## WHAT'S IN A T-SENTENCE?

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Abstract: The T-sentences are the bi-conditionals 'A iff T[A]' where A is a sentence of some first order language, T is a predicate symbol in that language and [A] denotes a term representing A. One of the main arguments against the use of T-sentences as a theory of truth is that they are deductively trivial: a consistent and ?natural? choice of T-sentences is either inconsistent or model-theoretically conservative over the base theory. In particular, compositional axioms for truth (for example, 'for every A, B, T[A & B] iff T[A] & T[B]') are not derivable from T-sentences except in trivial cases. In this talk I will present recent formal results that suggest this assumption cannot be further from the truth.