Conceptual Structuralism

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Both Feferman[1] and Martin[2] in the recent EFI Harvard Workshop presented papers which alluded to conceptual structuralism in varying degrees and ways. The latter's paper continued an analysis of Gödel's Conceptual Realism[3], and advocates a sort of conceptual structuralism concerning the universe, V, of sets, and the concept of *"set of"* . For Martin the concept of natural number and also a few countable ordinals may be deemed *fully determinate*, but not much more. Our aims here are firstly to analyse his ideas and ask whether they can actually be seen to be a form of one of the more established structuralisms, or not - it is perhaps closest to that of an *ante rem* flavour. Secondly to extend beyond his aims to take in a weak class theory (which Martin would probably eschew).

[1] *"Is the Continuum Hypothesis a definite mathematical problem?"* S. Feferman, EFI Harvard Workshop papers
[2] *"Completeness or Incompleteness of Basic Mathematical Concepts"* D.A. Martin, EFI Harvard Workshop papers
[3] *"Gödel's Conceptual Realism"*Bull. Symb. Logic, 2005