I am currently a Junior Research Fellow at the University of Oxford. Beginning in 2015, I will be a Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Sydney. Beforehand, I was an undergraduate at Princeton and a PhD student in philosophy at MIT.

I work mainly in epistemology and decision theory.

I am currently engaged in defending a time-slice centric picture of rationality on which all inTRApersonal requirements of rationality can be derived from more fundamental requirements which apply equally in the inTERpersonal case. Defending this conception of rationality is the project of various papers and a book (see below).

My MIT dissertation defends the relevance to everyday life of formal Bayesian models of epistemic and practical rationality, which can seem most at home in highly artificial and idealized settings. More specifically, it offers a solution to one obstacle to applying Bayesian models in everday situations, namely, the problem of specifying which actions are to be considered as options for the agent in the context of decision theory. This defense of the normative relevance of formal Bayesian models leads to a rejection of synchronic and diachronic Dutch Book Arguments, which infer principles of epistemic rationality from claims about rational action.

I am also interested in the philosophy of language and received a minor in linguistics.


    Reasons without Persons: Rationality, Identity, and Time, forthcoming with Oxford University Press



  • Uniqueness and Diachronic Requirements
    • Jowett Society, Oxford University, May 2014