

Mathematical proof  
Assessment of an empirical contribution  
to a philosophical dispute

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The nature of mathematical proof has been disputed by Yehuda Rav and Jodi Azzouni in the pages of *Philosophia Mathematica*. More recently, cognitive scientists led by Matthew Inglis have intervened on the side of Rav with an empirical study, concluding that there is probably no objective standard of what constitutes a mathematical proof. I will argue that the empirical data of the study (and one other) do not support this striking conclusion; and yet the study is valuable as it highlights a major weakness in Azzouni's case.

The empirical study: "On Mathematicians' Different Standards When Evaluating Elementary Proofs", Matthew Inglis et al., *Topics in Cognitive Science* 2013 April 5(2), 270-82.