Aristotle on mathematical truth

Janine Gührer (Oxford)

Philosophy of Mathematics Seminar
13th June 2016

While Aristotle is often credited as the first proponent of a correspondence theory of truth, even Crivelli’s *Aristotle on Truth* (CUP 2004) remains silent on Aristotle’s view on mathematical truth. The reason for this silence is that there is an interpretational difficulty as to what objects in Aristotle’s ontology mathematical propositions refer to. In this talk I will defend a correspondence theory reading of mathematical truth in Aristotle. I will first trace back the origins of Aristotle’s correspondence theory of truth (Metaphysics 1011b25, *Categories* 12b11, 14b14 and De Interpretatione 16a3), then introduce Aristotle’s view on mathematical objects (Metaphysics M 1-3), reject a fictionalist reading (Lear, Corkum) and finally defend the view that mathematical propositions must refer to physical objects qua mathematical.