Inner sense and time

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1 Introduction

According to Kant, inner and outer sense have different forms. Whereas space is the form of outer sense, time is the form of inner sense.¹ The fact that objects of outer intuition are subject to the form of outer sense explains why these objects are spatial objects that are located in space. Likewise, the fact that objects of inner intuition are subject to the form of inner sense explains why these objects are temporal objects that are located in time. Although inner and outer sense would seem to be symmetrical in this regard, Kant claims that there is an important asymmetry between them. Whereas space is restricted merely to outer appearances, time is meant to be the formal condition of all appearances (cf. A34/B50).²

Justifying this asymmetry and explaining how outer objects end up in time is, however, a rather difficult matter. This is because it would seem to follow from the fact that time is the form of inner sense that it is only applicable to inner but not to outer objects. After all, the form of a particular sense would seem to only condition those objects that pertain to the sense in question. Accordingly, it is not at all straightforward to explain how objects of outer sense can be in time. How then does time apply to outer objects? On what grounds do outer objects count as temporal entities?

Kant provides an argument in §6 of the Transcendental Aesthetic that is meant to explain why time is the condition of all appearances, both inner and outer (also cf. A98-99, 6:214, R5653 as well as 28:202):

Time is the formal a priori condition of all appearances in general.
Space as the pure form of all outer intuitions is restricted, as a pri-

¹ "Space is nothing but the form of all appearances of outer sense, i.e. the subjective condition of sensibility under which alone outer intuition is possible for us" (B42). "Time is nothing but the form of inner sense, i.e. of the intuiting of ourselves and of our inner state" (B49).
² This asymmetry is already to be found in the Inaugural Dissertation (cf. 2:405).
³ That outer appearances are in time is not only an intuitive desideratum, but is also presupposed by the schematisation of the categories, which involves a transcendental determination of time precisely because time is meant to apply to all appearances (cf. A138-139/B177-178). In Metaphysik L, Kant also appeals to the fact that all appearances are in time in order to derive the law of continuity from the continuity of time (cf. 28:201-203).
ori condition, solely to outer appearances. By contrast, because all representations, whether or not they have outer things as their objects, do yet in themselves, as determinations of the mind, belong to our inner state; this inner state belongs, however, under the formal condition of inner intuition, and therewith to time: so time is an a priori condition of all appearance in general, namely the immediate condition of inner appearances (of our souls), and precisely thereby also mediately of outer appearances. If I can say a priori: all outer appearances are in space and are determined a priori according to the relations of space, then I can quite generally say on the basis of the principle of inner sense: all appearances in general, i.e. all objects of the senses, are in time and stand necessarily in relations of time. (A34/B50-51)

This argument seems to proceed as follows: whereas the object of an outer intuition is in space, the outer intuition itself is in time because it is a mental state, i.e. a determination of the mind. That is, given that outer intuitions are representations that belong to inner sense, they are subject to the form of inner sense and thus end up in time. The outer object then derives its temporality from that of its representation, thereby also ending up in time. That is, because the outer intuition is an inner state that is in time, the outer object which is the object of this inner state also ends up in time. In this way, time is indirectly a condition of the outer object, as a result of being a direct condition of its representation.

This interpretation of the argument faces two problems:

- First, the wrong object ends up in time. In particular, since the objects of inner sense are inner objects, it will not be the outer object that is in time, but rather the representation thereof. More precisely, what will be in time is only the appearance of the representation and not the representation itself, since the latter is a modification of the noumenal self. That is, the form of inner sense conditions this representation insofar as it is the condition under which we can inwardly intuit it, thereby allowing us to become aware of the representation as an inner object (as it appears to us), rather than becoming aware of the object of the representation. This means that time will only apply to (appearances of) representations of outer objects, rather than to outer objects themselves. However, we want the outer object itself

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4This argument might also be thought to be problematic insofar as assigning temporality to outer objects on the basis of the temporality of their representations conflicts with the Refutation of Idealism, which argues that the time determination of inner states is parasitic on that of outer states. However, there is no conflict because we are here only concerned with appearances, i.e. with what is (subjectively) intuited, whereas the Refutation is concerned with experience, i.e. with what is (objectively) cognised (cf. Friedman: 2013, p. 5 footnote 6).
and not only (the appearance of) its representation to be in time and to be a temporal entity.

Second, the step that involves going from the representation (or rather the appearance of the representation) being in time to its object also being in time is rather problematic. It is not generally the case that just because a certain condition applies to a representation, that it thereby also applies to the object of the representation. Moreover, this type of reasoning risks overgenerating by assigning temporality to objects that are not in time, such as God, noumena or abstract objects. If all that it takes for something to be in time is that there is a representation that is representing it and that is subject to the form of inner sense, then everything that is an object of a representation becomes a temporal object that ends up in time. However, when one thinks about God, about a triangle (understood as an abstract geometrical object), or about noumena, then all these episodes of thinking are inner states, i.e. modifications of the mind that are subject to the form of inner sense. This means that all of these objects would end up in time, if Kant’s argument were simply that objects of representations derive their temporality from the fact that representations that represent them are subject to the formal condition of inner intuition. Yet, these objects are not in time but are atemporal. As Kant notes in R5661 “thinking itself, although it also takes place in time, does not at all take time into consideration, when the properties of a figure are to be thought”.

The problem is thus to provide an account that explains how outer objects themselves and not only (the appearances of) their representations end up in time, without leading to a situation whereby all objects of representations, including those that are merely thought, are classified as temporal objects. This paper will argue that we can avoid these problems and explain the temporality of outer objects by understanding time as the form of awareness, such that it is the condition under which we become aware of objects.

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\(^1\) Cf. “this argument is invalid if the distinction between representations and their objects is a real and genuine one. For if so, it does not at all follow that because our representations of objects are in time that the objects themselves are in time. In other words, the argument is valid only from the standpoint of extreme subjectivism” (Kemp Smith: 1918, p. 136). Strawson also notes the ‘striking’ nature of this inference and argues that Kant can justify “the time-relatedness of all spatially related objects of awareness as a consequence of the necessary time-relatedness of all states of consciousness” (Strawson: 1966, p. 56) only on the basis of a radically idealistic understanding of bodies in space.

Contra Kemp Smith and Strawson we can note that the fact that only the appearance of the representation will be in time (and not the representation itself) ensures that a radically subjectivist or idealistic understanding of bodies does not help in validating this inference, given that the subjectivist/idealist is not going to identify the body with the appearance of the representation. Moreover, this kind of reading is inadequate insofar as it is unable to make sense of the distinction between time being an immediate condition and its merely being a mediate condition.
2 Time as the form of awareness

Time is the form of consciousness, i.e. the condition under which alone we become aware of things. (R317)

Noumenal affection provides a cognitive subject with a manifold of intuition that is processed to result in representations. These representations are modifications of the mind that belong to the noumenal subject and that have representational content which results from subjecting the manifold of intuition to the forms of intuition. In the case of outer intuition, the manifold is ordered in space, resulting in a three-dimensional spatial manifold. Noumenal affection in this way brings about a mental state (a noumenal representation) that represents an outer object that is in space.

In order to become aware of this object, the subject needs to reflect on its mental state, i.e. the mind needs to look inward. By means of an act of reflexive awareness the subject reflects on its own representation, becoming aware of the object that it represents. This is what gets us from the noumenal level (i.e. from the modification of the noumenal self) to the level of appearances (i.e. to an awareness of an outer appearance). The subject becomes aware of the outer object, which is the intentional object of the representation, by reflecting on the representation (= reflexive awareness).

2.1 Awareness of outer objects

By reflecting on its mental state the subject becomes aware of the represented object, not of the representation itself. The representation is simply the representational vehicle/medium by means of which we become aware of the object. Rather than being aware of the representation, it is via the representation that we become aware of the object that it represents. That is, awareness is not of the representation itself, i.e. of the mental entity that is doing the representing, but

6 It should be noted that the notion of awareness at issue is rather minimal and does not require the subject to focus on or attend to the object, nor need it involve any conceptualising. Reflexive awareness, which is to be ascribed to sensibility, is accordingly not to be identified with empirical apperception, which belongs to the understanding and involves various cognitive elements. Reflexive awareness only constitutes the first step of the process that results in empirical apperception, that is, in cognition of the determinations of one's mind, i.e. in cognition of the determinable self (cf. B15:8 footnote) = the self considered as object (cf. 20:270).

7 The appearance is to be considered as being immanent to the awareness (i.e. immanent to the mental act and not to the representational medium), such that it only exists when the subject is aware of it. Representations of which the subject is not reflexively aware thus do not give rise to appearances. Whilst appearances, which are to be found in the subjective spatial and temporal frameworks of a particular subject, are dependent on reflexive awareness, this does not hold for phenomena, since the way in which the intersubjectively objective spatio-temporal physical world consisting of phenomena is constructed does not require any actual reflection (cf. Bader: 2010).
of that which is represented, i.e. the intentional object. Accordingly, representations do not feature in the content of awareness. They are not the things of which we are aware. Instead, we are aware of the intentional objects that these representations represent. The object of awareness is, accordingly, the outer appearance.

Though there is a mediating state, i.e. a representation, we are nonetheless immediately aware of the represented object. This is because we are not aware of the content of the representation by being aware of the medium, but are aware of the content via the medium. The intentional object is given through the medium, rather than in the medium. In other words, instead of being aware of the mediating state and then via it of the intentional object, we are only aware of the intentional object. As a result, the immediate objects of awareness are the intentional objects, rather than the representational media through which these intentional objects are given.

Given that time is the form of awareness, it follows that our awareness of the objects of our representations is mediated by this form. In particular, reflecting on one’s mental states results in awareness of the temporalised representational contents of these states. Since reflexive awareness brings about awareness of the temporalised contents, we are not aware of their contents as they are in themselves but are only aware of them in this mediated form. This ensures that the objects of these representations end up being in time. In particular, the subject becomes aware of these objects as temporal objects, more precisely as objects that are existing now.

This account thus solves the first problem. Since time is the form of awareness, it pertains to all those things of which we are aware, ensuring that everything of which we are aware is in time. In particular, given that the object rather than the representation is what one is aware of, the object itself is what ends up being in time. The representation is simply that by means of which one becomes aware of the object but is not that of which one is aware. That is, the outer object is the thing of which one is aware and which is subject to the form of awareness, which ensures that the outer object itself is in time. Understanding time as the form of awareness in this way allows us to make sense of the temporality of outer objects.

2.2 Atemporal thoughts

The proposed account also does not fall prey to the second problem, since it is not based on a claim about conditions of the representation transferring to its object.

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8In order for us to become aware of the representation, it has to feature as the object of another representation, i.e. it itself has to be represented in a representing (cf. section 3).

9That the outer object ends up in time as a result of being subjected to the form of awareness does presuppose the commitment of transcendental idealism that appearances have those features that they are represented as having, but pace Kemp Smith and Strawson (cf. footnote 8), there is no need for a commitment to any form of extreme subjectivism/radical idealism that would identify the outer object with a representation.
Temporality does not simply derive from being an object of a representation. Instead, it derives from being an object of awareness.

Moreover, there is no concern about overgenerating. This is because thinking needs to be distinguished from awareness. In particular, the form of thought needs to be distinguished from the form of awareness. Time is only the form of awareness but not the form of thought, which instead consists in the logical unity of consciousness.\(^\text{10}\) Whilst we can think about God, noumena, and abstract objects, we cannot be aware of them. Given that only the objects that one is aware of end up in time, the objects of thought are not temporalised. This means that, although thinking is in time (insofar as the episode of thinking can itself become an inner object by becoming an object of a further representation and can then be considered to be in time insofar as it (or rather its appearance) is the object of that further representation of which the subject can become reflexively aware in a temporal manner),\(^\text{11}\) what is thought need not be in time.\(^\text{12}\)

As we saw, temporality does not apply to all objects of representations. In particular, the objects of thoughts can be atemporal. This means that there has to be something distinctive about the objects of intuitions, i.e. appearances, that ensures that they end up in time. The relevant difference is that the objects of intuitions are things we can become aware of by reflecting on our representations, whereas atemporal objects, such as noumena, are not objects of awareness but merely things that we can think. That is, the objects of which we can become reflexively aware are objects of representations that are produced by intuition, i.e. not merely objects that are thought. This matters because the objects of which we are aware are the result of receptivity and involve sensibility, whereas the objects that are thought are the result of spontaneity and involve the understanding.\(^\text{13}\) In the latter case, we do not have a representation that has been brought about by affection and on which one needs to reflect in order to become aware of what it represents. Instead, we are dealing with the spontaneous production of thought

\(^{10}\)Cf. “The form of apperception is the formal unity of consciousness as such, which is logical” ([R224]).

\(^{11}\)One can be aware of thinking in two different ways: 1. one can be transcendentally aware of the spontaneous activity of the determining self, and 2. one can be empirically aware of a particular thought, i.e. of an episode of thinking, by having a representation that represents it. Only the latter is temporalised (cf. footnote 14).

\(^{12}\)In [R6311] Kant clearly distinguishes between thinking which involves transcendental apperception and need not involve time from being aware of the thought by means of inner sense, which is a temporal matter. “I think, e.g. about God and connect with this thought the transcendental consciousness (since otherwise I would not be able to think), without thereby representing myself to myself as being in time, which would have to happen if I were to be conscious of this representation through my inner sense. When impressions occur on my inner sense, then this presupposes that I affect myself (though it is inexplicable how this happens) and thus empirical consciousness also presupposes transcendental consciousness.”

\(^{13}\)Cf. “where we are self-active, that does not belong to sensibility” (29:832). Also cf. “all inner intuition is passive” ([R6354]).
content that is only subject to the logical form of thought. Thinking only involves transcendental apperception but not reflexive awareness.\footnote{In the same way that thought content is not subjected to the form of awareness, so the activity of thinking of which one can be conscious by means of transcendental apperception is likewise not temporalised, since it is also the result of spontaneity rather than of passive sensibility and hence does not involve reflexive awareness. In short, only empirical but not transcendental awareness involves time.}

The fact that what is thought is not temporalised implies that our access to the objects of thought is not mediated by time. This implies that, unlike in the case of awareness, we do not only have access to the representational content in a temporalised form, but rather have unmediated access to the thought content that is represented by our noumenal mental states. Although it might, at first sight, appear to conflict with Kant’s epistemic strictures, our having unmediated access to the contents of our thoughts is unproblematic and does not imply that one has access to one’s noumenal self. That is, one still only knows oneself as one appears to oneself. This is because in thinking one only has access to the content of the thought. In particular, one does not have access to the noumenal self or any of its modifications but only to what this self is thinking. Accordingly, no aspect of the determinable self is revealed in this way, i.e. one is not aware of any modification of the mind, and there is hence no conflict with the claim that we only know ourselves as appearances (cf. B156). To have access to one’s mental states requires that the relevant modifications of the mind themselves become the objects of other representations, which ensures that one can only have mediated access to one’s mental states.

\section{2.3 Temporal binding}

A further advantage of this account is that it can explain how different appearances end up occurring at the same time and are thus simultaneous.\footnote{The notion of simultaneity at issue here is that of subjective simultaneity, i.e. we are not yet concerned with objective relations of simultaneity which are identified in time determination (cf. section 3.2).} As a result of temporalising appearances, the subject is aware of appearances as existing now, i.e. we end up with now: x, now: y etc. The problem of temporal binding consists in specifying what determines whether x and y are happening at the same time or at different times. Providing such an explanation is rendered difficult by the fact that the indexical now cannot bind them together. The indexical by itself does not enable us to bind different temporal contents, because temporalising x as now and y as now does not in any way tell us whether these nows are the same.

Accordingly, it would seem that we need to go to a non-indexical temporal determination, i.e. to the time t that is picked out by the indexical. However, the transcendental ideality of time precludes us from saying that x and y are si-
multaneous if the now-operators applying to them indexically pick out the same time, i.e. we cannot say that x is simultaneous with y iff t is the time at which the subject is aware of x and t′ is the time at which the subject is aware of y and t = t′. This is not possible because we cannot think of an appearance as existing at the time at which the subject is having the relevant intuition, given that time only applies to appearances. Time is only part of the representational content but is not something that applies to representations themselves, which ensures that there is no time at which one is having an intuition. The things of which one is aware are in time and stand in temporal relations, but awareness itself is not temporal and does not occur in time. Put differently, temporal operators are within the scope of awareness and qualify that of which one is aware, rather than awareness being within the scope of temporal operators.16

The attribution of the indexical now, accordingly, can only be understood as x being simultaneous with itself, rather than as x occurring at the time at which the intuition representing x is had. Applying this indexical thus only amounts to an ‘internal’ temporal determination, namely that x stands in the reflexive relation of being simultaneous with itself, and not to any ‘external’ temporal determination whereby it is related to some other event (or to some absolute temporal location). This means that we cannot temporalise intuitions individually, since we would then have x existing now as well as y existing now without there being anything that would determine whether these nows would be the same, i.e. each now would be simultaneous with itself but there would be nothing that could bind them together.

Instead, we can solve this temporal binding problem by taking a more holistic top-down approach. This involves applying the indexical to the subject’s total state of awareness, i.e. to all the things of which the subject is co-conscious, such that x and y are subjectively simultaneous and belong to the same now iff they are part of the same state of awareness. That is, x and y end up belonging to the same now if the subject is aware of both of them together. Reflexive awareness in this way temporalises appearances and is responsible for relations of subjective simultaneity, which are analysed in terms of co-consciousness (i.e. jointly falling within the scope of an ‘I think’).

3 Reappropriating mental states

There are two different ways of gaining access to our mental states, one of which merely generates awareness of the contents of existing mental states, whereas the other generates new mental states that have as their objects other mental states. This is because representations can be considered in two ways, namely in terms of being representational vehicles that have intentional objects, as well as in terms

16This is the upshot of §7 of the Transcendental Aesthetic, in which Kant responds to the criticisms raised by Mendelssohn, Lambert and Schultz (cf. Bader: 2013).
of being modifications of the mind that belong to the subject’s inner state.

1. REPRESENTATIONAL VEHICLES

On the one hand, one can consider representations in terms of their representational content, i.e. in terms of what they represent. Understood in this way, a representation brought about by outer or inner intuition is a representational medium that has an object that it represents. We can gain access to this representational content by reflecting upon the representation, thereby becoming reflexively aware of what it represents. Becoming aware of the contents of our representations by reflecting on them does not bring about a new mental state but only brings about awareness of something that is already there. Instead of producing new representations, it produces awareness of the temporalised content of our representations, making us aware of appearances as existing now.

This account applies to both representations resulting from inner intuition as well as from outer intuition. The mechanism by means of which outer appearances end up in time is the same as that which explains the temporality of inner appearances. In each case, we have a representation, i.e. a modification of the noumenal self, that is brought about by noumenal affection (in the case of outer intuitions by external affection and in the case of inner intuition by self-affection) and then become aware of the object of the representation by reflecting on the mental state, becoming aware of its content in a temporal manner as existing now. That is, we are aware both of spatial objects as well as of our phenomenal representations as existing now, since they are the intentional objects of the (noumenal) representations on which we reflect.17

2. MODIFICATIONS OF THE MIND

On the other hand, one can consider representations not as representational vehicles but as mental entities in their own right. We can become aware of the determinations of the mind insofar as they become the objects of further representations. This involves reappropriating mental states that one has, i.e. one inwardly intuits states of the mind and thereby makes them the objects of further representations. Since becoming aware of a mental state in this way requires a

17That outer and inner appearances are temporalised by means of the same mechanism comes out clearly in Kant’s discussion in the Doctrine of Right at 6:214 (where Kant considers the relation between ethical and juridical duties, focusing on an analogous issue of whether all juridical duties are also ethical duties). There he says:

So one says in theoretical philosophy: only the objects of outer sense are in space, but all objects, as well those of outer as of inner sense, are in time: since the representations of both are after all representations and insofar belong together to inner sense.

In each case we have a representation that belongs to inner sense. In the one case this representation represents an inner object, in the other case an outer object. In each case the represented object (but not the representation itself) ends up being in time.
further representation that represents it, i.e. it itself needs to be represented by another mental state, we can see that this process of reappropriation produces new representations. Inner intuition (understood in terms of the reappropriation of mental content), accordingly, brings about a new modification of the mind that has another representation as its object. By becoming reflexively aware of the content of the (noumenal) representations produced by inner intuition, one becomes aware of inner appearances, namely of phenomenal representations.¹⁸

More precisely, when reappropriating mental states one does not consider the representation itself but rather the representing. That is, what one can reappropriate is representings, i.e. mental episodes of awareness or thought. In the case of intuitions, a representing consists in the representation together with the mind reflecting upon it (i.e. representings = representations combined with reflexive awareness). When one has a memory, one neither remembers the representation considered by itself,¹⁹ nor the object of the representation,²⁰ but rather that one was standing in an experiential relation to the object, namely that one was aware of the object. Likewise, one remembers mental episodes of thinking, rather than remembering the thought content, i.e. the object that was thought.²¹

While inner appearances are assigned the temporal position now, as a result of the temporalising involved in reflexive awareness, reappropriated mental states are given in the form of a subjective temporal ordering.²² That is, reflexive awareness only involves application of the indexical now. Reappropriation, by

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¹⁸This account of reappropriation implies that there are higher-order representations, i.e. representations which represent things that represent further things, namely noumenal representations that have phenomenal representations as their intentional objects, which in turn have other objects as their intentional objects. Contra van Cleve: 1999, p. 273 footnote 26, such higher-order representations are unproblematic as long as there is no free-floating or autonomous intentionality, i.e. as long as the noumenal representation represents other things as representing things.

¹⁹If one could simply remember the representation, then this would open up room for the possibility of remembering a representation of which one was never aware. This is ruled out by the reflection requirement. Moreover, since representations are modifications of the noumenal self, we do not have access to the representations themselves but only to what they represent.

²⁰Memory does not derive immediately but only mediately from the object, insofar as the object features in a representing that is then remembered. Cf. "Insofar as the representation either derives immediately or mediately from objects (either from the presence of objects or the reality of the representations in the past, as in the case of memory)" (R 314).

²¹Memory would seem to be the only kind of representation resulting from the reappropriation of one’s mental states. Present inner states are either representations of which the subject is aware by reflecting on them or thoughts that the subject is thinking, and future inner states are not intuited but anticipated. It is only past inner states that can be represented in the form of a temporally ordered inner manifold resulting from self-affection. This is also suggested by Kant’s discussion of how the mind appears to itself as a result of self-affection in the *Metaphysik Vigilantius*: “the subject is affected by itself, and thus can obtain representations through the inner sense of the soul and from that can cognize, according to how the mind was previously affected by objects" (29:982).

²²This ordering can be understood as resulting from synopsis and is ascribed to sensibility rather than the understanding. (Thanks to Houston Smit for suggesting the relevance of synopsis.)
contrast, involves a manifold of intuition that is ordered in an extended temporal framework. The content of our (phenomenal) representations is thus ordered in time, due to the form of inner intuition having been imposed on the manifold that is inwardly intuited, which means that the resulting inner appearances are higher-order representations that have temporally ordered content (= ordered manifold).

This temporal ordering of the inner manifold is analogous to the spatial ordering of the outer manifold. Whilst space comes in as part of the process of outer intuition, time comes in as part of the process of inner intuition. In the case of outer intuition, the intentional contents of our (noumenal) representations brought about by external affection are ordered in space. In particular, they are assigned spatial positions and relations, resulting in a manifold of outer states, i.e. a three-dimensional spatial manifold (= an ordered spatial array). In the case of inner intuition, the (higher-order) intentional contents of our (phenomenal) representations, which are themselves objects of (noumenal) representations brought about by self-affection, are ordered in time. They are assigned temporal positions and relations, resulting in a manifold of inner episodes, i.e. a one-dimensional temporal manifold of representings (= ordered temporal sequence).

We can now see why Kant states at A34/B50-51 that time is the immediate condition of inner appearances but only the mediate condition of outer appearances. In the case of outer appearances, time is not involved in the processing of the manifold of outer intuition. It is only space that directly applies to the manifold of intuition and thus classifies as an immediate condition of outer appearances. Time only comes in at the point at which one becomes reflexively aware of the spatial object by reflecting on its representation. Time is thus not a feature of the outer object itself. As Kant notes, “time cannot be a determination of outer appearances: it belongs neither to shape nor location etc., but rather determines the relation of representations in our inner state” (A33/B49-50). By contrast, in the case of inner appearances time is an immediate condition since we are here dealing with an inner manifold that is ordered in time. For instance, a memory is an inner appearance that has temporal content (i.e. what the memory represents is temporally ordered). Since the manifold of inner intuition is ordered in time, time classifies as a determination of this inner appearance.

3.1 Intermediate representations

An important asymmetry between the outer and the inner is that, whereas in the former case one is aware of the three-dimensional spatial array, in the latter case one is not aware of the one-dimensional temporal sequence. Instead, one is only aware of an inner appearance as existing now that represents the one-dimensional temporal sequence. In other words, an outer intuition results in spatially ordered content, whereas an inner intuition results in a further representation that has temporally ordered content. One ends up with a noumenal representation that
has a phenomenal representation as its content, whereby the phenomenal representation, in turn, has as its content a temporally ordered sequence of representings, i.e. of mental episodes. The inner case thus involves an intermediate representation, ensuring that the temporally ordered content is only indirectly represented. The representings that are reappropriated are thus not directly but only indirectly represented by the noumenal mental state that is brought about by self-affection. Rather than directly representing these different representings, the noumenal representation directly represents a phenomenal representation (= inner appearance) that has the different representings as its objects.

This asymmetry is due to the fact that one can add time to space, but that one cannot add time to time. Put differently, whereas one can temporalise a spatial array, one cannot temporalise a temporal sequence. One cannot be aware of multiple times concurrently, given that awareness is synchronic and given that time is only one-dimensional. One thus cannot be aware of an extended temporal sequence. Instead, one can only be aware of what is happening now, of what is present. Other times can be represented but cannot be things of which one can be aware as being present. A plurality of times thus cannot be something of which one is aware concurrently. Instead, such a plurality must itself be a content, thereby making it possible for one to be aware of that thing which has this plurality as its content. This means that that of which one is aware and which is temporalised needs to be distinct from that which is represented as being temporally ordered.

This separation between the representation of which one is aware as being present and the content of which is represented as occurring at different times clearly holds in the case of memory. The memory is what one is aware of and which exists now, whereby the memory has representational content consisting in a temporally ordered sequence of remembered mental episodes. That is, one is aware of the memory rather than of that which is remembered. Accordingly, what is temporalised as existing now is the memory, and not the past events that are being remembered, since one would otherwise end up with a contradiction, given that nothing can exist now that occurred in the past. That is, the inner objects of which one is aware are not the temporally ordered representings, but the memories that have these mental episodes as their contents.

### 3.2 Temporalising, ordering, and time determination

The faculty of inner sense thus operates in two different ways. Time, correspondingly, turns out to play two importantly different roles. It is implicated both in the case of reflexive awareness and in the case of the reappropriation of mental states. In the former case, it is the intentional contents of noumenal represen-

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\[\text{\footnotesize Since time does not apply to awareness itself but only to its contents, awareness is only synchronic in the sense that the (direct) objects of awareness are all simultaneous with each other.}\]
tations that are temporalised, whereby temporalising consists in the application of the indexical *now* and thus gives rise to subjective relations of simultaneity. Here time relates to the awareness of the contents of noumenal representations. In the latter case, it is the intentional contents of phenomenal representations that are ordered in time, whereby this involves an extended temporal framework with various objects standing in subjective relations of succession. Here time relates to the contents of phenomenal representations. In short, time both comes in at the level of awareness in the form of the indexical *now* and at the level of the contents of inner appearances in the form of an extended temporal framework.

Both of these roles are to be distinguished from time determination, which is a matter of (spontaneous) cognition and not a matter of (receptive) sensibility. That is, time determination needs to be distinguished from being aware of something as existing in time, as well as from remembering events as occurring in a certain order. In short, we are so far only concerned with mere temporal awareness, which is subjective, and not yet with temporally determined experience, which is objective, i.e. merely with what is intuited and not yet with what is experienced. Determining something in time involves judging events to be related in certain ways, integrating them into a temporal framework and determining their objective temporal locations and relations.²⁴

Once we are dealing with temporalised appearances standing in relations of subjective simultaneity, as well as once we have a subjective ordering that is the result of inner intuition (= reappropriation), namely a subjective ordering of representings, one can then go about trying to objectively order appearances (inner as well as outer), so as to determine what the objective ordering consists in (which we can only reach in the limit by means of the final scientific theory).²⁵ Subjective simultaneity and succession in this way constitute the input that can be systematised in accordance with the pure principles of the understanding to identify (or rather to approximate ever more closely) the objective law-governed connections that underlie the objective temporal ordering of the world.

### 3.3 Temporal conflicts

There are two points at which time comes in when one is concerned with inner objects, namely insofar as time is the framework in which the contents of the inner appearances (= phenomenal representations) are ordered, as well as insofar as time applies to these inner appearances themselves. As a result, one might worry that Kant rejected such a multiplication of times in R₅₆₆₁, on the grounds that this

²⁴That time determination is not involved in intuition should be clear on the grounds that objectively ordering events crucially involves the dynamical categories which are not constitutive of intuition but only of experience (cf. A₆₆₄/B₆₉₂ and 4:309-310).

²⁵As Kant argues in the Refutation of Idealism, the objective temporal ordering of inner states is parasitic on that of outer states.
would open up room for the possibility of conflicts, potentially undermining the unity of time.

Consciousness, when I make an experience, is representation of my existence, insofar as it is empirically determined, i.e. in time. Were this consciousness in turn itself empirical, then the self-same time-determination in turn would have to be represented as contained under the conditions of the time-determination of my state. A further time would thus have to be thought, under which (not in which) the time which constitutes the formal condition of my inner experience would have to be contained. Accordingly, there would be a time in which and simultaneous with which a given time would flow by, which is nonsensical.

We can, however, see that no conflicts arise. This is because the different temporal attributions apply to different things. In particular, \textit{now} applies to the phenomenal representation (e.g. a memory), whereas what is represented by this phenomenal representation (e.g. what is remembered) is placed in the extended temporal framework. For instance, it is unproblematic that I now remember having done something yesterday. Although \textit{now} and \textit{yesterday} are incompatible temporal attributes, they are not assigned to one and the same thing and hence do not conflict. In particular, \textit{now} is identified as the time at which the memory is had, whereas \textit{yesterday} concerns the time of that which is remembered.

Moreover, the unity of time is preserved as a result of relating the \textit{now} to the temporally extended manifold that is being remembered, i.e. locating the present time at which the memory is taking place in the temporal framework (cf. 7:182). In this way, one is aware of the memory as existing \textit{now}, whilst also representing this present inner state as standing in various temporal relations to other events that are being remembered. This double attribution does not give rise to conflicts since the first attribution is indexical, whereas the second involves a relational ordering in terms of succession.

4 Conclusion

Inner and outer appearances thus end up in time in the same way, since both of them are objects of representations of which we become aware in a temporal manner by means of an act of reflexive awareness. This temporalising function of inner sense, which is due to the fact that time is the form of awareness and which involves the application of the indexical \textit{now}, is to be distinguished from the subjective temporal ordering that results from the reappropriation of mental states by means of inner intuition. Both of these functions pertain to sensibility and are, in turn, to be distinguished from time determination, which is performed by the understanding. There is thus a three-fold progression that begins with
1. the temporalising of appearances as a result of reflexive awareness (subjective simultaneity), continues with 2. the subjective ordering of representings that occurs as part of the reappropriation of mental states (subjective succession), and that culminates in 3. an objective ordering identified by means of time determination (objective simultaneity and succession), whereby subjective simultaneity and succession function as the input of scientific theorising that tries to uncover the objective ordering.26

References


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