Economic Torts – Lecture 3 |
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Roderick Bagshaw Magdalen College Michaelmas 2002 |
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Allen v Flood and Lord Herschell’s Chasm |
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a. Allen v. Flood and TAYLOR [1898] AC 1 |
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“ arguably the most important case in
the book.” (Weir, Casebook (9th ed.), p. 599) |
D threatens employer that Ironworkers will stop working unless Flood and Taylor are not re-engaged the next morning. Done. (NB 1 – no procuring of a breach) (NB 2 – no unlawful means used to persuade employer) ? Is it a tort to “maliciously induce termination of a contract, or
maliciously induce a party to refuse to enter a contract”? |
For background, RFV Heuston, “Judicial Prosopography” 102 LQR 90 |
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*** Lord Watson, at p. 92, |
“the law of England does not, according to my apprehension, take into account motive as constituting an element of civil wrong.” |
Cf,
Bradford v Pickles [1895]
AC 587 |
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*** Lord
Macnaghten, at p. 151, |
“I do not think that there is any foundation in good sense or in authority for the proposition that a person who suffers loss by reason of another doing or not doing some act which that other is entitled to do or abstain from doing at his own will and pleasure, whatever his real motive may be, has a remedy against a third person who, by persuasion or some other means not in itself unlawful, has brought about the act or omission from which the loss comes, even though it could be proved that such person was actuated by malice towards the plaintiff, and that his conduct if it could be inquired into was without justification or excuse.” |
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*** Lord
Herschell, |
“I can imagine no greater danger to the community than that a jury should be at liberty to impose the penalty of paying damages for acts which are otherwise lawful, because they choose, without any legal definition of the term, to say that they are malicious.” [NB i. a civil jury, ii. how civil juries were selected] |
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*** Weir, Economic Torts (1997),
at p. 77, |
“I do believe that in the economic sphere where some deliberate harm may unquestionably be caused, not just in self-defence as in the physical sphere but for self-aggrandisement, the common law should not, unless the law has itself outlawed the means used, impose liability; liberty of action should not be constrained by vaguer criteria, however inspiring their formulation.” |
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>b. The centrality of UNLAWFUL MEANS< |
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If unlawful means had been used by Allen to get Flood and Taylor not re-engaged he would have committed a tort. If the unlawful means used had been a threat of an unlawful act this would have been the tort of intimidation (three-party). |
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O g |
c. The Untaken Path: MALICE & Prima-Facie Tort |
g N |
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Phys: Wilkinson v Downton [1897] 2 QB 57, Wright J |
“The defendant has ... wilfully done an act calculated to cause physical harm to the plaintiff - that is to say, to infringe her legal right to personal safety, and has in fact thereby caused physical harm to her. That proposition without more appears to me to state a good cause of action, there being no justification alleged for the act.” |
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Economic: Mogul Steam’p (1889) 23 QBD 598, at p. 613 |
Bowen LJ, “Intentionally to do that which is calculated in the ordinary course of events to damage, and which does, in fact, damage another in that other person’s property or trade, is actionable if done without just cause or excuse.”(HL [1892] AC 25) |
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The case in favour of the
prima-facie tort doctrine |
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Academics |
OW Holmes, “Privilege, Malice and Intent” (1894) 8 Harv LR 1 |
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JD Heydon, (1975) 12 UWALR 1, 14, “The change would make the law much more capable of handling bad behaviour and abuse of rights and of power; much more flexible; and much more based on factors of substance rather than technicality.” |
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Cases in need… |
Tuttle v Buck (1909) 119 NW 946; Keeble v Hickeringill (1705) 11 East
573n |
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*** The case against the prima-facie
tort *** |
· The case against the prima-facie tort doctrine1. ‘without justification’ too vague and too difficult to define 2. onerous for trade rivals, protestors and trade unions to justify 3. “Disinterested malevolence is so rare that it is unwise to develop a rule to combat it which can be used by a disgruntled hairdresser who has lost his profitable local monopoly.” (Weir, Economic Torts, p. 73) |
Website: http://users.ox.ac. uk/~mans0322/ |
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d. The Taken Path: Interference
with Trade by Unlawful Means |
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Functions>> |
1. Filling Gaps 2. Ironing-out
Inconsistencies, Neatness |
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Wedderburn,
(1983) 46 MLR 224, economic torts - “a ramshackle construction for decades …
they have lacked their Atkin”. |
<<Risks |
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…it
exists |
Lonrho v Fayed [1990] 2
QB 479, Woolf LJ, at 493E, “The tort relied upon by Lonrho of unlawful
interference is still, in my view, of uncertain ambit, albeit that its
existence is now beyond doubt and certain of its features are clearly
defined.” Merkur Island Shipping v Laughton [1983] 2 AC 570, Lord Diplock, at 609, “the evidence also
establishes a prima facie case of the common law tort ... of interfering with
the trade or business of another person by doing unlawful acts. To fall
within this genus of torts the unlawful act need not involve procuring
another person to break a subsisting contract or to interfere with the
performance of a subsisting contract.” |
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Torts outside the genus: procuring a breach of contract (Lumley v. Gye); simple conspiracy (Quinn v. Leathem); Deceit (?); Injurious falsehood (?) - squeezing everything in: Sales
& Stilitz 115 LQR 411 (1999) |
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Points of uncertainty: Lonrho v Fayed, Ralph Gibson LJ, at 492, “first, the nature of the intention
which is required to satisfy the requirement that conduct be ‘directed
against’ the plaintiffs ...; secondly, the nature of the business interest by
reference to which the plaintiff must prove that he has been damaged;
thirdly, whether there is a sufficient nexus or directness of impact between
the unlawful means employed and the alleged loss causing effect upon the
plaintiffs; and, fourthly, whether the damage alleged is sufficient to support
the existence of a cause of action.” |
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Uncertainty
1 |
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i. State of Mind |
??? |
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‘aiming at’ or ‘directed against’ Falconer v NUR [1986]
IRLR 331 - ‘aiming at’ commuters? |
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Uncertainty
2 |
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ii. Trade |
??? |
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Merkur Island – payment
expected under contract Stratford v Lindley
[1965] AC 269 – chance of new contracts Lonrho v Fayed – chance
to bid for House of Fraser RCA v Pollard [1983] Ch
135 - bootleggers & the Chelsea burglar ‘Unjustified
business reputations’? |
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Uncertainty
3 |
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iii. Unlawful Means |
??? |
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Rookes v Barnard [1964]
AC 1129 – threats to break contracts Lonrho v Shell (No. 2)
[1982] AC 173 – breaking penal statutes Lonrho v Fayed – deceit
without loss to the person deceived |
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Solutions
to Uncertainty 3 |
Carty 104 LQR 250 (1988) - choose:
“all things one is not at liberty to do”, “all crimes & civil wrongs”
or “all civil wrongs”. |
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Elias &
Tettenborn [1981] CLJ 230, 232, “a criminal
provision should ground liability … unless there are clear reasons of policy
or in its interpretation why it should not.” |
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Why
3 persists?. |
The problem of R E L
A T I
V I T Y
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Website: http://users.ox.ac. uk/~mans0322/ |
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Defining what
is wrongful between D and C, with regard to D causing harm to C’s economic
interests - using what it is unlawful for D to do
vis-à-vis T |
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