#### Political Sociology Lectures: Gender

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- Concepts and Measurement
- Inequality and (a little on) Patriarchy
- Political Participation
- Electoral Behaviour
- Representation
- Conclusions

#### Concepts

- Terms sex and gender are increasingly contested.
- **Sex:** Traditionally a biological distinction (male/female)
- Gender: Traditionally a social construct that represents the parallel division and inequality in society.
  - e.g. male and female are used to describe cultural ideals and personality stereotypes.
  - A social identity?
  - In common parlance and the electoral behaviour literature, a polite way of avoiding saying sex.
- Increasing political debate over legal and policy issues relating to trans-sexuality leading to rethinking of the terms sex and gender identity.
- This course topic is primarily about women and politics rather than gender.


Survey measurement tends to be binary and depends on survey mode  $% \left( {{{\mathbf{r}}_{i}}} \right)$ 

- Respondent self-identification in internet surveys
- Traditionally interviewer observation in face-to-face survey

## Gender Pay Gap UK

- 10th November 2017 (& 18) Equal Pay Day: Day from which women effectively work for free given the average pay gap of 14% for full time workers (18% median including part time)
- Gap wider in London and SE
- Gap is declining slowly but will take 100 years to close at current rates


#### The pay gap in high-earning occupations Average hourly earnings by gender





#### Gender Gaps internationally: World Economic Forum 2017


#### Figure 3: Range of scores, Global Gender Gap Index and subindexes, 2017



Source: Global Gender Gap Index 2017.


Note: Blue diamonds correspond to subindex averages.

#### Declining Patriarchy? Attar Taylor & Scott (BSA, 2018)



#### Mass Political Participation I

Education and party attachments are the most important predictors of voter turnout in the United States, with modest differences in other democracies.



Source: Dalton (Citizen Politics 2014), With CSES module 2 data.

### Mass Political Participation II

Although men no longer seem to vote more than women in post-industrial societies, they do still tend to be more active than women in other forms of political activity.

But the size and nature of the gap varies between countries and over time. E.g. Dalton (2014), *controlling for education*, *partisanship and ideology*, shows men more likely than women to:

- participate in campaigns in Germany, but not France, GB, and US
- directly contact politicians and engage in communal activities in France, but not Germany, GB and US
- but no gender gaps in any of these countries in protest activity.

Most notably gaps are larger in less developed countries.

### On average, women more likely to vote but otherwise less likely to participate. Carreras (Elec Stud, 2018)

#### Table 1

Determinants of political participation in 33 countries (ISSP 2014).

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Political Interest	Party ID	Attention to news	Political Efficacy	Contact Politicians	Attend political meeting	Protest	Vote
Female	-0.195***	-0.264***	-0.200***	-204***	-0.348***	-0.317***	-0.073*	0.093***
	(0.008)	(0.032)	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.029)
Age	0.096***	0.216***	0.212***	.091***	0.179***	0.016	-0.173***	0.516***
	(0.003)	(0.014)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.012)
Education	0.247***	0.225***	0.226***	.193***	0.532***	0.332***	0.463***	0.389***
	(0.007)	(0.027)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.026)
Satisfaction with democracy	0.026***	0.021***	0.032***	.000	-0.027***	-0.002	-0.073***	0.070***
	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.006)
Employment status	-0.025***	0.064*	-0.087***	008	0.166***	0.044	0.069	0.260***
	(0.009)	(0.035)	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.046)	(0.031)
Urban	0.064***	-0.291***	0.094***	.070***	-0.201***	-0.087**	0.502***	-0.205***
	(0.009)	(0.037)	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.053)	(0.033)
Constant	1.545***	-3.400***	3.508***	1.928***	- 3.972***	- 3.163***	-3.427***	-1.154***
	(0.047)	(0.194)	(0.070)	(0.052)	(0.162)	(0.163)	(0.176)	(0.154)
Observations	43,395	43,459	41,285	40,413	43,131	43,086	43,173	39,548
Number of groups	33	33	33	33	33	33	33	32

Standard errors in parentheses.

\*\*\*p < 0.01, \*\*p < 0.05, \*p < 0.1.

Similar findings with ESS data in Table 2.

Explanations for the gender gap: Norris (2007)

Supply-side

- **Resources:** e.g. education, time, income, and civic skills.
- **Cultural:** e.g. efficacy, interest, ambition, gender roles.

Demand-side

- Agency: e.g. mobilizing organizations such as churches and unions, and also media and social networks.
- Institutional: rules and procedures that make it easier for men to participate.

Supply-side explanations are the most dominant, and there is limited evidence for the demand-side, especially institutional factors, though note ...

## Waylen (1994) describes ...

- how women's protest activity was permitted in otherwise repressive regimes in Latin America, and contributed to the process of democratization, and
- how women were encouraged to participate in communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, but female political activity declined with democratization and the return of traditional values.
- This illustrates the importance of institutions and political opportunity structure (Kriesi, 1992).

Burns et al. (1997) show that male control of resources within households is associated with greater male political participation without affecting female participation rates.

# Gender differences in political concerns motivating participation I

In addition to finding no gender differences in overall participation, Schlozman et al (1995) in their study (of US in 1989) found few gender differences in the issues motivating participation. But,

- the education effect is explained by women more likely to have school-aged children in the household.
- the basic human needs effect may be driven by differences in dependency.

# Gender differences in political concerns motivating participation II

	Advant	aged <sup>a</sup>	Disadvantaged <sup>b</sup>		
	Women	Men	Women	Men	
Basic human needs	9	9	27	12**	
Taxes	8	16**	13	15	
Economic issues (except taxes)	14	15	4	5	
Abortion	13	12	6	0**	
Social issues (except abortion)	1	1	6	0**	
Education	24	14***	17	8	
Children or youth (except education)	5	3	9	5	
Crime or drugs	8	5	15	6*	
Environment	5	10*	0	4	
Foreign policy	7	9	2	4	
Women's issues	2	с	с	0	
Number of respondents	197	228	297	182	
Number of issue-based acts	326	338	113	72	

#### Table 4. Percentage of Issue-Based Political Activity Motivated by Concern about Particular Issues


<sup>a</sup>Advantaged: At least one year of college and family income at least \$50,000.

<sup>b</sup>Disadvantaged: No college education and family income less than \$20,000.

<sup>c</sup>Less than 1%.

p < .05; p < .01; p < .01; p < .001.

Women vote more because they have more civic duty, because they are more conscientious. Carreras (Elec Stud, 2018)



#### Percent of Total Effect Mediated: 0.45

Fig. 1. Mediation model.

Duverger (1955) found women were more conservative and linked this to their greater religiosity.

De Vaus and McAllister (EJPR 1989) found that women are more likely to place themselves on the right in 10 out of 11 countries they studied.

Women are now increasingly voting for the left in many countries and there appears to be a gender generation gap. (Inglehart and Norris 2003)

#### Gender and Voting II

 TABLE 4.2. Trends in the voting gap in the 1980s and

 1990s


	1981 Gap	1990 Gap	1995 Gap
The Netherlands	.08	.51 **	
Belgium	39 **	08	
France	39 *	09	
Canada	.01	.23	
Britain	25	03	
West Germany	06 *	.16 *	.05
Ireland	28	20	
United States	.14	.15 **	·35 **
Spain	08	21 *	28 **
Denmark	.84 **	.69 **	
Italy	·39 **	.05	

Note: The difference between the mean position of women and men on the ten-point voting scale. A negative figure represents women more conservative than men; a positive figure represents women more left-leaning than men. Sig. \*\* p. = 01, \* p. = 05. Source: WVS/EVS, 1981–95.

## Trend in the US voting gender gap

#### The gender gap is huge this year

Difference between how men and women have voted in presidential elections since 1952 and in Oct. 2016 polling avg.



🛛 FIVETHIRTYEIGHT 💦 SOURCE: AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTION STUDIES, GALLUP, NEW YORK TIMES, ROPER CENTER

#### Trend? in the GB voting gender gap: Shorrocks, ElecStud. (2016)




Fig. 1. The gender gap by election year. The gender gap is calculated by subtracting the lead party 1 has over party 2 for women from the lead party 1 has over 2 for men. Negatiwn numbers therefore indicate women are more supportive of party 2 than party 1, i.e. the Conservatives in the top two graphs, and Labour in the bottom one. Source: BES 1964–2015

#### GB gender-generation gap: Shorrocks, ElecStud. (2016)




Fig. 2. The gender gap by decade of birth. The gender gaps are calculated in the same way as Fig. 1. Source: BES 1964–2015, N: Fig. 2a = 22,030; Fig. 2b = 15,914; Fig. 2c = 16,554.

#### Vote by gender etc.: Britain in 2010

			ting					Chan			
	Con	Lab	LD	Oth	Con lead over Lab	Turn- out	Con	Lab	LD	Turn- out	Con Lab swin
	%	%	%	%	± %		± %	±%	± %	± %	%
All	37	30	24	10	7	65%	+4	-6	+1	+4	5.0
Gender											
Male	38	28	22	12	10	66%	+4	-6	0	+4	5.0
Female	36	31	26	8	4	64%	+4	-7	+3	+3	5.5
Age											
18-24	30	31	30	9	-2	44%	+2	-7	+4	+7	4.5
25-34	35	30	29	7	- 4	55%	+10	-8	+2	+6	9.0
35-44	34	31	26	9	- 4	66%	+7	-10	+3	+5	8.5
45-54	34	28	26	12	6	69%	+3	-7	+1	+4	5.0
55-64	38	28	23	12	10	73%	-1	-3	+1	+2	1.0
65+	44	31	16	9	13	76%	+3	-4	-2	+1	3.5
Men by Age											
18-24	29	34	27	10	-4	50%	-4	0	+2	+11	-2.0
25-34	42	23	30	6	18	56%	+13	-10	+3	+7	11.5
35-54	36	28	23	13	8	67%	+5	-8	+1	+3	6.5
55+	41	29	16	14	12	76%	+1	-4	-4	+2	2.5
Women by Age											
18-24	30	28	34	9	2	39%	+8	-15	+8	+4	11.5
25-34	27	38	27	8	-11	54%	+6	-5	-1	+6	5.5
35-54	33	31	29	8	2	67%	+6	-9	+4	+6	7.5
55+	42	30	21	7	12	73%	+1	-4	+1	0	2.5
Social Class											
AB	39	26	29	7	13	76%	+2	-2	0	+5	2.0
C1	39	28	24	9	11	66%	+2	-4	+1	+4	3.0
C2	37	29	22	12	8	58%	+4	-11	+3	0	7.5
DE	31	40	17	12	-10	57%	+6	-8	-1	+3	7.0
Men by Class						01.70					
AB	44	23	27	7	21	76%	+7	-4	-1	+7	5.5
01	40	28	22	10	12	67%	+1	-1	0	+3	1.0
02	33	33	19	15	0	58%	+1	-6	+1	+1	3.5
DE	32	35	13	20	-3	59%	+8	-12	-4	+4	10.0
Women by Class					-						
AB	34	29	31	6	5	75%	-2	0	+2	+4	-1.0
C1	39	28	25	8	10	66%	+5	-7	+2	+5	6.0
C2	41	25	25	9	17	58%	+7	-15	+5	0	11.0
DE	29	45	19	7	-15	56%	+4	-4	+1	+2	4.0
Housing Tenure	20	40	10		10	5576				12	4.0
Owned	45	24	21	11	21	74%	+1	-5	+1	+3	3.0
Mortgage	36	29	26	9	7	66%	+5	-7	+1	+6	6.0
Social renter	24	47	19	11	-23	55%	+8	-8	0	+4	8.0
Private renter	35	29	27	9	6	55%	+8	-7	-1	+4	7.5

Base: 10,211 GB adults aged 18+ (of which 5,927 were "absolutely certain to vote" or said they had already voted), interviewed 19 March-5 May 2010. Source: (psos MORI

#### Explanations for trends in gender voting gap

Inglehart and Norris (2003) say that this is because

- In older generations women are more Conservative while in younger generations (especially post-war) women are more Labour.
- This trend is linked to the post-materialism thesis and impact of feminism.
- following slide from Inglehart and Norris 2003 shows big cohort differences and a switch in the gender gap in postindustrial societies.




FIGURE 4.3. Ideological left-right self-placement by gender and type of society.

#### A gender gap because of feminism? I

- While there has been increasing support for the women's movement
- But it has been among men as well as women, at least up to the 1990s.
- So this doesn't help explain the gender gap.
- Following table from Dalton Citizen Politics (in which the starred numbers are those for which there is a significant difference between men and women) shows few differences on women in politics issues in bottom two rows.
- Similarly, although Davis and Robinson (ASR, 1991) show that in Austria, W Germany, GB and US, women are more aware than men of gender inequality in work and education and are also more likely to support efforts to reduce inequality, the differences are not substantial.

#### A gender gap because of feminism? II

	United States	Great Britain	France	West Germany	East Germany
Situation of women has improved	70	68	60	68	-
Work and Family					
Working/nonworking mothers can establish same relationship with children	70*	68	73	39*	56
Having a job is best way for woman to be independent	55*	65*	76*	67*	70*
Preschoolers suffer if mother works (Disagree)	47	45	33	15	21
A job is all right, but women really want home/children (D)	40*	49*	29*	42*	46
Being a housewife is as fulfilling as a job (D)	24*	35*	35*	39*	60*
Average	47	52	49	40	51*
Political Attitudes					
Approve of women's movement	81	63	62	62*	76
Country would be better governed if more women politicians	57	51	59	51	Т

#### Table 6.5 Attitudes toward Gender Equality (in percentages)

Source: 1990–91 World Values Survey; first and last items are from the "Men and Women Study 1995."

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A gender gap because of female employment?

- Manza and Brooks (1999) argue that increased female Labour Force Participation helps to explain the increased gender gap in the US.
  - ▶ Women's participation increased from 37% to 75% between 1950 and 1994.
  - This results in greater female exposure to wage inequality, segregation and increasing need for child care and income maintenance.
  - Since the Democrats attend to these issues, they benefit.
- The importance of labour force participation is also supported cross-nationally in left-right self placement (De Vaus and McAllister, EJPR 1989).




Figure 2. Lowess Curves of Proportion of Women Who Are Housewives, Average Age of Leaving Education, Percentage Christian, and Percentage Who Attend Church Once a Week or More, for Cohorts Born 1925–85. Note: N = 47,435. Source: Combined EVS (1989–2010) and WVS (1995–2012).




Figure 3. Lowess Curves of Average Positions for Competition, Benefits, Equalize Incomes and Responsibility for Cohorts Born 1925–85. Note: N=47,435. Higher values indicate more economically left-wing positions. Source: Combined EVS (1989–2010) and WVS (1995–2012).




Figure 4. Lowess Curves for the Average Position for Abortion, Divarce, Homosexuality, Housewife, and Postmaterialism for Cohorts Born 1925–85.

Note: N=47,435. Higher values on the abortion, divorce, and housewife scales indicate more liberal values. Source: Combined EVS (1989–2010) and WVS (1995–2012). Cohorts and Gender Gaps in Europe and Canada: Shorrocks (Pol & Soc, 2018)




Figure 5. Lowess Curves for the Average Left-Right Self-Placement and Vote Intention for Cohorts Born 1925–85. Note: N=42,023 (self-placement; left): 41,164 (vote intention; right). Higher values on the y-axis indicate more left-wing positions. Source: Combined VS (1989–2010) and WVS (1985–2012).

#### Cohorts and Gender Gaps in Europe and Canada: Shorrocks (Pol & Soc, 2018)




Figure 6. The Gender-Generation Gap in Left-Right Self-Placement (Left) and Vote Intention (Right) Cross-Nationally.

Note: The gender gap in self-placement is calculated as the mean left-right self-placement among women minus the mean left-right self-placement among men; the gender gap in party choice is calculated as the proportion of women who support left-wing parties minus the proportion of men who support leftwing parties. Negative numbers indicate a traditional gender gap, and positive numbers a modern gender gap. N=42,023 (self-placement; left); 41,164 (vote intention; right).

Source: From the merged EVS (1989-2010) and WVS (1995-2012).

Cohorts and Gender Gaps in Europe and Canada: Shorrocks (Pol & Soc, 2018)




Figure 8. Relationship between Gender and Left-Wing Self-Placement/Vote Choice, and Its Mediators.

**Note:** Thicker arrows denote a stronger causal relationship; minus signs indicate a negative relationship; plus signs indicate a positive relationship.

#### Differential responsiveness: Kellstedt et al. 2010 I


More detailed evidence from US on policy preferences does not show such a steady trend towards women having more socialist policy preferences as you would expect if female labour force participation were the cause.

Kellstedt et al. 2010 show the gender gap in policy mood has changed over time and argue that the changes are explained by greater responsiveness to policy output by men.


E.g. when Clinton became president and policy moved to the left, people became less likely to demand a shift to the left, but men moved quicker than women.

#### Differential responsiveness: Kellstedt et al. 2010 II


MALE AND FEMALE POLICY LIBERALISM, 1976 TO 2004



THE GENDER GAP, 1976 TO 2004



### Trends in Representation of Women in Parliaments I



#### Figure 1

Countries achieving political milestones for women, 1983-2006.

Source: Paxton et al. (An Rev Soc, 2007)

### Trends in Representation of Women in Parliaments II

	1955	1965	1975	1985	1995	2005	Selected readings
Scandinavia	10.4	9.3	16.1	27.5	34.4	38.2	Haavio-Mannila et al. 1985, Karvonen & Selle 1995,
							Bergqvist 1999
Western Industrial	3.6	4.0	5.5	8.6	12.8	22.7	Norris 1985, Norris 1997, Kittilson 2006
Eastern Europe	17.0	18.4	24.7	27.0	8.4	15.7	Rueschemeyer 1994, Jaquette & Wolchik 1998, Matland
							& Montgomery 2003
Latin America	2.8	2.7	5.2	8.1	10.0	17.1	Craske 1999, Craske & Molyneux 2002, Jaquette &
							Wolchik 1998
Africa	1.0	3.2	5.3	8.0	9.8	16.3	Goetz & Hassim 2003, Bauer & Britton 2006
Asia	5.2	5.3	2.8	5.6	8.8	15.3	Jayawardena 1986, Nelson & Chowdhury 1994
Middle East	1.2	1.2	2.9	3.5	3.9	8.1	Moghadam 1994, Karam 1999; Charrad 2001

Table 1 Historical comparison of the percentage of women in parliaments across regions and selected regional readings

Source: Paxton et al. (An Rev Soc, 2007)

# Factors associated with under-representation of women in parliament

- Attitudes to women as political leaders (Paxton and Kunovich, 2003)
- Years of democracy
- Religion
- Welfare system
- Female education and economic activity
- Electoral System
- Party Quotas

The first of these tends to be the most powerful.

Fox and Lawless (2011) look at a sample of US men and women from the professions that yield the highest proportion of political candidates for congressional and state legislative positions: law, business, education, and political activism.

They find that women are less likely to see themselves as qualified for political office than men with similar backgrounds (see following slide).

#### TABLE 3 Gender Differences in Perceptions of Skills, Traits, Campaigns, and the Electoral Environment

	Women	Men
Perceptions of Political Skills		
Knowledgeable about public policy issues.	46%**	59%
Professional experience relevant to politics.	66**	74
Good public speaker.	57**	66
Connected to the political system.	21**	27
Good fundraiser.	13**	21
Good self-promoter.	17*	21
Perceptions of Personal Background and Traits		
Has thick enough skin.	52**	71
Has a lot of skeletons in his or her closet.	10	11
Perceptions of Engaging in Typical Campaign Activities		
Deterred by soliciting contributions.	30	22
Deterred by dealing with party officials.	15	11
Deterred by going door-to-door to meet constituents.	19*	14
Deterred by dealing with the press.	15*	10
Deterred by potentially having to engage in a negative campaign.	45**	30
Perceptions of Gender Bias in the Political Arena		
Believe it is more difficult for a woman than a man to be elected.	78**	57
Believe it is harder for women than men to raise money for a campaign.	65**	38
Perceptions of Electoral Competition		
Perceive local elections as highly competitive.	58**	46
Perceive congressional elections as highly competitive.	61**	49
N	862	1,003

Notes: For "Perceptions of Skills and Traits," entries indicate the percentage of respondents who self-assess as possessing the skill or trait. For "Perceptions of Engaging in Typical Campaign Activities," entries indicate the percentage of women and men who report that they view the activity so negatively that it would deter them from running for office. For "Perceptions of Gender Bais in the Political Arena" and "Perceptions of Electoral Competition," entries indicate the percentage of respondents who answered affirmatively. Sample sizes vary slightly because some respondents omitted answers to some questions. Significance levels of chi-square tests comparing women and men: "p < .01; "p < .05."


# Effect of quotas: Hughes (APSR, 2011)

TABLE 5.	Summary of Effects of Quota Policies for Minority and Majority
Women an	nd Men

Quota Type	Primary Beneficiaries	Not Beneficial For				
Party gender quotas	Majority women	Minority men				
National gender quotas	Women (majority more)	Minority men				
Minority quotas	Minorities (men more)	Majority women				
Mixed quotas	Minority men and majority women	Minority women				
Tandem quotas	Minority women	Majority men and women				

- Minority quotas tend to be better for minority men than minority women
- But the conjunction of national gender and ethnicity quotas are good for minority women because they can satisfy both.
- See Hughes, Paxton and Krook (An Rev Soc 2017) for a review of gender quotas for legislatures and Corporate boards.

## Corporate board quotas increasing but much less common than electoral gender quotas Hughes et al (An Rev Soc 2017)



"After adoption, quotas have influenced women's numbers, the performance and outcomes of decision-making bodies, and broader public attitudes."

#### Does descriptive representation of women affect policy?

Campbell et al (BJPS 2010) argue that in Britain women have more feminist attitudes to gender equality than men, and this is reflected among parliamentary candidates.

Kittilson (2011) looked at 124 parties from 24 countries between 1990 and 2003 and found that the more women MPs a party had the more important welfare policy was in the party manifesto, but only if the party has a women's organization.




Figure 6. The mediating effect of women's organizations on women MPs on the salience of welfare state expansion in party programmes

Greene and O'Brien (EJPR 2016) show that as the percentage of women in a parliamentary party increases, parties address a greater diversity of issues and become more left wing.

#### Representation of Women & Welfare State

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	Parliament	Cabinet	Family
	%	%	Policy
AUL	3.5	5.6	1
AUT	12.3	21.8	7
BAH	2.9	26.1	
BAR	5.7	13.6	
BEL	7.5	15.9	10
BOT	5.1	8.4	
CAN	7.8	18.7	2
COL	6.7	11.5	
CR	9.4	10.5	
DEN	24	32.1	8
FIN	29.3	40	9
FRA	5.7	11	11
GER	13.4	17.4	7
GRE	4.5	5.6	
ICE	13.1	10	
IND	5.7	5.7	
IRE	6.7	16.7	1
ISR	7.5	10.6	
ITA	9	10.1	6
JAM	8.4	9.6	
JPN	1.8	4.8	2
LUX	12.7	22	
MAL	2.8	0	
MAU	4.9	4	
NET	16.8	25	4
NZ	10.9	9.6	2
NOR	29.1	42.1	9
PNG	.9	0	
POR	6.9	9	
SPA	9.4	19.9	
SWE	30.4	40.5	11
SWI	10.9	14.3	2
TRI	12.7	12.7	
UK	5	8.9	5
US	5.7	20.5	3
VEN	5	12.3	
Source:	Lijphart(1999)		

#### Extent to which women know less about politics varies Dassonneville & McAllister (AJPS, 2018)


FIGURE 1 The Estimated Gender Gap in Political Knowledge, CSES

	35	25	15	- 1	05	.05		35	25	15	05	.05
ZL 1996 -	-						CHL 2005					-
JS 2004 -	12			-			JPN 2004					- 11
SP 2000 -	12			-			ROU 1996					i - i - i
L 2007 -	1.1			-			AUS 1996					<u></u>
A 2002 -	1.0						AUS 2007					i
D 2006 -	1.1.1						FIN 2011					
R 2005 -				- i	i		SWE 2006					<u></u>
A 2005 -	1.51						CZE 1996					
L 2009 -	1.5						PHL 2010					1.1
U 2009 - E 1998 -	181						AUT 2008 BOU 2004					1
A 2004 -	121						CZE 2002					
L 2007 -	121				: mi		CZE 2010					r nin
X 1997 -	121						KOR 2008				-	
K 2010 -	1.5						NZL 2008					territer.
G 1998 -	1.6						IRL 2007					
D 1998 -	1.61						KGZ 2005				-	han in the second s
B 2003 -	1.1.			_	ii		EIN 2007					i
P 2004 -	1.5.						ZAF 2009					
N 1998 - N 2004 -	131						LVA 2010					
N 2001 - N 1998 -	180						ISR 1996					1
X 2000 - N 2001 -					111		RUS 2004 MEX 2006					
V 2007 -	121				: • • • •		MEX 2009					1
D 2010 -	121						HKG 2004					
L 2005 -	121						KOR 2004				-	par i par i
R 2011 -	12				: ng		EST 2011					je obre
L 1997 -	1.5						HUN 2002				-	
T 2002 -	1.1				i		NLD 2002					ter de la
A 2002 -	1.1.1		-				ISL 2009					i
11 1998 -	1.1.1						THA 2007					t
X 2003 -			_	_			DEU 2005				_	
N 2003 -							ESP 2008				_	£
N 2004 - T 2005 -			-		1		PHL 2004 ISB 2006					1
H 2005 - N 2004 -	18.						PHL 2004					
N 2004 - R 2005 -	181						HKG 2008 GAN 2008					5 T T
U 2002 -					er ni		NZL 2002 HKG 2008					i ni i n
E 2002 -	121						IRL 2002				-	
C 2001 -	12						UKR 1998					
IA 2007 -	10		-				NOR 2009					han dara
K 2007 -	1.1		-0-		:		JPN 2007					la contra
B 1997 -	1.61		- ingin -		i		PBT 2009					
N 2008 -	1.1		-				ITA 2006					
L 1999 -							USA 1996					
E 2003 -		i			i		NOB 1997				<u> </u>	
P 1995 -	1.1	<u>.</u>					BEL 2003					
E 2007 - R 2006 -	18.						CAN 1997					i
E 2005 -		_					CZE 2006					
E 1999 - B 2005 -	121						USA 2008 BRA 2010					r
N 1995 -							NOR 2001					

Note: Estimates are regression coefficients and 95% confidence intervals of the effect of being female (reference: male) on a 0–1 sum scale of political knowledge. Source: CSES Modules 1, 2, and 3.


#### Similar findings with ESS data.

# Gender gap in knowledge smaller when more women in parliament in formative years Dassonneville & McAllister (AJPS, 2018)



Similar findings with ESS data.

## But men learning less the more feminised politics becomes, not women learning more Dassonneville & McAllister (AJPS, 2018)



#### FIGURE 5 The Effect of the Percentage of Women in Parliament on Men's and Women's Level of Political Knowledge

Similar findings with ESS data, but with a flat line for women.

# Effects of random allocation of female representation: Chattopadhyay and Duflo (Econometrica 2004)

- In 1993, one third of local village council (Gram Panchayats) leader positions (Pradhans) in India were reserved for women.
- Which third was randomly allocated.
- The allocation affected investments in public goods
- Investments were more responsive to demands of women where a council leadership was reserved for a woman
- In West Bengal women complained more than men about drinking water and roads, in Rajasthan more about drinking water but less about roads
- Results show sensitivity to that difference

#### Conclusion

By comparison with other social cleavages, gender is striking because . . .

- the majority group is the one that does worst, and
- there are substantial inequalities in wealth and power, but
- it is only mildly politicized.

Large potential for conflict, but little in practice. Women are

underrepresented in politics for various, often cultural, reasons and this matters because it can effect

- party and government policy
- status of women in society.