(2015) Efficiency of competitive equilibria in economies with time-dependent preferences, "Journal of Economic Theory", 159, pp 311-325.
Additional results concerning representation of efficient allocations can be found in Efficiency and representation of a general equilibrium with time-dependent preferences (the working paper version of the article, dated 26 November 2013).
Revealed time-preference (June 2015)
In this paper we concentrate on the observable implications of the discounted utility model of time-preference. We consider a framework in which subjects are allowed to choose between pairs consisting of a reward and a time-delay at which the prize is delivered. Given a finite set of observations, we are interested in conditions under which choices of an agent can be rationalised by a discounted utility maximisation. We develop an axiomatic characterisation of time-preference with various forms of discounting, including weakly present-biased, quasi-hyperbolic, and exponential, and determine the testable restrictions for each specification. Moreover, we discuss possible identification issues that may arise in this class of tests. Finally, we apply the methods to study the impact of substance abuse on time-preference.
Testing for production with complementarities [with John Quah] (September 2014)
Suppose we observe a finite number of input decisions made by a firm, as well as the prices at which those inputs were acquired. What conditions on the set of observations are necessary and sufficient for it to be consistent with a firm choosing inputs to maximize profit, subject to a production function exhibiting production complementarities? In this paper, we develop an axiomatic characterisation of this hypothesis and also develop a test that can be easily applied to finite data sets.
A qualitative theory of large games with strategic complementarities [with Łukasz Balbus, Kevin Reffett, and Łukasz Woźny] (May 2014)
We study the existence and computation of equilibrium in large games with strategic complementarities. Importantly, our class of games allows to analyze economic problems without any aggregative structure. Using monotone operators (in stochastic dominance orders) defined on the space of distributions, we first prove existence of the greatest and least distributional Nash equilibrium under different set of assumptions than those in the existing literature. In addition, we provide results on computable monotone distributional equilibrium comparative statics relative to ordered perturbations of the parameters of our games that were previously only available for games with aggregative structure. We conclude by presenting applications of our results to models of social distance, large stopping games, keeping up with the Joneses, but also to a general class of linear non-atomic games.
(2012) On constructive methods for equilibrium modelling of dynamic oligopolistic markets under uncertainty, "Journal of Management and Financial Sciences", 7(5), March, pp. 7-33 [with Łukasz Woźny].
(2011) On time-to-build economies with multiple stage investments, "National Economy", 9, pp. 31-56.