	0.26	0.07	0.34	0.00	1.00
CNY currency share, by frequency	0.004	0.00	0.03	0.00	1.00
Producer currency trade volume, log	15.41	16.26	3.64	0.72	22.23
Local currency trade volume, log	15.56	15.98	2.99	-0.02	21.48
USD currency trade volume, log	14.91	15.45	3.32	0.86	21.94
EUR currency trade volume, log	14.77	14.84	3.19	0.59	21.76
CNY currency trade volume, log	12.95	12.52	2.87	-0.12	22.23

Source: Authors' calculations based on customs data.

Note: Shares are calculated based on bilateral imports in a given month in a given currency of invoicing over the period Jan 2016-Dec 2022.

Table 2: Choice of currency of invoicing: Producer and local currency

<i>Currency</i> <i>Dep. var.: Share or volume of trade</i> <i>invoiced in a producer or local currency</i>	1	2	3	4
	Producer currency Share	Log trade	Local currency Share	Log trade
Sanctions * China	0.285*** (0.0134)	2.461*** (0.728)	-0.00451 (0.00993)	0.450 (0.271)
Sanctions * India	0.0329*** (0.00986)	1.740** (0.718)	-0.0221* (0.0118)	-0.0506 (0.275)
Sanctions * UAE	0.0156** (0.00782)	4.637*** (0.688)	-0.0425*** (0.00870)	0.0252 (0.213)
Sanctions * Turkiye	0.00105 (0.00447)	2.128*** (0.701)	0.0160 (0.00993)	1.043*** (0.260)
Sanctions * CCA + Belarus + Moldova	0.00691 (0.00699)	1.742 (1.262)	0.0714* (0.0423)	1.729*** (0.614)
Sanctions * Not condemning	0.00175 (0.00429)	1.372 (1.000)	-0.0104 (0.0101)	1.041 (0.672)
Sanctions * Sanctioning			-0.00697 (0.0234)	-1.394*** (0.363)
Sanctions * USD producers	-0.0233 (0.0453)	0.999 (0.827)		
Sanctions * EUR producers	0.0440 (0.0296)	0.277 (0.754)		
Sanctions * Other sanctioning	0.0179* (0.00980)	-0.277 (0.823)		
Observations	12,593	4,583	12,593	6,050
R^2	0.925	0.890	0.741	0.864

Source: Authors' calculations.

Note: Standard errors are clustered two-way on exporters and months. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All regressions include month and country fixed effects. The dependent variable is the share of transactions (by volume) invoiced in producer currency (or local currency, RUB, as stated) in all transactions in a given month with a given group of trading partners, or the logarithm of bilateral monthly trade denominated in a given currency. Other sanctioning economies exclude EUR or USD producer currency economies included separately, as shown. Sanctions refers to the time period when international sanctions were in place.

Table 3: Choice of currency of invoicing: Vehicle currencies

<i>Currency</i>	1	2	3	4
<i>Dep. var.: Share or volume of trade invoiced in a currency</i>	Share	Log trade	Share	Log trade
Sanctions * China	-0.293*** (0.0313)	0.328** (0.140)	0.0280 (0.0200)	1.220*** (0.172)
Sanctions * India	-0.0609*** (0.0209)	0.323** (0.131)	0.0664*** (0.0198)	1.025*** (0.163)
Sanctions * UAE	-0.0106 (0.0226)	0.951*** (0.123)	0.0523** (0.0216)	1.288*** (0.205)
Sanctions * Turkiye	-0.0777*** (0.0266)	0.959*** (0.134)	0.0748*** (0.0218)	1.372*** (0.212)
Sanctions * CCA + Belarus + Moldova	-0.177*** (0.0592)	0.972*** (0.326)	0.0881** (0.0360)	1.912*** (0.623)
Sanctions * Not condemning	-0.0667** (0.0313)	0.298 (0.271)	0.0620* (0.0328)	0.105 (0.347)
Sanctions * USD producers	-0.0227 (0.0483)	0.301 (0.415)		
Sanctions * EUR producers			0.0651* (0.0368)	-0.330* (0.190)
Sanctions * Other sanctioning	-0.00805 (0.0304)	-0.727*** (0.238)	-0.000353 (0.0284)	-0.725*** (0.215)
Observations	12,593	11,698	12,593	8,816
R^2	0.749	0.872	0.696	0.868

Source: Authors' calculations.

Note: Standard errors are clustered two-way on exporters and months. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All regressions include month and country fixed effects. The dependent variable is the share of transactions (by volume, unless otherwise specified) invoiced in the specified currency in all transactions in a given month with a given group of trading partners, or the logarithm of bilateral monthly trade denominated in a specified currency. Other sanctioning economies exclude EUR or USD producer currency economies included separately, as shown. Sanctions refers to the time period when international sanctions were in place.

Table 4: Invoicing in CNY: The role of swap lines

<i>Dep. var.: Share or volume of trade invoiced in CNY</i>	1	2	3	4
	Share of volume	Share of transactions	Share of volume	Share of transactions
Swap line	0.0128 (0.00929)	0.00937 (0.00614)	0.0147 (0.0108)	0.0105 (0.00678)
Sanctions * Swap line	0.0176** (0.00673)	0.0160** (0.00687)	0.0434*** (0.0152)	0.0385*** (0.0145)
Sanctions * Sanctioning			0.00262 (0.00567)	0.00268 (0.00699)
Swap line * Sanctioning			-0.0132 (0.0109)	-0.00901 (0.00706)
Sanctions * Swap line * Sanctioning			-0.0453*** (0.0166)	-0.0398** (0.0160)
Sanctions * China	0.282*** (0.0178)	0.265*** (0.0172)	0.283*** (0.0220)	0.266*** (0.0191)
Observations	12,588	12,588	12,588	12,588
R^2	0.465	0.439	0.476	0.452

Source: Authors' calculations.

Note: Standard errors are clustered two-way on exporters and months. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All regressions include month and country fixed effects. The dependent variable is the share of transactions, by volume (or the logarithm of the volume of bilateral monthly trade) invoiced in CNY in a given month with a given group of trading partners. Sanctioning refers to 45 economies with sanctions on Russia, neutral are the rest. Sanctions refers to the time period when international sanctions were in place.

Table 5: The role of trade sanctions: Currency choice in intermediated vs. neutral trade

<i>Dep. var.: Share of trade invoiced in the currency shown</i>	1 Producer	2 CNY producer	3 CNY vehicle	4 USD vehicle	5 EUR vehicle	6 RUB
Intermediated * Sanctions	0.0286*** (0.00229)	0.0457*** (0.00588)	0.00282 (0.00218)	-0.0417*** (0.00402)	0.0160*** (0.00320)	-0.00354** (0.00171)
Observations	598,112	200,914	397,198	591,314	591,512	598,112
R^2	0.831	0.728	0.691	0.798	0.835	0.736

Source: Authors' calculations.

Note: Standard errors are clustered on product groups. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The dependent variable is the share of transactions, by volume in bilateral monthly trade in a certain product group, either of intermediated type or neutral type, invoiced in a given currency. Neutral exporting countries only. Intermediated trade involves goods originating in a sanctioning economy or traded under a Western trademark. All regressions include month-country-trade type and product-country-trade type fixed effects. Goods under sanctions are those where EU sanction apply at least partially, from the month following the adoption of the relevant package of EU sanctions. The three categories shown are mutually exclusive and cover all goods under EU sanctions.

Table 6: The role of trade sanctions: Currency choice by type of sanctioned goods

<i>Dep. var.: Share of trade invoiced in the currency shown</i>	1 Producer	2 CNY producer	3 CNY vehicle	4 USD vehicle	5 EUR vehicle	6 RUB
Sanctions * Dual-use	0.0180*** (0.00195)	0.0607*** (0.00612)	0.0199*** (0.00193)	-0.0223*** (0.00361)	-0.00493* (0.00272)	-0.00454*** (0.00146)
Sanctions * Industrial	0.0209*** (0.00375)	0.0660*** (0.0111)	0.0147*** (0.00333)	-0.0271*** (0.00633)	0.000315 (0.00480)	-0.00361 (0.00287)
Sanctions * Luxury	-0.0235*** (0.00233)	-0.0455*** (0.00771)	-0.0121*** (0.00218)	0.0282*** (0.00411)	0.0321*** (0.00388)	-0.0276*** (0.00253)
Observations	1,435,529	340,566	1,094,963	1,407,706	1,401,883	1,435,529
R^2	0.724	0.393	0.383	0.644	0.694	0.566

Source: Authors' calculations.

Note: Standard errors are clustered on product groups. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The dependent variable is the share of transactions, by volume in bilateral monthly trade in a certain product group, either of intermediated type or neutral type, invoiced in a given currency. Neutral exporting countries only. Intermediated trade involves goods originating in a sanctioning economy or traded under a Western trademark. All regressions include month-country-trade type and product-country-trade type fixed effects. Goods under sanctions are those where EU sanction apply at least partially, from the month following the adoption of the relevant package of EU sanctions. The three categories shown are mutually exclusive and cover all goods under EU sanctions.

Annex

Table A1: Country groups based on sanctions and UN voting

Sanctioning	Neutral Condemned the invasion at the UN	Neutral Did not condemn
Albania	Afghanistan	Mexico
Australia	Andorra	Micronesia
Austria	Antigua and Barbuda	Moldova
Belgium	Argentina	Myanmar
Bulgaria	Bahamas	Nauru
Canada	Bahrain	Nepal
Croatia	Barbados	Niger
Cyprus	Belize	Nigeria
Czech Republic	Benin	Oman
Denmark	Bhutan	Palau
Estonia	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Panama
Finland	Botswana	Papua New Guinea
France	Brunei	Paraguay
Germany	Cambodia	Peru
Greece	Cape Verde	Philippines
Hungary	Chad	Qatar
Iceland	Chile	Rwanda
Ireland	Colombia	Saint Kitts and Nevis
Italy	Comoros	Saint Lucia
Japan	Costa Rica	Saint Vincent
Latvia	Côte d'Ivoire	Samoa
Liechtenstein	Djibouti	San Marino
Lithuania	Dominica	São Tomé and Príncipe
Luxembourg	Dominican Republic	Saudi Arabia
Malta	DR Congo	Serbia
Monaco	Ecuador	Seychelles
Montenegro	Egypt	Sierra Leone
Netherlands	Fiji	Solomon Islands
New Zealand	Gambia	Somalia
North Macedonia	Gabon	Suriname
Norway	Georgia	Thailand
Poland	Ghana	Timor-Leste
Portugal	Grenada	Tonga
Romania	Guatemala	Trinidad and Tobago
Singapore	Guyana	Tunisia
Slovakia	Haiti	Turkey
Slovenia	Honduras	Tuvalu
South Korea	Indonesia	United Arab Emirates
Spain	Israel	Uruguay
Sweden	Jamaica	Vanuatu
Switzerland	Jordan	Yemen
Taipei China	Kenya	Zambia
Ukraine	Kiribati	
United Kingdom	Kuwait	
United States	Lebanon	
	Lesotho	
	Liberia	
	Libya	
	Malawi	
	Malaysia	
	Maldives	
	Marshall Islands	
	Mauritania	
	Mauritius	
		Abstained
		Algeria
		Angola
		Armenia
		Bangladesh
		Bolivia
		Burundi
		Central African Republic
		China
		Congo
		Cuba
		El Salvador
		Equatorial Guinea
		India
		Iran
		Iraq
		Kazakhstan
		Kyrgyzstan
		Laos
		Madagascar
		Mali
		Mongolia
		Mozambique
		Namibia
		Nicaragua
		Pakistan
		Senegal
		South Africa
		South Sudan
		Sri Lanka
		Sudan
		Tajikistan
		Tanzania
		Uganda
		Vietnam
		Zimbabwe
		Absent
		Azerbaijan
		Burkina Faso
		Cameroon
		Ethiopia
		Eswatini
		Guinea
		Guinea-Bissau
		Morocco
		Togo
		Turkmenistan
		Uzbekistan
		Venezuela
		Voted with Russia
		Belarus
		Eritrea
		North Korea
		Syria

Source: Authors based on United Nations General Assembly Resolution ES-11/1 adopted on 2 March 2022 and sanctions lists.

Table A2: CNY swap lines

Sanctioning economies					
Country	Date	Amount	Country	Date	Amount
South Korea	20.04.2009	180-400	Iceland	9.06.2010	3.5
Singapore	23.07.2010	150-300	New Zealand	18.04.2011	25
United Kingdom	22.06.2013	350	Australia	22.03.2012	200
ECB	08.10.2013	350	Hungary	09.09.2013	10-40
Canada	8.11.2014	200	Albania	12.09.2013	2
Switzerland	21.07.2014-21.07.2020	350	Ukraine	26.06.2012-10.12.2021	15
Japan	26.10.2018	200			
Neutral economies					
Country	Date	Amount	Country	Date	Amount
Hong Kong SAR	20.01.2009	200-500	Malaysia	08.02.2009	80-180
Argentina	02.04.2009	70-130	Belarus	11.03.2009	7-20
Indonesia	23.03.2009	100-250	Mongolia	06.05.2011	5-15
Kazakhstan	13.06.2011	7	Uzbekistan	19.04.2011-19.04.2014	0.7
Pakistan	23.12.2011	10-30	Thailand	22.12.2011	70
UAE	17.01.2012-14.12.2018	35	Turkiye	21.02.2012	10-35
Qatar	03.11.2014	35	Brazil	26.03.2013-26.03.2016	190
Sri Lanka	16.09.2014	10	Armenia	25.03.2015-25.03.2018	1
Chile	25.05.2015	22-50	South Africa	10.04.2015	30
Tajikistan	03.09.2015-03.09.2018	3	Morocco	11.05.2016-11.05.2019	10
Serbia	17.06.2016-17.06.2019	1.5	Egypt	06.12.2016	18
Nigeria	03.05.2018	15	Macau SAR	05.12.2019	30
Laos	20.05.2020	6			
Country	Date	Amount			
Russia	13.10.2014	150			

Source: Authors based on Bahaj and Reis (2020) and People's Bank of China.

Note: As of end-2022; amounts in CNY billion. If end date is not specified, the line is ongoing. In regression analysis ECB swap line is applied to Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Spain.

Table A3: Swap lines and the currency of invoicing: Country of origin view (semi-placebo)

	1	2	3	4
<i>Sample split</i>		Swap lines		Swap lines and sanctioning vs neutral
<i>Dep. var.: Share or volume of trade invoiced in CNY</i>	By volume	By number	By volume	By number
Swap line	-0.00164 (0.00224)	-0.000544 (0.00135)	-0.00270 (0.00186)	-0.00228 (0.00189)
Sanctions * Swap line	-0.00416 (0.00604)	0.000447 (0.00695)	0.00131 (0.0102)	0.00830 (0.0128)
Sanctions * Sanctioning			-0.00141 (0.00920)	0.00154 (0.00810)
Swap line * Sanctioning			0.00276 (0.00695)	0.00578 (0.00383)
Sanctions * Swap line * Sanctioning			-0.00844 (0.0136)	-0.0149 (0.0148)
Post-war x China	0.240*** (0.0125)	0.230*** (0.00703)	0.240*** (0.0147)	0.230*** (0.0101)
Observations	15,214	15,215	15,214	15,215
R^2	0.205	0.196	0.205	0.196

Source: Authors' calculations.

Note: Standard errors are clustered two-way on exporters and months. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All regressions include month and country fixed effects. The dependent variable is the share of transactions, by volume (or the logarithm of the volume of bilateral monthly trade) invoiced in CNY in a given month with a given group of trading partners. Trading partners are defined by the record of the country of origin instead of the record of trading firm in each transaction-level record.

Table A4: Invoicing in CNY: Sanctioned vs other goods, China-Russia trade

<i>Currency</i> <i>Dep. var.: Share of trade invoiced in CNY</i>	1	2	3	4
	Sanctioned or not		Sanctioned, by type	
	By volume	By number	By volume	By number
Goods under sanctions	0.0318*** (0.00592)	0.0283*** (0.00556)		
Dual-use goods			0.0624*** (0.00687)	0.0721*** (0.00597)
Industrial goods			0.0669*** (0.0122)	0.0725*** (0.0107)
Luxury goods			-0.0512*** (0.00890)	-0.0860*** (0.00903)
Observations	240,753	240,798	240,753	240,798
R^2	0.389	0.425	0.391	0.429

Source: Authors' calculations.

Note: Standard errors are clustered on product groups. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All regressions include month and HS6 fixed effects. The dependent variable is the share of transactions, by volume (or by number of transactions) invoiced in CNY in a given month for a given HS6 product line. Goods under sanctions goods are those where EU sanctions apply at least partially, from the month following the adoption of the relevant package of EU sanctions. The three categories shown are mutually exclusive and cover all goods under EU sanctions.


Table A5: Firm-level analysis: China-Russia trade

<i>Variables</i>	CNY	USD	EUR	RUB
Sanctions * Firm size, log	-0.00993*** (0.00380)	0.0124*** (0.00370)	0.000125 (0.000564)	-0.00261* (0.00133)
Sanctions * State-owned	0.0305 (0.0866)	-0.0282 (0.0871)	-0.0233 (0.0143)	0.0130 (0.00847)
Sanctions * Systemic firm	-0.0378 (0.0311)	0.0372 (0.0299)	-0.000890 (0.00380)	0.00219 (0.00587)
Sanctions * New firm	-0.00638 (0.0114)	0.0120 (0.0120)	-0.0000790 (0.00101)	-0.00539 (0.00364)
New firm	0.0109** (0.00459)	-0.0109** (0.00465)	-0.0000982 (0.000678)	0.000297 (0.00175)
Observations	4,291,415	4,291,415	4,291,415	4,291,415
R^2	0.788	0.798	0.814	0.837

Source: Authors' calculations.


Note: Standard errors are clustered on firms. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The dependent variable is the share of imports invoiced in a given currency, observation is bilateral monthly imports at the HS6 level by a given firm, differentiating between intermediated and neutral trade. Intermediated trade involves neutral exporting economy and either goods originating in a sanctioning economy or traded under Western trademark. The sample comprises transactions with China as exporter. All regressions include product-trade type-month and product-trade type-firm fixed effects.

Figure A1: Top 20 trading partners where Russia’s imports were invoiced in CNY in 2022




Source: Authors’ calculations based on customs data.
 Note: Based on volume of transactions, restricted to the economies with trade invoiced in CNY of at least US\$ 1 million equivalent in 2022.

Figure A2: Shares of vehicle currencies in Russia’s imports using vehicle currencies




Source: Authors’ calculations based on customs data.
 Note: Based on volume of transactions, by month, excluding transactions where local currency or producer currency is used.

Figure A3: Share of importers with trade invoiced in more than one currency




Source: Russia customs data and authors’ calculations.
 Note: Importers are identified by their unique tax id. A share of importing firms that dealt with invoices in a single currency in a given month, two currencies, three currencies and 4 or more currencies.

Figure A4: Number of new importers dealing with invoicing in each currency




Source: Russia customs data and authors’ calculations.
 Note: Importers are identified by their unique tax id. A new firm is one that has not conducted import operations in the preceding 12 months.

Figure A5: Share of import transactions, by currency of invoicing



Source: Authors’ calculations.
 Note: The shares and volumes are calculated by month, by number of transactions.

Figure A6: Combined effect of PBOC swap lines and trade sanctions: Event study estimates



Source: Authors' calculations.
 Note: The plots show regression coefficients on interaction terms between dummy variables for sanctioning (left) or non-sanctioning (right) economy with a PBOC swap line dummy and dummy variables for each month. Linear regressions of the share of Russia's imports in bilateral trade in a given month denominated in CNY on month and country fixed effects. 95 percent confidence intervals are based on standard errors clustered two-way.