EXPLANATION : THE DEDUCTIVE NOMOLOGICAL MODEL                    SCI/007

25/11/1999

 

Achinstein, P                     The Nature of Explanation, Ch.1-5

 

Dray, W                           Laws and Explanation in History

 

Feyerabend, PK               "Explanation, Reduction, and Empiricism" in Minnesota Studies in the Phil of Science (Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1962), eds. H Feigl & M Brodbeck.

 

Garfinkel, A                      Forms of Explanations, Introduction, Ch 1,2

 

Hempel, CG                     "Aspects of Scientific Explanations" in his Aspects of Scientific Explanation.

 

                                         The Philosophy of Natural Science, Ch. 5,6

 

Humpreys, P                     The Chances of Explanation (Princeton, Princeton University Press 1989),

                                         esp Ch 4

 

Miller, RW                        Fact and Method Part One (esp. Ch1, 2, and Ch3 for those doing social science)

 

Nagel, E                           The Structure of Science, Ch. 2,3

 

Putnam, H                         Meaning and the Moral Sciences, Lecture III

 

Ruben, D-H                      Explaining Explanation (London: Routledge, 1990), Ch1, Chs 4-7.

 

                                         Explanation (Oxford University Press, 1994)

 

Salmon, WC                     Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World

 

                                         Causality and Explanation (Oxford University Press 1998)

 

Salmon et. al.                    Philosophy of Science (Prentice Hall 1992), Ch 1

 

Scriven, M                        "Explanations, Predictions, Laws" in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science vol III (University of Minnesota Press 1962), 170-230.

 

Van Fraassen, B               The Scientific Image (OUP, 1980), Ch 5

 

Does the DN-model provide necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be an explanation, necessary but not sufficient, sufficient but not necessary, or none of these?

 

Critically evaluate the DN-model.

 

How important is the pragmatic dimension of explanation?  Can Hempel's account be modified to take account of this dimension?

 

To what extent has Hempel correctly characterized explanations as used in the nature sciences?