

Nationalism

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- ▶ What makes a nation?
- ▶ What is nationalism?
- ▶ Different kinds of national identity
- ▶ Decline of nationalism?

“As I write, highly civilized human beings are flying overhead, trying to kill me.

They do not feel any enmity against me as an individual, nor I against them. They are 'only doing their duty', as the saying goes. Most of them, I have no doubt, are kind-hearted law-abiding men who would never dream of committing murder in private life. On the other hand, if one of them succeeds in blowing me to pieces with a well-placed bomb, he will never sleep any the worse for it. He is serving his country, which has the power to absolve him from evil.

One cannot see the modern world as it is unless one recognizes the overwhelming strength of patriotism, national loyalty. In certain circumstances it can break down, at certain levels of civilization it does not exist, but as a *positive* force there is nothing to set beside it. Christianity and international Socialism are as weak as straw in comparison with it. Hitler and Mussolini rose to power in their own countries very largely because they could grasp this fact and their opponents could not.”

George Orwell (*The Lion and the Unicorn*, 1941)

What came before there were nations?

Nationalism is a modern (C18th) phenomenon, so what came before?

- ▶ Ruling classes with a (pan-European) culture and small locally distinctive communities of mainly peasants (Gellner)
 - ▶ No national culture specific to and ubiquitous within the political unit, even if there are some shared identities (e.g. Catholicism)
- ▶ Political authority based on personal (king, duke etc.) and dynastic relationships. (Anderson)
- ▶ A corresponding ethnic group: according to primordialists (e.g. Smith)

What created nations? I

- ▶ Modernization (Gellner):
 - ▶ Universal literacy is necessary for modernisation
 - ▶ Education confers identity to everyone
- ▶ Print capitalism (Anderson):
 - ▶ Printing of books/newspapers in the vernacular motivated by profits
 - ▶ Mass reading publics homogenise and stabilise language
 - ▶ Facilitated a shared culture with a common literature
 - ▶ Creation of 'imagined communities'
- ▶ Ruling class inventions (Hobsbawm):
 - ▶ Military competition and technological change means rulers invent nationalism in order to better impose their will on the masses.
 - ▶ e.g. Wales: red dragon flag and daffodils are C20th symbols
 - ▶ e.g. Scotland: short kilts C18th, and clan tartans C19th
 - ▶ Role of print media similar to that in Anderson but a different driving force: a conscious strategy in opposition to the masses

What created nations? II

- ▶ Nothing much new but the ideology (Smith):
 - ▶ Nationalism is (mainly) based on earlier ethnic identities, and symbols associated with that ethnic identity.
 - ▶ Ethnic symbols may have been strengthened with modernisation, even if some of the 'history' is mythical
 - ▶ The ideology of nations being the basis of political authority was new
- ▶ There is some scope for reconciliation between modernist and primordialist views
 - ▶ Modernists don't deny pre-existing cultures but claim they aren't necessary
 - ▶ Primordialists can accept this while arguing that pre-existing culture helps explain the strength and character of different national identities

Emergence of nation-states: Wimmer and Feinstein I




Figure 1. Number of Nation-States Created per Five-Year Period, Smoothed Hazard Rate

Emergence of nation-states: Wimmer and Feinstein II

- ▶ “no evidence for the effects of industrialization, the advent of mass literacy, or increasingly direct rule, which are associated with the modernization theories of Gellner, Anderson, Tilly, and Hechter’.
- ▶ Nationalist movements do help explain the emergence of nation-states
- ▶ But collapse of empires is the main factor.
- ▶ Note, their definition of a nation state: “an independent state with a written constitution, ruled in the name of a nation of equal citizens”
 - ▶ This doesn't imply that the population all think of themselves as part of the same nation, e.g Belgium, Iraq, Israel, UK.
 - ▶ Contrast with Smith: “We may term a state a ‘nation-state’ only if and when a single ethnic and cultural population inhabits the boundaries of a state, and the boundaries of that state are coextensive with the boundaries of that ethnic and cultural population.”

What is a nation?

- ▶ “a named population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for its members” (Smith)
- ▶ An imagined community (Anderson)
 - ▶ “is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion”
- ▶ The product of nationalism (Gellner)

What is nationalism?

Various different phenomena:

- ▶ A political ideology: nations should be the basis of states
 - ▶ Compare with 'self determination of peoples' and other formulations
 - ▶ General universal principle selectively applied or appealed to on a self serving basis by nationalists
 - ▶ Implies a belief that there are nations
- ▶ A kind of social identity and related sentiments
 - ▶ "Scholars have defined national identity as a socially constructed sameness resulting from nationalism." (Kunovich 2009)
 - ▶ Thinking of yourself as British, English etc., i.e. as part of a nation
 - ▶ Views about what it means to be and who can count as British, English etc.
 - ▶ Patriotism and national pride
 - ▶ Maybe also jingoism and other extreme view
- ▶ A kind of (basis for a) social movement
 - ▶ Nationalism has no force without some kind of political organisation and activity

Vocabulary of nationalism is politically contested

E.g. Macron, at the 2018 armistice centenary, and in response to Trump describing himself as a nationalist:

"Patriotism is the exact opposite of nationalism. Nationalism is a betrayal of patriotism. In saying our interests first, whatever happens to the others, you erase the most precious thing a nation can have, that which makes it live, that which causes it to be great and that which is most important: its moral values."

[https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/11/
trump-joins-macron-and-world-leaders-at-armistice-ceremony](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/11/trump-joins-macron-and-world-leaders-at-armistice-ceremony)

Different types of nationalism (Kohn, Brubaker)

- ▶ Civic nationalism
 - ▶ National identity is about citizenship and is acquired (*jus soli*).
 - ▶ Classic examples include Roman citizenship and post-revolutionary French nationalism
- ▶ Ethnic nationalism (or perhaps cultural nationalism)
 - ▶ National identity is about ancestry and cannot be acquired (*jus sanguinis*)
 - ▶ Classic example is German nationalism
 - ▶ an “illiberal and belligerent doctrine” (David Miller)
 - ▶ Related to anti-immigrant sentiment and hostility to ethnic minorities
- ▶ The difference between these are primarily about the basis for national identity, not the political claims they make

Contemporary survey measurement of ethnic and civic national identity

Some people say that the following things are important for being truly [e.g., American]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is?

[Not important at all, not very important, fairly important, or very important]

1. To have been born in [America]
 2. To have [American] citizenship
 3. To have lived in [America] for most of one's life
 4. To be able to speak [English]
 5. To be a [Christian]
 6. To respect [America's] political institutions and laws
 7. To feel [American]
 8. To have [American] ancestry
- ▶ Born, lived and ancestry items pick up ethnic conceptions of national identity.
 - ▶ Feel, language and respect items reflect civic national identity

Jones and Smith (J of Soc 2001)

Table 1: Comparative responses to seven items forming the national identity module (23 countries)

| <i>Country (and Sample Size)</i> | <i>Percent Who Think Item is 'Very Important' for National Identity</i> | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|----------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-------------|-----------------|
| | <i>Birth</i> | <i>Citizen</i> | <i>Residence</i> | <i>Language</i> | <i>Religion</i> | <i>Laws</i> | <i>Feelings</i> |
| Ireland (N=994) | 58 | 66 | 49 | 14 | 32 | 42 | 67 |
| New Zealand (N=1043) | 42 | 55 | 35 | 61 | 16 | 59 | 67 |
| Slovak Republic (N=1388) | 37 | 54 | 38 | 71 | 12 | 49 | 72 |
| Netherlands (N=2089) | 23 | 39 | 21 | 68 | 3 | 40 | 47 |
| USA (N=1367) | 41 | 75 | 44 | 71 | 38 | 65 | 62 |
| Canada (N=1543) | 25 | 59 | 23 | 49 | 14 | 64 | 64 |
| Austria (N=1007) | 46 | 66 | 50 | 67 | 31 | 56 | 68 |
| Norway (N=1527) | 35 | 60 | 32 | 74 | 10 | 80 | 62 |
| Australia (N=2438) | 29 | 66 | 26 | 61 | 14 | 69 | 72 |
| Great Britain (N=1058) | 50 | 54 | 42 | 65 | 22 | 57 | 52 |
| Poland (N=1598) | 43 | 44 | 38 | 53 | 26 | 34 | 72 |
| Italy (N=1094) | 44 | 45 | 44 | 47 | 26 | 50 | 57 |
| Latvia (N=1044) | 36 | 41 | 40 | 61 | 14 | 58 | 62 |
| Japan (N=1256) | 37 | 49 | 34 | 40 | 10 | 26 | 56 |
| Sweden (N=1296) | 27 | 53 | 29 | 71 | 8 | 83 | 56 |
| Russia (N=1585) | 40 | 48 | 45 | 57 | 18 | 54 | 65 |
| Slovenia (N=1036) | 43 | 50 | 41 | 71 | 17 | 49 | 63 |
| Hungary (N=1000) | 41 | 45 | 47 | 79 | 20 | 29 | 85 |
| Czech Republic (N=1111) | 38 | 51 | 47 | 75 | 11 | 43 | 70 |
| Philippines (N=1200) | 71 | 65 | 58 | 62 | 57 | 54 | 63 |
| Spain (N=1221) | 37 | 33 | 34 | 33 | 18 | 33 | 45 |
| Germany (N=1894) | 29 | 46 | 30 | 54 | 16 | 53 | 46 |
| Bulgaria (N=1105) | 58 | 53 | 50 | 60 | 46 | 54 | 78 |
| All countries (N=30894) | 39 | 53 | 37 | 60 | 20 | 53 | 63 |

Source: International Social Survey Program, 1995.

Changing Britishness: Kiss and Park, BSA31, 2014

Table 4.1 Importance of different attributes for being “truly British”, 1995–2013

| % saying “very important” or “fairly important” | 1995 | 2003 | 2013 | Change: 1995 to 2003 | Change: 2003 to 2013 |
|--|-------------|-------------|-------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Ability to speak English | 85 | 86 | 95 | 1 pp | 9 pp |
| Having British citizenship | 83 | 83 | 85 | 0 pp | 2 pp |
| Respecting institutions/laws | 82 | 82 | 85 | 0 pp | 3 pp |
| Feel British | 73 | 74 | 78 | 1 pp | 5 pp |
| Live life in Britain | 71 | 69 | 77 | -2 pp | 8 pp |
| Been born in Britain | 76 | 70 | 74 | -6 pp | 4 pp |
| Have British ancestry | n/a | 46 | 51 | n/a | 5 pp |
| Sharing customs/traditions* | 50 | 52 | 50 | 2 pp | -2 pp |
| Be a Christian | 32 | 31 | 24 | -1 pp | -7 pp |
| <i>Weighted base</i> | <i>1079</i> | <i>881</i> | <i>894</i> | | |
| <i>Unweighted base</i> | <i>1058</i> | <i>873</i> | <i>904</i> | | |

* For this question the table shows the per cent who “strongly agree” or “agree”

- ▶ About 30% Civic only and about 60% Ethnic and Civic, after a slight rise in “Civic only” due to cohort replacement

Cohort differences in conceptions of Britishness: Kiss and Park, BSA31, 2014

Table 4.5 Distribution of conceptions of national identity, by generation, 2003 and 2013

| | Born pre-1945 | Born 1945–1964 | Born post-1964 |
|--------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | % | % | % |
| Civic and ethnic | 86 | 61 | 50 |
| Only civic | 13 | 33 | 40 |
| Neither civic nor ethnic | 2 | 5 | 10 |

- ▶ “Civic only” people are more internationalist, pro-European and relaxed about immigration.

Explaining Ethnic and Civic Nat ID: Kunovich (ASR 2009)

Table 4. National Identity and Country-Level Characteristics: Multilevel Models

| | Civic + Ethnic National Identity | | | | | | Civic – Ethnic National Identity | | | | | |
|--|----------------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------|----------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|
| | 1 | 1A | 1B | 2 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1A | 1B | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| Intercept | -.042 (.066) | -.038 (.068) | -.047 (.066) | -.043 (.064) | -.040 (.064) | -.040 (.064) | -.142 (.081) | -.143 (.084) | -.138 (.082) | -.146 (.079) | -.155* (.076) | -.156* (.074) |
| Economic Characteristics | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Development | -.050 (.067) | -.114* (.055) | | | | .047 (.089) | .063 (.091) | .164* (.076) | | | | -.137 (.111) |
| Economic globalization | -.102 (.065) | | -.132* (.052) | | | -.019 (.085) | .164 (.090) | | .201* (.072) | | | -.052 (.107) |
| Political Characteristics | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Military preparedness | | | | .082 (.084) | | | | | | -.022 (.115) | | |
| Military experiences | | | | -.009 (.067) | | | | | | .033 (.092) | | |
| Political globalization | | | | -.036 (.068) | | | | | | .024 (.094) | | |
| Democratic governance | | | | -.133* (.061) | | -.140 (.100) | | | | .224* (.084) | | .200 (.125) |
| Cultural Characteristics | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Religious diversity | | | | | .041 (.051) | | | | | | .025 (.066) | |
| Linguistic diversity | | | | | .087 (.052) | | | | | | -.011 (.068) | |
| Cultural globalization | | | | | -.143* (.050) | -.056 (.086) | | | | | .265* (.066) | .261* (.108) |
| Explained Country-Level Variance (%) | 18.6 | 12.0 | 17.4 | 26.1 | 26.5 | 24.7 | 22.1 | 14.0 | 2.6 | 26.9 | 35.6 | 40.3 |
| Reduction in Test Statistic (χ^2) | 6.4 | 4.1 | 5.8 | 9.3 | 9.5 | 8.8 | 7.5 | 4.3 | 7.0 | 9.4 | 12.8 | 15.3 |
| DF (for χ^2) | 2 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 4 |

Notes: $N_{\text{individuals}} = 38,007$; $N_{\text{countries}} = 31$. Standard errors are in parentheses. The coefficients are net of all individual-level variables.

* $p < .05$ (two-tailed).

Sample (ISSP 2003) includes Venezuela, Philippines, Uruguay and several then recently democratised CE European countries. They are relatively ethnically nationalist, and so drive the cross-national variation.

Consequences of Ethnic and Civic Nat ID: Kunovich (2009)

Table 5. Policy Attitudes and National Identity: Multilevel Models

| | Preference for restrictive views on immigrants and immigration ^a | | Preference for citizenship for those born to non-citizens | | Preference for citizenship for those born abroad to citizens | |
|--------------------------|--|------|---|------|---|------|
| | Coefficient | SE | Coefficient (Logged Odds) | SE | Coefficient (Logged Odds) | SE |
| Civic + Ethnic | .087* | .005 | -.088* | .011 | .026* | .011 |
| National Identity | | | | | | |
| Civic – Ethnic | -.065* | .005 | .234* | .012 | .261* | .012 |
| National Identity | | | | | | |
| N _{individuals} | 27,479 | | 36,705 | | 36,724 | |
| N _{countries} | 30 ^b | | 31 | | 31 | |
| | Preference for assimilation | | Preference for pursuing national interests, even in the face of conflict | | | |
| | Coefficient (Logged Odds) | SE | Coefficient (Logged Odds) | | SE | |
| Civic + Ethnic | .146* | .013 | .355* | | .011 | |
| National Identity | | | | | | |
| Civic – Ethnic | -.083* | .014 | -.130* | | .011 | |
| National Identity | | | | | | |
| N _{individuals} | 32,652 | | 36,266 | | | |
| N _{countries} | 31 | | 31 | | | |

Note: The coefficients are net of all individual-level variables.

^a I control for *perceived threat* in addition to the other individual-level variables.

^b The *immigrants* scale and the *perceived threat* independent variable are not available for South Africa.

* $p < .05$ (two-tailed).

Increasing transnational identity in Europe?

Dogan (1994) argues that decline in national pride is pervasive across Western Europe because of European integration




Figure 1. Europe as a network of transnational attachment. [Colour figure can be viewed at

From Deutschmann et al (EJPR, 2018), based on responses to the survey question: Which country other than your country do you feel the most attached to? Just over half mentioned another country.

Declining British national pride?


From Tilley and Heath (2007)

TABLE I: *National pride in Britain, 1981–2003*

| Year | % Not at all proud | % Not very proud | % Somewhat proud | % Very proud | N (unweighted) |
|------|--------------------|------------------|------------------|--------------|----------------|
| 1981 | 3 | 7 | 33 | 57 | 1162 |
| 1982 | 2 | 7 | 30 | 61 | 911 |
| 1983 | 1 | 6 | 32 | 60 | 954 |
| 1984 | 2 | 6 | 37 | 54 | 982 |
| 1985 | 2 | 9 | 31 | 58 | 991 |
| 1986 | 3 | 9 | 35 | 54 | 959 |
| 1990 | 3 | 8 | 35 | 54 | 1410 |
| 1994 | 5 | 11 | 43 | 41 | 944 |
| 1997 | 3 | 10 | 44 | 43 | 991 |
| 2003 | 3 | 11 | 41 | 45 | 2082 |

Source: WVS 1981, 1990; Eurobarometer 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1994, 1997; ISSP 2003.


Figure 8.1. Pride in being British and sense of belonging to Britain do not appear to be in long-term decline



From Heath (2018) *Social Progress in Britain*

These figures are not inconsistent with the previous slide. There have been changes in relative balance of “very proud” and “proud”.

Figure 8.2. Social divisions in feelings of national pride have never been large and have changed little over thirty years in Great Britain



From Heath (2018) *Social Progress in Britain*

Diversionary nationalism: Solt (JOP 2011)


TABLE 1 Effects of Economic Inequality on Nationalism

| | Model 1 National Pride | Model 2 Emotional Attachment to Country | Model 3 National-Cultural Pride Index |
|--------------------------------------|------------------------------|---|---|
| | Estimate (Std. Error) | Estimate (Std. Error) | Estimate (Std. Error) |
| <i>Economic Inequality</i> | | | |
| Inequality | .044* (.011) | .042* (.009) | .013* (.005) |
| Inequality \times Household Income | \gg -.001 (.001) | .001 (.001) | $>$ -.001 (.001) |
| <i>Individual Controls</i> | | | |
| Age | .013* (.001) | .021* (.002) | .005* (.001) |
| Years of Education | -.041* (.005) | -.014* (.006) | -.013* (.004) |
| Female | .005 (.019) | .052 (.032) | .063* (.019) |
| Married | .099* (.013) | .059* (.021) | .008 (.013) |
| Unemployed | -.116* (.025) | -.097* (.038) | -.021 (.014) |
| Household Income | -.010 (.032) | -.013 (.035) | -.006 (.018) |
| <i>Country-Year Controls</i> | | | |
| GDP/Capita | .007 (.008) | -.015 (.010) | .003 (.004) |
| International Conflict | .158* (.068) | -.262* (.087) | .040 (.033) |
| Migrant Stock | -.023* (.011) | .009 (.009) | -.010* (.004) |
| Democracy | .331 (.316) | | |
| New Democracy | -.210 (.228) | -.390* (.186) | -.385* (.107) |
| <i>Country Controls</i> | | | |
| War Guilt | -.849* (.281) | -.474* (.237) | -.216 (.174) |
| Federalism | -.348 (.245) | -.150 (.182) | .063 (.113) |
| Ethnic Diversity | .005 (.005) | -.007 (.005) | .002 (.003) |
| Constant | -1.942* (.471) | -2.719* (.529) | -.293 (.200) |
| Second Threshold | 1.691* (.061) | 1.753* (.090) | |
| Third Threshold | 3.759* (.079) | 4.064* (.155) | |

(selection from full table. 78 countries for Model 1, 34 for Models 2 and 3)

E.g. Thatcherism as “bitter-tasting market economics sweetened and rendered palatable by great creamy dollops of nationalistic custard.” (Worsthorne)


Figure 3. Path model relating geopolitical threat to country average attitudes toward immigration. Graphic does not represent a correlation between the two mediating variables as well as residual errors. Coefficients displayed are standardized



Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.001$


From Hiers et al (Soc Forces, 2017)

Figure 2. Average level of attitudes toward immigrants from different ethnic/racial background (left panel) and same ethnicity race (right panel) on a scale from 1 to 4, with indicating more restrictive preferences plotted against the geopolitical threat scale



From Hiers et al (Soc Forces, 2017)

Figure 8.3. Dual identities predominate in all four territories, but substantial minorities in Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland reject a British identity



Support for Scottish Independence only weakly linked to strength of Scottish national identity

Table 3.2 Referendum vote intention, by Moreno National Identity

| | Moreno National Identity | | | |
|---------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------------|--|
| | Scottish, not British | More Scottish than British | Equally Scottish and British | More British than Scottish/British not Scottish* |
| Referendum vote intention | % | % | % | % |
| Yes | 53 | 34 | 12 | 7 |
| No | 29 | 48 | 73 | 82 |
| Undecided | 14 | 14 | 11 | 5 |

From pre-referendum 2013 Scottish Social Attitudes. Curtice (BSA31, 2014).
25%, 29% and 29% in the first three columns.

Support for Scottish Independence strongly linked to economic expectations

Table 3.4 Intention to vote Yes in the referendum, by perceptions of the economic consequences of independence^[2]

| % intending to vote Yes | Perceived effect of independence on | | | |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------|-------------------|-------|
| | Scotland's economy | Living standards | Personal finances | Taxes |
| A lot better/higher/lower* | 86 | 74 | 89 | ** |
| A little better/higher/lower* | 67 | 65 | 82 | (53) |
| No difference | 23 | 26 | 35 | 37 |
| A little worse/lower/higher | 5 | 5 | 7 | 33 |
| A lot worse/lower/higher | 2 | 3 | 3 | 6 |

From pre-referendum 2013 Scottish Social Attitudes. Curtice (BSA31, 2014).

Nationalism and Brexit

- ▶ There was never enough European identity in the UK to sustain EU membership.
- ▶ In May 2016,
 - ▶ 62% said they were “British only”,
 - ▶ 31% “British and European”,
 - ▶ 1% “European and British”
 - ▶ 1% “European only”.
- ▶ These figures are typical of the full Eurobarometer series since 1992.
- ▶ Also, as we’ve seen above, most people have a (partly) ethnic conception of what it means to be British, and so not keen on immigration.

Immigration increased substantially after Blair elected

Table 3: Long-term International Migration in the UK, 1991–2015

| <i>Year</i> | <i>Inflow Thousands</i> | <i>Outflow Thousands</i> | <i>Net Balance Thousands</i> |
|-------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 1991 | 329 | 285 | + 44 |
| 1992 | 268 | 281 | -- 13 |
| 1993 | 266 | 266 | -- 1 |
| 1994 | 315 | 238 | + 77 |
| 1995 | 312 | 236 | + 76 |
| 1996 | 318 | 264 | + 55 |
| 1997 | 327 | 279 | + 48 |
| 1998 | 391 | 251 | + 140 |
| 1999 | 454 | 291 | + 163 |
| 2000 | 479 | 321 | + 158 |
| 2001 | 481 | 309 | + 179 |
| 2002 | 516 | 363 | + 172 |
| 2003 | 511 | 363 | + 185 |
| 2004 | 589 | 344 | + 268 |
| 2005 | 567 | 361 | + 267 |
| 2006 | 596 | 398 | + 265 |
| 2007 | 574 | 341 | + 273 |
| 2008 | 590 | 427 | + 229 |
| 2009 | 567 | 368 | + 229 |
| 2010 | 591 | 339 | + 256 |
| 2011 | 566 | 351 | + 205 |
| 2012 | 498 | 321 | + 177 |
| 2013 | 526 | 317 | + 209 |
| 2014 | 632 | 319 | + 313 |
| 2015 | 631 | 299 | + 332 |

Source: UK Office for National Statistics Long-Term International Migration Estimates. Available online at: <https://www.ons.gov.uk/migration>

From Curtice (JCMS 2017).

Majority expected immigration to go down but no majority thinking other things would get worse if UK left EU

Table 5: Expected Consequences of Leaving the EU, May/June 2016

| | <i>Better*</i> | <i>About the Same</i> | <i>Worse</i> |
|----------------------------------|----------------|-----------------------|--------------|
| Britain's influence in the world | 17 | 40 | 35 |
| General economic situation | 23 | 32 | 35 |
| Unemployment | 22 | 39 | 28 |
| National Health Service | 33 | 36 | 21 |
| Personal financial situation | 9 | 58 | 21 |
| Risk of terrorism | 21 | 51 | 20 |
| Immigration | 55 | 28 | 9 |

Note: * In the case of immigration 'better' indicates that the respondent thought immigration would be lower. **Source:** 2015 British Election Study Internet Panel Wave 8.

From Curtice (JCMS 2017).

Regression analysis shows economic expectations more important than immigration expectations for vote intention.


Table 7: Why the Outcome was Close

| <i>Perceived impact of leaving on economy</i> | <i>% Holding that View</i> | <i>Of whom % voted Remain</i> | <i>Of whom % voted Leave</i> | <i>Value to Leave</i> |
|---|----------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------|
| Worse | 40 | 93 | 7 | 3 |
| About the same | 35 | 31 | 69 | 24 |
| Better | 25 | 10 | 90 | 23 |
| Total | | | | 50 |
| <i>EU undermines Britain's identity</i> | <i>% Holding that View</i> | <i>Of whom % voted Remain</i> | <i>Of whom % voted Leave</i> | <i>Value to Leave</i> |
| Disagree | 34 | 91 | 9 | 3 |
| Neither agree nor disagree | 16 | 64 | 36 | 6 |
| Agree | 51 | 18 | 82 | 42 |
| Total | | | | 51 |
| <i>Impact of leaving on immigration</i> | <i>% Holding that View</i> | <i>Of whom % voted Remain</i> | <i>Of whom % voted Leave</i> | <i>Value to Leave</i> |
| Lower | 60 | 30 | 70 | 42 |
| About the same | 31 | 83 | 17 | 5 |
| Higher | 9 | 65 | 35 | 3 |
| Total | | | | 50 |

Note: Respondents who said Do Not Know have been added to the middle category. **Source:** 2015 British Election Study internet panel waves 8 and 9.


From Curtice (JCMS 2017).

Figure 8.6. The same social divisions over Europe have been present for over fifty years, but their magnitude increased between 1964 and 2015



From Heath (2018) *Social Progress in Britain*

Many more people now have a strong 'Leaver' or 'Remainer' identity than a strong party identity



From Curtice (2018) *The emotional legacy of Brexit: How Britain has become a country of 'Remainers' and 'Leavers'*, at WhatUKthinks.org

Conclusion

- ▶ Nations and nation-states are a modern phenomenon even though they frequently have their bases in long standing groups with ethnic identities
- ▶ Nature and strength of national identity and pride depend on various contextual factors
- ▶ Popularity of nationalist causes (e.g. Scottish independence and Brexit) apparently depended at the times of the referendums more on expectations of economic and other consequences than on pure nationalist sentiment.
- ▶ Both have since become more about (divisive) identities.