Corrections for *Are we bodies or souls?*

Page 11 lines 5-8. After “It is not possible that…” delete the rest of the sentence and replace it by “there could be a scientific explanation of why any of us exist at all, since any particular foetus could have caused any of an infinite number of different souls to exist instead of the one it did cause.”

Page 16 line 14 Put ‘naturally’ instead of ‘physically’ after ‘of nature is’

Page 88 line 17 Put full stop after “scales”. Delete “.and”. Insert new sentence “The value of an electric charge is a measure of the force with which one electrically charged body repels another electrically charged body;” Then continue with “and we learn…”

Replace all of the section beginning on page 88 line minus-8 to page 92 line-16 by the following section. (Many of the sentences are the same.)

So in order to talk about anything, we need a lot of designators whose meaning we know in virtue of being able to recognize instances of them straight-off. And the obvious way in which we acquire such knowledge of the meanings of words is by ‘acquaintance’; that is, by perceiving or experiencing paradigm instances of the correct application of those words. They are words or longer expressions, designating some property or kind of substance (or event) such as those which I have used in developing the definitions just discussed - ‘weight’, ‘lighter’, ‘particle’, ‘wire’, ‘label’, ‘ceremony’, ‘difference’, ‘possession’, and also numbers. Other such words include ‘line’, ‘edge’, ‘red’, ‘longer’, ‘door’, ‘road’, ‘straight’, ‘side’, ‘shirt’, ‘walks’, ‘shoe’, ‘cat’, ‘dog’, ‘flower’, ‘face’, ‘mouth’, ‘arm’, ‘talks’, and ‘kiss’. Or they are nouns referring to particular substances, especially easily recognisable landmarks in some vicinity, such as ‘The tower of London’, ‘the Eiffel Tower’, ‘the Shard’, ‘the Statue of Liberty’, and ‘Stonehenge’; and ones only well known to those who live in the vicinity such as ‘Main Street, Middletown, Maryland’ or ‘Leckford Road, Oxford, England’; and also more extended substances such as ‘Oxford’ or ‘London’. Most of us can recognize red objects, lines on paper, the edges of a building, etc. straight-off. The normal way by which we come to acquire this ability to recognize things is simply by listening to other people talk, or, more explicitly, by having at some time been shown instances of correct application of its designator and being shown how these instances differ from non-instances. We are told that this, that, and the other paradigm objects (such as a ripe tomato or raspberry, a London bus, or a British post box) are
‘red’, and that various other objects (such as unripe tomatoes or raspberries) are not red. This process enables us to recognize new objects as ‘red’ or ‘not red’ in future. Likewise with the names of substances. We learn to recognize some substances of the kind described above by someone telling us, when we are standing near to the substance, ‘that is the Eiffel Tower’, ‘this city is Oxford’. Others learn the meaning of such words by descriptions such as ‘Oxford is the city 60 miles west north-west of London’. But such descriptions do not fix the meaning of names of particular substances; the city picked out as ‘Oxford’ by pointing to it, would still be Oxford if London were destroyed. When we can refer to substances and properties in virtue of our ability to recognize them, then we can refer to other substances and properties by their relations to these substances and properties so defined. Thus a ‘Londoner is a person who has lived much of his or her life in London and feels that that is where he or she naturally belongs’. (If a word is used in more than one sense—for example, ‘London’ can be used to refer not merely to the English city, but also to a Canadian city—the context of any sentence in which it is used will normally reveal in which sense the word is being used.)

Being able to recognize instances of the correct application of a designator straight-off, as I am understanding this, involves being able to recognize whether or not it applies to an object—under ideal conditions. Conditions are ideal when one’s faculties are working properly, one is in the best possible position (that is, best possible location relative to the object) for recognizing the property (or whatever) referred to, and one is not subject to an illusion. Thus if someone had normal sight and then became totally blind, their inability now to recognize a face doesn’t show that they do not know what the word ‘face’ means. For now their faculties are not working properly. If someone is too far away from two rods, they may not be able to recognize whether one rod is ‘longer than’ another rod, but that doesn’t show that they do not know what the expression ‘longer than’ means. For then they are not in the best possible position for recognising which rod is the longer. Further the circumstances must not be illusory, that is such as to make a property look (feel, sound, or whatever) differently from the way it would look in paradigm circumstances (that is, the normal circumstances in which the meaning of its designator is explained to new speakers); or such as to make some other property look differently from the way it looks in paradigm circumstances, so that it looks like the property in question. It does not show that we do not know what the word ‘cat’ means if we cannot recognise a cat when it is disguised to look like a dog, or we misidentify a robot as a ‘cat’ if it is made to look and behave like a cat. Nor does it show that we do not know what ‘Stonehenge’ means if we cannot recognise it when all the standing stones are covered with domes, or we
misidentify a perfect copy of Stonehenge made of cardboard as ‘Stonehenge’. In these cases observers would be subject to an illusion.

In the case of words whose meaning we know straight-off and so are able to recognize under ideal conditions whether or not they apply, we know—simply in virtue of knowing the meaning of the word—what it is for the object to which they apply to be that object; we know logically necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be that object. For an object to be ‘a door’ just is for it to look, feel like, and behave like (e.g. open when pushed) paradigm instances of doors. For a person to be ‘walking’ just is for that person to be doing what we recognize as paradigm instances of persons ‘walking’ as doing when we observe them under ideal conditions (standing fairly close to that person in daylight, with eyes working properly, and not subject to some illusion). To be London just is to be the big city which we (that is, those of us who learn what ‘London’ means straight-off) recognize as ‘London’ under ideal conditions (walking around a big city which looks totally familiar, with eyes working properly, and not subject to an illusion by being in another city which looks exactly like London.) Hence these words whose meaning we know straight-off are all informative designators. Most words which denote properties and so kinds of substance (such as ‘proton’) (as opposed to words which denote individual substances which have those properties), and which can be defined by other words whose meaning we know straight-off, are also informative designators; and so we can know to which object (that is, to which property), in the sense of knowing the essence of that object, they refer merely in virtue of knowing their meaning. Which property a designator denotes is a matter of whether the property satisfies the definition which gives logically necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of the designator. For some such words it may take a long process of definition by words defined by other words to determine which is the property (for example, which is the kind of substance) to which it refers. But, as I have illustrated, ‘proton’ is an informative designator because it can be defined by words which are such that speakers can always recognize whether or not these words (e.g. ‘weight’, ‘electrically charged’, ‘twenty-seven times’) apply to some object, when they are in the best possible position relative to the object, their faculties are working properly, and they are not subject to illusion. And so being a proton just is being an object which satisfies the definition of a proton. In the case of both kinds of informative designators, whether we know their meaning by being able to recognize when they apply straight-off or via a definition, simply in virtue of knowing the meaning of the word, we know what it is for some object to be an instance of that word.¹
By contrast, an ‘uninformative designator’ is a word (or longer expression) which is such that if we know what the word means (that is, the meaning which is common to its use in different contexts), that is not by itself enough to know to what it refers on a particular occasion of its use. Many ‘definite descriptions’—that is, descriptions of an object which pick out that object by some property of that object, such as ‘the tallest building in London’—are uninformative designators of that object. We may know the meaning of ‘the tallest building in London’ and so what property it designates, but knowing this is not enough to show us which building is the tallest building. To know this, we need to compare the heights of different buildings in London and discover the location, size, shape, and composition of the tallest one; and to discover this we need to do much empirical investigation. And knowing the meaning of ‘the car outside the window’ and so what it is to have the property of being ‘the car outside the window’ does not put us in a position to know which car that is; that involves knowing what make of car it is and how it differs from other cars of that make. Likewise most ‘indexicals’ are uninformative designators. An indexical is a word like ‘he’, or ‘you’, ‘that river’, or ‘now’, the referent of which (that is, to what they are referring) depends on the context in which it is uttered; that is, who says it, when, and where. Someone knows what ‘you’ means iff they know that it means the person to whom the speaker is talking; but unless they know who the speaker is and to whom the speaker is talking, they do not know to what ‘you’ refers. And even if they do know the context and do know some properties of the person who is being referred to by ‘you’, they may not know what makes that person the person he or she is. Someone knows what ‘that river’ means iff they know that it refers to a river to which the speaker has just pointed or alluded, but unless they know who the speaker is, and some properties of the river to which he or she has just pointed or alluded, they will not know what that river is, in the sense of what makes the river that particular river—which is a matter of its location and where it is flowing from and to. As I am using the word “essence”, to know an ‘essence’ of the object is to know a set of logically necessary and sufficient conditions for an object to be that object.

Delete the whole paragraph running from page 93 line minus-5 to page 94 line-15. Ensure that the paragraph beginning “Whether a word…” begins in the middle of page 94, and so that the pagination thereafter remains the same as in the original version.

Page 93 line 3 replace ‘a crucial sense the’ by ‘my sense an’.
Page 95 lines minus – 6, minus – 4 (twice), and minus – 2, replace “the earth” by “Stonehenge”

Page 95 lines minus – 6 minus – 4, minus – 3, and Page 96 line 3, replace “4” by “10”.

Page 96 line 8 Insert “(as then understood)” before “does not entail”

Page 96 line 10 Enclose ‘water’ in single quotes

Page 107 lines 3 to 4 delete the sentence ‘So the…sensations’.

Page 107 lines 11 to 12. Delete the clause ‘(and perhaps..character)’

Page 107 lines 13 to 22. Delete all of ‘Others mean by…just is to be’ and replace it by:

‘But since those others do not have the (not merely privileged but infallible) access to who the person is to whom they are referring which I have, their use of ‘Richard Swinburne’ or some indexical expression to refer to me involves using it as an uninformative designator. Others mean by ‘Richard Swinburne’ the person whose body is such-and-such a body, or whose brain is such-and-such a brain, and/or who makes certain memory claims, and refers to himself as ‘Richard Swinburne’ or ‘I’. Their use of the uninformative designator “Richard Swinburne” is therefore also deferential; they regard me, picked out by physical properties, one of which is that I (picked out by the other physical properties), refer to myself as ‘I’, as the expert on who I am. But I mean by ‘I’

Continue on line 22 with ‘the person who is aware…’

Notes

Page 176 Insert new note 1 to chapter 5:

“1. For some of the words designating properties some people know what they mean in virtue of being able to recognise instances of them straight off, whereas other people know what they mean in virtue of knowing how they are defined by other words. Normally this will make no difference to the meaning of the word. Thus some people may know what ‘heavier’ means in virtue of being able to determine of pairs of different objects which is the heavier. Other people may know what ‘heavier’ means by a definition that one object is ‘heavier than’ another iff it ‘has a greater weight than’ the other. But then they will need to know what
‘weight’ means, and then that knowledge will consist either in an ability to weigh things or by ‘weight’ being defined by yet other words, examples of which they can recognise straight off.”

Renumber previous note 1 as note 1a. After the last sentence of note 1a add:

“Also in previous writings I have added a further criterion for a word being an informative designator additional to the criteria that anyone who knows what the word means straight off must be able to recognise to what it applies. That further criterion was that someone who knows what the word means straight off knows the propositions ‘mini-entailed’ by (or ‘mini-entailing’) the existence of the substance (or whatever) referred to. I do not need to take account of that criterion for the purposes of this book.”