The Jewel of Liberty Stolen? The Rokosz of Sandomierz and Polish Dissent

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The Rokosz of Sandomierz, the noble rising against the Polish crown of 1606-9, is traditionally seen as a turning point in the history of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The earliest analyses of the Rokosz saw it from the perspective of Poland’s later partition. Its failure marked the end of a ‘golden age’ of Commonwealth greatness, szlachta liberty and liberty of conscience; with the resulting narrowing political and religious authority, the Commonwealth was increasingly unable to cope with modernity or reform. The source of legitimacy appeared to shift; power moved from a broader base of szlachta (noble) rule to an elite ‘magnate oligarchy’ close to the crown. A similar shift in religious legitimacy from liberty of conscience for szlachta of all Christian confessions to a dominant Catholicism is also marked by the ‘failure’ of the Rokosz.

Mickiewicz wrote that the Commonwealth had declined due to the excesses of szlachta liberty, which overruled all other social groups and undermined the ancient bases of the Polish State. This view, which crystallised with the Romantics under partition, was then used by historians of the Polish People’s Republic. Maciszewski’s unfinished Marxist-Leninist analysis of 1960 sees the ‘feudal’ forces of crown, elite and religious hierarchy overcoming ‘szlachta democracy’ in the Rokosz; this unholy alliance of spiritual and secular authorities undermined traditional Commonwealth plurality, trying and failing to impose reform from the centre. The Rokosz thus divided the elite from the rest of the szlachta, destroying the unity of the estate.

A wealth of material, published and unpublished, documents the rokosz. The rising sparked an unparalleled amount of political polemic and interest in this arose particularly with Polish independence between the wars. By returning to these sources, we may challenge both Mickiewicz and Maciszewski’s...

2 J Maciszewski, Wojna domowa w Polsce (Wrocław 1960) pp.358-9
3 A Rembowski (ed.), Rokosz Zebrzydowskiego: Materiały historyczne: Biblioteka Ordinacji Krasinskiach – Muzeum Konstantego Savidzińskiego vols. 9-12 (Warszawa 1893); J Czubek (ed.), Pisma polityczne z czasu rokoszu Zebrzydowskiego t.1-3 (Kraków 1916-18); C Chowaniec, “Poglady polityczne rokosza 1606-7 wobec doktryn monomarchomachów francuskich” in Reformacja w Polsce 3 (1924); A Strzelecki, “Udział i rola równowierstwa w rokoszu Zebrzydowskim” in Reformacja w Polsce 7-8 (1935-6). Unpublished manuscripts in Biblioteka Racynskich (BR) MS 18, 34, 233; Biblioteka PAN w Kórniku (BK) MS 315, 316, 317, 1069; Biblioteka Ossolińskich (BO) MS 115-III; Biblioteka Czartoryskich (BC) MS 335, 337, 338; Biblioteka Narodowa (BN) MS 6611, 6639
assumptions. Far from being a failure, Rokosz ideals were re-legitimised in the Commonwealth power structures, during and years after the event. This rising did not mark the ‘beginning of the end’ of the Polish-Lithuanian State, hopelessly unravelling towards partition; it brought the crown and szlachta back in line with each other, enabling them to work together again after the unrest. The rising released tensions, strengthening the Commonwealth for the next decades.

The Commonwealth was one of the largest European territories. The Union of Lublin in 1569 united the parliaments of Poland and Lithuania, where diversity was commonplace; Cossacks and German burghers, Orthodox, Protestants and Catholics, Jews and Muslims shared the same state. To govern this vast area, power had to be devolved from the monarch and Sejm (parliament) at the centre, to regional szlachta on their estates and sejmiki (local diets). The elective monarchy also gave szlachta a chance to influence politics at the centre greatly during interregna. Still, the provinces protested if they found the centre overbearing.

Traditionally the Rokosz is seen as the beginning of the end of the szlachta ideals of the 1573 election of Henri IV Valois. The Henrician Articles and Pacta Conventa of this year, to which each elected monarch had to subscribe, consolidated the rights gained by the szlachta over more than two centuries (including religious liberty, according to the Warsaw Confederation, and exemption from taxation).

The article *de non praestanda oboedientia* stated the szlachta’s right to oppose the monarch with military force in a Rokosz, if they agreed he had broken his obligations. This had occurred before, making Rokosz a traditional form of szlachta protest. These *rokoszanie* (risers) justified their reaction against the *absolutum dominium* of a king who had broken his contract with his subjects. As one anonymous szlachta polemicist put it, the crown was the head of the Commonwealth body, but if the head was sick, a healthy body had every right to oppose its will.

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4 J Bardach (ed.), *Historia panstwa i prawa polskiego* (Warszawa 1976) p.219; The theory of *de non praestanda oboedientia* was well established in the 16th century as the work of the political writer Orzechowski for example shows, & other rokoszy occurred in 1379 & 1537. W Sobieski, „Idee rokoszowe a różnowiercy za czasów Zygmunta Augusta” in *Reformacja w Polsce 4* (1925) p.6; H Wisner, *Rokosz Zebrzydowskiego* (Kraków 1989) p.3


6 The author went on to argue for treasury reform to fund a proper Commonwealth army – an issue to return in the rokosz. *Votum szlachcica polskiego ojczyzne wiernie milujacego* (Kraków 1589) Biblioteka PAN w Kórniku (BK) Cim. Qu. 2561p.Aii. See also parliamentarian Marcin Broniewski & Zygmunt Grudzinski, Palatine of Rawă defending the loyalty to the Commonwealth above loyalty to the crown; Broniewski at Sandomierz, 15 VIII 1606 in *zjazd* diary in Biblioteka Ossolinskich (BO) 115/III p.23b; Grudzinski, diary of the Sandomierz *zjazd* in BK MS 991 p.227b
This Rokosz progressed over three years. Its origins are at the start of Zygmunt III’s reign. His plans to marry into the Habsburg house without szlachta consent caused tension. Chancellor Jan Zamojski led the opposition, which became explicit in the Sejm of 1590. Dissatisfaction with this Sejm led to the zjazd (szlachta assembly) at Kolo, seat of the Great Polish regional diet, protesting that the crown was ignoring the szlachta role in decision making in the Sejm; other assemblies followed. The 1605 Sejm brought political tensions to a head. Here, Zygmunt reiterated his plans for marriage, claims to the Swedish throne and war with the Ottomans; all were rejected. The Sejm ended without conclusions; the issues the rokoszanie were to raise could not be resolved with the crown in parliament. The final attempt at this was the 1606 Sejm. Zygmunt III was forced to affirm the commitment to Commonwealth liberties he had made on his election before a distrustful szlachta, but failure to agree over the religious toleration led to the break up of the Sejm.

The rising in 1606 only occurred when parliamentary means had failed. The day after the Sejm ended, the declaration calling for a Rokosz came from Stezyca on 9 April 1606, calling the szlachta to rise against the crown since he had overruled the will of the Sejm. Both sides, produced their own manifestos, at Sandomierz and Wislica respectively; the anti-regalists, led by Palatine of Kraków Michal Zebrzydowski and Palatine of Wilno Janusz Radziwill and regalists, including leading nobles like the Potockis and Koniecpolksis. The breakdown of negotiations led to open civil war, and it was only in 1609 that the opposition leaders accepted royal authority again in an amnesty.

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7 The royal marriage was a recurring rokosz grievance. Zygmunt’s new wife, Constantia, Archduke Frederick’s sister, was the sister of his old one. The main grievance was the secret negotiation with the Habsburgs, without consulting the szlachta; neither through his senatorial advisors nor through the Sejm. K Lepszy, *Rzeczpospolita polska 1589-1592 w dobie sejmu inkwizycynego* (Kraków 1939) p.40, p.135, p.139, p.169, pp.197ff, p.225, pp.271ff p.300
8 *Confoederatio generalis Wielkopolski w Kole* (Poznan 1590); copy in W Dworzaczek (ed.), *Akta sejmikowe wojewodztwa poznańskiego i kaliskiego 1: 1572-1616* (Poznan 1957) pp.98ff. The Kolo zjazd wanted the taxation of the last Sejm cancelled, electoral and treasury reform, and offices distributed only at the Sejm, & Sejm constitutions not altered without them. They wanted royal elections at a fixed time & place, to avoid a repeat of Henry IV’s flight (after which it was debated for a year & a half whether they were living in interregnum or not) under Zygmunt III – clear concern about his dynastic ambitions in Sweden. The zjazdy at Radom & Lublin in 1591 and 1592 combined these with opposition to the Habsburg alliance, with Chancellor Zamojski’s support; K Lepszy, *Rzeczpospolita* ch.13
10 Sejm diary 1606 in BK MS 325 p.601, pp.610ff; p.620
The Rokosz itself harked back to the ideals of the 1573 settlement, as the demands the risers made in their Sandomierz Articles show. A key priority was the dissolution of the Habsburg alliance, this was the main thrust of criticism of Zygmunt’s foreign affairs and military failures. The risers called for a permanent army set up at royal expense, an end to all internal customs and duties, and an investigation into the holding of royal lands. Key religious questions were securing toleration, ‘anticlerical’ articles on cancelling tithes and annates, and a call for Church contribution to state funds by at least paying the kwarta (military) tax. We will see how far these demands were met.

Far from being a failure, the ideals of 1573, which the rokoszanie defended, were absorbed back into the mainstream of Commonwealth discourse. This took time; some demands were met during the rising, thus destabilising opposition to the crown. Others were met years later, as the spirit of the Rokosz continued as an opposition force in Commonwealth politics.

The Rokosz did not dramatically change the face of political authority. Maciszewski set the historiographical tone from the 1960s on, seeing the Rokosz as the point where senators and lesser szlachta were divided from each other. The rising marked a split between a magnate elite allied with the crown, intent on rational reform, and the mass of petty nobles unreasonably clinging to their excessive liberties. Some Polish historians, notably Maczak, develop the idea of a narrowing magnate oligarchy from this point on. Yet as others, such as Edward Opalinski argue, magnates and mass szlachta were not polarised after the rising. Mobility and alliances across the estate continued, binding the szlachta together.

The rising itself did not cause a split between senators and szlachta. The rokoszanie made every effort to involve senators, both spiritual and secular, seeing them as their natural leaders, lamenting the time when Chancellor Zamojski was there to take this role, and praising Rokosz leaders Zebrzydowski and Radziwill. They stressed the need for unity of all three parts of the mixta

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12 Sandomierz articles, 8 X 1606 in BK MS 315 pp.34ff; also in Rembowski (ed.), Rokosz pp.294ff; They also wanted Brandenburg Prussia to be absorbed into the Commonwealth, rejecting Zygmunt’s bestowal of the fief (kuratela) to Prince Joachim Friedrich. Royal ambassadors to Moscow, sent without szlachta consent, should also be returned, and Polish control of Estonia should be restored.

13 He sees the rift with senators as more decisive than that with the crown; Maciszewski, Wojna domowa p.334, p.1, p. 61, p.173, p.290, p. 334, pp.358-9; See also Z Litowska, “Województwa sieradzkie i leczyckie w latach rokoszu Zebrzydowskiego” in Zeszyty naukowe uniwersytetu lodzkiego seria 1 z.30 (1963)


15 E Opalinski, Elita władzy w województwach poznańskim i kaliskim za Zygmunta III (Poznan 1981); idem, Kultura polityczna szlachty polskiej 1587-1652 (Warszawa 1995)

16 Na senatory, IV 1606, Sumienie mówi, VI 1606 & Echo rokoszanskie on Wislica in Czubek (ed.), Pisma polityczne t.1 p.11, p.23, pp.85-7; Kalisz zjazd asks Archbishop of
government; by the crown ruling in the Sejm, listening to szlachta deputies and resident senator advisors.\(^\text{17}\) The Rokosz faltered precisely when this unity of estates began to be restored in the Articles of Wislica. Most senators shifted to the regalists once the crown offered hope that they could influence a compromise; important negotiators were Zbigniew Ossolinski and Jan Ostroróg.\(^\text{18}\) The crown and supporters met at Wislica while their opponents were at Sandomierz; their articles recognised many Rokosz demands, like the importance of resident senators, need for court reform, and that szlachta status should not be granted to foreigners.\(^\text{19}\)

The 1607 Sejm adopted all 13 Wislica articles and only four rokosz demands, rejecting the ones against the Jesuits, on toleration, the army and treasury.\(^\text{20}\) The army and treasury articles had aimed to force responsibility onto a monarch seen to be avoiding his obligations; reform of these was sidelined once crown and szlachta could work together again in the existing system.\(^\text{21}\) The religious articles were the main reason left for opposition against the crown; indeed the proportion of dissenters increased as the number of *rokoszanie* declined.\(^\text{22}\)

Yet religious authority also did not shift with the Rokosz. The risers’ concern to uphold confessional plurality was met, though slowly. Mieczysław Korolko sees the Rokosz as the beginning of the end for liberty of conscience.\(^\text{23}\) Jarminski argues that without Catholics, dissenters, both Protestant and Orthodox, were not

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\(^{17}\) Gniezno for support, 16 I 1607 in BC MS 335 pp.96-7; At Sandomierz they called on senators and crown to meet them; see Rembowski (ed.), *Rokosz* p.76, p.288, p.84

\(^{18}\) Rozmowa o rokoszu, X 1606, sees Wislica as decisive in winning senators over to the crown, Czubek (ed.), *Pisma polityczne t.2* p.122; another rokoszanin attacks the sentors for this, though he still see the crown as worse & expects all three estates to work together, VII 1607 in Czubek (ed.), *Pisma polityczne t.3* pp.359-60, p.365, p.368. On compromise senators see H Schmitt, *Rokosz Zebrzydowskiego* (Lwów 1838) p.241, p.265, pp.353-4, p.568 & S Cynarski, “Stronnictwo królewskie w dobie rokoszu Zebrzydowskim” in *Malopolskie studia historyczne* 8 (1965) p.24

\(^{19}\) Collatio tego wszystkiego, co na rokoszu w Wislicy zawarto, i zaraz rozsadek o tym after 13 IX 1606, Czubek (ed.), *Pisma polityczne t.3* pp.117ff


\(^{21}\) There was minor reform, and alternative sources of treasury revenue were sought; e.g. debate on whether the clergy should pay the pobor tax dominated the 1613 Sejm; Sejm diary 1613 in AR VI II-48 pp.22ff. The 1632 election Sejm introduced a new kwarta, sending 40% of starostwa profits to the treasury, though the problems of executing this recurred; see A Sucheni-Grabowska, *Spory królów ze szlachta w zlotym wieku* (Kraków 1988) esp. p.61

\(^{22}\) Strzelecki, “Udział i rola różnicowierstwa” p.112, p.131, p.173, p.177

Yet this alliance of dissenters and Catholics continued in and after the Rokosz to uphold liberty of conscience.

The seventeenth century supposedly saw the rise of the *Polak-Katolik*; a shift from confessional plurality in the Commonwealth to its identification of Polishness with Catholicism. This crystallised much later, but it has been seen as stimulated by the Rokosz. The rising reacted to what they saw as Zygmunt’s promotion of Catholics over other confessions. The Sandomierz Articles reflect resistance to the return of church buildings and the rise of the Jesuits, opposition to tithes and legal appeals to Rome, as part of a wider fear that liberty of conscience would be eroded. The clergy declaration at Wislica condemned the Warsaw Confederation; they opposed the suspension of tithes and blocking appeals to Rome, as part of their strong objection to a *compositio inter status*. The szlachta had been calling for a *compositio* since 1573; it would define the limits of clerical and noble jurisdiction, both legal, from clerical influence in the Royal Tribunal down to the competencies of local courts, and financial, through tithes, which szlachta could also collect.

The end of the rising did not mean ceding to Catholic dominance; other confessions held up in Commonwealth power structures. Zygmunt received a clear warning not to push his szlachta too far; thereafter, church returns declined and dissenter foundations increased. Protestants kept high representation in key regional office; in Great Poland they continued to make up one third of Sejm deputies and castellans under Zygmunt and his son. Władysław IV reaffirmed

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26 Sandomierz article on liberty of conscience, Rembowski (ed.), *Rokosz* pp.284-9, p.303-6
27 Deklaracja panów duchownych pod Wislica in BC MS 335 pp.242-4
28 The published settlement ruled that appeals in clergy and szlachta conflicts could no longer go to Rome, but had to stop at the nuncio in Warsaw, bishops had to approve the existing contracts on tithes and settle local conflicts over them. J Dziegielewski, „Sprawa compositio inter status” in *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 90 (1983)
30 Protestant deputies from Sroda, the key sejmik in Great Poland averaged 30% from 1587-1632, unchanged before and after the rokosz; W Dworzaczek, “Sklad społeczny wielkopolskiej reprezentacji sejmowej w latach 1572-1655” in *Rozcinki historyczne* 23 (1957) p.304. Many of Great Poland’s castellans were dissenters; 38% of those whose religion I could trace. There were 13 castellanships in the palatinates of Poznan and Kalisz. 84 individuals held them under Zygmunt and Władysław; A Bianaszewski (ed.), *Urzednicy wielkopolscy XVI-XVIIIw* (Wroclaw 1987). Of these, I was able to find the
the Warsaw Confederation in 1632. He enacted what the szlachta had been demanding for decades; a *compositio inter status*, with papal approval, in 1635. This was an important affirmation of religious plurality, limiting Catholic clerics in secular jurisdictions and giving nobles more autonomy to support dissenting churches.

The Polish Rokosz must be seen in the context of confessional and political conflict in Central Europe of the period to White Mountain, all of which were led by Protestants against the expanding, confessionalising Catholicism that Habsburg rule epitomised. Lubieniecki, one of the first historians of the Polish Reformation, saw the Rokosz as a liberation movement against Zygmunt III who was too closely tied to the Habsburgs. His marriage and alliance with the house that had dominated the Bohemian and Hungarian estates, was symbolic of absolutism. Their later resistance to Habsburg rule in the 1610s and 1620s would also recall the Polish model, and *rokoszanie* supported the efforts of their neighbours resisting Habsburg rule during and after the rising. Opposition to confession of 45, (PSB, synod records etc). There were 28 Catholics, eight Czech Brethren, a Calvinist, six Lutherans and two undefined dissenters, a total of 17 dissenters or 38%.

While this time it excluded Socinians, there were also more Catholic signatories this time, & the Orthodox were stronger in the debate, so their rights also improved with the 1635 settlement. Korolko, *Klejnot* p.134, p.137; J Dziegielewski, *O tolerancje dla zdominowanych* (Warszawa 1986) p.58, p.89; J Seredyka, *RP w ostatnich latach Zygmunta III* (Opole 1978) pp.196-7

**Rokoszanie on compositio issues:** Przestroga i sposób na przyszłe naprawy RP, VIII 1606 in Czubek (ed.), *Pisma polityczne t.2* p.462; Sandomierz zjazd diary in BC MS 335 p.66; Wisner, *Rokosz* p.28. On the *compositio* settlement itself, see J Dziegielewski, „Sprawa compositio inter status” in *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 90 (1983)


**Przyczyny wypowiedzenia posłuszeństwa Zygmuntaowi, królewiczowi szwedziemu** 24 VI 1607 in Czubek (ed.), *Pisma polityczne t.3* pp.350-1, p.357 is just one example from the polemic literature.

Habsburg Emperor Frederick recalled the Polish rokosz, when writing to Zygmunt III about the Bohemian estates’ rising ten years later; he may have seen it as a model for his Bohemian subjects; 2 XI 1619 in BK MS 1638 pp.62-3

*Rokoszanie* Radziwill and Heriburt led secret negotiations with Gabriel Batory, prince of Transylvania, during the rising hoping to put him on the Polish throne; eg. W Konopczynski, *Dzieje Polski nowozytnej* (Warszawa 1999) p.231. Former *rokoszanin* and Czech Brethren Broniewski, followed the Bohemian and Hungarian risings closely in reports to Krzysztof Radziwill, clearly taking the risers’ side and deploring Zygmunt’s policy against them; see his letters of 25 III & 9 IX 1620, 1 X 1621, 1 & 22 XII 1622, 22 V, 3 VII, 18 & 22 VIII 1623, 9 IV & 5 VII 1624 in ARV 1419. Rafal Leszczynski
Zygmunt III in the later years of his reign, like the 1626 plot to replace him with the French duke Gaston D’Orleans, made a clear connection between dominant Catholicism and centralising state authority, seeing royal attempts to copy the model of their Habsburg neighbour as dangerous. Such opposition included not just dissenters, but also Catholics.\textsuperscript{38}

The Rokosz was a traditional mechanism of noble protest against a new foreign monarch, warning him not to copy the centralising model of his Habsburg neighbour. From Mickiewicz to Maciszewski, later interpretations of the Rokosz have misinterpreted this reaction, using it to mark the causes for the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth’s decline far too early. Yet the rising was a restorative check, not a catastrophe. After the rising, Zygmunt III went on to rule for over two decades; he and his son Władysław IV worked with their whole szlachta, gradually meeting most Rokosz demands. These reaffirmed a working Commonwealth model of devolved religious and political authority, legitimising szlachta liberty and liberty of conscience.

\textsuperscript{38} The plotters also negotiated with Transylvanian Prince Bethlen Gabor. See U Augustyniak (ed.), “Spisek orleanski”1626-8 (Warszawa 1990). The plotters were led by Czech Brethren Rafał Leszczynski, Palatine of Belz, Calvinist Krzysztof Radziwill, Palatine of Wilno and Catholic Jerzy Zbaraski, Castellan of Kraków.
Key events

1569    Union of Lublin between Poland and Lithuania

**King Henri IV Valois (1573-4)**

1573    Henrician Articles & Pacta Conventa;
        increased noble privileges, defined royal rule
        Warsaw Confederation guarantees liberty of conscience to all szlachta

**King Stefan I Batory (1576-86)**

**King Zygmunt III Waza (1587-1632)**

1590    Kolo zjazd (assembly) of szlachta opposition
1591    Radom zjazd
1592    Lublin zjazd
1605    failed Sejm
1606    7 March, failed Sejm
        9 April, Stezyca zjazd
        5 June, Lublin zjazd
        10 August, Sandomierz zjazd ; Rokosz articles written
        12 August, Wislica regalist zjazd; compromise articles written
        20 August, szlachta call for a *pospolite ruszenie* (general muster)
        4-8 October, Janowiec agreement

1607    28 March, Jedrzejów zjazd
        7 May, Sejm
        24 June, Rokosz formally withdraws its loyalty from Zygmunt III
        5 July, Battle of Guzów

1608    24 April, regalist convocation at Kraków
        9 June, Kraków convocation formally forgives the *rokoszanie* (risers)

1609    15 January, Sejm & amnesty for *rokoszanie*

1626    *spisek orleanski* – conspiracy to put the French Gaston d’Orleans on the Polish throne

**King Wladyslaw IV Waza (1632-48)**

1635    Settlement of *compositio inter status* defining clerical & noble jurisdictions