PHILOSOPHY is like mathematics in that you can’t just set down your answer — you have to show how you got there. A common fault in philosophy essays is that the writer is in such a hurry to get her ideas down — to attack a hated position, to state an attractive theory — that she forgets to argue. Without arguments, all you have is a set of opinions, however interesting; with arguments, you have philosophy.

STRUCTURE. But perhaps the most common cause of problems with essays (apart from the amount of work put into them) is poor structure. A badly structured essay doesn’t only make it difficult for the reader to follow what you’re saying — it can make it difficult for you to keep track of what you’re saying, leading to repetition, contradiction, and irrelevance. Make an essay plan before you start writing, and try to stick to it. It shouldn’t be too detailed, otherwise it’ll be too rigid; most, if not all, plans will fall into three parts, including an introduction to and explanation of the problems, a discussion of the main arguments, and some sort of conclusion. Whatever your position, be sure to treat the positions with which you disagree as fully and sympathetically as possible before you start to criticise them; apart from anything else this will help you to avoid knocking down straw men. Don’t strive too hard for originality and new ideas; these will come (if they do) as you think and write about other people’s ideas and arguments. If you do come up with what you think is an original idea or argument, don’t be too protective towards it; be at least as critical of it as you would be of anyone else’s.

CRITICAL APPARATUS. All quotations should be given references clear and detailed enough to allow the reader to go straight to the original source. This will normally involve author, title, and page number; in the case of historical or translated works, you should be sure to give the edition you’re using, and if possible use a standard reference system (often found in the margins or at the top of each page). If you’re unsure, check to see how other authors do it, or ask me. Never use other writers’ words or even ideas without acknowledgment. A separate bibliography is usually helpful.

LANGUAGE. Clarity and precision often depend upon careful use of language — and this includes spelling and grammar. Don’t underestimate the problems caused by misspelling (the differences between ‘intention’ and ‘intension’, or ‘ingenious’ and ‘ingenuous’, are more important than the single letters involved). This is even more true of grammar and punctuation. Keep your language simple: don’t use three syllables where one will do, or ‘had it not been written by him’ instead of ‘if he hadn’t written it’. Make sure that quotations fit into their new contexts (avoid, for example, ‘Descartes said that “I can be certain”’; write either Descartes said: “I can be certain”’ or ‘Descartes said that he could be certain’).

PLAGIARISM. Your essays must be your own work. The reading is there to guide you, to suggest avenues of thought, to offer explanations of difficult arguments or ideas; it is not there to be repeated parrot-fashion. If you need to quote from another writer, mark the quotation clearly (see above, under Critical apparatus) — but again, don’t overdo it.

PRACTICAL MATTERS. N.B.: when I give more than one essay question, these are alternatives, so choose one. Don’t tread too much (or, of course, too little); three or four items from the relevant reading list is usually about right (one introductory or general work, and two or three others). If you want to (or have to) go outside the reading I suggest, talk to me about it; too often I find that essays have suffered because students have read what are frankly bad and misleading books. I strongly advise having a tutorial (which I’ll offer in the latter half of the semester); it will almost certainly improve your mark, often significantly. If you use a word-processor (and I’d advise it), use the spell-checker; don’t bother with grammar-checkers — I’ve yet to see one that works.

Peter J. King
E-mail: peter.king@philosophy.oxford.ac.uk
WWW: http://users.ox.ac.uk/~worc0337
GENERAL READING

Monographs
J. Beloff
R. Broughton
H. Irwin
C. McCreery

Collections of Papers and Readings
(Referred to in the reading lists by the editors’ names only)
A. Angoff & B. Shapin
H. Edge et al.
Antony Flew
K. Frazier
I. Gratton-Guinness
P. Grim
S. Krippner
P. Kurtz
J. Smythies
J. Wheatley & H. Edge
B. Wolman

Parapsychology as a science

Is parapsychology a pseudoscience?

J. Beloff
—

The Psychological Sciences — chapter 8
—
‘Psychical research and psychology’ (in Gratton-Guinness)
—
‘What is your counter-explanation? A plea to sceptics to think again’ (in Kurtz)

S. Blackmore
—
‘The adventures of a psi-inhibitory experimenter’ (in Kurtz)

B. Brier
—
‘Methodology in parapsychology and other sciences’ (in Angoff & Shapin)

R. Broughton
Parapsychology: the Controversial Science — chapter 4

H. Cahn
—
‘Methodological postulates for science and the paranormal’ (in Angoff & Shapin)

Antony Flew
—
‘Parapsychology: science or pseudoscience?’ (in Kurtz, & in Grim)

D. Gjertsen
Science and Philosophy — chapter 9

Ivor Gratton-Guinness
—
‘Psychical research versus the established sciences’ (in Gratton-Guinness)

G. Hansen et al.
—
‘Critique of the PEAR remote-viewing experiments’ (J. Para 56, 1992)

H. Irwin
An Introduction to Parapsychology — chapter 16

J. Palmer
—
‘The ESP controversy’ (in Edge et al.)
—
ESP: research findings’ (in Krippner, vol.2)

J. Pratt
—
‘The inexplicable and the supernatural’ (Philosophy 43, 1968)

R. Reinsel
—
‘Parapsychology: an empirical science’ (in Grim)

D.-H. Ruben
Explaining Explanation

J. Smythies
—
‘Is ESP possible?’ (in Smythies)

S.J. Tambiah
Magic, Science, Religion, and the Scope of Rationality

J. Taylor
Superminds — chapters 5–8

Abbreviations used in the reading lists
APQ = American Philosophical Quarterly
AJP = Australasian Journal of Philosophy
BJPS = British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
CJP = Canadian Journal of Philosophy
J.Phil. = Journal of Philosophy
J.Para. = Journal of Parapsychology
JRPR = Journal of Religion and Psychical Research
JSPR = Journal of the Society for Psychical Research
PAS = Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
PASS = Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume
Phil.Q. = Philosophical Quarterly
Phil.Rev. = Philosophical Review
S.J.Phil. = Southern Journal of Philosophy
Astrology

“Astronomy and astrology clash in a way that prompts us to classify the former as genuine science and the latter as pseudoscience” (ROTHBART) Discuss.

H. Barber – ‘Resistance by scientists to scientific discovery’ (Science 134, 1961)
A. Chalmers – *What Is This Thing Called Science?*
G. Dean – ‘Does astrology need to be true?’ (in Frazier)
A. Flew – ‘Parapsychology: science or pseudoscience?’ (in Kurtz, & in Grim)
K. Frazier [ed.] – *The Hundredth Monkey and Other Paradigms of the Paranormal* — part 7
M. Gauquelin – *Astrology and Science*
Ivor Grattan-Guinness – ‘Psychical research versus the established sciences’ (in Grattan-Guinness)
P. Grim [ed.] – *Philosophy of Science and the Occult* — section 1
W.H. Newton-Smith – *The Rationality of Science*
A. Oram – ‘Astrology’ (in Grattan-Guinness)
D.-H. Ruben – *Explaining Explanation*

Precognition

“Precognition is impossible because it invokes an incoherent idea: that of backwards causation”. Is this criticism justified?

J. Beloff – *The Relentless Question: Reflections on the Paranormal*  
S. Braude – *ESP and Psychokinesis: A Philosophical Explanation*  
— – *The Limits of Influence* — chapter 5
B. Brier – ‘Magicians, alarm clocks, and backwards causation’ (*S.J. Phil.* 11, 1973; & in Flew)
B. Brier & M. Schmidt-Raghavan – ‘Precognition and the paradoxes of causality’ (in Grim)
C.D. Broad – ‘The notion of “precognition”’ (in Smythies)  
— – ‘The philosophical implications of foreknowledge’ (in Flew, as ‘An examination of a priori objections’)
H. Edge – ‘Survival and other philosophical questions’ §4.2 (in Edge et al.)
A. Flew – ‘What has Brier proved?’ (Flew)
H. Irwin – *An Introduction to Parapsychology* — chapter 5
— – *The Cement of the Universe* — chapter 7
D. Mellor – *Real Time* — chapter 10
C. Mundle – ‘Is “paranormal recognition” a coherent concept?’ (in Flew)
A. Roy – ‘Precognition — a sort of radar?’ (in Grattan-Guinness)
D. Sanford – ‘The direction of causation & the direction of conditionship’ (*J.Phil.* 73, 1976)
A Schillp [ed.] – *The Philosophy of C.D. Broad* — chapters 11–12, & Replies
J. Smythies – ‘Is ESP possible?’ (in Smythies)
R. Taylor – ‘The metaphysics of causation’ (in Sosa [ed.] *Causes and Conditionals*)
I. Thalberg – ‘Fatalism towards the past and future’ (in van Inwagen [ed.] *Time and Cause*)
L. Werth – ‘Normalising the paranormal (a philosophical feasibility study of precognition)’ (*APQ* 15, 1979)
### Justification

Could psi-experiences constitute a source of knowledge?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R. Almedar</td>
<td>‘Truth and evidence’ (Phil.Q. 24, 1974)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L. Bonjour</td>
<td>The Structure of Empirical Knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.D. Broad</td>
<td>‘The philosophical implications of foreknowledge’ (PASS 16, 1937; &amp; in Flew, as ‘An examination of a priori objections’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Dancy</td>
<td>Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology — chapters 2–3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fred Dretske</td>
<td>‘Conclusive Reasons’ (AJP 49, 1971)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Duran</td>
<td>‘Philosophical difficulties with paranormal knowledge claims’ (in Grim)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. Feldman</td>
<td>‘Reliability and Justification’ (Monist 68, 1985)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Flew</td>
<td>‘Analysing the concepts of parapsychology’ (in Flew)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Gauld</td>
<td>‘ESP and attempts to explain it’ (in Flew)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Gettier</td>
<td>‘Is knowledge justified true belief?’ (Analysis 23, 1963; &amp; in Griffiths)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Phillips Griffiths [ed.]</td>
<td>Knowledge and Belief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. W. Hamlyn</td>
<td>The Theory of Knowledge — chapter 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Moser</td>
<td>Empirical Justification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Mundie</td>
<td>‘Is “paranormal precognition” a coherent concept?’ (in Flew)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Pappas &amp; M. Swain [edd.]</td>
<td>Essays on Justification and Knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.A. Prichard</td>
<td>‘Knowing and Believing’ (extract, in Griffiths, from his Knowing and Believing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Pollock</td>
<td>‘Reliability and Justified Belief’ (CJP 14, 1984)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ernest Sosa</td>
<td>‘How do you know?’ (APQ 11, 1974; &amp; in Sosa [ed.] Knowledge in Perspective)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Swain</td>
<td>Reasons and Knowledge — chapters 5–6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Woozley</td>
<td>Theory of Knowledge — chapter 8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Perception

What sense can be made of the notion of extrasensory perception?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D.M. Armstrong</td>
<td>A Materialist Theory of the Mind — chapters 10–11 (an extract appears in Dancy [ed.] Perceptual Knowledge)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.J. Ayer</td>
<td>Foundations of Empirical Knowledge — chapters 1, 2, &amp; 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—</td>
<td>The Problem of Knowledge — chapter 3</td>
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<td>—</td>
<td>Central Questions of Philosophy — chapter 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>René Descartes</td>
<td>Meditations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fred Dretske</td>
<td>Seeing and Knowing — chapters 1–2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Flew</td>
<td>‘Analysing the concepts of parapsychology’ (in Flew)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.W. Hamlyn</td>
<td>The Theory of Knowledge — chapter 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.J. Hirst</td>
<td>The Problem of Perception — chapter 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—</td>
<td>‘The Difference between Sensing and Observing’ (PASS 28, 1954; &amp; in Warnock [ed.] The Philosophy of Perception)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Locke</td>
<td>Essay Concerning Human Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.L. Mackie</td>
<td>Problems from Locke — chapter 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.H. Price</td>
<td>Perception — chapter 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Robinson</td>
<td>‘The Objects of Perceptual Experience’ (PASS 54, 1990)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Russell</td>
<td>The Problems of Philosophy — chapter 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Snowden</td>
<td>The Objects of Perceptual Experience (PASS 64, 1990)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—</td>
<td>Perception, Vision, and Causation (PASS 81, 1980/1; &amp; in Dancy [ed.] Perceptual Knowledge)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. Wollheim</td>
<td>‘The Difference between Sensing and Observing’ (PASS 28, 1954; &amp; in Warnock [ed.] The Philosophy of Perception)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Theory and Observation

“It is a good rule not to put overmuch confidence in the observational results until they are confirmed by theory” (Eddington) Is this a good rule for parapsychologists?

Peter Achinstein – Concepts of Science — chapters 5–6
J. Beloff – The relentless question@ reflections on the paranormal
R. Boyd et al. – The Philosophy of Science — §2
B. Brier – ‘Methodology in parapsychology & other sciences’ (in Angoff & Shapin)
A.F. Chalmers – What Is This Thing Called Science? — chapter 3
C. Chari – ‘Theories and models of psi: a critical evaluation’ (in Wolman)
— – ‘ESP and the “theory of resonance”’ (BJPS 15, 1964)
A. Dobbs – ‘The feasibility of a physical theory of ESP’ (in Smythies)
A. Gauld – ‘ESP and attempts to explain it’ (in Flew)
S. Gendin et al. – ‘But what, if anything, needs to be explained?’ (in Flew)
H. Irwin – An Introduction to Parapsychology — chapter 8
D. Lawden – ‘Psychical research and physics’ ((in Grattan-Guinness)
C. McCauley – Science, Philosophy, and ESP — chapters 9–10 & 13
C. Mundle – ‘The explanation of ESP’ (in Smythies)
Ernest Nagel – The Structure of Science — chapter 5
W.H. Newton-Smith – The Rationality of Science — chapters 1–2
Anthony O’Hear – An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science — chapter 5
G. Pletcher – ‘Coincidence and explanation’ (in Grim, & in Flew)
Karl Popper – Objective Knowledge — Appendix
— – ‘What Theories Are Not’ (in Nagel, et al. [edd] Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science)
R. Robinson – ‘Paranormal means or magic without means?’ (in Flew)
D.H. Ruben – Explaining Explanation
J. Smythies – ‘Is ESP possible?’ (in Smythies)
R. Stanford – ‘An experimentally testable model for spontaneous extrasensory events’ (in Grattan-Guinness)
I. Scheffler – Science and Subjectivity
J. Taylor – Superminds — chapters 5–8
W. Tenhaeff – Telepathy and Clairvoyance

Evidence and belief

“A miracle is a violation of a law of nature: and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against the miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined” (HUME). Could a parallel argument be mounted against belief in the existence of the paranormal?

M. Boden – ‘Miracles and scientific explanation’ (Ratio 11, 1969)
Paul J. Dietl – ‘On miracles’ (APQ 5, 1968; & in Donnelly [ed.] Logical Analysis and Contemporary Theism)
Antony Flew – Hume: Philosopher of Moral Science — chapter 5
— – Hume’s Philosophy of Belief — chapter 8
— – ‘Parapsychology, miracles, and repeatability’ (in Frazier)
J. Gaskin – Hume’s Philosophy of Religion — chapter 8
D. Gjertsen – Science and Philosophy — chapter 8
David Hume – Enquiry — sections VII and XII give some of the philosophical background, section X and pp. 344–346 (“Additional Note” to section X) is the central text, and as ‘Of Miracles’ is available as a separate volume, & parts are reprinted in Flew
Chris Hughes – ‘Miracles, laws of nature, and causation’ (PASS 66, 1992)
Peter J. King – ‘Miracles’ (as a hand-out)
A. McKinnon – “Miracle” and “paradox” (APQ 4, 1967)
D. Odergaard – ‘Miracles and good evidence’ (Religious Studies 18, 1982)
G. Price – Hume’s argument as a challenge to parapsychology (in Flew)
G. Robinson – ‘Miracles’ (Ratio 9, 1967)
S. Soal – ‘What price George Price?’ (in Flew)
T. Williams – The Idea of the Miraculous
## Telepathy & energy

Outline Braude's *a priori* objection to the 'energy transfer' theory of telepathy. Are they valid?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S. Braude</th>
<th>'Telepathy' (<em>Noûs</em> 1978)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C. Broad</td>
<td><em>Lectures on Psychological Research</em> — lecture 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Gauld</td>
<td>'ESP and the &quot;theory of resoniance&quot;' (<em>BJPS</em> 15, 1964)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Hansel</td>
<td>'the search for a demonstration of ESP' (in Kurtz)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Price</td>
<td>'Some philosophical questions about telepathy and clairvoyance' (<em>Philosophy</em> 1940)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Schmeidler</td>
<td>'Clairvoyance and telepathy' (in Grattan-Guinness)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. Swiggart</td>
<td>'A note on telepathy' (<em>Analysis</em> 22, 1961–2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Tenhaeff</td>
<td><em>Telepathy and Clairvoyance</em> — chapter 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Thalberg</td>
<td>'Telepathy' (<em>Analysis</em> 21, 1960–1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Life after death

*The Immortality of the Soul*

a) "The only intelligible belief in life after death would be belief in bodily resurrection." Discuss

b) Is belief in reincarnation coherent?

c) Does any theory of karma offer both a metaphysically and an ethically satisfying account?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Roy Bhaskar</th>
<th><em>From East to West</em> — <em>passim</em> (an unusual, not to say off-beat, account, linking notions such as karma with Bhaskar's critical realism)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C.D. Broad</td>
<td><em>Lectures on Psychological Research</em> — <em>epilogue</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. Broughton</td>
<td><em>Parapsychology: The Controversial Science</em> — chapter 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Dodds</td>
<td>'Why I do not believe in survival' (in Flew)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Ducasse</td>
<td>'How could survival be proved?' (in Flew)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Edge et al.</td>
<td><em>Foundations of Parapsychology</em> — chapter 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antony Flew</td>
<td>'Is there a case for bodied survival?' (in Flew, &amp; in Wheatley &amp; Edge)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antony Flew &amp; D.M. MacKinnon</td>
<td>'Death' (in Flew &amp; MacIntyre [edd] <em>New Essays in Philosophical Theology</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.C.A. Gaskin</td>
<td><em>Hume's Philosophy of Religion</em> — chapter 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Geach</td>
<td><em>God and the Soul</em> — chapters 1 &amp; 2 (chapter 1 also in Flew as 'Reincarnation')</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geshe Kelsang Gyatso</td>
<td><em>Understanding the Mind</em> — contains some directly relevant material and much that's indirectly relevant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Hick</td>
<td><em>Philosophy of Religion</em> — chapters 7 &amp; 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Hovelman</td>
<td>'Evidence for survival from near-death experiences? A critical appraisal' (in Kurtz)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Hume</td>
<td>'On the immortality of the soul'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Irwin</td>
<td><em>An Introduction to Parapsychology</em> — chapters 9 &amp; 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.M. Jantzen</td>
<td>'Do we need immortality?' (<em>Modern Theology</em> 1:1, 1984; &amp; in Loades &amp; Rue)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hywel Lewis</td>
<td>'Immortality and dualism' (in Brown; a response to Shoemaker’s paper in the same collection)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. MacGregor</td>
<td><em>Images of Afterlife</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The nature of mind

What implications would the existence of clairvoyance and/or telepathy have for the philosophy of mind?

L. Bailey & J. Yates [edd] — The Near-Death Experience; A Reader

J. Beloff — 'Is Mind Autonomous?' (BJPS 29, 1978)


C. Broad — Lectures on Psychical research — epilogue

C. Ducasse — 'The philosophical importance of "psychic phenomena" ' (J.Phil. 51, 1954)

A. Flew — 'The "soul" of Mr A.M. Quinton' (J.Phil. 90, 1963)

J. Godbey — 'Parapsychology and central-state materialism' (Analysis 36, 1975 & in Beloff)

C. Mundle — 'Behaviouristic descriptions and more about BLPs' (in Flew)

H. Price — 'Psychical research and human personality' (in Smythies)

A. Quinton — 'The soul' (Philosophy 89, 1962)

R. Robinson & C.D. Broad — 'two traditions on the nature of man' (in Flew)

B. Smart — 'Can disembodied persons be spatially located?' (Analysis 31, 1970–71)

J. Smythies — 'The mind-brain problem today: a viewpoint from the neurosciences' (in Angoff and Shapin)

I. Thalberg — 'Are paranormal events nonphysical?' (in Flew)
Out of the body

What are ‘out of body’ and ‘near death’ experiences? What are be the philosophical implications of their occurrence?

S. Blackmore — Beyond the Body: An Investigation of Out-of-the-Body Experiences
— ‘Out-of-the-body experiences’ (in Grattan-Guinness)
R. Broughton — Parapsychology: The Controversial Science — chapter 8
A. Davenport — ‘Science and the near-death experience’ parts 1 & 2 (JRPR 7, 1984)
G. Hovelman — ‘Evidence for survival from near-death experiences? A critical appraisal’ (in Kurtz)
C. McCreery — Psychical Phenomena and the Physical World — chapter 2
J. Taylor — Superminds

Synchronicity

What is Jung’s Principle of Synchronicity? Is it an explanatory principle?

J. Beloff — ‘Psi phenomena: causal versus acausal interpretation’ (JSPR 1977)
M. Friedmann — ‘Explanation and Scientific Understanding’ (J. Phil. 73, 1974)
A. Gauld — ‘ESP and attempts to explain it’ (in Flew)
I. Grattan-Guinness — ‘Coincidences as spontaneous psychological phenomena’ (JSPR 52, 1983)
— ‘... or was it just a coincidence?’ (in Grattan-Guinness)
C. Hansel — ESP and Parapsychology: A Critical Reevaluation — chapter 21
A. Jaffe — ‘Jung and parapsychology’ (in Smythies)
C. Jung — Synchronicity (as a separate volume, or in his Collected Works, vol. 9)
A. Koestler — The Roots of Coincidence — chapter 3
Jean Monod — Chance and Necessity — chapters 1–4
N. Rescher — ‘On Prediction and Explanation’ (BJPS 8, 1958)
D.-H. Ruben — [ed.] — Explaining Explanation
— Explanation
J. Yolton — ‘Explanation’ (BJPS 10, 1959)