Anti-immigrant sentiment and populist right parties

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▶ Key terms and questions
▶ Attitudes to minorities
▶ Attitudes to immigrants
▶ Radical-Right parties
▶ Mainstream anti-immigrant sentiment mobilization
▶ Brexit, Trump and populism
▶ Conclusions
Key terms I

In no particular order:

▶ Ethnocentrism
  ▶ ‘a deep-seated psychological predisposition that partitions the world into ingroups and outgroups into “us” and “them.”’ (Kam and Kinder 2012)
  ▶ Measured for Kam and Kinder (2012) by tendency to have negative stereotypes of out-groups
  ▶ Measured by Hooghe and Quintellier (PolBehavior 2013) as a anti-immigrant sentiment

▶ Self-declared prejudice against people of different races

▶ Social distance:
  ▶ *How bothered would you be a close relative married a ...*

▶ Symbolic Racism (Sears and Henry 2002)
  ▶ *Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same?*
  ▶ *Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten more economically than they deserve?*
Key terms II

- Islamophobia
  - 55% of Britons think, “There is a fundamental clash between Islam and the values of British society” (YouGov, Nov 2015)
- Opinions on what ethnic minorities do or do not contribute to society, or the problems they may or may not cause.
- Policy preferences on asylum, immigration and minority integration, e.g. affirmative action.
Key questions: not all addressed in this lecture

- Is ethnocentrism an innate human trait?
- Are White natives in Western democracies becoming more tolerant of minorities and immigrants as a result of modernisation? (c.f. Dalton, Citizen Politics)
- What factors affect the dynamics of prejudice and anti-immigrant sentiment?
- Are immigration attitudes driven primarily by economic or cultural threat?
- Is radical/populist right voting mainly a function of anti-immigrant sentiment?
Measurement issues

- Social desirability bias
  - It is possible to overcome this to some extent with carefully designed survey experiments (e.g. Sniderman et al., APSR, 2004; Hainmueller and Hopkins, AnRevPolSci, 2014)

- Term immigration evokes images of particular kinds of immigrant, usually resulting in more negative responses

- As with other policy areas, public typically have poor knowledge of numbers involved
Attitudes to Racial Integration in USA. Dalton (Citizen Politics, 2014)

Support for racial integration is nearly universal today, but it was opposed by a majority of Americans until the 1960s.

Sources: Adapted from Smith and Sheatsley 1984, and updated from Schuman et al. 1997.

Note: Figure entries are the percentages favoring integration in each area.
Hostility to positive discrimination in the US seems to be the result of perceptions of unfairness (race-neutral values) rather than racism (Sniderman and Carmines, 1997).

However, Banks and Valentino (AJPS 2012) argue that “anger [rather than disgust or fear] is uniquely powerful at boosting opposition to racially redistributive policies among white racial conservatives.”

- i.e. anger triggers racism
- but anger doesn’t affect economic left-right policy attitudes generally.
Would you describe yourself as very prejudiced/a little prejudiced against people of other races? 1983-2013 (including 5 year moving average)
Do you think there is generally more racial prejudice in Britain now than there was 5 years ago, less, or about the same amount?

It is striking to note that across more than three decades, we have consistently felt that racial prejudice has been on the increase or unchanged, and (with the exception of 1991), have predicted a continuation of that trend when asked to look to the future. What might explain this? It seems likely that this picture is a result of both increasing awareness and decreasing social tolerance of racial prejudice.
Social Distance in Britain: Storm et al. (BJS, 2017)

Figure I: Percentage who mind if a close relative marries an Asian or Caribbean
Figure II: Percentage who mind having an ethnic minority in-law by birth cohort

BSA 2013 (only white respondents)
### Various attitudes to Immigrants, Dalton (Citizen Politics)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Great Britain</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attitudes toward Immigration</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anyone can come</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Come if there are jobs</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strict limits</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prohibit immigration</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Illegal Immigration</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stronger action to exclude illegals</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Multicultural versus Assimilation of Immigrants</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minorities preserve traditions</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should assimilate</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Positive Attitudes toward Immigrants</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants good for economy</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants bring new ideas</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants (don’t) take jobs away</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** 1999–2002 European Values Survey/World Values Survey; 2003 International Social Survey Program.

**Note:** Table entries are the percentages agreeing with each statement. Missing data were excluded from the calculation of percentages.
Contact theory

McLaren (Social Forces, 2003) finds that attitudes towards immigrants are more positive among those who have friends from minority groups.

▶ An example of the Allport (1954) Contact Hypothesis.
▶ Also the effects of immigration levels on perceptions of threat seem to depend on the level of contact people have with minorities (as the following figure shows).

FIGURE 2: Interaction, Another View
Working Class Authoritarianism and Economic threat

Idea that working class and poorer people would be more racist and anti-immigrant goes back a long way. E.g. Lipset, 1960 *Political Man*

- Economic deprivation breeds intolerance as a result of competition for scarce resources.

More recent US research discusses a more specific idea that anti-immigrant sentiment comes from experiencing a direct economic threat, which is stronger for the working class.
Hainmueller and Hiscox (APSR, 2010)

This paper uses a survey experiment whereby half the sample, chosen at random, were asked about allowing more ‘highly skilled’ immigrants, while the other half were asked the same question but about ‘low-skilled’ immigrants.

The analysis compares the two groups to test theories that attitudes to immigration are based on economic self-interest.

They conclude otherwise saying, “The results are consistent with alternative arguments emphasizing noneconomic concerns associated with ethnocentrism or sociotropic considerations about how the local economy as a whole may be affected by immigration.”

“the labor market competition hypothesis has repeatedly failed to find empirical support, making it something of a zombie theory.” Hainmueller and Hopkins (AnRevPolSci, 2014).
FIGURE 4. Support for Highly Skilled and Low-skilled Immigration by Respondents’ Skill Level

Predicted Probability: In Favor of Increase in Immigration

- Highly Skilled Immigration
- Low-skilled Immigration

95% confidence interval

Respondent Educational Attainment

HS DROPOUT  HIGH SCHOOL  SOME COLLEGE  BA, MA, PHD

Hainmueller and Hiscox (APSR, 2010)
FIGURE 7. Support for Highly Skilled and Low-skilled Immigration by Respondents' Income Level and Immigrant Fiscal Exposure of Respondents’ State

- Fiscal Exposure High: Highly Skilled Immigration
- Fiscal Exposure High: Low-skilled Immigration
- Fiscal Exposure Low: Highly Skilled Immigration
- Fiscal Exposure Low: Low-skilled Immigration

95% confidence interval

Predicted Probability: In Favor of Increase in Immigration

Quartile 1  Quartile 2  Quartile 3  Quartile 4

Household Income
Unemployment effects are conditional on education (Finseraas et al 2016)

Figure 2: Marginal Effect of Unemployment (Y-Axis) on Cultural Concern Over Immigration at Different Levels of Proportion Foreign Born (X-Axis)

Notes: The dashed line indicates low education, the full line high education. ‘High education’ is defined as years of education being two standard deviations above the country mean, while ‘low education’ is years of education being two standard deviations below the country mean. The estimates are derived from the coefficients presented in Table 2.
Immigration in Britain: Ford et al (BSA 2012)

Total migration inflow - Net migration inflow

Source: Office for National Statistics, Long Term International Migration Estimates
2011 figure is estimate for year to September

Figures are thousands
Changing views on Immigration levels in Britain: Ford et al (BSA 2012)

### Table 2.1 Views of immigration levels, 1995–2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>... increase a lot/a little</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... remain the same</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... reduce a little</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... reduce a lot</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>+12</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Structure of Attitudes to immigration in Britain: Ford & Heath (BSA 2014) I

#### Table 5.3 Views about the impact of immigration on Britain, by age, migrant heritage, region and number of migrant friends[3]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic impact</th>
<th>Cultural impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All</strong></td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Age**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Net score</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Net score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18–29</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30–39</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40–49</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>-11</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50–59</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>-27</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60–69</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-21</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 plus</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>-36</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Migrant heritage**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migrant heritage</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Net score</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Net score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Migrant</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>+31</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant parents</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>+9</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native born, native parents</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>-26</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Region**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Net score</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Net score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>+32</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other regions</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>-23</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Migrant friends**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migrant friends</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Net score</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Net score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Several</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>+23</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One/a few</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>-45</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Net Score (in italics) is calculated by subtracting the percentage with a negative view of the impact of immigration from the percentage who have a positive view. The Net score (in italics) may not always reflect the percentage figures in the table, due to rounding.
Also, graduates and professionals positive about immigration

Used to have more negative cultural than economic impact attitudes but now similar, perhaps as a result of E European migration and recession
Economic and Cultural Threat perceptions
Cross-nationally: Lucassen and Lubbers (CPS 2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social class (manuals = ref.)</th>
<th>Economic threat</th>
<th>Cultural threat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Technocrats</td>
<td>-0.156***</td>
<td>-0.213***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociocult. specialists</td>
<td>-0.250***</td>
<td>-0.400***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine nonmanuels</td>
<td>-0.131***</td>
<td>-0.152***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>-0.063***</td>
<td>-0.052*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-0.127***</td>
<td>-0.118***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>0.096***</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Contextual variables (centered)

- GDP: -0.017*** (0.001) -0.009*** (0.001)
- % Muslims: 0.014*** (0.003) -0.042*** (0.003)

Control variables

- Gender (male): -0.085*** (0.012) 0.050*** (0.012)
- Age: 0.002*** (0.000) 0.005*** (0.000)
- Religiosity: -0.009*** (0.002) 0.004* (0.002)
- Years of education: -0.030*** (0.002) -0.042*** (0.002)
- Migrant: -0.186*** (0.016) -0.206*** (0.018)

Intercept: 0.523 0.371
Wilks's lambda: .973
F: 33.395 (12)
\( p < .001 \)
\( \eta^2 \): 0.014

a.Wilks's lambda is a test statistic used in MANOVA as a direct measure of the proportion of variance in the combination of dependent variables that is unaccounted for by the independent variable.
*\( p < .05 \)
**\( p < .01 \)
***\( p < .001 \)
Legewie (AJS 2013) uses a regression discontinuity design to estimate effects of the 2002 Bali bombings on attitudes to immigrants.

- Exploiting the effectively random allocation of ESS interviews just before or just after the event as analogous to a random treatment allocation.

- Finds weak effects in just three countries, but importantly they are conditioned by economic circumstances and contact with migrants.

- No effects in Britain despite more British deaths and more media coverage.
Terror Attack Effects on Immigration Attitudes II

**Fig. 5.**—Relation between changes in the unemployment rate and the response to the terror attack in Bali across 65 European regions. Circle size represents the size of the population in the respective region.
Fig. 6.—Relation between the relative size of the immigrant population and the response to the terror attack in Bali for those who have friends or coworkers with an immigration background and for those who have no direct contact with immigrants.
Populist and/or radical right parties

- There has been recent growth in Europe of populist/radical-right parties
e.g. National Front (France), Freedom Party (Austria), Flemish Block/Interest (Belgium), Party for Freedom-PVV (NL), Lega Nord (Italy), Swiss People’s Party (SVP), Danish People’s Party (DF), Progress Party - FrP (Norway), UKIP (Britain), Law and Justice-PiS (Poland), Fidesz (Hungary) etc.

- Disagreement over what unites them, but anti-immigrant sentiment is the most common ideological theme.

- Many such parties used to be referred to as extreme-right, while now more commonly referred to as radical or populist right. For Golder (2016):
  - Extremism: opposition to democracy
  - Radicalism: seeking systemic political and economic reform
  - Populism: claiming to speak for “the people” against a corrupt elite
Recent far right versus fascism, Golder (2016)

Figure 1

The circles represent the core ideological traits of the far right. The populism and nationalism circles are in gray to show that these traits are not shared by all far right parties and can also be found among mainstream parties. The purple area shows the combination of traits—radicalism, populism, and nationalism—that is increasingly dominant on the contemporary far right. The orange region indicates the location of fascism.
From Norris, *Radical Right*, 2005

**Figure 2.1.** ‘Expert’ Location of Party Competition in Western Europe. The location of parties on ten-point scales measuring left-right economic positions (vertical axis) and tolerance of immigration (horizontal axis). Source: Marcel Lubbers [principal investigator]. 2000. *Expert Judgment Survey of Western-European Political Parties* 2000. Nijmegen, the Netherlands: NWO, Department of Sociology, University of Nijmegen.
Possible influences on populist-right performance I

- **Niche laissez-faire—authoritarian position** in a changed policy space (Kitschelt and McGann, 1995).

- Most surveys show, economic and social liberalism only weakly correlated, and radical-right parties are rarely *laissez-faire* on economic policy.
Possible influences on populist-right performance II

- **Dealignment**

  The relative lack of strong party attachments to mainstream parties is often seen as an important prerequisite for the rise of niche parties of all kinds.

- **Anti-immigration stance**
  - Racism, ethno-centrism, anti-immigration and welfare chauvinism are the policies that most characterize relatively successful radical-right parties.
  - Ivarsflaten (CPS, 2007) shows immigration policy more important than populism, economic policy or Euroscepticism.
Possible influences on populist-right performance III

Figure 1
The Predicted Probability of Voting for the Populist Right in Seven Western European Countries, 2002 and 2003

Ivarsflaten (CPS, 2007)
Attitudes to ethnic minorities and immigrants are typically the best predictor of who votes for the radical right, and this helps explain why people with different economic interests do so (Ivarsflaten, 2005).

Moreover, “no populist right party performed well in elections around 2002 without mobilizing grievances over immigration . . . but there are several examples of populist right parties experiencing electoral success without mobilizing grievances over economic changes or political elitism and corruption.” (Ivarsfalaten 2008)

However, . . .

It isn’t so easy to mobilize anti-immigrant support.

- Between 1985 and 2005 six out of seven anti-immigrant parties in Europe did badly; those that did well had ‘reputational sheilds’ from having existed before immigration became an issue (Ivarsflaten 2006).
- Perhaps there is social desirability in voting for a party that can claim to be not just an anti-immigrant party.
Possible influences on populist-right performance V

- e.g. UKIP had the repetitional shield of Euroscepticism, but among Eurosceptics immigration attitudes (and especially assessments of major party performance on the issue) matter a lot for UKIP support (Ford and Goodwin 2014)

- Puzzling that the growth of the radical-right has been accompanied by a decline in racism.

- It is also not the case that countries with the highest levels of immigration, ethnic-minorities or hostility to immigrants are those with the strongest radical-right parties (Norris, 2005)
Possible influences on populist-right performance VI

- **Economic hardship coupled by immigrant economic threat**
  Golder (CPS, 2003) argues that higher unemployment is associated with greater support for *populist* radical-right parties only where there is sufficiently high levels of immigration.

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**Figure 4.** The effect of unemployment on populist party voteshare conditional on the percentage of foreign citizens.
The effect doesn’t work for what Golder classifies as non-populist neofascist parties, e.g. the BNP.

- Note that the radical-right did not do much better in the 2009 European Parliament elections despite the major recession.
Possible influences on populist-right performance VIII

Lucassen and Lubbers (CPS 2011)

### Table 4. Parameter Estimates From Logistic Regression Models on Far-Right Preference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Models</th>
<th>Baseline: Control and class</th>
<th>1: + ethnic threats</th>
<th>2: + threats × class</th>
<th>3: Baseline + context</th>
<th>4: + threat</th>
<th>5: + threats × context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social class (manuals = ref.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technocrats</td>
<td>−0.193* (0.082)</td>
<td>0.028 (0.084)</td>
<td>−0.061 (0.096)</td>
<td>−0.302*** (0.083)</td>
<td>−0.071 (0.086)</td>
<td>−0.074 (0.086)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociocult. specialists</td>
<td>−0.934*** (0.160)</td>
<td>−0.523*** (0.163)</td>
<td>−0.696*** (0.180)</td>
<td>−1.090*** (0.161)</td>
<td>−0.690*** (0.164)</td>
<td>−0.707*** (0.164)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine nonmanuals</td>
<td>−0.133 (0.095)</td>
<td>0.026 (0.097)</td>
<td>−0.104 (0.113)</td>
<td>−0.284*** (0.096)</td>
<td>−0.123 (0.099)</td>
<td>−0.124 (0.099)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>−0.019 (0.120)</td>
<td>0.006 (0.123)</td>
<td>0.134 (0.145)</td>
<td>0.143 (0.123)</td>
<td>0.245* (0.126)</td>
<td>0.227* (0.127)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>−0.118 (0.113)</td>
<td>−0.009 (0.115)</td>
<td>−0.204 (0.146)</td>
<td>−0.289* (0.115)</td>
<td>−0.191 (0.119)</td>
<td>−0.186 (0.119)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>−0.041 (0.149)</td>
<td>−0.103 (0.153)</td>
<td>−0.043 (0.183)</td>
<td>0.117 (0.152)</td>
<td>0.076 (0.157)</td>
<td>0.082 (0.158)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Perceived ethnic threats (centered)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cultural threat(^a)</td>
<td>0.833*** (0.050)</td>
<td>0.764*** (0.088)</td>
<td>0.834*** (0.051)</td>
<td>0.922*** (0.060)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic threat(^b)</td>
<td>0.116* (0.051)</td>
<td>0.012 (0.083)</td>
<td>0.282*** (0.054)</td>
<td>0.254*** (0.057)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contextual variables (centered)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>0.131*** (0.008)</td>
<td>0.151*** (0.008)</td>
<td>0.168*** (0.011)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Muslims</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Interaction class and cultural ethnic threat(^c)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Technocrats × cult. threat</td>
<td>0.134 (0.130)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>SC specialists × cult. threat</td>
<td>0.743* (0.257)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Routine × cult. threat</td>
<td>0.081 (0.148)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-empl. × cult. threat</td>
<td>−0.478* (0.196)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Other × cult. threat</td>
<td>0.319* (0.186)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployed × cult. threat</td>
<td>−0.288 (0.246)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interaction class and economic ethnic threat(^d)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Technocrats × econ. threat</td>
<td>0.074 (0.134)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>SC specialists × econ. threat</td>
<td>−0.025 (0.278)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Routine × econ. threat</td>
<td>0.317* (0.154)</td>
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<td>Self-empl. × econ. threat</td>
<td>0.359* (0.199)</td>
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<td>Other × econ. threat</td>
<td>0.077 (0.186)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployed × econ. threat</td>
<td>0.184 (0.228)</td>
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(continued)
### Table 4. (continued)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Models</th>
<th>Baseline: Control</th>
<th>1: + ethnic threats</th>
<th>2: + threats × class</th>
<th>3: Baseline + context</th>
<th>4: + threat</th>
<th>5: + threats × context</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interaction context(centralized) and ethnic threats (centered)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>GDP × cultural threat</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP × econ. threat</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Muslims × cultural threat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Muslims × econ. threat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (male)</td>
<td>0.346*** (0.064)</td>
<td>0.329*** (0.066)</td>
<td>0.331*** (0.066)</td>
<td>0.308*** (0.065)</td>
<td>0.307*** (0.068)</td>
<td>0.305*** (0.068)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.008*** (0.002)</td>
<td>-0.012*** (0.002)</td>
<td>-0.013*** (0.002)</td>
<td>-0.010*** (0.002)</td>
<td>-0.015*** (0.002)</td>
<td>-0.015*** (0.002)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>-0.046*** (0.011)</td>
<td>-0.050*** (0.011)</td>
<td>-0.049*** (0.011)</td>
<td>-0.026* (0.011)</td>
<td>-0.017 (0.011)</td>
<td>-0.019 (0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of education</td>
<td>-0.102*** (0.010)</td>
<td>-0.068*** (0.011)</td>
<td>-0.068*** (0.011)</td>
<td>-0.110*** (0.010)</td>
<td>-0.072*** (0.011)</td>
<td>-0.071*** (0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant</td>
<td>-0.223* (0.096)</td>
<td>-0.014 (0.098)</td>
<td>-0.015 (0.098)</td>
<td>-0.243* (0.097)</td>
<td>-0.008 (0.100)</td>
<td>-0.010 (0.100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.538</td>
<td>-1.046</td>
<td>-0.956</td>
<td>-0.500</td>
<td>-1.125</td>
<td>-1.185</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\chi^2$ (df) model</td>
<td>307.289 (11)</td>
<td>760.030 (13)</td>
<td>793.589 (25)</td>
<td>668.290 (13)</td>
<td>1209.247 (15)</td>
<td>1220.917 (19)</td>
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<tr>
<td>−2 log likelihood</td>
<td>8467.076</td>
<td>8014.335</td>
<td>7980.776</td>
<td>8105.442</td>
<td>7565.118</td>
<td>7553.448</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke $R^2$</td>
<td>.046</td>
<td>.112</td>
<td>.117</td>
<td>.099</td>
<td>.176</td>
<td>.177</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


a. Including this variable solely results in $\chi^2$ (model) = 754.734, df = 12, $p < .001$. −2 log likelihood = 8019.631, Nagelkerke $R^2 = .111$, $B = 0.892$, $SE = 0.044$, $p < .001$.

b. Including this variable solely results in $\chi^2$ (model) = 473.830, df = 12, $p < .001$. −2 log likelihood = 8300.535, Nagelkerke $R^2 = .071$, $B = 0.559$, $SE = 0.043$, $p < .001$.

c. Including this block exclusively results in $\chi^2$ (model) = 786.842, df = 19, $p < .001$. −2 log likelihood = 7987.523, Nagelkerke $R^2 = .116$.

d. Including this block exclusively results in $\chi^2$ (model) = 770.470, df = 19, $p < .001$. −2 log likelihood = 8003.895, Nagelkerke $R^2 = .114$.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$. 

Possible influences on populist-right performance IX
Possible influences on populist-right performance

- Minority threat, mitigated by local contact
  - Biggs and Knauss (ESR 2011) look at the geography of BNP members from the leaked list
  - Probability of membership is lower in neighbourhoods with a substantial proportion of non-whites (Contact theory).
  - But probability is higher in cities with a larger proportion of non-whites, where they are also highly segregated (Threat theory).
  - Results more sensitive to South Asian and Muslim population than Black population.
Figure 3  The effect of non-white proportion and segregation within authority.
Possible influences on populist-right performance XII

- **Anti-system appeal**
  - Stable coalition government and/or pilarization have led to the (perception of) indifference and corruption among political elites.
    
    e.g. Freedom Party, Vlaams Blok/Belang.

- **Electoral System**
  Proportional Representation makes it easier than does simple-plurality for radical-right and other small parties to gain representation and be taken seriously.
    
    e.g. compare the UK and US with radical-right parties in other countries

    ▶ also compare UKIP in Euro versus other British elections.
    ▶ Note that the French run-off system might help small parties in a way that other majoritarian systems do not, by allowing voters to signal support in the first round.
Possible influences on populist-right performance XIII

- **Party funding and organization**
  State funding of parties can help small parties develop, and this is especially important in European Parliament elections which voters may treat as ‘2nd order’. Extreme-right parties have often been efficiently organized and mobilized on militaristic lines.

- **Leadership**
  Success is often associated with charismatic leadership, but it is difficult to identify causal direction since some leaders are only described by the media as charismatic once their movement has been successful.
  - There are some convincing cases though, e.g. UKIP did well when and only when Farage was leader.
Possible influences on populist-right performance XIV

- **Mainstream Party Strategy**
  Meguid (APSR 2005) argues that the fortunes of radical-right (and other niche parties) are largely a product of the strategies pursued by their mainstream competitors. She outlines three main strategies:
  - Dismiss the radical-right parties and pretend ignore the issues they raise
  - Accommodate radical-right issues by changing policy.
  - Argue against radical-right policies (Adversarial)

She hypothesizes their effects as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategies</th>
<th>Issue Salience</th>
<th>Issue Position</th>
<th>Issue Ownership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dismissive (DI)</td>
<td>Decreases</td>
<td>No movement</td>
<td>No effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodative (AC)</td>
<td>Increases</td>
<td>Converges</td>
<td>Transfers to mainstream party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adversarial (AD)</td>
<td>Increases</td>
<td>Diverges</td>
<td>Reinforces niche party’s ownership</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Niche Party Electoral Support: Decreases

The following figure is an illustration of the more general model, but focusing on the French FN.
Possible influences on populist-right performance XV

Figure 1. Electoral Trajectory of the French Front National: Actual versus Predicted (With 95% Confidence Intervals)

Note: Predictions calculated for a centralized state with plurality rules and GDP/capita, unemployment levels and lagged FN vote as observed in France.
Mobilizing anti-immigrant sentiment in the mainstream

Thraenhardt (1995) argues that all parties have become more anti-immigration (i.e. chosen accommodation) Koopmans (1995) claims this has legitimized racist violence.

If you aim to promote tolerance the accommodation strategy is self defeating and Koopmans (1995) argues that racist violence is lower where radical-right parties are stronger, so an adversarial strategy might have better social outcomes even if it not good for the mainstream party.

Even where there are no radical-right parties, mainstream right can benefit from taking a relatively anti-immigrant position (Prados Prado et al, Pol. Behav. 2013).

“Based on issue ownership theory and using panel and media data for Germany (1999-2009), we provide evidence that individual concern over immigration increases party attachment towards the centre-right CDU-CSU, especially when immigration debates are primed in the media.”
Prados Prado et al, (*Pol. Behav.* 2013)

**Fig. 2** Simulations for conversion, mobilization and activation to CDU–CSU
Brexit, Trump and Right-wing Populism

- While mobilization of anti-immigrant sentiment is common to all of these, it is not necessarily helpful to see them all as part of one western trend or try to find a common explanation.

- Support for Brexit was primarily about reducing immigration, facilitated by nationalist demand for “taking back control” which also served as a reputational shield.
  - Being a high profile referendum with divisions in both main parties, party identification played a weaker role than in elections.

- By contrast Trump’s success depended primarily on strength of long-standing Republican party identification.
  - 90+% of Trump voters were Romney voters, and were on average richer than Clinton voters.
  - Trump’s election was clinched with additional mobilization of low-education, white, anti-immigration voters in the rust-belt
  - But this was on top of a much larger base of long-standing Republican groups, including higher-income voters and evangelicals

- Support for radical-right parties in Western Europe much smaller than for Brexit and Trump so unsurprisingly more socially distinctive.
  - e.g. UKIP 2015 vote 13% overwhelmingly “left-behind” voters, but Brexit 52% inevitably a broader set.
Nature of anti-immigrant sentiment sustaining **radical-right parties in Europe** differs between countries

- e.g. UKIP mainly anti-EU migration while most continental radical right parties emphasis Muslim immigration.

Dealignment from mainstream parties important pre-cursor in the West, but little alignment to start with in the East.

- Nature of distrust and dissatisfaction with government also varies

Kind of relevant economic grievance also varies:

- Unemployment, stagnation, relative deprivation, inequality, etc. all relevant in different contexts
How important is populism in explaining the success of populists?

- “Rise of Populism” apparently includes not only Brexit, Trump and radical-right, but also left-wing populists, including Podemos, Syriza, 5-star movement and Corbyn.

- It is not clear whether populist strategies actually help explain the success of populist movements since there is populist rhetoric on all sides. For example,
  - Corbyn’s “For the many not the few” was used by Blair and the Tories before him.
  - Cameron’s ‘big society’ was pitched as anti-Westminster
  - Macron, hailed as an anti-populist, came to power claiming to be an outsider against the established old parties.

- Also some populist leaders clearly part of the economic elite, e.g. Trump, Farage.
Immigrant rights have been improved in Europe, but more slowly, if at all, in recent years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Naturalization</td>
<td>−.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.05</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marriage migration</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expulsion</td>
<td>−.28</td>
<td>−.19</td>
<td>−.10</td>
<td>−.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector employment</td>
<td>−.60</td>
<td>−.43</td>
<td>−.09</td>
<td>−.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antidiscrimination</td>
<td>−.21</td>
<td>−.11</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political rights</td>
<td>−.43</td>
<td>−.29</td>
<td>−.20</td>
<td>−.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural rights in education</td>
<td>−.38</td>
<td>−.17</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other cultural and religious rights</td>
<td>−.29</td>
<td>−.22</td>
<td>−.07</td>
<td>−.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual equality dimension</td>
<td>−.09</td>
<td>−.01</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cultural difference dimension</td>
<td>−.30</td>
<td>−.19</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.03</td>
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</table>

Note.—Higher scores indicate more inclusive policies.
### TABLE 7

**Average Scores and Rankings of Countries on Immigrant Citizenship Rights, 1980–2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>.27 (1)</td>
<td>.31 (2)</td>
<td>.48 (1)</td>
<td>.51 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>.18 (2)</td>
<td>.22 (3)</td>
<td>.43 (3)</td>
<td>.44 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>−.17 (5)</td>
<td>.33 (1)</td>
<td>.47 (2)</td>
<td>.40 (3)</td>
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<td>Belgium</td>
<td>−.22 (7)</td>
<td>−.13 (6)</td>
<td>.19 (5)</td>
<td>.34 (4)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Norway</td>
<td>−.11 (4)</td>
<td>−.06 (5)</td>
<td>.21 (4)</td>
<td>.12 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>−.54 (9)</td>
<td>−.49 (9)</td>
<td>−.11 (7)</td>
<td>−.12 (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>−.18 (6)</td>
<td>−.14 (7)</td>
<td>−.16 (8)</td>
<td>−.15 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>−.09 (3)</td>
<td>−.02 (4)</td>
<td>−.10 (6)</td>
<td>−.17 (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>−.60 (10)</td>
<td>−.57 (10)</td>
<td>−.31 (10)</td>
<td>−.30 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>−.47 (8)</td>
<td>−.42 (8)</td>
<td>−.18 (9)</td>
<td>−.30 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>−.19</td>
<td>−.10</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.08</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Note.**—Higher scores indicate more inclusive policies. Countries are listed in the order of their degree of inclusiveness in 2008. Figures in parentheses indicate rank orders.
The rise of the radical-right helps to explain slowdowns and reversals of immigrant rights.

### TABLE 8

**Results of Stepwise Regressions of Levels of Immigrant Rights, 1990–2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Immigrant Rights</th>
<th>Individual Equality Rights</th>
<th>Cultural Difference Rights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU membership</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength of judicial review</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980 level of rights</td>
<td>0.596 (.000)</td>
<td>0.558 (.000)</td>
<td>0.786 (.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of immigrant-origin voters</td>
<td>0.042 (.001)</td>
<td>0.039 (.002)</td>
<td>0.042 (.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote share of right-wing populist parties</td>
<td>$-0.011 (.029)$</td>
<td>$-0.011 (.058)$</td>
<td>$-0.011 (.034)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-party government incumbency</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>$-0.004 (.961)$</td>
<td>0.002 (.977)</td>
<td>0.056 (.615)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N$</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note.**— Unstandardized regression coefficients and significance levels; NS = not significant.
Conclusion

- Racial prejudice typically in long term decline but with persistent hostility to Muslims particularly.
- Anti-immigrant sentiment seems to be driven by a mixture of economic and cultural factors.
- Radical-right voters are distinctive for their anti-immigrant attitudes.
- The electoral success and coalition potential of the radical-right has grown in recent years, not necessarily as a result of increasing intolerance to immigrants or ethnic minorities,
- but more likely as a result of complex mix of institutional and party-competition factors,
- with the role of economic factors especially complex.