When Bush comes to Shove
Avi Shlaim
Written for the Financial Times but unpublished, 30 October 2001
The
most recent and dramatic events in Afghanistan have an extraordinary
ring of the 1990-91 Gulf crisis and war about them. In both cases the
Palestinian question became linked to the broader conflict between the
west and its enemies. In 1990 Saddam Hussein pioneered the concept of
linkage by making an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait conditional on
Israel’s withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories. In this
crisis Osama bin Laden has posed as the champion of Palestinian rights.
A decade ago George Bush Sr sought the support of the Arab states in the war
against Iraq. Today George W.Bush Jr is seeking the support of the Arab
and Islamic world in the war against international terrorism. Bush Sr
reassured the Arabs by promising to resolve the Palestinian issue. Bush
Jr must deliver on that promise.
Both conflicts
imposed severe strains on the special relationship between the US and
Israel. Many Israelis hoped that the events of 11 September would
engender greater sympathy and support in America for their war against
Palestinian militants. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon reportedly said to
Colin Powell: “everyone has his own Bin Laden and Arafat is
ours.” Sharon also hoped to make common cause with the US in the
war aginst international terrorism. All these hopes, however, were
quickly dashed.
Israel was excluded from
any anti-terror military action; some of its enemies, such as Syria and
Iran, were considered for membership. Its attempt to demonise Yasser
Arafat backfired. Far from gaining respectability, Israel felt that it
was being treated almost as a pariah and as an impediment to the US
effort to build an anti-terror coalition.
Two weeks after the
attack on the twin towers, President Bush issued the strongest
statement yet endorsing an independent Palestinian state with east
Jerusalem as its capital. Departing from standard operating procedures,
the state department prepared its own plan, rather than forwarding
Israeli proposals with minor modifications. The US plan was anathema to
Mr Sharon. He reacted to America’s peace plan with an astonishing
outburst of anger, warning President Bush not to repeat the mistake of
Neville Chamberlain in 1938 of trying to appease Nazi Germany. The
American response reflected equally extreme anger. Although Sharon
expressed regret for this public dispute, his allegation of appeasement
and of American treachery continued to rankle.
Israel’s reaction
to the assassination of tourism minister Rehavam Zeevi, on 17 October,
deepened the crisis. Sharon vowed all-out war against Palestinian
terrorism. Israeli tanks and troops retook control of six cities on the
West Bank in the most drastic assault on Yasser Arafat’s
authority since limited self-rule began seven years ago.
America’s strenuous efforts to yank Sharon back from the brink of
war have so far met with only limited success. President Bush is
furious with Sharon for jeopardizing his coalition.
Pro-American Arab regimes
such as Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia have been viewing the escalation
of violence with mounting anguish and anxiety. They have been
shamed and discredited in the eyes of their own people by their
inability to help the Palestinians or to modify America’s blatant
partiality towards Israel. Osama bin Laden was quick to seize the
plight of the Palestinians as an additional stick with which to beat
these regimes following the Anglo-American assault on Afghanistan. Like
the Iraqi dictator, bin Laden is exploiting the plight of the
Palestinians for his own ends. But his motives do not detract from the
centrality of the Palestinian question. His plea struck a sympathetic
chord in much of the Arab and Islamic world. And by swearing that
America will have no peace until Palestine is free, bin Laden succeeded
in setting the agenda for Arab demands on Palestine. America’s
reassessment of its relationship with Israel has already begun. The
moderate Arab leaders are putting pressure on America to take this
process to its logical conclusion by pushing its recalcitrant ally
towards a settlement with the Palestinians.
After the Gulf war
America failed to fulfil George Bush Sr’s pledge to push the
Israelis into a solution. But the situation has changed. In 1991 the
Arabs needed American protection against Saddam Hussein. Today America
badly needs the support of the Arab world for its campaign against
Osama bin Laden and the Taliban regime. To get this support, it must
make a determined effort to force Israel to recognise the right of the
Palestinians to national self-determination and to withdraw from most
of the land that it occupied in 1967. The Arabs complain that America
makes promises on Palestine when it needs their help and lets matters
slip after the crisis blows over. This time round, they will judge
America not by words but by actions. If the US fails to promote a
settlement that satisfies moderate Arab demands on Palestine, popular
opinion in the Arab world would shift in favour of the alternative
advocated by Osama bin Laden and his followers.
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