

MIRACLES

Anna Kalypsas: a philosophers and teacher
Mel Etitis: one of her best students
Kathy Merinos: a student of more average ability
Theo Logos: a religious believer with philosophical interests

(A harbour front somewhere in the Peloponnese. A small crowd has gathered by a fishing boat; there's clearly some excitement, accompanied by arms raised to the sky and exclamations of joy and wonder. A figure detaches itself from the fringes of the crowd and strolls over to the café at one of whose tables sit Anna (a philosopher), Kathy, and Mel (her students); the figure is that of Theo (a leading local religious believer), and he joins them for a coffee.)

Anna: What's all the fuss about, Theo?

Theo *(apparently slightly embarrassed)*:

Er, one of the fishermen has caught a fish.

Anna: Oh come on, Theo — I know that pollution and over-fishing have cut down the catches, but it's not as bad as that is it? There must be more to it.

Theo: Yes, well ... *(he coughs)* ... they think that they can see the head of St Peter in its scales.

Mel: How do they know that it's St Peter, Dr Logos?

Theo: When they cut the fish open they found a key in its stomach — and of course, having found the key, they looked at the fish wanting to see it as special, and so could hardly help seeing *something*. They are all certain that it is a miracle, and they want to have the fish stuffed and placed in the church along with the key.

(Anna and Mel can't hide their amusement; Kathy is looking puzzled and slightly scandalised.)

Theo: Yes, yes, I know. When they have calmed down a little I shall try to dissuade them. You must know, though, that fishermen are particularly superstitious. The number of false miracle reports increases exponentially as one nears a port.

Kathy: But what's so funny? Why are you all assuming that it isn't a miracle? How do you know that the fish really doesn't have St Peter's head on its scales?

Theo: Well, apart from anything else Kathy, I have just looked at it, and I can assure you that the slightly discoloured patch at which they are all pointing looks as much like a deformed aubergine as it does St Peter. As to why Anna and Mel find the notion so amusing — you should ask them.

(Theo and Kathy turn to Anna and Mel with enquiring looks.)

Anna: Very well *(she glances at her watch)*, let's talk about miracles, shall we?

(The other three nod eagerly, and settle down for a discussion.)

There are two main questions, I suppose: are miracles possible? And if they are, should we believe that they've happened?

Mel: The metaphysical and the epistemological.

Anna: Quite. But before we begin, we ought to be sure that we agree on what a miracle is. Would anyone object to David Hume's definition? Roughly: a miracle is the violation, by god or his agents, of a law of nature.

Mel: Don't some people argue that a miracle needn't be a violation of a law of nature? That what counts as a miracle depends mainly on the way that you see the world?

Anna: They do, yes — but whatever you think of that position, it makes miracles rather uninteresting from a philosophical point of view. If perfectly explicable events can be miracles, then there's no problem about whether they're possible. And if the miraculous is in the eye of the beholder, then there's no standard of evidence involved, and no problem as to whether you should believe miracles have happened. The question becomes a much more general one about that sort of approach to knowledge and belief, which would tangle us up, so that we'd probably never get to talk about miracles at all.

So can we all agree that, even if it makes sense to talk of miracles that aren't violations of laws of nature, we're only interested in the ones that are?

Mel: I'm still not sure, actually. After all, aren't you saying that the fishermen over there are claiming that there's been a miracle? And what law of nature is being violated by a fish having its scales in a certain pattern? I mean, fish have all sorts of patterns in their scales, don't they?

Theo: Yes — and a miracle might consist in a storm happening at the right time, but there is nothing unnatural about a storm.

Kathy: And aren't people sometimes cured miraculously, even though they *could* have been cured by ordinary medicine?

Anna: OK, OK, so we can't all agree... Let's leave that for the moment, then; what about the other part of Hume's definition? Doesn't a miracle have to be the work of god, or one of his agents?

Kathy: People often talk about things being miracles when they don't mean anything religious.

Anna: Well, yes, they do, but they're at best using the term 'miracle' loosely or even metaphorically. In that sense – the tabloid journalist sense – a miracle is just anything that's very surprising, whether it's the fact that no-one happened to be hurt in a train crash, or that someone scored a difficult goal at a crucial time... that sort of thing. But that usage is ruled out by both parts of Hume's definition; no-one's claiming either that the event violated the laws of nature or that it was god's work.

Mel: Fair enough, but I still don't see why we have to include god in the definition of 'miracle'.

Anna: Do you think that it might be a practical matter — that Hume's limiting his discussion to just those miracles that are *god's* violations of the laws of nature?

Theo: I fail to see why that should be necessary; after all, what could violate a natural law except something that lies *outside* nature?

Anna: In other words, a violation of a law of nature implies the existence of an extra-natural — if you like, a supernatural — being. If a certain effect can only be produced by a certain cause, then finding that the effect exists would prove that the cause exists. And it's true that miracle stories have often been offered by theists as proof of their beliefs, and that Hume's discussion was partly concerned to show that that couldn't work.

Kathy: How did he do that?

Anna: Well, can we come to that later? Let's deal with one thing at a time. Although I should say that it's not *obvious* that laws of nature can only be violated from outside the natural world — there's some arguing to do before you can reach that conclusion. So it's at least possible that Hume was pre-empting that sort of discussion, and saying that, even if you can have a miracle that isn't god's work, he's only interested in the ones that are.

Mel: You don't sound convinced, Anna.

Anna: I'm not, to be honest. In fact I'm not really sure why Hume gave the definition he did; perhaps he just didn't notice (or didn't believe) that laws of nature can only be violated from outside the natural world, or perhaps he thought that it still left open the identity of that extra-natural violater.

Mel: There's an epistemological question, I suppose. Given his definition, it's reasonable to point out that describing an event as a miracle depends upon its meeting two conditions: it has to be the violation of a law of nature, *and* it has to be the work of god. That could be taken to mean that judging something to be a miracle *presupposes* the existence of god, so that miracle stories can't count as proofs of that existence.

Anna: Good point, Mel — but let's leave all that to one side for the moment. Can we agree that, at least if we're talking about religious miracles, they have to be the work of god or one of his agents?

(Everyone nods agreement.)

Anna: Good. But now we can go back to the business about laws of nature. Even if a particular kind of event *can* happen in the ordinary course of things, according to the laws of nature, still, if god makes it happen, then he's interfered with those laws.

Theo: Ah, like the lottery? Although any particular sequence of numbers *can* and *might* come up by the normal laws of chance, it would still be cheating if someone fixed the machine to

make sure that a certain sequence does come up. You cannot look at the winning sequence and conclude that it must have been the result of cheating, because there is no obvious difference between a sequence obtained by chance and one obtained by trickery.

Anna: That's it exactly. Even if god causes something like a storm, which would normally be a natural event, the very fact that *god* has caused it means that he's interfered with the natural law.

Mel: I see. So if a miracle has to be caused by god, then it has to be a violation of a law too.

Anna: That's right. It just doesn't make sense to talk about god acting in the world in a non-miraculous way.

Theo: Very well; I think that we can agree to use Hume's definition, at least for the sake of today's discussion.

Anna: OK then, as we're using Hume's definition, let's look at *his* reasons for why we shouldn't believe that god put a picture of St Peter on today's fish (which, by the way, I see is now being carried in procession to the taxidermist's).

(Theo shifts uneasily.)

Anna: First we have to ask why we believe that *anything* has happened; when someone reports an event to us, on what basis do we accept or reject what she says?

Mel: I suppose that we have to ask ourselves whether what she says happened is likely or not.

Kathy: And how reliable she is; if she's usually trustworthy we're likely to believe her, but if she isn't – like the little boy who cried 'wolf!' – then we'll probably ignore what she says.

Anna: Right. In other words we weigh one thing against another. On one side of the scales of judgement is the unlikelihood of the event – that's the evidence against, if you like – and on the other side is the testimony of our witness; if she's reliable then her testimony weighs heavy, if she's not then it weighs light.

OK, now we have to think about the nature of the event in question. We said, remember, that a miracle is the violation of a law of nature, so we have to ask what a law of nature is. Anyone?

Mel: Well, I know what Hume said it was...

Anna: Yes, good — let's start with that at least.

Mel: He said that we had no evidence or other reason to think that the world actually contained necessary connections between events, so that all we had were our observations of regularities. To say that it's a law of nature that... oh, I don't know, that metal expands when you heat it, is just to say that everyone's always seen metal expand when it's been heated.

Anna: So a law of nature is an observed regularity.

Mel: Yes, that's right. Well, it's what Hume said, anyway.

Anna: So now we have to look at the scales of judgement in the case of a miracle report. On one side is the unlikelihood of the miracle — the evidence against. Now, as a miracle is a violation of a law of nature, the evidence against is all the observations that make up the law in question. That's going to be huge, because it includes every occasion on which anyone's seen an example of the regularity. In your example, Mel, that's every time someone's seen metal expand when heated.

Kathy: And on the other side is the evidence of the people who've seen the miracle.

Anna: Right — and Hume's point is that the scales will always tip against the miracle. After all, we'd only call something a miracle if it violated a law of nature, and we'd only call something a law of nature if there was a huge amount of evidence for it (in a way, in fact, the law just is the evidence). So no matter how reliable the witnesses are, their testimony will always be outweighed by the inherent unlikelihood of the event — by the testimony against.

Theo: There seems to me, though, to be something unfair in this argument. You say that the witnesses' testimony is rejected *no matter how reliable they are*. Are you not, then, assessing them twice? First you must have assessed them in order to see how reliable they were — probably by looking at how often they have told the truth in the past — and then, when they report that they have witnessed a miracle, you assess them again by weighing their testimony against the likelihood of the miracle having happened. Do you see my problem? If they are reliable, then you should believe them. Are you sure that you are not counting them as unreliable simply on the grounds that anyone who claims to have witnessed a miracle must be?

Anna (*pauses for a moment in surprised thought, then gives an ironic laugh*):

That's an interesting point, Theo. I'd not like to say that that never happens, but I hope that I'm not doing it here. Let's think about what we mean when we say that someone's reliable. Imagine a reporter, for example: she's covering a war somewhere, and sends back what she claims to be a full and accurate account. Now, if I say that she's 90% reliable, what might I mean?

Kathy: Well, I suppose that you mean that 90% of what she writes is true...

Mel: Yes, or that she writes about 90% of what happens.

Anna: Right — and those two meanings are very different. On Mel's account, everything that the reporter writes is true, but she misses (deliberately or not, it doesn't matter) 10% of what's going on. On Kathy's account, she reports on everything that's going on, but only 90% of

what she says about it is true. Now that distinction can sometimes be crucial, so we have to ask whether it is in Hume's case — and if so, which kind of reliability he's talking about.

Mel: I'm not sure. I suppose that the kind that I mentioned isn't really relevant...

Anna: Why not? After all, the context within which an event occurs is often crucial to understanding. I remember an example from something I once read — a short story, I think: a woman is walking along the street when suddenly a man knocks her over and throws himself on top of her. Our reaction might at first be one of outrage, until we learn that the woman had brushed against a street-trader's brazier, her coat had caught fire, and the man saved her from being badly burnt by his quick thinking.

Theo: A good example, Anna ; it is clear that reliability must involve noticing and reporting all the relevant facts, not just the central ones. But surely we should demand the other kind of reliability too.

Anna: Yes, I think that we should. A first thought about Hume's argument, then, might be that we sometimes judge people to be reliable in one of the two senses, but then have to consider their reliability in the other sense. But before I take that further, I want to give another example.

All right, imagine that there are only two kinds of fish in the Mediterranean: red mullet and grey mullet. Now, the fish that's even now being stuffed by Yianni the taxidermist is therefore one of the two, red or grey. Let's assume that Theo is something of an expert on fish, and is known to be 90% reliable when it comes to picking out a red mullet. Theo tells us that the fish he saw was a red mullet; so what is the probability that it was red?

(No-one speaks, though they show various signs of puzzlement and worry as they look at each other and at Anna. She laughs.)

Anna: It's all right, there's no trick; you're probably looking for something too complicated. I know that, strictly speaking, it doesn't make sense to talk of probability when there's a fact of the matter — it's either a red or a grey mullet, and that's all there is to it. I'm just using the term 'probability' in a loose sense though, to mean something like: 'what should our expectations be?' If we wanted to bet on whether the fish was red or grey, what are the odds that it's red?

Kathy *(hesitantly)*:

Nine to one?

Anna: Right, that's the obvious answer isn't it? And on the information I've given so far it's a pretty reasonable answer. But now what if I add some more details — for example, that red mullet have been fished to near extinction, so that there are nine grey mullet to every

red one? In other words, it's 90% more likely that the fishermen had a grey mullet than a red mullet. What should we make of the probability now?

Mel: Well, it partly depends on what you meant in the first place, when you said that Dr Logos was 90% reliable in picking out red mullet. It might be that 90% of the times he's shown any mullet he gets its colour right, or that 90% of the times he's shown a red mullet he gets its colour right.

Anna: Right. And that latter case leaves open the possibility that sometimes he calls something a red mullet when it's really grey; and if that's the case, then how many red and grey mullets there are becomes very significant.

So assessing someone's reliability isn't an easy matter. First, we have to take into account the context of their evidence on each occasion, and secondly, we have to make sure that we agree as to what exactly we mean when we call them reliable.

Mel: Don't those two problems come to much the same thing in the case of miracles? After all, the context of a miracle report is extremely unusual, so that the background improbability of what people are testifying to is high — and their *prior* reliability as witnesses is based on normal events, not on abnormal events like violations of laws of nature, so we can't just treat them as reliable full stop.

Anna: True — so I think that accusing Hume of subjecting witnesses to two tests for reliability – a sort of double jeopardy – is unfair. Which takes us back pretty much to where we started: no matter how reliable the witnesses are in normal circumstances, their testimony will always be outweighed by the unlikelihood of the event they're testifying to.

Theo: Still, I am not sure that that is quite right. The scales will only tip against the miracle if the witnesses are at all unreliable. If you had witnesses who were 100% reliable, then it would not matter how much evidence there was on the other side — nothing outweighs 100%.

Anna: That's perfectly correct, which I think is why Hume offers another set of arguments – well, more like observations on human nature – designed partly to show why we can never treat witnesses as 100% reliable. For example, he points out we're naturally prone to believe in whatever's marvellous or unusual, that we enjoy what he calls “the passion of surprise and wonder”; just think about all those believers in UFOs and corn circles (and, if this were the U.S.A., our fishermen would have been just as likely to have seen the face of Elvis in the fish scales). Also, people are always prone to deception — and the more they want to believe, the easier it is to deceive them. It's no wonder, then, that most miracle stories come from distant times and places, in which people were predisposed to believe (perhaps because of their religious convictions). And that also, of course, makes it easy for testimony to become distorted as it's transmitted to us.

Mel: And surely we have to take into account the fact that people aren't always honest.

Kathy: And that it's always possible to make mistakes about what you've seen.

Anna: Right. All of this goes to show that, no matter how reliable witnesses are, you can never be sure that they're 100% reliable. But 100% reliability is the only thing that would stand a chance of outweighing the intrinsic unlikelihood of a miracle.

Kathy: So it doesn't make any sense to say that miracles happen — Hume's argument shows that they're impossible.

Anna: No, no, not at all. All this business about testimony is designed to show only that we can never have good grounds to believe that a miracle has occurred; it's purely epistemological. Whether the notion of a miracle makes *metaphysical* – or, indeed, *theological* – sense is another matter entirely.

Theo: Fair enough, Anna, and I can see how Hume's argument is supposed to work. It is quite ingenious — showing that by the definition of 'miracle' in terms of laws of nature, and 'law of nature' in terms of testimony, there is always much better testimony against than for a miracle. But his argument is confined to the testimony of others, and ignores one's own experiences. Perhaps that is why you sat here instead of looking at the fish yourself?

Anna: Well, in the case of the fish, you did look at it, and came back saying that it was no miracle. But more generally, why should I take my own experience to be 100% reliable? Remember that that's what's needed for the testimony for the miracle to outweigh the testimony against.

After all, I know that in the past I've made mistakes, or misunderstood what I thought I'd experienced. I know that I'm not dishonest, but I can't be sure that I'm not being tricked, or seeing what I want to see (and that'd be even more significant for a religious believer). Of course I tend to *feel* more certain about what I experience for myself, but I'd need more than that to tip the scales in favour of belief in a miracle.

Mel: I can see that, Anna, but does Hume's argument apply to a case like the fish?

(Theo makes a movement as if to interrupt.)

Yes, I know Dr Logos — but let's assume for a moment that you'd gone over there and actually seen what the fishermen saw. And suppose that you'd called us over to look for ourselves, and we'd seen it too. Now that's not like the usual sort of miracle, which just happens, and then there are just the reports of it for us to go on. In this sort of case the fish is still here.

Kathy: And if they do get it stuffed it'll be here for everyone to see for a good long time.

Theo: I suppose that there are real examples of that sort of miracle; the Shroud of Turin, for example.

Kathy: But Dr Logos, hasn't that been proved to date from the Middle Ages?

Anna: Well, whether it has or not, it's the right sort of example. Let's suppose that instead of the shroud we have Veronica's Veil – the image of Christ's face on a piece of cloth – and that dating tests showed it to date from the time of Jesus. Is Mel right, then? Does Hume's argument extend to that sort of miracle, where the evidence outlasts the initial event?

Theo: Rather reluctantly I should have to say no.

Mel: Why's that, Dr Logos?

Theo: Well, the miracle itself is, as Anna hinted, still in the past. Even if we have something like the image of a face on a piece of old cloth, *that* is not a violation of natural law, any more than a face formed by the scales of a fish. The latter might be improbable if left to chance, and the former might be difficult to explain given our current understanding of chemistry and knowledge of the skills of our ancestors — but neither is in itself miraculous. The miracle, if any, would be in how the result was achieved, and that is not available to us.

Kathy: But I don't understand. If you have something that can't be explained by science, isn't that what you said a miracle was — a violation of a natural law? Hasn't the religious explanation given us evidence for the truth of the religion? After all, religion's explained something that science can't.

Mel: But Kathy, you can't jump from saying that science *hasn't* explained something to saying that it *can't*. After all, science progresses, and things that couldn't be explained a hundred years ago can be explained now; how do you know that something like the Turin Shroud – or Veronica's Veil, or whatever – won't be explainable by science in a hundred years' time?

Anna: Yes, I must say there's a tendency on the part of some religious people to insist that, if science doesn't have an explanation of something *now*, then we should accept their explanation — as though we've got to have an answer to everything immediately. In fact, think of the common religious position that what they can't explain is an impenetrable mystery for which no explanation is even possible; why should we assume that we're capable of understanding everything in the natural world? We have to try, of course – that's what science is all about – but there's nothing odd about the idea that some things are just beyond us.

(The others nod in acceptance of the point.)

Anna: But there's another problem with Kathy's suggestion — one that we saw when we talked about the design argument, remember? When a scientist investigates Veronica's Veil she tries to discover how the image got there; when the religious person says that it was a miracle, she's not telling us how the image got there, but only (at best) who put it there...

and, possibly, why. So religion can't claim that it's answered a question that science can't; even if calling something a miracle is an explanation at all, it isn't the sort of explanation that scientists are looking for.

Theo: I see your general point, Anna, and on the whole I accept it. I confess that I have never considered the occurrence of miracles to be at the heart of my religious beliefs. Nevertheless, I fail to see why pronouncing an event to have been a miracle is not to explain it. If a leper returned home one day free of his disease, and his family asked him how he had been cured, would it not be an explanation for him to have said: 'Jesus performed a miracle and cured me'?

Anna: I'd have said not. Imagine that that fishing boat over there suddenly turned into a kangaroo; you'd be amazed and you'd want an explanation wouldn't you?

Theo: Yes, of course.

Anna: And would you feel satisfied if I told you that I'd done it?

Theo: Well, no; I see what you mean. To be a real explanation you would have to tell me how you had done it, or at least offer some good independent evidence that you had the power to transform fishing boats into kangaroos.

Anna: The former, yes — but I'm not sure about the latter. Remember Voltaire poking fun at people who 'explain' the fact that opium produces sleep by saying that it has a dormitive power. That's no explanation, of course, because you've done nothing more than use fancy words to repeat the fact that opium produces sleep. If you were to ask me how I turn boats into kangaroos and I answered that I had a transmogrificatory power, I'd have told you nothing; I'd just have said: 'Because I can.'

Theo: Nevertheless, you are being much too strict, Anna. An explanation is meant to replace puzzlement with understanding. If *you* had turned a boat into a kangaroo — or water into wine for that matter — I should still have been puzzled; if *god* had done it, I should have understood. Saying that something is a miracle surely is an explanation in some sense.

Anna: Well, it can certainly replace puzzlement with non-puzzlement; in other words, it has the *psychological* effect of an explanation, at least to someone who's a religious believer. But the nature of explanation can't just be psychological — if it were, then scientists would be down at the level of politicians.

Mel: But shouldn't a good explanation lead to a prediction?

Anna: It's true that, in most cases, we expect an explanation to be reversible, as it were. So if you can explain why water boils, you should be able to predict when it'll boil (and when it won't). The better you can predict, the better your explanation — and calling an event miraculous doesn't allow any sort of prediction of when a miracle will or won't happen

again. But isn't that just the same point as before? I mean, describing something as a miracle doesn't tell us *how* it happened, only who did it (usually), and why (sometimes).

Theo: Agreed — but I am still unhappy with your more general point. I think that your mistake is to think only in terms of explaining the *type* of event, such as changing boats into kangaroos. With most miracle stories, though, the explanation is of a *particular event*. Remember when we first met, shortly after you had moved here, one night all the lights in the town suddenly went out, and you asked me for an explanation; I told you that it was a power cut, and that we often suffered them in the Summer. I think that you felt that I had explained the event. Of course, I had not explained the fact that power cuts occur in the Summer — that is another problem. My explanation served to put the event in an explicable context; it did not then explain that context, but if you demanded that, then all explanations would be immensely long, and would involve god (or the Big Bang).

Anna: Yes, I see your point Theo. Perhaps we can just agree that calling something a miracle can be an adequate explanation for the religious believer but not for the non-believer; that is, it counts as an explanation in the context of a particular religion.

Kathy: I wonder, if that's settled, whether we could go back to the beginning. You said, Anna, that we'd come back to what Hume said about using miracles to prove the truth of a religion.

Theo: If we do discuss that, I should like to make it clear that I am probably in agreement with whatever Hume says; I believe that miracles are possible and that they have occurred, but I certainly do not consider them to count as any kind of proof of my religious beliefs.

Anna: Fair enough — though, of course, you still mightn't like what Hume has to say. And you should remember that he was writing at a time when miracles were often offered as proof of the truth of Christianity. Anyway, his argument's simple enough: every religion has its miracles, but religions contradict each other — they can't all be right. If a Christian miracle proves that Christianity's true, then a Hindu miracle proves that Hinduism's true; given that they can't both be true, and that there's no good prior reason to accept the miracles of one religion and not those of another, we have to reject the idea that miracles prove anything.

Mel: But even if that was true in Hume's day, is it true now? I mean, lots of religions, all the main ones I think, are coming closer together; I don't think that they'd say that all the others were false any more.

Theo: Hmmm, well, not really Mel. It is true (and something for which to be thankful) that the major world religions have begun to show less hostility towards each other, but that is limited in scope. After all, even Christian œcumenism has failed to erase some deep

disagreements in doctrine between the various churches. What one might call religious rapprochement is more or less limited to the social and political sphere.

Anna: In other words, they don't kill each other so often.

Theo: Well, it is a little more than that, but in essence, yes. For example Christians still believe in Christ's divinity, and hold that salvation is possible only through belief in him; other religions clearly do not agree. It seems to me that Hume's point still holds.

Anna: And we might add what we said a while ago: if a miracle is defined in terms of a god's actions, then you'd only call something a miracle if you already believed in that god.

(There's a commotion on the harbour front; they all look up, to see a somewhat ragged procession led by a group of fisherman, one of whom carries aloft a stuffed fish and a key. They're heading for the church.)

Anna *(clearly amused)*:

Well, whatever we all think, we seem to be in a minority in this vicinity.

Theo: I'm sorry Anna, Mel, Kathy — I really ought to go and try to do something...

(He leaves the table and hurries after the departing procession, leaving Anna and the others to finish their coffees.)

Suggested Reading

- John Beversluis – *C.S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion* (1985: W^m B. Eerdmans) – chapter 4. Contains a salutary discussion of Lewis's arguments against naturalism in his *Miracles* (1960: Fontana)
- Robert J. Fogelin – *A Defence of Hume on Miracles* (2003: Princeton University Press)
- David Hume – *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding* – sections VII and XII give some of the philosophical background, section X pp 344–346 (“Additional Note” to section X) is the central text. Section X ('Of Miracles') is available as a separate volume, and is reprinted in Swinburne
- J.L. Mackie – *The Miracle of Theism* 1982: Oxford University Press) – chapter 1 (an extract from which is reprinted in Swinburne)
- Richard Swinburne [ed.] – *Miracles* (1989: Macmillan)

Peter J. King
Pembroke College, Oxford

