

# Bradford Jean-Hyuk Kim

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## EDUCATION

- 2015-10 Apr **University of Oxford**  
2018 DPhil in Philosophy  
(viva/defense) Thesis: *Aristotle on the Value of Friends* (Supervisors: Professor Terence Irwin, Associate Professor Karen Margrethe Nielsen)  
Examiners: Professor Roger Crisp (University of Oxford), Professor Anthony Price (Birkbeck College, University of London)
- 2014-2015 **University of Oxford**  
MSt in Ancient Philosophy (Distinction)  
Thesis: "The Relationship Between Happiness and External Goods in Aristotle" (Supervisor: Professor Terence Irwin)
- 2010-2014 **Swarthmore College**  
B.A. (GPA: 3.9/4.0) in Philosophy (Honors), Greek Minor, Latin Minor, Phi Beta Kappa  
Thesis: "Moral Non-Objectivism as Moral Nihilism?" (Supervisor: Professor Peter Baumann)

## AREAS

**Specialization:** Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

**Competence:** Political Philosophy, Comparative Philosophy (especially between Ancient Greek/Roman Philosophy and Ancient Chinese Philosophy)

## LANGUAGES

**Modern:** English (first language), French (intermediate reading), German (intermediate reading)

**Ancient/Classical:** Greek (advanced), Hebrew (intermediate), Latin (advanced)

## WORK IN PROGRESS

Revise and Resubmit Three papers, derived from my dissertation; see Dissertation Abstract below

Under Review Two papers, derived from my dissertation; see Dissertation Abstract below

## AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS

2018 **Philosophical Fellowship Fund Postdoctoral Fellowship (University of Oxford)**, to fund research 2018-9

2017 **Philosophy Faculty Graduate Lecturing Scheme Award (University of Oxford)**, to teach self-designed lecture series "Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* on Friendship" in Fall Term 2017

2015 **Award for MSt Distinction (St. Edmund Hall, Oxford)**

**Best of Issue Award;** "Untangling the Knot that is Kant's 'Moral Feeling'" voted by Executive Council of Phi Sigma Tau, the International Honor Society of Philosophy, as best paper of *Dialogue: Journal of Phi Sigma Tau* 57.1 (October 2014, submitted June 2013)

- 2014 **Hannah A. Leedom Fellowship (Swarthmore College)**, to fund University of Oxford MSt in Ancient Philosophy
- 2013 **Phi Beta Kappa Honor Society (Swarthmore College)**  
**The Class of 1962 Student Summer Fellowship (Swarthmore College)**, to fund Senior Honors Thesis Research  
**Susan P. Cobbs Scholarship (Swarthmore College)** for most outstanding student of classics in the senior class
- 2011 **Helen North Scholarship (Swarthmore College)**, to fund Summer Intensive Introductory Ancient Greek

### INVITED TALKS

- 2018 **“Aristotle on Loving Other Selves”**
- Workshop in Ancient Philosophy, University of Oxford
- “Aristotle on Self-Love and Maximizing the Fine for Oneself”**
- The Ancient Philosophy Triangle Graduate Colloquium (Oxford-Cambridge-KCL-UCL), University College London
- “Nicomachean Ethics VIII.7: Friendship, Justice, and Equality”**
- Aristotle Workshop: *Nicomachean Ethics* VIII.1-7, Union College

### EMPLOYMENT/TEACHING

- 2017-2018 **Tutor**, Latin Philosophy (135) (in Latin), Summer Term (University of Oxford)  
**Tutor**, Plato: *Euthyphro* and *Meno* (Honour Moderations) (in Greek), Summer Term (University of Oxford)  
**Guest Lecturer**, “Other Selves in Aristotle’s Theory of Friendship,” Associate Professor Simon Shogry’s “Aristotle: *Nicomachean Ethics*” Class (University of Oxford)  
**Tutor**, Ethics (Self-Designed Course), Spring Term (University of Oxford)  
**Tutor**, Plato: *Republic* (115) (in translation), Spring Term (University of Oxford)  
**Lecturer**, “Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* on Friendship,” Fall Term (University of Oxford)  
**Tutor**, Aristotle: *Nicomachean Ethics* (116) (in translation), Fall Term (University of Oxford)
- 2013-2014 **Grader**, First-Year Introductory Greek (Swarthmore College)
- Graded exams and assignments
- Research Assistant** for Jeremy Lefkowitz, Swarthmore Professor of Classics
- Teaching Assistant and Grader**, Introductory Logic (Swarthmore College), Fall Term
- Graded exams and assignments
  - Held weekly open tutoring sessions (help with problem sets, make-up lectures)
- 2012-2013 **Grader**, First-Year Introductory Latin (Swarthmore College)
- Graded exams and assignments
- Teaching Assistant and Grader**, Introductory Logic (Swarthmore College),

Fall Term

**Index Locorum Compiler**, *Herodotus* Volumes 1-2 (Oxford Readings in Classical Studies), ed. Rosaria V. Munson, Swarthmore Professor of Classics

### PROFESSIONAL SERVICE

2017-2018 **Referee**, *Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought*

### ACTIVITIES

2017-2018 **Organizer**, Oxford Graduate Ancient Philosophy Work in Progress Group

- Organized applications and scheduled presentations
- Chaired presentations

2016-2017 **MSt Ancient Philosophy Student Representative**

- Orientation programme and Q&A sessions
- Organized community/social events

**Committee Member**, Oxford Philosophy Ockham Society (Graduate Presentations)

- Webmaster
- Organized applications and scheduled presentations
- Chaired presentations

**Committee Member**, 20<sup>th</sup> Oxford Philosophy Graduate Conference

- Webmaster
- Received, anonymized, and distributed submissions for review
- Handled conference email
- Booked venue and created schedule
- Organized accommodation for three keynotes and twelve student speakers

2015-2016 **Committee Member**, Oxford Philosophy Ockham Society

**Committee Member**, 20<sup>th</sup> Oxford Philosophy Graduate Conference

### REFERENCES

- **Professor Roger Crisp** (University of Oxford)
- **Emeritus Professor Terence Irwin** (University of Oxford, Cornell University)
- **Associate Professor Karen Margrethe Nielsen** (University of Oxford)
- **Professor Michael Pakaluk** (The Catholic University of America)

## **DISSERTATION ABSTRACT**

Recent scholarship often understands Aristotelian friendship to be non-egoistic. I reject this in my dissertation, *Aristotle on the Value of Friends*.

In Chapter 1, I argue that Aristotle's basic principle of friendship, that all friends love only because of the lovable, is egoistic. "The lovable" refers to one's own happiness and "because of" tracks at least the final cause or end; so friends love only for the sake of their own happiness.

In Chapter 2, I explain the ways in which the claims of the first chapter are compatible with several key expressions that do *not* seem egoistic: wishing goods for the sake of the other and loving the other for himself. I show *that* these types of concern fall under Aristotle's principle of loving because of the lovable. They do so because the fundamental final cause of each kind of concern is the good instantiated by a person's virtue, where the good is one of the lovable objects, that is, one of the objects that contributes to one's own happiness. I then explain *how* we are to understand these types of concern as ultimately regarding one's own happiness; the other person's virtue that is at the heart of these types of concern is valued because of its contribution to *one's own* virtuous actualization, which is the most important part of *one's own happiness*.

In Chapter 3, I explore another type of concern that is often understood as non-egoistic: loving another as another self. I assess the first two instances of the notion in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, in 8.12 and 9.4, and argue that an egoistic understanding of other selfhood prevails. The essential feature of other selfhood is involvement in *one's own* virtuous actualization; in line with egoism, it is involvement in one's own virtuous actualization, one's own happiness, that makes the other self valuable. I then show how the last two instances of another self in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, in 9.9, support this egoistic reading of other selfhood. I argue that Aristotle grounds the value of other selves on their contributions to one's own virtuous actualization; he suggests that the happy person needs other selves in order to attain the adequately continuous and easy activity that is required for happiness.

In Chapter 4, I assess the endorsement in *Nicomachean Ethics* 9.8 of praiseworthy self-love. I argue that praiseworthy self-love involves self-prioritization that is both operant at the level of motivation and substantive; an egoistic model emerges. The self-prioritization here involves maximizing the superlatively valuable fine (*to kalon*) for oneself, which manifests itself in promoting the common good. To completely show that this is egoistic, I address the issue of what it is that virtuous agents are maximizing when they maximize the fine for themselves; I argue that what they are maximizing is their own virtuous activity, which is the most important part of their own happiness.