

Nationalism

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- ▶ What makes a nation?
- ▶ What is nationalism?
- ▶ Different kinds of national identity
- ▶ Decline of nationalism?

What comes before a nation?

Nationalism is a modern (C18th) phenomenon, so what came before?

- ▶ Ruling classes with a (pan-European) culture and small locally distinctive communities of mainly peasants (Gellner)
 - ▶ No national culture specific to and ubiquitous within the political unit, even if there are some shared identities (e.g. Catholicism)
- ▶ Political authority based on personal (king, duke etc.) and dynastic relationships. (Anderson)
- ▶ A corresponding ethnic group: according to primordialists (e.g. Smith)

What created nations? I

- ▶ Modernization (Gellner):
 - ▶ Universal literacy is necessary for modernisation
 - ▶ Education confers identity to everyone
- ▶ Print capitalism (Anderson):
 - ▶ Printing of books/newspapers in the vernacular motivated by profits
 - ▶ Mass reading publics homogenise and stabilise language
 - ▶ Facilitated a shared culture with a common literature
 - ▶ Creation of 'imagined communities'
- ▶ Ruling class inventions (Hobsbawm):
 - ▶ Military competition and technological change means rulers invent nationalism in order to better impose their will on the masses.
 - ▶ e.g. Wales: red dragon flag and daffodils are C20th symbols
 - ▶ e.g. Scotland: short kilts C18th, and clan tartans C19th
 - ▶ Role of print media similar to that in Anderson but a different driving force: a conscious strategy in opposition to the masses

What created nations? II

- ▶ Nothing much new but the ideology (Smith):
 - ▶ Nationalism is (mainly) based on earlier ethnic identities, and symbols associated with that ethnic identity.
 - ▶ Ethnic symbols may have been strengthened with modernisation, even if some of the 'history' is mythical
 - ▶ The ideology of nations being the basis of political authority was new
- ▶ There is some scope for reconciliation between modernist and primordialist views
 - ▶ Modernists don't deny pre-existing cultures but claim they aren't necessary
 - ▶ Primordialists can accept this while arguing that pre-existing culture helps explain the strength and character of different national identities

Emergence of nation-states: Wimmer and Feinstein I




Figure 1. Number of Nation-States Created per Five-Year Period, Smoothed Hazard Rate

Emergence of nation-states: Wimmer and Feinstein II

- ▶ “no evidence for the effects of industrialization, the advent of mass literacy, or increasingly direct rule, which are associated with the modernization theories of Gellner, Anderson, Tilly, and Hechter’.”
- ▶ Nationalist movements do help explain the emergence of nation-states
- ▶ But collapse of empires is the main factor.
- ▶ Note, their definition of a nation state: “an independent state with a written constitution, ruled in the name of a nation of equal citizens”
 - ▶ This doesn't imply that the population all think of themselves as part of the same nation, e.g Belgium, Iraq, Israel, UK.
 - ▶ Contrast with Smith: “We may term a state a ‘nation-state’ only if and when a single ethnic and cultural population inhabits the boundaries of a state, and the boundaries of that state are coextensive with the boundaries of that ethnic and cultural population.”

What is a nation?

- ▶ “a named population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for its members” (Smith)
- ▶ An imagined community (Anderson)
 - ▶ “is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion”
- ▶ The product of nationalism (Gellner)

What is nationalism?

Various different phenomena:

- ▶ A political ideology: nations should be the basis of states
 - ▶ Compare with 'self determination of peoples' and other formulations
 - ▶ General universal principle selectively applied or appealed to on a self serving basis by nationalists
 - ▶ Implies a belief that there are nations
- ▶ A kind of social identity and related sentiments
 - ▶ Thinking of yourself as British, English etc., i.e. as part of a nation
 - ▶ Views about what it means to be and who can count as British, English etc.
 - ▶ Patriotism and national pride
 - ▶ Maybe also jingoism and other extreme views
- ▶ A kind of (basis for a) social movement
 - ▶ Nationalism has no force without some kind of political organisation and activity

Different types of nationalism (Kohn, Brubaker)

- ▶ Civic nationalism
 - ▶ National identity is about citizenship and is acquired (*jus soli*).
 - ▶ Classic examples include Roman citizenship and post-revolutionary French nationalism
- ▶ Ethnic nationalism (or perhaps cultural nationalism)
 - ▶ National identity is about ancestry and cannot be acquired (*jus sanguinis*)
 - ▶ Classic example is German nationalism
 - ▶ an “illiberal and belligerent doctrine” (David Miller)
 - ▶ Related to anti-immigrant sentiment and hostility to ethnic minorities
- ▶ The difference between these are primarily about the basis for national identity, not the political claims they make

Contemporary survey measurement of ethnic and civic national identity

Some people say that the following things are important for being truly [e.g., American]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is?

[Not important at all, not very important, fairly important, or very important]

1. To have been born in [America]
 2. To have [American] citizenship
 3. To have lived in [America] for most of one's life
 4. To be able to speak [English]
 5. To be a [Christian]
 6. To respect [America's] political institutions and laws
 7. To feel [American]
 8. To have [American] ancestry
- ▶ Born, lived and ancestry items pick up ethnic conceptions of national identity.
 - ▶ Feel, language and respect items reflect civic national identity

Jones and Smith (J of Soc 2001)

Table 1: Comparative responses to seven items forming the national identity module (23 countries)

<i>Country (and Sample Size)</i>	<i>Percent Who Think Item is 'Very Important' for National Identity</i>						
	<i>Birth</i>	<i>Citizen</i>	<i>Residence</i>	<i>Language</i>	<i>Religion</i>	<i>Laws</i>	<i>Feelings</i>
Ireland (N=994)	58	66	49	14	32	42	67
New Zealand (N=1043)	42	55	35	61	16	59	67
Slovak Republic (N=1388)	37	54	38	71	12	49	72
Netherlands (N=2089)	23	39	21	68	3	40	47
USA (N=1367)	41	75	44	71	38	65	62
Canada (N=1543)	25	59	23	49	14	64	64
Austria (N=1007)	46	66	50	67	31	56	68
Norway (N=1527)	35	60	32	74	10	80	62
Australia (N=2438)	29	66	26	61	14	69	72
Great Britain (N=1058)	50	54	42	65	22	57	52
Poland (N=1598)	43	44	38	53	26	34	72
Italy (N=1094)	44	45	44	47	26	50	57
Latvia (N=1044)	36	41	40	61	14	58	62
Japan (N=1256)	37	49	34	40	10	26	56
Sweden (N=1296)	27	53	29	71	8	83	56
Russia (N=1585)	40	48	45	57	18	54	65
Slovenia (N=1036)	43	50	41	71	17	49	63
Hungary (N=1000)	41	45	47	79	20	29	85
Czech Republic (N=1111)	38	51	47	75	11	43	70
Philippines (N=1200)	71	65	58	62	57	54	63
Spain (N=1221)	37	33	34	33	18	33	45
Germany (N=1894)	29	46	30	54	16	53	46
Bulgaria (N=1105)	58	53	50	60	46	54	78
All countries (N=30894)	39	53	37	60	20	53	63

Source: International Social Survey Program, 1995.

Changing Britishness: Kiss and Park, BSA31, 2014

Table 4.1 Importance of different attributes for being “truly British”, 1995–2013

% saying “very important” or “fairly important”	1995	2003	2013	Change: 1995 to 2003	Change: 2003 to 2013
Ability to speak English	85	86	95	1 pp	9 pp
Having British citizenship	83	83	85	0 pp	2 pp
Respecting institutions/laws	82	82	85	0 pp	3 pp
Feel British	73	74	78	1 pp	5 pp
Live life in Britain	71	69	77	-2 pp	8 pp
Been born in Britain	76	70	74	-6 pp	4 pp
Have British ancestry	n/a	46	51	n/a	5 pp
Sharing customs/traditions*	50	52	50	2 pp	-2 pp
Be a Christian	32	31	24	-1 pp	-7 pp
<i>Weighted base</i>	<i>1079</i>	<i>881</i>	<i>894</i>		
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>1058</i>	<i>873</i>	<i>904</i>		

* For this question the table shows the per cent who “strongly agree” or “agree”

- ▶ About 30% Civic only and about 60% Ethnic and Civic, after a slight rise in “Civic only” due to cohort replacement

Cohort differences in conceptions of Britishness: Kiss and Park, BSA31, 2014

Table 4.5 Distribution of conceptions of national identity, by generation, 2003 and 2013

	Born pre-1945	Born 1945–1964	Born post-1964
	%	%	%
Civic and ethnic	86	61	50
Only civic	13	33	40
Neither civic nor ethnic	2	5	10

- ▶ “Civic only” people are more internationalist, pro-European and relaxed about immigration.

Explaining Ethnic and Civic Nat ID: Kunovich (ASR 2009)

Table 4. National Identity and Country-Level Characteristics: Multilevel Models

	Civic + Ethnic National Identity						Civic – Ethnic National Identity					
	1	1A	1B	2	3	4	1	1A	1B	2	3	4
Intercept	-.042 (.066)	-.038 (.068)	-.047 (.066)	-.043 (.064)	-.040 (.064)	-.040 (.064)	-.142 (.081)	-.143 (.084)	-.138 (.082)	-.146 (.079)	-.155* (.076)	-.156* (.074)
Economic Characteristics												
Development	-.050 (.067)	-.114* (.055)				.047 (.089)	.063 (.091)	.164* (.076)				-.137 (.111)
Economic globalization	-.102 (.065)		-.132* (.052)			-.019 (.085)	.164 (.090)		.201* (.072)			-.052 (.107)
Political Characteristics												
Military preparedness				.082 (.084)						-.022 (.115)		
Military experiences				-.009 (.067)						.033 (.092)		
Political globalization				-.036 (.068)						.024 (.094)		
Democratic governance				-.133* (.061)		-.140 (.100)				.224* (.084)		.200 (.125)
Cultural Characteristics												
Religious diversity					.041 (.051)						.025 (.066)	
Linguistic diversity					.087 (.052)						-.011 (.068)	
Cultural globalization					-.143* (.050)	-.056 (.086)					.265* (.066)	.261* (.108)
Explained Country-Level Variance (%)	18.6	12.0	17.4	26.1	26.5	24.7	22.1	14.0	2.6	26.9	35.6	40.3
Reduction in Test Statistic (χ^2)	6.4	4.1	5.8	9.3	9.5	8.8	7.5	4.3	7.0	9.4	12.8	15.3
DF (for χ^2)	2	1	1	4	3	4	2	1	1	4	3	4

Notes: $N_{\text{individuals}} = 38,007$; $N_{\text{countries}} = 31$. Standard errors are in parentheses. The coefficients are net of all individual-level variables.

* $p < .05$ (two-tailed).

Consequences of Ethnic and Civic Nat ID: Kunovich (2009)

Table 5. Policy Attitudes and National Identity: Multilevel Models

	Preference for restrictive views on immigrants and immigration ^a		Preference for citizenship for those born to non-citizens		Preference for citizenship for those born abroad to citizens	
	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient (Logged Odds)	SE	Coefficient (Logged Odds)	SE
Civic + Ethnic National Identity	.087*	.005	-.088*	.011	.026*	.011
Civic – Ethnic National Identity	-.065*	.005	.234*	.012	.261*	.012
N _{individuals}	27,479		36,705		36,724	
N _{countries}	30 ^b		31		31	
	Preference for assimilation		Preference for pursuing national interests, even in the face of conflict			
	Coefficient (Logged Odds)	SE	Coefficient (Logged Odds)		SE	
Civic + Ethnic National Identity	.146*	.013	.355*		.011	
Civic – Ethnic National Identity	-.083*	.014	-.130*		.011	
N _{individuals}	32,652		36,266			
N _{countries}	31		31			

Note: The coefficients are net of all individual-level variables.

^a I control for *perceived threat* in addition to the other individual-level variables.

^b The *immigrants* scale and the *perceived threat* independent variable are not available for South Africa.

* $p < .05$ (two-tailed).

Decline of national pride

From Tilley and Heath (2007)

TABLE I: *National pride in Britain, 1981–2003*

Year	% Not at all proud	% Not very proud	% Somewhat proud	% Very proud	N (unweighted)
1981	3	7	33	57	1162
1982	2	7	30	61	911
1983	1	6	32	60	954
1984	2	6	37	54	982
1985	2	9	31	58	991
1986	3	9	35	54	959
1990	3	8	35	54	1410
1994	5	11	43	41	944
1997	3	10	44	43	991
2003	3	11	41	45	2082

Source: WVS 1981, 1990; Eurobarometer 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1994, 1997; ISSP 2003.

Dogan (1994) argues that decline in national pride is pervasive across Western Europe because of European integration

Explaining variation in national pride: Solt (JOP 2011)


TABLE 1 Effects of Economic Inequality on Nationalism

	Model 1 National Pride	Model 2 Emotional Attachment to Country	Model 3 National-Cultural Pride Index
	Estimate (Std. Error)	Estimate (Std. Error)	Estimate (Std. Error)
<i>Economic Inequality</i>			
Inequality	.044* (.011)	.042* (.009)	.013* (.005)
Inequality × Household Income	≫ −.001 (.001)	.001 (.001)	> −.001 (.001)
<i>Individual Controls</i>			
Age	.013* (.001)	.021* (.002)	.005* (.001)
Years of Education	−.041* (.005)	−.014* (.006)	−.013* (.004)
Female	.005 (.019)	.052 (.032)	.063* (.019)
Married	.099* (.013)	.059* (.021)	.008 (.013)
Unemployed	−.116* (.025)	−.097* (.038)	−.021 (.014)
Household Income	−.010 (.032)	−.013 (.035)	−.006 (.018)
<i>Country-Year Controls</i>			
GDP/Capita	.007 (.008)	−.015 (.010)	.003 (.004)
International Conflict	.158* (.068)	−.262* (.087)	.040 (.033)
Migrant Stock	−.023* (.011)	.009 (.009)	−.010* (.004)
Democracy	.331 (.316)		
New Democracy	−.210 (.228)	−.390* (.186)	−.385* (.107)
<i>Country Controls</i>			
War Guilt	−.849* (.281)	−.474* (.237)	−.216 (.174)
Federalism	−.348 (.245)	−.150 (.182)	.063 (.113)
Ethnic Diversity	.005 (.005)	−.007 (.005)	.002 (.003)
Constant	−1.942* (.471)	−2.719* (.529)	−.293 (.200)
Second Threshold	1.691* (.061)	1.753* (.090)	
Third Threshold	3.759* (.079)	4.064* (.155)	

(selection from full table)

E.g. Thatcherism as “bitter-tasting market economics sweetened and rendered palatable by great creamy dollops of nationalistic


Figure 3. Path model relating geopolitical threat to country average attitudes toward immigration. Graphic does not represent a correlation between the two mediating variables as well as residual errors. Coefficients displayed are standardized



Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.001$

From Hiers et al (Soc Forces, 2017)

Figure 2. Average level of attitudes toward immigrants from different ethnic/racial background (left panel) and same ethnicity race (right panel) on a scale from 1 to 4, with indicating more restrictive preferences plotted against the geopolitical threat scale



From Hiers et al (Soc Forces, 2017)

Support for Scottish Independence only weakly linked to strength of Scottish national identity

Table 3.2 Referendum vote intention, by Moreno National Identity

	Moreno National Identity			
	Scottish, not British	More Scottish than British	Equally Scottish and British	More British than Scottish/British not Scottish*
Referendum vote intention	%	%	%	%
Yes	53	34	12	7
No	29	48	73	82
Undecided	14	14	11	5

From pre-referendum 2013 Scottish Social Attitudes. Curtice (BSA31, 2014).
25%, 29% and 29% in the first three columns.

Support for Scottish Independence strongly linked to economic expectations

Table 3.4 Intention to vote Yes in the referendum, by perceptions of the economic consequences of independence^[2]

% intending to vote Yes	Perceived effect of independence on			
	Scotland's economy	Living standards	Personal finances	Taxes
A lot better/higher/lower*	86	74	89	**
A little better/higher/lower*	67	65	82	(53)
No difference	23	26	35	37
A little worse/lower/higher	5	5	7	33
A lot worse/lower/higher	2	3	3	6

From pre-referendum 2013 Scottish Social Attitudes. Curtice (BSA31, 2014).

Nationalism and Brexit

- ▶ There was never enough European identity in the UK to sustain EU membership.
- ▶ In May 2016,
 - ▶ 62% said they were “British only”,
 - ▶ 31% “British and European”,
 - ▶ 1% “European and British”
 - ▶ 1% “European only”.
- ▶ These figures are typical of the full Eurobarometer series since 1992.
- ▶ Also, as we’ve seen above, most people have a (partly) ethnic conception of what it means to be British, and so not keen on immigration.

Immigration increased substantially after Blair elected

Table 3: Long-term International Migration in the UK, 1991–2015

<i>Year</i>	<i>Inflow Thousands</i>	<i>Outflow Thousands</i>	<i>Net Balance Thousands</i>
1991	329	285	+ 44
1992	268	281	-- 13
1993	266	266	-- 1
1994	315	238	+ 77
1995	312	236	+ 76
1996	318	264	+ 55
1997	327	279	+ 48
1998	391	251	+ 140
1999	454	291	+ 163
2000	479	321	+ 158
2001	481	309	+ 179
2002	516	363	+ 172
2003	511	363	+ 185
2004	589	344	+ 268
2005	567	361	+ 267
2006	596	398	+ 265
2007	574	341	+ 273
2008	590	427	+ 229
2009	567	368	+ 229
2010	591	339	+ 256
2011	566	351	+ 205
2012	498	321	+ 177
2013	526	317	+ 209
2014	632	319	+ 313
2015	631	299	+ 332

Source: UK Office for National Statistics Long-Term International Migration Estimates. Available online at: <https://www.ons.gov.uk/migration>

From Curtice (JCMS 2017).

Majority expected immigration to go down but no majority thinking other things would get worse if UK left EU

Table 5: Expected Consequences of Leaving the EU, May/June 2016

	<i>Better*</i>	<i>About the Same</i>	<i>Worse</i>
Britain's influence in the world	17	40	35
General economic situation	23	32	35
Unemployment	22	39	28
National Health Service	33	36	21
Personal financial situation	9	58	21
Risk of terrorism	21	51	20
Immigration	55	28	9

Note: * In the case of immigration 'better' indicates that the respondent thought immigration would be lower. *Source:* 2015 British Election Study Internet Panel Wave 8.

From Curtice (JCMS 2017).

Regression analysis shows economic expectations more important than immigration expectations for vote intention.

Table 7: Why the Outcome was Close

<i>Perceived impact of leaving on economy</i>	<i>% Holding that View</i>	<i>Of whom % voted Remain</i>	<i>Of whom % voted Leave</i>	<i>Value to Leave</i>
Worse	40	93	7	3
About the same	35	31	69	24
Better	25	10	90	23
Total				50
<i>EU undermines Britain's identity</i>	<i>% Holding that View</i>	<i>Of whom % voted Remain</i>	<i>Of whom % voted Leave</i>	<i>Value to Leave</i>
Disagree	34	91	9	3
Neither agree nor disagree	16	64	36	6
Agree	51	18	82	42
Total				51
<i>Impact of leaving on immigration</i>	<i>% Holding that View</i>	<i>Of whom % voted Remain</i>	<i>Of whom % voted Leave</i>	<i>Value to Leave</i>
Lower	60	30	70	42
About the same	31	83	17	5
Higher	9	65	35	3
Total				50

Note: Respondents who said Do Not Know have been added to the middle category. *Source:* 2015 British Election Study internet panel waves 8 and 9.

From Curtice (JCMS 2017).

Conclusion

- ▶ Nations and nation-states are a modern phenomenon even though they frequently have their bases in long standing groups with ethnic identities
- ▶ Nature and strength of national identity and pride depend on various contextual factors
- ▶ Popularity of nationalist causes (e.g. Scottish independence and Brexit) apparently depend more on expectations of economic and other consequences than on pure nationalist sentiment.