Israel and the Arab Coalition in 1948

Session 4: 

The Second Round of Fighting

Inter-Arab rivalries re-emerged with renewed vigor during the truce. As far as King ‘Abdullah was concerned, the war was over. He began to lobby in the Arab world for the incorporation of what was left of Arab Palestine into his kingdom. He made no secret of his view that the resumption of the war would be disastrous to the Arabs. His solution, however, was unacceptable to any of the other members of the Arab coalition. Syria and Lebanon saw ‘Abdullah as a permanent threat to their independence, while King Faruq saw him as a growing menace to Egypt's hegemony in the Arab world. Count Folke Bernadotte, the UN mediator, omitted all reference to the UN partition plan, and proposed the partition of mandatory Palestine between Israel and Transjordan. ‘Abdullah could have hardly asked for more but since the Arab League and Israel rejected Bernadotte's proposals out of hand, he saw no point in going out on a limb by publicly accepting them.

Having failed to promote a settlement of the Palestine problem, Bernadotte proposed the extension of the truce that was due to expire on 9 July. Once again, Transjordan found itself in a minority of one in the Arab League. All the Arab military leaders pointed to the gravity of their supply positions but the politicians voted not to renew the truce. To deal with the difficulty of resuming hostilities when their arsenals were depleted, the Arab politicians settled on a defensive strategy of holding on to existing positions. ‘Abdullah suspected that the decision was taken with the sinister intention of undermining his diplomatic strategy and embroiling his army in a potentially disastrous war with the Israelis. He therefore summoned Count Bernadotte to Amman to express his extreme unease at the prospect of war breaking out afresh and to urge him to use the full power of the UN to bring about a reversal of the Arab League's warlike decision. But the Egyptians pre-empted by attacking on 8 July, thereby ending the truce and committing the Arab side irreversibly to a second round of fighting.

If ‘Abdullah was against a second round of fighting, Glubb Pasha was even more reluctant to be drawn in as his army had only four contact days' worth of ammunition and no replenishments in sight. Indeed, in the second round, the Arab Legion only reacted when it was attacked. When hostilities were resumed, the IDF quickly seized the initiative on the central front with Operation Danny. In the first phase the objective was to capture Lydda and Ramla; in the second it was to open a wide corridor to Jerusalem by capturing Latrun and Ramallah. All these towns had been assigned to the Arab state and fell within the perimeter held by the Arab Legion. On 12 July, Israeli forces captured Lydda and Ramla and forced their inhabitants to flee eastwards. In Latrun, on the other hand, the Israeli offensive was repulsed as was the last minute attempt to capture the Old City of Jerusalem. 

The ALA, the Egyptian, Iraqi, Syrian, and Lebanese armies all suffered some reverses in the course of the second round of fighting. The IDF offensive in the north culminated in the capture of Nazareth and in freeing the entire Lower Galilee from enemy forces. On the other hand, the attempt to eject the Syrians from the salient at Mishmar Hayarden was not successful and the fighting ended in stalemate. Israel's overall position improved appreciably as a result of the 10 days of fighting. Israel seized the initiative and was to retain it until the end of the war.

The second UN truce came into force on 18 July and, unlike the first truce, it was of indefinite duration. As soon as the guns fell silent, Arab politicians resumed the war of words against one another. The line that the Arab Legion was being prevented from using its full strength against the Jews, both through the treachery of the British officers and the withholding of supplies by the British government, was actively propagated by the Syrian and Iraqi officers and by ‘Azzam Pasha. The Iraqi army officers operating in Transjordan were particularly hostile to the British who served in the Arab Legion. The suspicion that Glubb was secretly working to impose on the Arabs London's policy of partition accounted for the virtual breakdown of the relations between the two Hashemite armies and for the Iraqi branch jealously guarding its freedom of action. 

Lull in the storm

During the lull in the storm ‘Abdullah kept flirting with the idea of bilateral negotiations with Israel to settle the Palestine problem. Though it did not go as planned, the war had served its basic purpose in enabling him to occupy the central areas of Arab Palestine. Not only was there nothing else to be gained from an appeal to arms, but such an appeal could jeopardize both his territorial gains and his army, the mainstay of his regime and his only defense against his Arab opponents. Accordingly, he shifted his attention from the military to the political arena.

The Israelis had their own reason for wanting to resume direct contact with their old friend. Disunity in the Arab camp gave them considerable room for manoeuver. The Arabs had marched into Palestine together but as they sustained military reverses, each country looked increasingly to its own needs. Each country was licking its wounds and was in no position and in no mood to help the others or to subordinate its interests to the common cause. Under these circumstances, anyone looking for cracks in the wall of Arab unity could easily find them. Israel, with the memory of its military victories still fresh in everybody's mind, was well placed to play off the Arabs against one another. This was the background of the renewal of contact with King ‘Abdullah's emissaries in September 1948.

Rumors that ‘Abdullah was once again in contact with the Jewish leaders further damaged his standing in the Arab world. His many critics suggested that he was prepared to compromise the Arab claim to the whole of Palestine as long as he could acquire part of Palestine for himself. "The internecine struggles of the Arabs," reported Glubb, "are more in the minds of the Arab politicians than the struggle against the Jews. ‘Azzam Pasha, the mufti and the Syrian government would sooner see the Jews get the whole of Palestine than that King ‘Abdullah should benefit." 

To thwart ‘Abdullah's ambition, the other members of the Arab League, led by Egypt, decided in Alexandria on 6 September to approve the establishment of an Arab government for the whole of Palestine with a seat in Gaza. This was too little and too late. The desire to placate public opinion, critical of the Arab governments for failing to protect the Palestinians, was a major consideration. The decision to form the Government of All-Palestine in Gaza, and the feeble attempt to create armed forces under its control, furnished the members of the Arab League with the means of divesting themselves of direct responsibility for the prosecution of the war and of withdrawing their armies from Palestine with some protection against popular outcry. Whatever the long-term future of the Arab government of Palestine, its immediate purpose, as conceived by its Egyptian sponsors, was to provide a focal point of opposition to ‘Abdullah and serve as an instrument for frustrating his ambition to federate the Arab regions with Transjordan.

But the contrast between the pretensions of the All-Palestine Government and its capability quickly reduced it to the level of farce. It claimed jurisdiction over the whole of Palestine, yet it had no administration, no civil service, no money, and no real army of its own. Even in the small enclave around the town of Gaza its writ ran only by the grace of the Egyptian authorities. Taking advantage of the new government's dependence on them for funds and protection, the Egyptian paymasters manipulated it to undermine ‘Abdullah's claim to represent the Palestinians in the Arab League and in international forums. Ostensibly the embryo for an independent Palestinian state, the new government, from the moment of its inception, was thus reduced to the unhappy role of a shuttlecock in the ongoing power struggle between Cairo and Amman.

Israel was content to see the rift develop inside the Arab League but prudently refrained from expressing any opinion in public for or against the All-Palestine Government. Before the Provisional State Council, on 23 September 1948, foreign minister Moshe Sharett described what remained of Arab Palestine as a "geographical expression" rather than a political entity. There were two candidates for ruling this part of Palestine: the mufti and King ‘Abdullah. In principle, said Sharett, Israel had to prefer a separate government in the Arab part to a merger with Transjordan; in practice, they preferred a merger with Transjordan though their public posture was one of neutrality. In practice, Israel also took advantage of the renewed contacts with ‘Abdullah in order to thwart the establishment of a Palestinian state and expand the territory of the Jewish state. As Yaacov Shimoni, the deputy head of the Middle East Department in the Foreign Ministry, candidly confessed:

Sharett knew that we had agreed with ‘Abdullah that he will take and annex the Arab part of Palestine and Sharett could not support this ludicrous, impotent, and abortive attempt made by the Egyptians against ‘Abdullah. This attempt had nothing to do with us. It was a tactical move by ‘Abdullah's enemies to interject something against his creeping annexation. At that time there was no annexation. Formal annexation only occurred in April 1950. But he had started taking and preparing for annexation. So they tried, without any success, to build a countervailing force.

The second point is that at that time Sharett and our men knew what the powerful State of Israel has forgotten in recent years. He understood the meaning of diplomacy and knew how to conduct it. Sharett was definitely aware that publicly we were obliged to accept the Palestinian Arab state and could not say that we were opposed to the establishment of such a state. In the first place, we had accepted the UN resolution which included a Palestinian Arab state. Secondly, this was the right, fair, and decent course and we were obliged to agree to it. The fact that below the surface, behind the curtain, by diplomatic efforts, we reached an agreement with ‘Abdullah--an agreement which had not been uncovered but was kept secret at that time--was entirely legitimate but we did not have to talk about it. Sharett knew that our official line had to be in favour of a Palestinian state if the Palestinians could create it. We could not create it for them. But if they could create it, certainly, by all means, we would agree. The fact that he made a deal with ‘Abdullah on the side to prevent the creation of such a state, that is diplomacy, that is alright. Sharett behaved in accordance with the rules of diplomacy and politics that are accepted throughout the world.

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