GÖDEL VS. CARNAP ON LOGICAL SYNTAX

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Abstract: Gödel claimed that, assuming the goal of the Logical Syntax of Language was to avoid assuming mathematical objects exist, it necessarily fails. This is easy to verify (Quine, Beth). Worse, Gödel claimed that "eliminating" mathematical intuition by substituting conventions for it forces the abandonment of mathematics as a science. As so often, confusions arise due to inadequate explication both of Intuition and of Convention—and of Platonism as well. Once explicated correctly, the result is that Conventionalism is not inconsistent with Platonism at all, because Conventions "reveal" (Samuelson) Intuitions. And intuitions can be made objectively valid through refinement—just like empirical measurements! (Gödel's "analogy" between mathematics and natural science.) Furthermore, Conventions as social institutions are eo ipso intersubjective (thus quasi-objective), contrary to widespread supposition: I discuss some rationality conditions (for voting and coalition formation) allowing establishment of robust and stable Conventions. Finally, I discuss to what extent Platonism can be confirmed using empirical evidence of mathematicians' behavior.