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How expressivists can and should solve their problem with negation

Problem with negation

When we give an expressivist semantics for negation using the single primitive attitude 'disapproves of', there aren't enough places for the 'not' to go:

w	Jon thinks that murdering is wrong.	w*	Jon disapproves of murdering.
n1	Jon does not think that murdering is wrong.	n1*	Jon does not disapprove of murdering.
n2	Jon thinks that murdering is not wrong.	n2*	???
n3	Jon thinks that not murdering is wrong.	n3*	Jon disapproves of not murdering.

The standard response to this is to introduce an additional primitive attitude, 'tolerates', which cannot be defined in terms of 'disapproves' and of negation.

But then it must be stipulated that 'Jon tolerates murdering' and 'Jon disapproves of murdering' are inconsistent. We want to be able to explain this inconsistency.

Premises:

The form of an expressivist's explanation of the inconsistency of two sentences should be that they express inconsistent states of mind.

The form of an expressivist's explanation of the inconsistency of two states of minds should be that they are the same attitude toward inconsistent contents, and that the attitude is inconsistency-transmitting.

Conclusion:

An expressivist's explanation of the inconsistency of two sentences should be that they both express the same (inconsistency-transmitting) attitude towards inconsistent contents.

Horgan and Timmons do not explain inconsistency, rather they postulate a potentially infinite structure of attitudes which must be stipulated to be pairwise inconsistent when had to a content.

Gibbard also fails to explain why the attitudes in question are pairwise inconsistent, but also fails to provide a candidate n2*.

Dreier adds a primitive distinction between indifference and undecidedness to Gibbard's picture, but still fails to explain the inconsistency in the way Schroeder wants.

Schroeder's explanation

Schroeder proposes that the inconsistency of 'tolerates' and 'disapproves of' are that they should both be analysed in terms of a primitive 'is for' attitude, which is stipulated to be inconsistency-transmitting:

Jon tolerates murdering. -> Jon is for not blaming for murdering.

Jon disapproves of murdering. -> Jon is for blaming for murdering.