



## The Roots of Begin's Success.

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is much to disagree with and much to commend. It is stimulating, even colourful. Bits of gossip, one-liners, anecdotes may be irritating to some readers but will be revealing to others. One is certainly left in no doubt that Mr Randal is sincere in his beliefs and persuasive in presenting them. He is also a veteran journalist and it is therefore surprising that in his summing-up about the Christians *en masse* he should ignore some of his own findings and leave himself open to accusations of naïveté which some might choose to call prejudice.

KATE E. MAGUIRE

**Party politics in Israel and the occupied territories.** By Gershon R. Kieval. Westport, Conn., London: Greenwood. 1983. 228 pp. Index. £29.50.

FOLLOWING unexpected successes in the Six Day War of 1967, Israel found itself occupying territories on the West Bank of the Jordan river. The fate of these so-called 'occupied territories' has still not been conclusively determined by the occupying power and it is with the background to this uncertainty that Mr Kieval is concerned. Matters of Israeli foreign policy are peripheral to his internal political perspective. The fact is, of course, that control over the occupied territories has grown and become consolidated, not as part of any systematic plan but because both the Labour and Likud-dominated governments have failed to formulate—still less to implement—any permanent decision concerning the future status of the territories. This is therefore not a study of the Israeli occupation *per se*, nor of policies within the territories.

What Kieval shows is that there are both structural and political characteristics to Israel's political system which inhibit decisive choices. The political cause is rooted in the system of proportional representation which operates in such a way as to prevent any one party securing an overall majority. The structural cause—and the root of factionalism—is that the two major groupings, the Labour Alignment and the Likud, both originated in the merger of several predecessor parties which have continued to maintain some semblance of organization and identity within the newly formed groupings. This may well be a perfect vehicle for the expression of public opinion but it is also a perfect recipe for intense factionalism. This applies particularly to contentious issues such as the fate of the territories. In this light, Kieval examines the beginnings of the occupation 1967–9; its consolidation along the ceasefire lines 1969–73; the beginning of the process of withdrawal 1973–7; and the quest for peace and security 1977–81. This catalogue of analyses seems to break out from the antecedent framework at its conclusion when, for example, Kieval writes: 'the fundamental problem for Israel is whether it can afford to yield control over the West Bank when it fears that the creation of a Palestinian state—close to Israel's heartland—would pose a threat to Israel's very existence' (p. 195). Even though Kieval also points out that 'each issue is considered in terms of its ultimate impact on the government's political survival' (p. 195), it is difficult not to conclude that Ranke's 'primacy of foreign policy' plays more of a part than is allowed for here.

This book was written before the war in Lebanon and Mr Begin's withdrawal from office. It nevertheless has enduring value and interest as a fascinating analysis of the interplay of domestic and foreign policy.

*University of Warwick*

LIONEL KOCHAN

**The roots of Begin's success.** Edited by Dan Caspi, Abraham Diskin and Emanuel Gutmann. London, Canberra: Croom Helm; New York: St Martin's. 1983. 297 pp. Index. £16.95.

HISTORY does repeat itself, observed Karl Marx, the first time as tragedy and the second time as farce. And so it was with Menachem Begin's two electoral victories, first in 1977 and then in 1981. In the light of this renewed, if exceedingly narrow and unexpected, victory, it is no longer possible to write off the 1977 swing from the Labour Alignment to the Likud as a one-off episode, or to regard the Begin phenomenon as a temporary aberration from the natural course of Israeli history. It is the great merit of the present volume that it not only provides an intensive study of the 1981 election but also places the results of this election in the broader context of structural, social and economic change. Three principal factors are

identified as working in favour of the Likud: ethnicity, age and religious observance. Widespread support among the oriental Jews, the young and the religiously inclined, to which the Likud owed its rise to power, also constituted the relatively stable basis of the new dominant party.

The editors and contributors to this volume are all Israeli academics from a variety of disciplines—political science, sociology, communications—but with a common interest in psephology. They examine the 1981 election from different angles, including two articles on the ethnic factor, one on the National Religious Party, one on the Arab vote, one on the impact of pre-election polls and two separate articles on the role of the media. Readers of *International Affairs* will be particularly interested in Yoram Peri's article 'Coexistence or hegemony? Shifts in the Israeli security concept'. Despite the ambiguity in the title, Peri leaves no room for doubt that hegemony rather than coexistence with the Arab world is the aim of the Likud's security policy and that Labour's concept of preventive war has been replaced by a new concept of war as an instrument for attaining national objectives, as exemplified by the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Without exception, the contributions to this volume are based on very detailed and thorough research, the results of which are presented in a compact and scholarly fashion and with an elaborate apparatus of statistics, tables, graphs and all manner of quantitative data. This does not make for easy reading, while the editing and proof-reading, leave a great deal to be desired.

This book deals only with Begin's success in the narrow sense of gaining and retaining power. It does not deal with Begin's record as Prime Minister. Few observers would adjudge that record, with its catastrophic mismanagement of the economy and the ill-considered and ill-fated adventure in Lebanon, to be a success. It is arguable that these substantive failures also have deeper roots in the history, composition and ideology of the Likud. It would be highly fitting, therefore, if this book were to be followed by another volume: *The roots of Begin's failure*.

University of Reading

AVI SHLAIM

**Jordan: crossroads of Middle Eastern events.** By Peter Gubser. Boulder, Col.: Westview; London: Croom Helm. 1983. 139 pp. Index. £13.50.

THIS is an up-to-date and concise introduction to its subject, written with knowledge and insight. Gubser has succeeded in making the people, economy, history and politics of Jordan intelligible and accessible to the general reader, and his book, which also includes a substantial bibliography and useful statistical tables, forms a welcome addition to the Westview/Croom Helm survey series on the Middle East and North Africa.

The book's brief introduction describes the development of Jordan since 1920, and the various crises through which the country has passed since its evolution as a separate political entity. In his description of how Jordan is governed, Gubser touches briefly on a point that he deals with at greater length later in the book, namely that 'processes and institutions for the people's political expression and participation are either very weak or non-existent' (p. 2). The second and third chapters describe the country's physical and human infrastructure; here the peculiar complexities and effects of the fluctuations in area and population following the Israeli occupation of the West Bank in 1967 are clearly explained. The regime's essentially paternalistic approach to regional development is mentioned (pp. 33–4), and this theme is taken up in detail in chapters 4 and 5, where Gubser notes: 'The devolution of authority to the people has long been officially envisaged, but none of significance has occurred' (pp. 115, 60–2).

Chapter 4 contains a brief but comprehensive description of the economy; it is clear from the tables on pages 56–7 that Jordan is almost wholly dependent on a combination of remittances from its own expatriates working elsewhere in the Arab world and 'budget support' from other Arab states and the United States. The boom of the period since 1974 thus rests on highly precarious foundations, and although industry's share of GDP has increased from 14 per cent in 1971 to about 20 per cent in 1979, services still account for some 65 per cent of GDP, a figure which is alarmingly high even by Third World standards.

Almost inevitably, the last two chapters suffer most of all from the constraints of the 'country guide' format. However, Gubser is particularly good on 'Abdullah's Machiavellian