

Political Sociology Lectures: Religion

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- ▶ Concept and Measurement
- ▶ Cultural evolution of Christianity, Capitalism and Democracy
- ▶ Secularization in Christian societies
- ▶ Islam, Democracy and Political Violence
- ▶ Electoral Behaviour
- ▶ Institutional approaches to religious division
- ▶ Conclusions

Concepts and Measurement

A definition: A religion is a set of beliefs, symbols and practices based on the idea of the sacred.

Problems with defining religion include . . .


- ▶ What beliefs are religious?
 - ▶ Not all religions have a God or Gods.
 - ▶ Want to distinguish religion from nationalism and Marxism, hence use of the term sacred.
- ▶ Is belief necessary?
 - ▶ Core beliefs not always well defined and differ between elite and members.
 - ▶ People are often considered members of a religion almost irrespective of belief (e.g. Jews, Catholics) and *vice versa* (e.g. Church of England).
- ▶ If belonging to a group is necessary, how active do you have to be?

Various indicators used, including . . .

- ▶ Self-identification.
- ▶ Attendance (also marriages, christenings, etc.)
- ▶ Beliefs

Cultural evolution of religions (Henrich, 2020, Chpt 4)

- ▶ Small and ancient societies tend to have more personal, local and less moral gods
- ▶ Big gods facilitated development of big societies
 - ▶ stronger moral codes; free will with (afterlife) punishment
 - ▶ moral universality
 - ▶ promotion of altruism, especially within group
 - ▶ development of credibility enhancing displays: prayers, taboos, rituals, sacrifices, and martyrdom
- ▶ Societies with big gods have better within group cooperation, and competitive advantage



Source: Henrich, 2020, Fig14.1

Church marriage policy ultimately leads to democracy (Henrich, 2020)




FIGURE 12.1. The relationship between the prevalence of cousin marriage and the quality of national-level democratic institutions. Countries with more cousin marriage have weaker democracies.

Previous accounts of Christianity and Capitalism

Weber argued that Protestantism was instrumental in the development of capitalism because of a diffusion of entrepreneurial values.

- ▶ Protestants have to *prove* themselves and so have a strong work ethic
- ▶ For Catholics confession is a pressure valve
i.e. difference is not doctrinal but behavioural
- ▶ Belonging to a protestant sect also becomes a badge of credit worthiness.

Causality/Endogeneity Problem: Economic interests of certain groups may have influenced the development of Protestantism.

Bell (Contradictions of Capitalism) argues that modern capitalism has itself changed values, undermining it's Protestant origins. We have become,

- ▶ more secular and amoral
- ▶ lacking in work ethic
- ▶ consumerist
- ▶ individualist

Christianity and Democracy

Bruce (2003) argues:

- ▶ The protestant reformation led to capitalism (Weber) and the tolerance of different sects.
- ▶ Capitalism and the presence of different groups led to liberalism.
- ▶ Liberalism led to liberal democracy.


Henrich (2020) account similar but emphasises protestant demand for literacy and broader development of WEIRD psychology.

Democratization of Catholic countries is perhaps the result of the successful practice of democracy in Protestant countries.

- ▶ Catholic Church only officially accepted democracy in 1944.
- ▶ However, the Church sometimes found it better to support Catholic parties within democracies rather than groups that sought to undermine democracy e.g. Kalyvas (1998) on late 19th Century Belgium.

Catholics much less Nazi in 1932: Spenkuch & Tillmann (AJPS, 2017)

FIGURE 1 Religion and Nazi Vote Shares




- ▶ It was Protestants rather than Catholics that most supported the Nazis and led to the collapse of democracy in 1930s Germany.
- ▶ Hitler thought NSDAP only able to win Catholic voters if curia gave up opposition to national socialism.

Catholic priests mattered: Spenkuch & Tillmann (AJPS, 2017)

- ▶ Where the local priest was sympathetic to the Nazis, the Catholic Nazi vote was bigger.
- ▶ Church failed to reduce the Catholic communist vote because those voters too far from the church position, because of the economic crisis.

FIGURE 3 Theoretical Predictions of Our Elite Influence Model



Note: Graphs illustrate the predictions of the model sketched out in the section "On the Importance of the Catholic Party and the Limits of Elite Influence."

Secularization in Christian Societies I

Three dimensions (Dobbelare, 1981)

1. Level of society and institutions
2. Within religious institutions
3. Individual level association with religious institutions.

Linked to modernization in three ways.

- ▶ Social differentiation: especially adoption of health and education by the state.
- ▶ Societalization: A reduction in the importance of community relative to the wider society.
- ▶ Rationalization: reduces need for coordination and ordering by values (Bell 1976).




FIG. 1.—Religious affiliation by decade of birth, Great Britain, 1983–2013. Data are from the British Social Attitudes survey, 1983–2013. Includes white respondents age 20–84. Three-survey moving average.

Source: Voas and Chaves (AJS, 2016)




FIG. 3.—Religious affiliation by decade of birth, Australia, 1971–2011. Data are from the Australian Bureau of Statistics: commissioned tables from the census of population, 1971–2011. Includes only people born in Australia.




FIG. 5.—Religious affiliation by decade of birth, Canada, 1985–2012. Data are from the Canadian General Social Survey, 1985–2012; includes only respondents born in Canada. Three-survey moving average.

Source: Voas and Chaves (AJS, 2016)




FIG. 8.—Strong or somewhat strong religious affiliation by decade of birth, United States, 1974–2014. Data are from the General Social Survey, 1974–2014. Includes respondents age 20–84 born in the United States. Three-survey moving average.

Source: Voas and Chaves (AJS, 2016)




FIG. 9.—Attendance monthly or more often by decade of birth, United States, 1973–2014. Data are from the General Social Survey, 1974–2014. Includes respondents age 20–84 born in the United States. Three-survey moving average. To avoid overstating religious decline, the unusually religious 1972 GSS sample has been excluded.





FIG. 10.—Knows God exists by decade of birth, United States, 1988–2014. Data are from the General Social Survey, 1988–2014. Includes respondents age 20–84 born in the United States. Three-survey moving average.

Source: Voas and Chaves (AJS, 2016)

US is not a counter-example to the secularization thesis.

Secularisation in Britain: Voas and Bruce (BSA36, 2019)



Secularisation by cohort replacement in Britain: Voas and Bruce (BSA36, 2019)

	Male	Female	All
% Have a religion			
18-34	32	41	36
35-54	37	50	43
55+	51	65	58
All ages	41	54	47
% Ever attends religious services or meetings*			
18-34	26	32	29
35-54	28	35	32
55+	29	37	33
All ages	28	35	31
% Believe in God‡			
18-34	29	38	33
35-54	36	44	40
55+	33	50	42
All ages	33	45	39

Debates about Secularization theory

- ▶ Globally religion is on the rise.
 - ▶ Primarily Western Europe and other high income democracies where it is in decline.
 - ▶ The US is modern but not secular.
- ▶ Even within W Europe, measures of secularization (identification, church attendances, religious marriages, etc.) have been disputed and may be a sign of changing practice not general decline of religion. (e.g. Martin, 1978).
 - ▶ e.g. religious TV and radio, New Age spirituality and 'believing without belonging'.
 - ▶ However any increases in these are too small to compensate for decline in traditional religious activity in those countries that have secularized.
- ▶ There has been no decline in *demand* for religion, it is just that some European countries have problems with the *supply* in the market for religious services (e.g. Stark and Finke).
 - ▶ So the plurality of religions and free competition explains high religiosity in the US.
 - ▶ US is also a country based on immigration of religious refugees.

Norris and Inglehart *Sacred and Secular*




Figure 1.1. Schematic Model Explaining Religiosity

Criticism of Norris and Inglehart

- ▶ Gorski and Altinordu (2008) criticise Norris and Inglehart (2004) for,
 1. using 'existential security' to mean basic physical needs in non-Western countries but higher-order psychological needs (predictability, protection against risk) in the US.
 2. making a temporal argument based on cross-sectional data.

Relationships between Religions and the State affect Religiosity

Most European states were originally legitimated by religion. To maintain power, the church allied with the political elite to resist moves towards democratization.

France: Since the revolution the state has been strongly anti-clerical most notably in the education policy.

- battle over headscarves in schools should be understood in this light.

England: Early victory of state over church (C16th).

- Church remains established but politically weak.


US, Ireland, Greece and Poland: Separation of (majority) church from state has allowed religion to flourish.

- It is the association with the political elite, rather than religion, that lead to rejection of the church (Martin, 1978).

These factors are relevant for trends in secularization as well as the politicisation of religion.


Cold War cohorts less religious than predecessors in Central Eastern Europe: Muller and Neundorf (Soc Forces, 2012)

Figure 1. Cohort Differences in Religiosity (1990-92)




Bigger drops with more communist repression of religion: Muller and Neundorf (Soc Forces, 2012)

Figure 2. Cohort Differences (1990-92) and State-Church Relation (1980)



Post Cold War religious recovery in East, despite secularisation in W Europe: Muller and Neundorf (Soc Forces, 2012)


Figure 3. Proportion of Believers over Time (in %)



Within-cohort period effects different for East and West:


Muller and Neundorf (Soc Forces, 2012)

Figure 4. Cohort Differences in Religiosity over Time




Religiosity increases with GDP in CE Europe, but declines with GDP in W Europe: Muller and Neundorf (Soc Forces, 2012)

Figure 5. Religiosity by GDP (Both Centered by Country)



Religiosity moves with religious legislation, but in different directions in East and West: Muller and Neundorf (Soc Forces, 2012)

Figure 6. God Belief by Religious Legislation over Time



Secularisation in the US: Djupe et al (Pol Res Q, 2018)




Figure I. None growth in the states, 2006–2016.

Source. The 2006–2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study.

Increasing numbers stating religious affiliation as “None”

More secularisation where Christian Right strong enough to institute Same-Sex Marriage Bans: Djupe et al (Pol Res Q, 2018)

- ▶ Rush from 2004 to set state constitutions in opposition to LGBT rights, including SSM bans in 29 states, made Christian Right more salient in some states.
- ▶ “As a result”, religion lost 2 to 8 % of the population”




Figure 2. How the SSM bans interacted with a visible CR to influence the growth of nones and the unclaimed. CR = Christian Right; CCES = Cooperative Congressional Election Study; SSM = same-sex marriage.

Only statistically significant for census “unclaimed”, and small effect magnitude.

Islam and Democracy I

There is a substantial difference between the level of democratization between the Islamic and non-Islamic regions (Bruce Tables 7.1 and 7.2) with Arab states especially unlikely to be democratic.

EXPLANATION 207

Table 7.1 Type of regime in Muslim countries, 2001

Type of regime	Number
Presidential-parliamentary democracies	10
Traditional monarchies	9
Authoritarian presidencies	9
Dominant party states with token opposition	7
Presidential-parliamentary with authoritarian elements	6
One-party states	3
Military ruled	1
Theocracy	1
Parliamentary democracies	1

Source: The Freedom House Survey Team, 'Freedom in the World 2002: the democracy gap'

Table 7.2 Political rights and civil liberties in Muslim and non-Muslim states, 1981 and 2001 (%)

State	Muslim		Non-Muslim	
	1981	2001	1981	2001
Free	3	2	41	59
Partly free	51	38	25	28
Not free	46	59	34	14
TOTAL	100	100	100	101
No. of states	39	47	123	145

Totals not 100 owing to rounding.

Source: The Freedom House Survey Team, 'Freedom in the World 2002: the democracy gap'

Islam and Democracy II

- ▶ In 2023 no Muslim majority states classified as “Free”.
- ▶ Economist IU 2022 classifies Albania, Malaysia and Indonesia as “Flawed democracies”. Other Muslim states are Hybrid or Authoritarian.
- ▶ Perhaps to do with the legalism of Islam, oil, colonialism, etc.
- ▶ Tunisia was the only example of a moderate Islamist party coming to power and acting in accordance with constitutional democratic norms (March, AnRevPolSci 2015)
 - ▶ Islamist Turkish AK Party has curtailed press freedom
 - ▶ Apart from Tunisia, Arab Spring democratisation movements were either (eventually) suppressed or led to ongoing conflict


Islam and Democracy III

But note . . .

- ▶ Plenty of peaceful and thoughtful debate about democracy in Islamic countries and Islamic democracy (March, *AnRevPolSci* 2015)
- ▶ Davis and Robinson (2006) find that support for implementation of Sharia law is associated with economic communitarianism, whereby the state should provide for the poor, reduce inequality, and meet community needs via economic intervention.
- ▶ Non-violent Islamist groups often successful in elections due to reputation for good governance built up in opposition to autocratic regimes (Cammett and Luong, *AnRevPolSci* 2014)

Islam and Democracy IV

- ▶ Norris and Inglehart (2004 & 2012) argue that public support for democracy is not noticeably lower in the Muslim world.
- ▶ Following figure shows attitudes in Muslim (Origin) and high-income Christian (Destination) countries, and for the Muslim migrants who moved between the two.



Beliefs and behaviour counteracting: Ben-Nun Bloom and Arikan (2011)

- ▶ Religious beliefs reduce support for democracy (WVS data).
- ▶ But social interaction from religious behaviour can increase support.
- ▶ While overall Muslims are pro-democratic, among Muslims both more belief and behaviour associated with less support for democracy.






Fig. 2 Interactions among religious identification and religious belief and behavior. Figure depicts the significant interactions between religious identification and religious belief, and identification and religious social behavior. The *left side panels* present the effect of religious belief on democratic attitudes for Catholics, Muslims and all other religious traditions, while the *right side panels* present the effect of religious social behavior on democratic attitudes for these three groups

How religion affects support democracy: Ben-Nun Bloom and Arikan (2012)



The within part of the theory-driven path model



The between part of the theory-driven path model

Fig. 1. The theory-driven path model

Are Muslims more politically violent? |

- ▶ There has been substantial Islamist terrorism internationally.
 - ▶ However, not clear that suicide bombing is especially related to Islam as opposed to the circumstances Islamist groups find themselves in (Horowitz, AnRevPolSci 2015)
- ▶ Although Islamic extremists are often characterized as anti-democratic the motivations of Islamic terrorists and political Islam, are varied (Sadowski, 2006).
- ▶ Most recent armed conflicts have been in Muslim countries and they have a higher than average participation in interstate conflicts.(Gleditsch and Rudolfson, R&P 2016)
 - ▶ However, whole data after WWII suggests Muslims countries not particularly war prone.
 - ▶ Other factors help explain the pattern: colonial history, major power intervention, econ and political developments.
 - ▶ Most victims are Muslim

Are Muslim countries more violent? Gleditsch and Rudolfson (R&P 2016)




Figure 2. All civil wars, civil wars in Muslim countries and civil wars with Islamist insurgents, 1946–2014.
Sources: As in Table 1. The data on Islamist insurgents are listed in the online supplementary material.

Are Muslim countries more violent? Gleditsch and Rudolfen (R&P 2016) II




Figure 4. Share of all civil war battle deaths occurring in civil wars in Muslim countries, 1946–2014.
Sources: As in Figure 2. The PRIO battle deaths data run from 1946 to 1989, of Lacina and Gleditsch (2005). The UCDP data run from 1989 to 2014




Figure 5. Total number of battle deaths in interstate wars, and battle deaths involving Muslim countries, 1946–2014.
Sources: As in Table 1.

Are Muslim countries more violent?

Gleditsch and Rudolfsen (R&P 2016)



Table 1. Religion and the absolute and relative incidence of civil war, 1946–2014.

Majority religion	Number of countries	Number of countries with civil war	%	Independent years since 1946	Years with civil war	%
Buddhism	8	4	50	503	73	15
Christianity	110	30	27	5807	177	3
Folk Religion	3	1	33	146	10	7
Hinduism	3	2	67	181	19	10
Islam	49	20	41	2467	174	7
Judaism	1	1	100	66	2	3
Unaffiliated	6	1	17	312	6	2
All	180	59	33	9482	461	5


Sources: For majority religion: Pew (2012), for internal armed conflict: UCDP (www.pcr.uu.se/data/). See also Pettersson and Wallensteen (2015). We use the Gleditsch and Ward (1999) data for the composition of the interstate system. A preliminary version of these data was published in Gleditsch and Rudolfsen (2015), which also includes tables for all armed conflicts regardless of size.

Religion and Electoral Behaviour I

- ▶ Rose and Urwin (1969)—“Religious divisions, not class, are the main social bases of parties in the Western world today”.
- ▶ Where religion, class and linguistic divides co-exist (e.g. Belgium, Canada, S. Africa and Switzerland), religion is the most important and we can find both effects (Lijphart, APSR, 1979, Table 3).

Effects of religiosity also in European Parliament Elections (van der Brug et al., WEP, 2009)

FIGURE 1
RELIGIOSITY AND PARTY CHOICE



They also provide evidence that the effects of religion are greater where there is more religious diversity.

Denominational and religiosity differences

- ▶ Hayes (1995) found that for US, GB, Norway, NL, Germany, N Ireland and Italy there were substantial differences in opinions on various social issues between religious identifiers and others, but relatively little difference between Catholics and Protestants.
- ▶ Dalton (Citizen Politics, 2014) argues both denominational and religiosity effects on voting are modest

Denominational differences in Dalton (2014, 2019)

Religious denomination influences voting preferences but in different ways across nations.

United States (2008)	No Religion	Catholic	Reformation Protestant	Baptist Protestant	Other Protestant	Jewish
Democrats	63	62	48	46	46	87
Republicans	37	38	52	54	54	13
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Great Britain (2010)	No Religion	Catholic	Anglican	Presbyterian
Labour	32	35	28	46
Liberal Democrats	27	24	17	14
Conservatives	32	35	48	18
Other parties	9	6	5	22
Total	100	100	100	100

France (2007)	No Religion	Catholic
PCF	11	3
Socialists	45	29
Greens	8	4
MoDem	10	9
UMP	24	53
National Front	2	2
Total	100	100

Germany (2009)	No Religion	Catholic	Protestant
Linke	25	6	10
Greens	13	7	16
SPD	24	21	27
FDP	14	18	16
CDU/CSU	25	48	31
Total	100	100	100

Table 8.2 Religion and Vote

Table 8.2 Religion and Vote				
United States (2016)	No Religion	Catholic	Protestant	Jewish
Democrats	61	51	31	63
Republicans	39	49	69	37
Total	100	100	100	100
Great Britain (2017)	No Religion	Catholic	Anglican	Presbyterian
Labour	47	50	25	31
Liberal Democrats	9	3	8	4
Conservatives	35	42	62	46
Other parties	9	5	5	19
Total	100	100	100	100
France (2017)	No Religion	Catholic		
PCF	4	2		
LFI	27	10		
Socialists	8	6		
Greens	4	3		
En Marche!	28	39		
Republicans	5	16		
National Front	17	17		
Other parties	7	7		
Total	100	100		
Germany (2017)	No Religion	Catholic	Protestant	
Linke	16	7	5	
Greens	13	16	17	
SPD	19	18	23	
CDU/CSU	21	38	32	
FDP	14	11	12	
AfD	13	6	7	
Other parties	4	5	3	
Total	100	100	100	

Source: The United States, 2016 American National Election Study; Great Britain, 2017 British Election Study; France, 2017 French Election Study; Germany, 2017 German Longitudinal Election Study.

Note: U.S. data are based on the congressional vote.

Religiosity differences in Dalton (2014, 2019)

Attending church regularly increases support for parties on the Right.

	NEVER	OCCASIONALLY	WEEKLY
<i>United States (2008)</i>			
Democrats	58	61	44
Republicans	41	39	56
Total	100	100	100
<i>Great Britain (2010)</i>			
Labour	32	31	43
Liberal Democrats	24	17	17
Conservatives	35	44	34
Other parties	9	8	6
Total	100	100	100
<i>France (2007)</i>			
PCF	9	5	4
Socialists	52	34	17
Greens	10	5	2
MoDem	6	9	12
UMP	22	44	64
National Front	1	2	1
Total	100	99	101
<i>Germany (2009)</i>			
Linke	20	7	5
Greens	15	11	7
SPD	24	25	7
FDP	16	18	18
CDU/CSU	25	39	64
Total	100	100	101

Table 8.3 Church Attendance and Vote

Attending church generally increases support for conservative parties.			
	Never	Occasionally	Weekly
<i>United States (2016)</i>			
Democrats	61	54	37
Republicans	39	46	63
Total	100	100	100
<i>Great Britain (2017)</i>			
Labour	45	34	51
Liberal Democrats	5	6	10
Conservatives	43	52	36
Other parties	7	8	3
Total	100	100	100
<i>France (2017)</i>			
PCF	5	3	1
LFI	23	21	11
Socialists	8	4	6
Greens	3	3	3
En Marche!	26	36	40
Republicans	8	10	16
National Front	19	15	14
Other parties	8	11	9
Total	100	100	100
<i>Germany (2017)</i>			
Linke	15	7	5
Greens	14	15	12
SPD	19	22	15
CDU/CSU	21	34	53
FDP	12	13	8
AfD	14	6	3
Other parties	6	2	6
Total	100	100	100

Sources: The United States, 2016 American National Election Study; Great Britain, 2017 British Election Study; France, 2017 French Election Study; Germany, 2017 German Longitudinal Election Study.

Decline in religion as a basis for vote choice? I

From Brooks et al (Social Science Research, 2006):




Fig. 1. Changing magnitude of the class, religion, and gender cleavages.

Decline in religion as a basis for vote choice? II

From Best (EPSR, 2011):

Decline in contributions mainly due to declining loyalty among Christians as a whole, and declining numbers of church goers.

Table 6. Sources of change in the contributions of Christians to Christian democratic parties: size, turnout, and loyalty

	Christians								Churchgoers							
	Contribution		Size		Turnout		Loyalty		Contribution		Size		Turnout		Loyalty	
	Trend	SE	Trend	SE	Trend	SE	Trend	SE	Trend	SE	Trend	SE	Trend	SE	Trend	SE
Belgium	-1.05*	0.11	-0.18*	0.06	-0.09*	0.03	-0.88*	0.08	-0.86*	0.07	-0.73*	0.21	-0.03*	0.01	-0.23*	0.06
Denmark	-0.05*	0.01	-0.01*	0.00	0.01*	0.00	-0.05*	0.02	-0.02*	0.01	-0.02*	0.01	0.01*	0.00	-0.01	0.01
Germany	-0.59*	0.09	-0.09*	0.02	-0.15*	0.04	-0.39*	0.09	-0.41*	0.04	-0.29*	0.03	-0.04*	0.02	-0.17*	0.04
Italy	-0.69*	0.15	-0.07*	0.02	-0.14*	0.03	-0.52*	0.16	-0.15*	0.11	0.29*	0.31	-0.08*	0.01	-0.32*	0.09
The Netherlands	-0.56*	0.11	-0.43*	0.03	0.10	0.08	-0.28*	0.09	-0.47*	0.06	-0.44*	0.14	0.11*	0.04	-0.16*	0.03

Table entries are the results of regressing the variables on time. Size, turnout, and loyalty regressions represent the trends in the contribution when only the reported variable is allowed to vary and the others are held constant at their 1975–77 values.

For Christian regressions: N = 19 for Germany, 18 for Denmark and the Netherlands, 17 for Belgium, and 15 for Italy.

For churchgoer regressions: N = 14 for Germany, 13 for Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands, and 12 for Denmark.

*Statistical significance at the 0.05 level for one-tailed tests.

Stability of religious differences in England: Tilley 2014




Fig. 2. Labour support, by religion in England over time, BES and BSA data

Inter-generational transfer: Tilley 2014

- ▶ Religious identity, religiosity and partisanship are all transferred from parents to children through socialisation
- ▶ Tilley (2014) argues that this process explains some of the religious cleavage in Britain, but ideological differences (socialism or liberalism) do not.

TABLE 3 *Predicted Probabilities of Labour Support, for Selected Religious Groups from a Series of Multinomial Logistic Regression Models Using BES Data 1979–1997*

Denomination	Model 4 (+social characteristics)	Model 5 (+ parental party ID)
<i>Scotland</i>		
Practising Presbyterian	26%	23%
Catholic	64%	44%
<i>Difference between Presbyterians and Catholics</i>	-37%	-22%
<i>England</i>		
Practising Anglican	36%	32%
Nonconformist	46%	38%
Catholic	59%	48%
<i>Difference between Anglicans and Catholics</i>	-23%	-16%

Religious Household Context: Kotler-Berkowitz (2001)

TABLE 3 *Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis: Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democratic Voting, 1992 British General Election*

Independent variables	Labour vs. Tory, predicting Labour		Liberal Democrat vs. Tory, predicting Liberal Democrat		Labour vs. Liberal Democrat, predicting Labour	
	Model A	Model B	Model A	Model B	Model A	Model B
<i>Religious Variables</i>						
Religious Belonging: ¹						
Catholic	0.57***	0.45**	-0.04	-0.07	0.62***	0.52**
Dissenting Protestant	0.21	0.24	0.35**	0.33*	-0.14	-0.09
Church of Scotland	-0.34	-0.36	-0.34	-0.47	0.00	0.11
Other religion	1.09**	1.06**	0.26	-0.03	0.83*	1.08**
Secular	0.40***	0.37***	0.19	0.15	0.22*	0.22*
Religious Behaviour	-0.08**	-0.08*	0.12***	0.12***	-0.20***	-0.20***
Religious Belief	-0.06	-0.06	-0.29***	-0.30***	0.23***	0.24***
Household Religious Context: ²						
Catholic		0.40*		0.08		0.32
Dissenting Protestant		0.08		0.13		-0.05
Church of Scotland		0.20		0.42		-0.22
Other religion		0.42		0.72		-0.30
Secular		0.25*		0.16		0.09
Mix		0.05		0.05		0.00
Alone		0.50**		0.03		0.47**
<i>Economic Variables</i>						
Economic assessments	-0.14***	-0.11***	-0.10**	-0.09*	-0.03	-0.02
Unemployment benefits	0.04	0.09	0.10	0.10	-0.06	0.00

Kotler-Berkowitz (2001) also shows that religious denominational effects in Britain can depend on belief and on class identity. E.g. greater Labour voting among Catholics seems to be weaker among stronger believers and among the working class identifiers.

Church influence on attitudes to immigrants?

- ▶ Church of England identifiers more likely to vote UKIP in 2015, Leave in 2016 and hold negative attitudes to immigration, despite church teaching.
- ▶ But those anglicans that attend church more often hold more positive views towards immigrants (Paterson (BJPIR, 2018)).




Figure 1. Cross-national bivariate analyses: Immigration Attitudes Index and three measures of religiosity (ESS Rounds 3-7).


- ▶ But religion apparently has a negative effect in other European countries.

Denominational alignment in the US

Manza and Brooks (1999) argue there has been no general decline in denominational differences in the **US**, in particular . . .

- ▶ Secularization has not weakened the religious cleavage
- ▶ Liberal Protestants (Methodist, Anglicans etc.) have become more moderate perhaps due to increasing Republican conservatism.
- ▶ The Christian Right have become neither more right wing nor more participatory, at least up to 1999.
- ▶ Allowing for JFK, Catholics have remained stable.

From Brooks et al (Soc. Quarterly, 2004)



Note: Estimates in first seven panels (triangles) measure a group's divergence from a mean of 0; estimates in eighth panel (circles) measure the magnitude of the overall religion cleavage in voting.


**FIGURE 1. VOTING BEHAVIOR OF RELIGIOUS GROUPS
IN U.S. NATIONAL ELECTIONS, 1972-2000**

Religious priming leads to values voting: McCauley, APSR 2014 I

- ▶ In Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire ethnic priming leads to preferences for local goods, while religious (Muslim vs Christian) priming leads to preferences for high moral standards
- ▶ The author supposes this is because ethnic groups are more geographically bounded in these countries
- ▶ Not so in all contexts

Religious priming leads to values voting: McCauley, APSR 2014 II

FIGURE 2. Treatment Effects



Notes: The x axis depicts differences in the proportion of affirmative responses among treated groups, compared to the control category (control means set at zero). In Question 1, the moral candidate is pitted against a development candidate (control group mean = 0.662). In Question 2, the figure indicates the proportion selecting a community in which everyone has strong morals over one in which everyone is wealthy (control group mean = 0.798). In Question 3, the figure indicates the proportion stating a willingness to pay a small bribe for schooling (control group mean = 0.378). Bars indicate 95-percent confidence intervals.

Institutional approaches to Religious Division

If there is a severe religious or ethnic division that might have been or become violent there various institutional structures that have been thought to reduce conflict.

- ▶ imposing an autocratic regime e.g. former Yugoslavia where c.40% are Muslim (partly due to Turkish invasions in the middle ages, stories of which have led to Serbian nationalism and resentment).
 - ▶ Balkan case could also/alternatively be thought of as one where divisions were suppressed by great powers.
- ▶ Pillarization (*verzuiling*) is a social solution whereby individuals interact within groups, but group leaders coordinate to organize society. Corresponding governing arrangement is consociationalism.
 - ▶ Thought to be key to understanding successful government in the Netherlands, which is divided by both religion (Protestant/Catholic) and class.
 - ▶ Good Friday agreement in N Ireland is informed by this kind of thinking, since a double majority of Catholics and Protestants is required for the executive to work.

Conclusion

- ▶ Development of christianity in Europe perhaps crucial to development of capitalism and democracy (Henrich, Weber, etc.).
- ▶ Secularisation in high income christian-heritage democracies has further changed politics
 - ▶ but still religious divisions in social attitudes and voting
 - ▶ state action increasing religiosity and politicisation of religion in Central and Eastern Europe
- ▶ Developments in political Islam raise interesting questions about the relationships between religion and both political violence and democracy.
- ▶ Religious divisions affect politics because of values and identity divisions. Which of those is predominant changes the nature of the impact.