Israel and the Arab Coalition in 1948
Session 1:
Introduction
"A
nation," said the French philosopher Ernest Renan, "is a group of
people united by a mistaken view about the past and a hatred of their
neighbors." Throughout the ages, the use of myths about the past has been
a potent instrument of forging a nation. The Zionist movement is not unique in
propagating a simplified and varnished version of the past in the process of
nation-building. But it does provide a strikingly successful example of the use
of myths for the dual purpose of promoting internal unity and enlisting
international sympathy and support for the state of Israel.
The
traditional Zionist version of the Arab-Israeli conflict places the
responsibility on the Arab side. Israel is portrayed as the innocent victim of
unremitting Arab hostility and Arab aggression. In this respect, traditional
Zionist accounts of the emergence of Israel form a natural sequel to the history
of the Jewish people, with its emphasis on the weakness, vulnerability, and
numerical inferiority of the Jews in relation to their adversaries. The
American Jewish historian Salo Baron once referred to this as the lachrymose
view of Jewish history. This view tends to present Jewish history as a long
series of trials and tribulations culminating in the Holocaust.
The
War of Independence constituted a glorious contrast to the centuries of
powerlessness, persecution, and humiliation. Yet the traditional Zionist
narrative of the events surrounding the birth of the state of Israel was still constructed around the
notion of the Jews as the victims. This narrative presents the 1948 war as a
simple, bipolar no-holds-barred struggle between a monolithic and malevolent
Arab adversary and a tiny peace-loving Jewish community. The biblical image of
David and Goliath is frequently evoked in this narrative. Little Israel is portrayed as fighting with its back
to the wall against a huge, well-armed and overbearing Arab adversary. Israel's victory in this war is treated as
verging on the miraculous, and as resulting from the determination and heroism
of the Jewish fighters rather than from disunity and disarray on the Arab side.
This heroic version of the War of Independence has proved so enduring and
resistant to revision precisely because it corresponds to the collective memory
of the generation of 1948. It is also the version of history that Israeli
children are taught at school. Consequently, few ideas are as deeply ingrained
in the mind of the Israeli public as that summed up by the Hebrew phrase
me’atim mul rabim, or "the few against the many."
nt
myths surrounding the birth of the State of Israel is that in 1948 the
newly-born state faced a monolithic and implacably hostile Arab coalition. This
coalition was believed to be united behind one central aim: the destruction of
the infant Jewish state. As there is no commonly accepted term for the
liquidation of a state, Yehoshafat Harkabi, a leading Israeli student of the
Arab-Israeli conflict, proposed calling it "politicide"--the murder
of the politeia, the political entity. The aim of the Arabs, Harkabi asserted,
was politicidal. Linked to this aim, according to Harkabi, was a second aim,
that of genocide--"to throw the Jews into the sea" as the popular
phrase put it. Harkabi's view is just one example of the widely held belief
that in 1948 the Yishuv, the pre-state Jewish community in Palestine, faced not just verbal threats but a
real danger of annihilation from the regular armies of the neighboring Arab
states. The true story of the first Arab-Israeli war, as the "new
historians" who emerged on the scene in the late 1980s tried to show, was
considerably more complicated.
The
argument advanced in this seminar, in a nutshell, is that the Arab coalition
facing Israel in 1947-49 was far from monolithic; that within this coalition
there was no agreement on war aims; that the inability of the Arabs to
coordinate their diplomatic and military moves was partly responsible for their
defeat; that throughout the conflict Israel had the military edge over its Arab
adversaries; and, finally, and most importantly, that Israel's leaders were
aware of the divisions inside the Arab coalition and that they exploited these
divisions to the full in waging the war and in extending the borders of their
state.
The
military balance
As
far as the military balance is concerned, it was always assumed that the Arabs
enjoyed overwhelming numerical superiority. The war was accordingly depicted as
one between the few against the many, as a desperate, tenacious, and heroic
struggle for survival against horrifyingly heavy odds. The desperate plight and
the heroism of the Jewish fighters are not in question. Nor is the fact that
they had inferior military hardware at their disposal, at least until the first
truce, when illicit arms supplies from Czechoslovakia decisively tipped the scales in their
favor.
But
in mid-May 1948 the total number of Arab troops, both regular and irregular,
operating in the Palestine theater was under 25,000, whereas the
Israel Defense Force (IDF) fielded over 35,000 troops. By mid-July the IDF
mobilized 65,000 men under arms, and by December its numbers had reached a peak
of 96,441. The Arab states also reinforced their armies, but they could not
match this rate of increase. Thus, at each stage of the war, the IDF
outnumbered all the Arab forces arrayed against it, and, after the first round
of fighting, it outgunned them too. The final outcome of the war was therefore
not a miracle but a faithful reflection of the underlying military balance in
the Palestine theater. In this war, as in most wars,
the stronger side prevailed.
The
Arab forces, both regular and irregular, mobilized to do battle against the
emergent Jewish state were nowhere as powerful or united as they appeared to be
in Arab and Jewish propaganda. In the first phase of the conflict, from the
passage of the United Nations partition resolution on 29
November 1947
until the proclamation of statehood on 14 May 1948, the Yishuv had to defend itself
against attacks from Palestinian irregulars and volunteers from the Arab world.
Following the proclamation of the state of Israel, however, the neighboring Arab states
and Iraq committed their regular armies to the
battle against the Jewish state. Contact with regular armies undoubtedly came
as a shock to the Haganah, the paramilitary organization of the Yishuv which
was in the process of being transformed into the IDF. Yet, the Jewish propaganda
machine greatly exaggerated the size and quality of the invading forces. A
typical account of the war of independence, by a prominent Israeli diplomat,
goes as follows: "Five Arab armies and contingents from two more, equipped
with modern tanks, artillery, and warplanes … invaded Israel from north, east, and south. Total war
was forced on the Yishuv under the most difficult conditions."
joined
in the invasion of Palestine were Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq; while the two contingents came from Saudi Arabia and Yemen. All these states, however, only sent
an expeditionary force to Palestine, keeping the bulk of their army at
home. The expeditionary forces were hampered by long lines of communication,
the absence of reliable intelligence about their enemy, poor leadership, poor
coordination, and very poor planning for the campaign that lay ahead of them.
The Palestinian irregulars, known as the Holy War Army, were led by Hasan
Salama and ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni. The Arab Liberation Army consisted of
around 4,000 Arab volunteers for the Holy War in Palestine. They were funded by the Arab League,
trained in bases in southern Syria, and led by the Syrian adventurer
Fawzi al-Qawuqji. Qawuqji's strong points were politics and public relations
rather than military leadership. The Arab politicians who appointed him valued
him more as a known enemy and therefore potential counter-weight to the grand
mufti, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, than as the most promising military leader to lead
the fight against the Jews. The mufti certainly saw this appointment as an
attempt by his rivals in the League to undermine his influence over the future
of Palestine.
eset
by profound internal political differences. The Arab League, since its
foundation in 1945, was the highest forum for the making of pan-Arab policy on Palestine. But the Arab League was divided
between a Hashemite bloc consisting of Transjordan and Iraq and an anti-Hashemite bloc led by Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Dynastic rivalries played a major
part in shaping Arab approaches to Palestine. King ‘Abdullah of Transjordan was
driven by a long-standing ambition to make himself the master of Greater Syria
which included, in addition to Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine. King Faruq saw ‘Abdullah's ambition
as a direct threat to Egypt's leadership in the Arab world. The
rulers of Syria and Lebanon saw in King ‘Abdullah a threat to the
independence of their countries and they also suspected him of being in cahoots
with the enemy. Each Arab state was moved by its own dynastic or national
interests. Arab rulers were as concerned with curbing each other as they were
in fighting the common enemy. Under these circumstances it was virtually
impossible to reach any real consensus on the means and ends of the Arab intervention
in Palestine. Consequently, far from confronting a
single enemy with a clear purpose and a clear plan of action, the Yishuv faced
a loose coalition consisting of the Arab League, independent Arab states,
irregular Palestinian forces, and an assortment of volunteers. The Arab
coalition was one of the most divided, disorganized, and ramshackle coalitions
in the entire history of warfare.
Separate
and conflicting national interests were hidden behind the fig-leaf of securing Palestine for the Palestinians. The Palestine problem was the first major test of
the Arab League and the Arab League failed it miserably. The actions of the
League were taken ostensibly in support of the Palestinian claim for
independence in the whole of Palestine. But the League remained curiously
unwilling to allow the Palestinians to assume control over their own destiny.
For ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Azzam, the secretary-general of the Arab League, the mufti
was "the Menachem Begin of the Arabs." ‘Azzam Pasha told a British journalist
(who relayed it to a Jewish official) that the Arab League's policy "was
intended to squeeze the mufti out."
At
Arab League meetings, the mufti argued against intervention in Palestine by the regular Arab armies, but his
pleas were ignored. All the mufti asked for was financial support and arms and
these were promised to him but delivered only in negligible quantities. It is
misleading, therefore, to claim that all the resources of the Arab League were
placed at the disposal of the Palestinians. On the contrary, the Arab League
let the Palestinians down in their hour of greatest need. As Yezid Sayigh, the
distinguished historian of the Palestinian armed struggle, put it:
Reluctance
to commit major resources to the conflict and mutual distrust provoked constant
disputes over diplomacy and strategy, leading to incessant behind-the-scenes
manoeuvring, half-hearted and poorly conceived military intervention, and,
ultimately, defeat on the battlefield.
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Session 2