I'm a D.Phil candidate in philosophy at the University of Oxford, with research interests in mind, language, and metaphysics. My thesis Singular Representation is supervised by John Hawthorne and Tim Williamson, and is currently under examination.
This year my research is supported by a Postdoctoral Award from the Philosophical Fellowship Fund. I am also a Stipendiary Lecturer in Philosophy at St. Edmund Hall (Oxford). In 2016, I was a visiting student at USC.
Research and Papers
It is widely supposed that if there is to be a plausible connection between the truth of a de re attitude report about a subject and that subject’s possession of a singular thought, then ‘acquaintance’-style requirements on singular thought must be rejected. I show that this belief rests on a poorly motivated picture of how we talk about the attitudes.
I defend Lewis’ (1979) influential treatment of de se belief from recent criticism (Cappelen and Dever, 2013; Holton, forthcoming) to the effect that a key explanatory notion—self-ascription—goes unexplained. It is shown that Lewis' characterisation of de se belief can be reconstructed in a way which requires only widely recognised primitives.
Unger’s (1980) Problem of the Many suggests that almost coincident with any ordinary object are a vast number of almost-identical objects. As Unger noted, this raises difficulties for the claim that we have singular thoughts about ordinary objects. This paper canvasses possible responses to these difficulties.
- General Philosophy reading list.
- Knowledge & Reality reading list.
- Philosophy of Logic and Language reading list.
- Early Modern Philosophy reading list.
- Logic resources.
- Possible Worlds: Lecture 1 handout: Introduction.
- Possible Worlds: Lecture 2 handout: Modal Realism I.
- Possible Worlds: Lecture 3 handout: Modal Realism II.
- Possible Worlds: Lecture 4 handout: Modal Fictionalism.
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