LECTURE ONE: "PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY ILLUSTRATED"



The doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty is the dominant characteristic of the British Constitution. It dominates any account and explanation of the British Constitution and it furnishes a cluster of arguments when any constitutional reform is proposed; e.g. British membership of the European Economic Communities, or Legislative Devolution to Scotland or to Wales, or the introduction into our system of law of a Bill of Rights. It is characteristic in that it differentiates the British Constitution from many others in that, under many written constitutions, the legislature is subject to judicial review whereby legislation can be disqualified as invalid or unconstitutional by the ordinary courts or by a specially defined constitutional court by reference to standards or values embodied in the written constitution, normally protected from change by the requirement of a qualified, rather than a simple, majority and thus having the character of "fundamental law". The American legal system is, perhaps, the clearest and most familiar example.



Despite its importance, commentators have struggled over the years to catch the full import of the doctrine in a concise and precise formula. Part of the reason for this is that the term "sovereignty" bestrides several different disciplines. Thus the concept is relevant not only to a study of English Law but also to International Law and to International Relations where the concept of "State Sovereignty" is widely discussed; to Politics, Political Science, to Political Philosophy and to History.



For example, the debates surrounding British application to join the European Economic Communities were much confused by running together questions of Parliamentary Sovereignty and State Sovereignty and commentators on Constitutional Law not infrequently slip from the proposition that Parliament is legally sovereign to the proposition that it is absolutely sovereign(1).



There have been many attempts in the literature to capture the essence of the doctrine in one apposite phrase. Some carry a self-conscious air of paradox such as the proposition that Parliament can do anything except bind its successors.(2) The notion that Parliament can do anything except bind it successors is simultaneously an assertion and a denial of its omnipotence and in any event there are reasons to suppose that Parliament can indeed bind its successors at least as to the form of legislation as we shall see.



Some formulations are plain silly. For example, de Lolme's widely quoted remark that Parliament can do anything but change men into women and women into men on which Jennings comments that "... like many of the remarks which de Lolme made, it is wrong for if Parliament enacted that all men should be women they would be women so far as the law is concerned". Furthermore, by the Interpretation Act, 1889 words of the masculine gender import words of the feminine and vice versa and by the Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, Parliament attempted and perhaps has even partially succeeded in assimilating men and women, at least for some purposes.



It is generally accepted, however, that the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty means that there are no legal limits upon the legislative competence of Parliament. This, in turn, is usually understood to entail a positive and a negative aspect of the doctrine: Positively, the doctrine implies that Parliament can legislate on any matter whatsoever and in any way whatsoever irrespective of how morally obnoxious, politically inexpedient, inefficacious, or socially divisive that legislation might appear to some. Negatively, the doctrine implies that there is no other legal authority competent to legislate for Britain in competition with Parliament and no legal authority with power to impose legal limits upon Parliament or to subject its legislation to scrutiny with a view to disqualifying it as unconstitutional or invalid. And this generally accepted view is wholly in accord with Dicey's statement that Parliament has "under the English constitution the right to make or unmake any law whatever and further that no person or body is recognised by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament" [pp 39-40].

"Today's Text":"Parliament may remodel the British Constitution, prolong its own life, legislate ex post facto, legalise illegalities, provide for individual cases, interfere with contracts, give dictatorial power to the Government, dissolve the United Kingdom or the British Commonwealth, introduce communism or socialism or individualism or fascism, entirely without legal interference" (as Jennings wrote). So let us see how accurate this assessment is.



The very nature of the United Kingdom itself has been created and modified by Acts of Parliament, eg Union with Scotland Act 1707; Union with Ireland Act 1800



The extent of the United Kingdom has been modified by Acts of Parliament, eg the Ireland Act 1949 belatedly recognised the republican status of Southern Ireland and its cessation from being part of the Crown's dominions.



It seems that Partliament can even "entrench" sections of Acts in order to protect them from subsequent change: e.g. the Act of Union, 1707 contains several apparent limitations upon subsequent legislation, including Art. 18: "... no alteration be made in laws which concern private right except for the evident utility of the people of Scotland" and other Articles expressly preserve the Scottish Church, Education, and Legal System. Plainly, As Dicey put it, "...the statesmen of 1707, though giving full sovereign power to the Parliament of Great Britain, clearly believed in the possibility of creating an absolutely sovereign legislature which should yet be bound by unalterable laws. From one point of view, which is clearly realised by most modern jurists, the attempt to limit absolutely sovereign power involves something like a contradiction of ideas. [Thoughts on The Union of England and Scotland (1920) p 252] Dicey, however, understood the point: "A sovereign parliament, in short, though it cannot be logically bound to abstain from changing any given law, may, by the fact that an Act when it was passed had been declared to be unchangeable, receive a warning that it cannot be changed without grave danger to the Constitution of the country" [253-4].



Another example: The Northern Ireland Constitutions Act, 1973, s.1 provides that Northern Ireland shall not cease to be part of the United Kingdom without the consent of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland voting in a "border-poll". And it is a nice question, as we shall subsequently see, whether Parliament could validly pass such legislation without recourse to such a referendum.



But, apparently, notwithstanding such clauses, Parliamnet can disregard and indeed has disregarded just such prohibitions in subsequent legislation; e.g. The Universities (Scotland) Act, 1853 abolished the requirement that professors in the ancient Scottish Universities should be confessing members of the Church of Scotland, thereby repealing the unalterable provisions of the Act of Union securing the Presbyterian Church of Scotland. Examples can be multiplied.



There is no doubt that Parliament can (and does) regard itself as being able to pass legislation stating on its face to be binding in all times coming, e.g. The John F Kennedy Memorial Act, 1964 which is an "Act to vest in the United States of America a site at Runnymede forming part of the Crown Estate to be preserved in perpetuity in memory of the late President John F Kennedy for the use and enjoyment of the public ..."(3)



The fact that Parliament can and has enacted legislation with such protected clauses and the circumstance that it has also repealed or amended such legislation raises the difficult question of whether Parliament can bind its successors, a question which I will consider later, under the fifth formulation of the doctrine.



Parliament can and has enacted that British territories be ceded to a foreign government, e.g. Anglo-German Agreement Act, 1890, re Heligoland. And it can and has enacted that territories, not hitherto part of Britain, be included, e.g. Island of Rockall Act, 1972 (partly because of the availability of sub-acquatic manganese nodules).



Parliament has enacted legislation wholly transforming the nature of the British Empire:-

(a) Nowadays when independence is conferred, it is usually the case that the relevant Act includes a section providing that no future Act of the UK Parliament shall extend, or be deemed to extend, to the newly independent country as part of its law, e.g. Kenya Independence Act, 1963, s.1; Mauritius Act, 1968, s.1(2):- "No Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom passed on or after the appointed day shall extend or be deemed to extend to Mauritius as part of its law". Further examples included the Zimbabwe Act, 1979 s.1(2), the Kiribati Act, 1979 a. 1(2), and the Canada Act, 1982, ss. 1 & 2: "No Act of the United Kingdom Parliament passed after the Constitution Act comes into force shall extend to Canada as part of its law".

(b) Earlier legislation, at least in principle, maintained the possibility of the UK Parliament legislating for former colonies granted their independence by Britain, e.g. the Statute of Westminster, 1931, s.4 provided that no Act was to extend or be deemed to extend to the dominion as part of its law unless the request and consent of that Dominion were expressly declared in the Act.

(c) Still earlier legislation, and notably the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, retained a residual power in the imperial Parliament to legislate for a colony, even without that colony's request and consent, provided under s.1 that it was made applicable "by the express words or necessary intendment" and s.2 of the Act provides that any colonial legislation repugnant to such an Imperial Act is void and inoperative.



Even in the twentieth century Parliament can and sometimes does retain wholly to itself power to legislate for a territory even if it also establishes a legislature within such a territory, e.g. The Government of Ireland Act, 1920 which created a legislature and executive for Northern Ireland did not curtail the Westminster Parliament's continuing legislative authority over Northern Ireland and s.75 expressly provided that the power of Parliament was undiminished in respect of Northern Ireland.



The proposals for the establishment of a legislative assembly for Scotland in Edinburgh which were ultimately contained in the subsequently repealed Scotland Act, 1978, likewise preserved a general legislative power in the UK Parliament to pass laws for Scotland. And the new Scotland Act 1998 which (at section 28) empowers the Scottish Parliament to make laws, "to be known as Acts of the Scottish Parliament", subject to reservation in section 29 also preserves the sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament insofar as by section 28(7) the empowering section

"does not affect the power of the Parliament of the United Kingdom to make laws for Scotland". Indeed, by section 37, "The Union with Scotland Act 1706 and the Union with England Act 1707 have effect subject to this Act". Accordingly, in the last resort, and especially in respect of constitutional matters such as the European Communities Act 1972, the Human Rights Act 1998, and the Scotland Act, 1998, itself, the Westminster Parliament remains sovereign.

Parliament can and has extended its own lifetime: in 1716 by 4 years; in 1911 to 8 years, despite the limitation enacted by the very same Parliament that Parliament should last for only 5 years; and the Parliament of 1935 extended its life to nearly 10 years.



Political rights to vote in Parliamentary elections have been the subject of legislation, significantly in Representation of the People Acts, 1832, 1867, 1884, 1918, 1928, 1948, 1949, 1969, 1974, 1976, 1979, 1980, etc. Parliament has redefined itself in the Parliament Acts, 1911 and 1949, the effect of which is radically to constrain the legislative power of the House of Lords.



Despite jurisprudential (e.g. Blackstone) and constitutional theories (e.g. Doctrine of the Separation of Powers) to the effect that Parliamentary legislation necessarily issues in general rules and that it is solely for the judiciary to apply these general, abstract rules to particular, concrete cases, Parliament can enact and has enacted legislation relating solely to one individual, e.g. The Honourable Lady Hylton-Foster's Annuity Act, 1965, s. 1(10:- "In consideration of the eminent service as speaker of the House of Commons of the Rt Hon Sir Harry Braustyn Hylton Hylton-Foster, there shall be paid to his widow, Audrey Pellew Hylton-Foster, commonly known as the honourable Lady Hylton-Foster an annuity of 1667 payable from 3rd September 1965 ...to continue during her life".



Again, prior to the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857, the only way in which an aggrieved party could obtain a divorce was by an individual Act of Parliament - NB Separation of Powers and the dual history of parliament as not only a legislature but as the highest court.(4)



The Defence of the Realm Acts, 1914-15 granted very extensive powers to the government of the day - the better to pursue the war effort - which, apparently, for all their width were not yet wide enough, for in 1920 the Indemnity Act and in 1925 the War Charges Validity Act in effect clothed with retrospective legality behaviour which at the time was contrary to law. The Enemy Property Act, 1953 was similarly retrospective.



In 1931 Parliament granted ex post facto legality to the refusal by the Bank of England to convert paper currency into gold - a refusal which at the time was as patently illegal as were the Cabinet instructions for it to do so. The Gold Standard (Amendment) Act 1931 [Royal Assent, 21st Sept, 1931] s. 1(1) repeals s.1(2) of the Gold Standard Act, 1925 and s. 1(2) provides :- "The Bank of England are hereby discharged from all liability in respect of anything done by the Bank in contravention of the provisions of the said subsection (2) [of the 1925 Act at any time after the 18th day of September, 1931 and no proceedings whatsoever shall be instituted against the bank or any other person in respect of anything so done as aforesaid".



In the same year [1931] Parliament authorised government to reduce salaries and, if necessary, to break contracts made by local authorities by passing the National Economy Act, 1931 which empowered the making of Orders in Council as appear expedient [S1(1)]concerning remuneration cuts to achieve economies in Education, National Health Insurance, Police, Unemployment Benefit, Roads; and [s 1(1)(d)] allows "modification or termination of statutory or contractual rights, obligations, or restrictions".



Retrospective legislation is a clear indication of the legal sovereignty of parliament. It is widely criticised as contrary to the Rule of Law [e.g. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, p 270] and retrospective criminal liability is contrary to Article 7 of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Some commentators have regarded such legislation as "impossible". Blackstone, for example, took the view that parliamentary legislation was necessarily prospective, because it is impossible to direct a man now to behave differently than he did then. As against which there is nothing impossible about visiting a sanction now on someone whose conduct was not known to attract such a sanction at the time it occurred. It is, however, obviously unfair.



If one defines law, as Lon Fuller does in his Morality of Law, as the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules, then retrospective legislation seems bizarre, pointless, and even perverse, and retrospective criminal legislation both crude and unfair. Fuller himself states that "It is the retrospective criminal statute that calls most directly to mind the brutal absurdity of commanding a man today to do something yesterday" [p 59]. Nonetheless one can readily conceive of circumstances in which retrospective legislation might be justified. Suppose a revolutionary or unlawful takeover such as the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Rhodesia on November 11, 1965 (Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke [1969 1 AC 645; Calvert, An Introduction to British Constitutional Law, pp 6-8). Suppose further that during the resultant period of illegality, marriages, contracts, and other private law transactions are entered into. Suppose still further that the unlawful regime is eventually replaced by a lawful regime, as under the Zimbabwe Act, 1979. For the avoidance of doubt, such re-establishment of a lawful regime might well include the passage of legislation retrospectively validating such private law transactions, thereby giving the force of law to acts which otherwise appear tainted with the general illegality of the unlawful regime. And even Fuller, though radically opposed to retrospective legislation agrees:- "It is when things go wrong that the retrospective statute often becomes indispensable as a curative measure; though the proper movement of law is forward in time, we sometimes have to stop and turn about to pick up the pieces" [p 53].



In the case of Southern Rhodesia/Zinbabwe, the Southern Rhodesia Act, 1979, S 3(1) provide for Her Majesty by Order in Council (a) [to] make provision for and in connection with the Government of Southern Rhodesia in the period up to the appointed day [and] (b) [to] make such provision in relation to Southern Rhodesia or person or things in any way belonging to Southern Rhodesia as appear to Her Majesty to be Necessary or expedient - (i) in consequence of any unconstitutional action taken therein.



This Act was followed by the Southern Rhodesia Constitution (Interim Provisions) Order SI 1571/1979 which by S. 4 provided that "The Governor may make laws for the peace order and good government of Southern Rhodesia including laws having extra territorial effect [and in particular for] the continuation with such adaptations, qualifications, exceptions and modifications as he may deem appropriate, of provisions purporting to have effect as law immediately before the appointed day". These powers were implemented in the Southern Rhodesia Constitution (Interim Provisions) Ordinance 1979 1/79 which by S.4 provided that "Subject to the provisions of the Constitution Order, this ordinance and any other ordinance made by the Governor, all laws in Southern Rhodesia immediately before the appointed day, which dare was the date the Governor assumed office ... shall have full force and effect as law on and after the appointed day ...". The effect of all this was that virtually all legislation, court decisions and private transactions occurring during the currency of the illegal regime were retrospectively clothed with legal validity. At best that was of very belated assistance to an English woman who on December 29, 1965 (i.e. shortly after UDI) married a man domiciled in Southern Rhodesia and who was granted a decree of divorce in the High Court of Rhodesia on April 9, 1970; and who, later wanted to remarry in England but found herself refused licence because the Registrar-General of Births, Deaths and Marriages would not recognise as valid her Rhodesian divorce. She petitioned the Court that her divorce should be recognised either on the basis of "necessity" or on the grounds that the judge who had granted it, though not an judge de jure was a judge de facto. The Attorney General intervened to oppose her contention and the Court dismissed her application, taking the view that it would be a constitutional anomaly to recognise as legally valid the judicial acts of a de facto judge whilst the executive acts of those appointing him are refused any recognition by the British government: Adams v Adams (A-G Intervening) [1971] P 18.



Whatever the justification of retrospective legislation may be, examples occur frequently enough to show that Parliament assumes the power so to enact legislation and the courts plainly have no authority under present constitutional arrangement to declare such statutes invalid or unconstitutional. Burma Oil Company v Lord Advocate [1965] AC 75 is one striking example. The House of Lords, acting judicially, held that the company was entitled at common law to compensation from the Government for the destruction of its oil installations in Burma in 1942, as part of a "scorched-earth" policy, to prevent the installations falling into the hands of the Japanese, the better to prosecute the war.



While the case was pending in the Court of Session in Scotland, the Treasury Solicitor has written to the company in the following terms: "I have been instructed to inform you that H M Government have carefully considered your action ... and have been advised that the claim in this action is wholly unfounded in law and that it is likely to be rejected by the courts [singularly ill-informed advice and a radically erroneous prediction !] H M Government are moreover satisfied that the claim made is not in any event one which ought to be met by the British Taxpayer. Her Majesty's Government have accordingly decided that in the unlikely event of your company succeeding, legislation would be introduced to indemnify the Crown ... If your company should decide to abandon its claim ... H M Government are prepared to consider the question of contributing towards the [legal] expenses which your company has incurred up to this date".



Burma Oil Company estimated its loss at 31 Million. The Government had put up 10 Million to cover all losses. Burma Oil Company had received 4.5 Million from this fund. An "independent" committee appointed by the Government had assessed the company's loss at 17 Million.

The company won its case in the House of Lords. The Government introduced the War Damages Act, 1965 which provided by S 1(1) that "No person shall be entitled at common law to receive from the Crown compensation in respect of damage to, or destruction of, property caused (whether before or after the passing of this Act within or outwith the United Kingdom)by acts lawfully done by or on the authority of the Crown during or in contemplation of the outbreak od a war in which the sovereign was, or is engaged". S 1(2) added that "where any proceedings to recover at common law compensation in respect of such damage or destruction have been instituted before this Act, the court shall, on the application of any party forthwith set aside or dismiss the proceedings subject only to the determination of any question arising as to costs or expenses".



Another example of retrospective legislation relates to the aftermath of Malloch v Aberdeen Corporation [1971] 2 All E R 1278. From 1965 a General teaching Council had been in existence. Regulations made under the Education (Scotland) Act, 1946, as amended in 1967, required that every teacher employed by an education authority be a member of that Council. Mr Malloch, a certificated teacher was entitled to be registered but he refused on principle, along with others, on the basis that he should not now be required to pay for a new qualification for a job he already had.



Aberdeen Education Authority were advised that it had no legal option but to dismiss him, which it did. Mr Malloch alleged that his dismissal, not allowing him an opportunity to present his case, was contrary to the principle of natural justice, audi alteram partem - "hear both sides" - and sought to be re-instated. The Court of Session did not agree and Mr Malloch appealed to the House of Lords which in the course of its judgment strongly hinted that the crucial regulations were ultra vires - i.e. beyond the powers granted by - the Act, and held that Mr Malloch's dismissal was in any event invalid as contrary to natural justice, because he had not been given a fair hearing.



Aberdeen Education Authority then proposed to hold a hearing to which Mr Malloch was invited in order to present his case for the purposes of deciding whether or not to dismiss him. Because his continued employment appeared unlawful under the Act and regulations, he reasonably anticipated that he would be dismissed whatever he might say at this hearing and he therefore pre-empted the hearing by petitioning the Court of Session for a declaration that the regulations were ultra vires, founding in part on the dicta of the House of Lords. The Lord Ordinary do held and on appeal by Aberdeen Corporation, the Inner House of the Court of Session also held that the crucial regulation was ultra vires but that Aberdeen Corporation could, as a reasonable policy, require all teachers it employed to be members of the General teaching Council, even though the effect was that qualified teachers who failed to acquire and pay for a new qualification - such as registration - could be dismissed.



Therefore it was not necessary for an employing authority to rely upon the regulation to exercise its power of dismissal for the failure of a teacher to register. An authority could dismiss as a matter of policy. Nonetheless it was, to say the least, embarrassing that a regulation under which many teachers had felt required to register had been declared invalid on grounds of vires by the highest civil court in Scotland and, albeit obiter, similarly discredited by the House of Lords. Thus the Education (Scotland) Act, 1973 reversed the holding of the Court of Session retrospectively from November 1, 1965.



The power to enact retrospective legislation encroached upon human rights, particular where the retrospective legislation is penal or taxative. Legislation which requires payment for a further qualification on pain of dismissal from one's employment is close to being penal or taxative. Therefore the Malloch example suggests that the power of parliament extends to legislating contrary to human rights. Indeed that is the sovereign objection to parliamentary sovereignty(5).

Those who insist upon the values compendiously referred to as the Rule of Law usually treat each of the (eight) desidera as a matter of degree, from which it follows that a deviation or even several deviations from the ideal (of non-retrospectivity)does not necessarily deprive a legal system of legitimacy. Yet the shock that such cases as Burma Oil and Malloch generate suggests that many see the ideal of non-retrospectivity as tending towards an absolute and certainly, if a government can easily and does frequently deviate from that ideal, its legitimacy much surely be questioned.



Returning to the catalogue of positive powers of parliament, mention should be made of the dramatic legislative changes after 1945 whereby several large and important industries were nationalised and an extensive social security system progressively established, heralding a mixed economy and a welfare state founded upon socialist principles. So much so that by the seventies sober social commentators such as Unger [Law in Modern Society (1976), pp 192-216, "The Disintegration of the Rule of Law in Postliberal Society"] or Babington [The Rule of Law in Britain (1978), Ch 24, "The Frailty of the Rule of Law"] thought that the Rule of Law was in terminal decline or at least seriously under threat although others, even from the left E P Thompson, Whigs and Hunters (1975) saw in "the notion of the rule of law ... an unqualified good" [267]; and as "a true and important cultural achievement ... of universal significance" [265]. By the mid-nineties, however, reactionary legislation has rolled back the apparatus of the welfare state and privatised many previously nationalised industries. It is clear, therefore that parliamentary legislation accompanies great social transformations but it is less clear whether such legislation, despite Jenning's confident assertion that it can "...introduce communism or socialism or individualism or fascism", is truly a transformative engine of change or merely a response to and a reflection of social, economic, political, and ideological change driven by some other mechanism.



One final illustration of the width of Parliament's power, not included in Jenning's already extensive list, relates to territorial competence; i.e. the spatial sphere of validity of legislation. The basic view is that parliament can make any law whatsoever for any part of the world - or the galaxy - and, of course, United Kingdom courts are under a legal obligation to apply such law. Jennings, himself, [at p170-1] gives the fanciful example that Parliament could make it a criminal offence for Frenchmen to smoke in the streets of Paris. This, he says, would only be regarded as an offence by those who pay attention to English law. Therefore the Paris police would not arrest and the French courts would not convict such Frenchmen, "But if any Frenchman came into any place where attention was paid to English law, proceedings might be taken against him".



Certainly criminal liability can attach to acts done by UK citizens in a foreign state; e.g. treason, murder, manslaughter, and bigamy. And we do not need an example as fanciful as that which Jennings offers because the Hijacking Act, 1971 attributes legal consequences to acts done by aliens in foreign countries. S 1(1) provides that "a person aboard an aircraft in flight who unlawfully by the use of threats of any kind seizes the aircraft or exercises control of it commits the crime of hijacking, whatever his nationality, whatever the State in which the aircraft is registered and whether the aircraft is in the United Kingdom or elsewhere", though the scope is qualified somewhat in s. 1(2). See, too, on extra-territoriality, The Herring Fisheries (Scotland) Act, 1889 and Mortensen v Peters 1906 8F 99 to which I will revert in the third lecture in this series. As those who have been following the fascinating series of cases involving general Pinochet(6) in the House of Lords may be aware, extra-territoriality characterises the Taking of Hostages Act 1982 and section 134(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988







ENDNOTES (preserved excisions from earlier versions)

1. Dicey, however, for all his attachment to the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty, properly distinguished between legal sovereignty which he saw as vested in Parliament and political sovereignty which he saw as residing in the electorate

2. A view associated with James Bryce, formerly Regius Professor of Civil Law at Oxford and a Fellow of Oriel College and described as "that awful Scotch [although born in Belfast] fellow [who out wrote everybody]".

3. JFK, "the most overrated U S President of the Century" according to Eric Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991 (London, 1994), p 243]

4. Manchester, Modern Legal History, pp373-378 and RHST would like to look at Hansard May 28, 1857 to see to what extent parliamentary sovereignty might have been constrained by religious doctrine

5. The Immigration Act, 1971 is a clear example in that it is contrary to the 4th Protocol of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which precludes a state fro, refusing to admit it own nationals. It is significant that the United Kingdom did not ratify this protocol. I will return to human rights issues and the matter of a Bill of Rights for Britain in the eighth lecture in this series.

6. R v Bartle, ex p Pinochet; R v Evans, ex p Pinochet House of Lords 25th November, 1998