

munities as cases amenable to comparative analysis. Beyer clearly describes the process through which she coded her key conceptual frames, especially in relation to anonymity, regulation, and spatial divisions online. This appendix should be of considerable use to those interested in designing similar studies.

Expect Us convincingly shows that online spaces have an architecture that shapes political communication online. The question remains, however, how these online factors intersect with the kind of offline mobilization that moves the needle politically. It is unclear if we are witnessing a “coalescing into a transnational social movement focused on freedom of information” or the occasionally coordinated efforts of trolls who do it for the lulz. Beyer recognizes this quandary, pointing out that Anonymous’ successful 2010 protests over WikiLeaks servers were followed by a failed effort to analyze WikiLeaks data (Operation Leakspin). The reason for this is that “political mobilization depends on both . . . participation [and] entertainment value.”

Expect Us makes an important contribution to movement scholarship. In particular it upends the notion that mobilization relies on close and pre-existing social networks. It also bears witness to the enduring political potential that lies within everyday social and cultural practices (here video games and chat rooms). The next step will be for a fresh round of social movement scholarship to build on these observations in order to ask compelling questions about the conditions under which new digital spaces and technologies take the crucial next step politically.

Emily Beaulieu. *Electoral Protest and Democracy in the Developing World*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014. \$29.95 (Paperback).

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Elections can provoke protest when the process or the outcome is deemed illegitimate. A significant step in the emergence of the modern social movement in the eighteenth century was the campaign for “Wilkes and Liberty.” John Wilkes, a radical Member of Parliament, was eventually expelled for opposing the government and the king; support from London’s populace forced Parliament to accept his reelection. In recent decades, especially since the end of the Cold War, elections have become fundamental for a state’s legitimacy. This has produced gen-

uine democratization; it has also led authoritarian rulers to clothe themselves in the trappings of democracy. Protest against manipulated elections is therefore common. Occasionally it even overturns the results, as happened in Georgia’s “Rose Revolution” in 2003 and Ukraine’s “Orange Revolution” in 2004.

Beaulieu’s book presents original data on multiparty elections in 118 developing countries over three decades, from 1975 to 2006. It examines two facets of electoral protest: boycotts of the election, and demonstrations following the vote. Of the 765 elections, 7% were boycotted by most of the opposition, while 9% were followed by mass demonstrations organized by opposition parties.

The book theorizes a bargaining game between the incumbent and the opposition. A sequence of decision points follow the incumbent’s decision to hold an election. The opposition decides whether to participate in the election or to boycott it, depending on the degree of manipulation they expect. The incumbent then decides how much to manipulate the result. After the election, the opposition decides whether to accept the outcome or to hold demonstrations. Finally, the incumbent decides whether to reform the electoral system; reform can be designed to either enhance or undermine electoral democracy. This bargaining game has the virtue of clarity and parsimony. It is commendable for explicitly modeling the decision of state elites as well as potential protesters.

The empirical analysis begins with the causes of electoral protest. A major boycott most likely occurs in states where the executive is less constrained and in countries with lower literacy rates, controlling for per capita GDP. Beaulieu interprets literacy as measuring the information available to both sides: with less information, they find it harder to reach a tacit agreement over the degree of manipulation that the opposition will tolerate. Mass demonstrations are more likely after the incumbent won, of course, but also respond to several other factors. Demonstrations are most likely where the opposition holds few legislative seats (in the year before the election) and is fragmented (no one party has a majority of the opposition seats). They are least likely where the opposition holds many seats and is fragmented. The presence of international observers increases the probability of demonstrations.

The book then turns to the immediate consequences of electoral protest. According to logistic regression, major boycotts do not reduce voting turnout. The author advances two hypotheses that could explain this puzzle. First, the incumbent may inflate the number of recorded

voters. Secondly, the opposition may treat the boycott as a means to undermine the election’s legitimacy in the eyes of international audiences rather than to dissuade citizens from voting. Demonstrations after the election are subject only to bivariate analysis. Where the opposition initiated demonstrations, the probability of the incumbent leaving power increases from 16% to 28%. The lack of multivariate analysis, however, is curious, because the “Color Revolutions” in the former Soviet bloc have attracted so much attention from social scientists and policymakers. Beaulieu’s data could be used to situate these famous cases within a more extensive context. Do they represent an increasing trend or are they exceptional?

The book concludes by analyzing the longer-term consequences of electoral protest, on legislative reforms of the electoral system. Authoritarian and democratic reforms are each treated as separate binary variables for logistic regression; multinomial logistic regression would seem more appropriate. Democratic reform is more likely after a boycott accompanied by “international reaction,” defined as comments on the election by a Western “democracy-promoting state” or an international organization like the European Union. Authoritarian reform is more complex. It responds to many variables, including interactions between boycott and demonstration, and between demonstration and international reaction.

The book’s quantitative analyses are interspersed with brief case studies. Lengthy appendices document the coding of boycotts, post-

electoral demonstrations, and electoral reforms. The list of postelectoral demonstrations strangely omits the protest in Yugoslavia in 2000 that ousted Milosevic and inspired subsequent Color Revolutions. The author should be congratulated on presenting the underlying data, which will enable other social scientists to build on the results reported in the book.

Further analysis could overcome the limitations of the analytical framework, which treats every election as an independent event. The dataset contains, on average, half a dozen elections in each country. This longitudinal structure could be exploited to examine change over time. For example, one could analyze the change in turnout between one election without a boycott and the next one that is boycotted. This follows the logic of Beaulieu’s theoretical model, because the interaction between incumbent and opposition does not start anew at each election; each side knows how the other has acted in previous rounds. Longitudinal analysis would still treat states as independent. Mark Beissinger shows how the Color Revolutions were connected in his article, “Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions,” *Perspectives on Politics*, 2007—not cited in the book). Opposition parties emulated success elsewhere. They were also aided by foreign activists—like those from the Serbian Otpor!—sponsored by the United States. To fully understand electoral protest, it will be necessary to trace diffusion across states as well as interactions within them.