About Me

I'm a D.Phil candidate in philosophy at the University of Oxford with research interests in mind, language, and metaphysics. My thesis Singular Representation is supervised by John Hawthorne and Tim Williamson and is under examination.

I am currently Stipendiary Lecturer in Philosophy at St. Edmund Hall (Oxford). My research is funded by a Postdoctoral Award from the Philosophical Fellowship Fund. In 2016, I was a visiting research student at USC.

Research

  • 'Lewisian Self-Ascription' (2018), Synthese.
  • I defend Lewis’s (1979) influential treatment of de se belief from recent criticism (Cappelen and Dever, 2013; Holton, 2015) to the effect that a key explanatory notion—self-ascription—goes unexplained. It is shown that Lewis's characterisation of de se belief can be reconstructed in a way which requires only widely recognised primitives.
  • 'Singular Thoughts and De Re Attitude Reports' (2018), Mind & Language. Penultimate draft.
  • It is widely supposed that if there is to be a plausible connection between the truth of a de re attitude report about a subject and that subject’s possession of a singular thought, then ‘acquaintance’-style requirements on singular thought must be rejected. I show that this belief rests on a poorly motivated picture of how we talk about the attitudes.
  • ’Re-Fixing Reference’ [draft available on request]
  • Imogen Dickie’s Fixing Reference (2015) presents a new, acquaintance-theoretic analysis of aboutness. In this paper I show that her official picture suffers from serious concerns. Fortunately, there is an epistemic condition on aboutness which avoids those concerns and, most importantly, is more faithful to the intuitive picture presented in the early stages of the book. Incorporating this picture using the resources suggested provides fresh avenues for the investigation of aboutness and vindicates Russell’s idea that aboutness is an epistemic phenomenon.
  • ’Intentional Problems of the Many’ [draft available on request]
  • Unger’s (1980) Problem of the Many suggests that almost coincident with any ordinary object are a vast number of almost-identical objects. As Unger noted, this raises difficulties for the claim that we have singular thoughts about ordinary objects. This paper canvasses possible responses to these difficulties.

    Curriculum Vitae

    Click here to download a copy of my CV.

    Contact

    [firstname].[lastname]@philosophy.ox.ac.uk