I am currently a Junior Research Fellow at the University of Oxford . Beginning in 2015, I will be a Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Sydney . Beforehand, I was finishing my PhD in philosophy at MIT.

I work mainly in epistemology and decision theory.

I am currently engaged in defending a time-slice centric picture of rationality on which all inTRApersonal requirements of rationality can be derived from more fundamental requirements which apply equally in the inTERpersonal case. Defending this conception of rationality is the project of various papers and a book (see below).

My MIT dissertation defends the relevance to everyday life of formal Bayesian models of epistemic and practical rationality, which can seem most at home in highly artificial and idealized settings. More specifically, it offers a solution to one obstacle to applying Bayesian models in everday situations, namely, the problem of specifying which actions are to be considered as options for the agent in the context of decision theory. This defense of the normative relevance of formal Bayesian models leads to a rejection of synchronic and diachronic Dutch Book Arguments, which infer principles of epistemic rationality from claims about rational action.

I am also interested in the philosophy of language and received a minor in linguistics.


    Reasons without Persons: Rationality, Identity, and Time, forthcoming with Oxford University Press



  • Time-Slice Rationality
    • Formal Epistemology Festival, Jun 2013
    • Australian National University, Mar 2013
    • University of Sydney, Mar 2013
    • University of Cambridge, Feb 2013
    • Oxford Theoretical Work in Progress Seminar, Nov 2012
    • Arche/St Andrews, Nov 2012
  • Self-Reinforcing and Self-Frustrating Decisions
    • Cambridge/MIT Decision Theory Workshop, May 2012
  • Options and the Subjective Ought
  • Incoherence without Exploitability
    • CMU Episteme Conference, Jun 2011
    • MIT Work in Progress Seminar, Apr 2011
  • Decision-Making Under Normative Uncertainty
  • Rational Failures of Self-Knowledge
    • MIT/Institut Jean Nicod Conference on the De Se, Paris, Mar 2010