## Selected publications

(2014) ** Differential information in large games with strategic complementarities**, "Economic Theory", forthcoming [with Łukasz Balbus, Kevin Reffett, and Łukasz Woźny].

(2012) ** On constructive methods for equilibrium modelling of
dynamic oligopolistic markets under uncertainty**, "Journal of Management and Financial Sciences",
7(5), March, pp. 7-33 [with Łukasz Woźny].

(2011) ** On time-to-build economies with multiple stage investments**, "National Economy", 9, pp. 31-56.

## Working papers

** Testing for production with complementarities** [with John Quah]

Suppose we observe a finite number of input decisions made by a firm, as well as the prices at which those inputs were acquired. What conditions on the set of observations are necessary and sufficient for it to be consistent with a firm choosing inputs to maximize profit, subject to a production function exhibiting production complementarities? In this paper, we develop an axiomatic characterisation of this hypothesis and also develop a test that can be easily applied to finite data sets.

*Revealed time-preference*

Consider an experiment in which subjects are asked to choose between pairs consisting of a monetary payment and a time-delay at which the payment is delivered. Given a finite set of observations, under what conditions the choices of an individual agent can be rationalised by a discounted utility function? We develop an axiomatic characterisation of time-preference with various forms of discounting, including weakly present-biased, quasi-hyperbolic, and exponential, and determine the testable restrictions for each specification. Moreover, we discuss identification issues which may arise in this class of experiments.

*Competitive and sequential equilibria in economies with time-dependent preferences*

We show that in exchange economies with time-dependent preferences and sophisticated agents competitive and sequential equilibria are equivalent.

*Efficiency and representation of a general equilibrium with time-dependent preferences*

This paper focuses on the welfare properties of equilibria in exchange economies with time-dependent preferences. We introduce a notion of recursive efficiency and show that any quilibrium allocation is efficient in the sense defined. Therefore, we present a version of the First Fundamental Welfare Theorem for this class of economies. Moreover, we present a social welfare function with maximisers that coincide with recursively efficient allocations, and prove that every equilibrium can be represented by a solution to a social welfare optimisation problem.

** A qualitative theory of large games with strategic complementarities** [with Łukasz Balbus, Kevin Reffett, and Łukasz Woźny]

We study the existence and computation of equilibrium in large games with strategic complementarities. Importantly, our class of games allows to analyze economic problems without any aggregative structure. Using monotone operators (in stochastic dominance orders) defined on the space of distributions, we first prove existence of the greatest and least distributional Nash equilibrium under different set of assumptions than those in the existing literature. In addition, we provide results on computable monotone distributional equilibrium comparative statics relative to ordered perturbations of the parameters of our games that were previously only available for games with aggregative structure. We conclude by presenting applications of our results to models of social distance, large stopping games, keeping up with the Joneses, but also to a general class of linear non-atomic games.