Sharon Needs to Be Told to Stop Shooting and Start Talking
Avi Shlaim
International Herald Tribune, 10 January 2002
Ariel Sharon is a very
dangerous man. His long and chequered career as a soldier and
politician is marked by three main features: mendacity, reliance on
military force to solve political problems, and the most savage
brutality towards Arab civilians. The best illustration of these
features is Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982 when Sharon
served as minister of defence. The war was fraudulently named
‘Operation Peace for Galilee’; it deployed military force
on a massive scale in a vain attempt to break the backbone of
Palestinian nationalism and to create a new political order in Lebanon;
and it ended with the massacre in the Palestinian refugee camps of
Sabra and Shatilla for which Sharon had indirect responsibility.
As leader of the opposition Sharon contributed to the outbreak of the
Al-Aqsa intifada by his provocative visit to Temple Mount on 28
September 2000. In the general elections held three months later,
Sharon won a decisive victory against Ehud Barak by promising peace
with security. In his first year in office, however, Sharon
utterly failed to deliver either peace or security. On the
contrary, the year has been marked by complete deadlock on the
diplomatic front, by mounting violence and bloodshed, by Palestinian
suicide attacks, and by ever more brutal and savage Israeli retaliation.
Despite this grim record, Sharon has been remarkably successful in
holding his national unity government together and in retaining the
support of the country for this government. Henry Kissinger once
remarked that Israel has no foreign policy, only domestic politics, and
the present cabinet is a case in point. At the moderate end of
the spectrum there is Shimon Peres, the architect of Oslo, while at the
other end there is the Rasputin-like figure of Avigdor Liberman, the
advocate of the mass expulsion of Palestinians from the Land of
Israel. To keep his multi-party coalition together, Sharon has
refrained from putting forward any plan for the resolution of the
conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. By insisting on
seven full days with no acts of violence as a condition for resuming
the negotiations on the final status of the territories, he has ensured
that no political dialogue can take place at all.
On the kind of final settlement that he would like to reach with the
Palestinians after the guns fall silent, Sharon has remained studiously
silent. He has conceded the need for an independent Palestinian
state but he has also expressed great reluctance to yield to the
Palestinian Authority more than Gaza and the 42% of the West Bank that
it currently controls. This implies a weak and demilitarized
Palestinian state, make up of a series of enclaves, with Israel
controlling its borders. Having rejected Ehud Barak’s offer
of statehood over Gaza and 95% of the West Bank, there is not the
remotest chance that Yasser Arafat would accept such a plan and Sharon
knows this. His aim, in the short term, is to undermine the Oslo
accords, to weaken Yasser Arafat, to delegitimize the Palestinian
Authority as an organization sponsoring terrorism, and to tighten
Israel’s military grip over the territories.
But where does Sharon want to lead Israel in the longer term? His
record may offer a few clues. Ever since 1967, he has
consistently maintained that there is room for only one Palestinian
state to the West of Israel, and he has been an outspoken proponent of
the thesis that ‘Jordan is Palestine’. Whereas the
Labour Party was strongly committed to the survival of the monarchy in
Amman, Sharon held that the transformation of the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan into the Republic of Palestine would work to Israel’s
advantage: it would reduce international pressure on Israel, encourage
Palestinian migration from the West Bank to the East Bank of the river
Jordan, and facilitate the absorption of the West Bank into Greater
Israel.
In fairness to Sharon it has to be said that since coming to power he
has behaved in a more cautious and pragmatic manner than in the
past. The fierce hawk and the aggressive expansionist has
reinvented himself as a kindly grandfather and as a man of peace.
But the dangerous notions with which Sharon was associated for decades
could come to the fore again if the situation continues to
deteriorate. Moreover, in the absence of a meaningful peace
process the military conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is
likely to escalate with all the attendant dangers of a regional war
involving Syria, Jordan, and Iraq. And in the context of a
regional war, the temptation to solve the Palestinian problem at
Jordan’s expense may prove too strong to resist. To keep
this danger at bay, the full weight of the international community,
with the United States and European Union in the lead, should be
brought to bear to persuade Ariel Sharon to stop shooting and start
talking.
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