The set text
The prescribed translation of Descartes' Meditations is John Cottingham's. This is available in at least 3 formats, the following from Cambridge University Press:- Descartes: Selected Philosophical Writings
- The Philosophical Writings of Descartes Vol. II
- Meditations on First Philosophy, with Selections from the Objections and Replies, trans. by J. Cottingham with an introduction by B. Williams.
Commentaries
- J. Cottingham, Descartes (Blackwell, 1986)
- G. Hatfield, Descartes and the Meditations (Routledge, 2003)
- G. Dicker, Descartes: an Analytical and Historical Introduction (OUP, 1993)
- C. Wilson, Descartes's Meditations: an Introduction (CUP, 2003)
- B. Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry (Penguin, 1978)
- M. Wilson, Descartes (Routledge, 1978)
- A. Kenny, Descartes (Random House, 1968)
Collections
There are a number of good collections of essays on Cartesian themes; in particular: J. Cottingham (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Descartes (CUP, 1992); J. Cottingham (ed.) Descartes (Oxford Readings in Philosophy, OUP, 1998); W. Doney (ed.) Descartes: a Collection of Critical Essays (Macmillan, 1968); A. Rorty (ed.) Essays on Descartes' Meditations (University of California Press, 1986). Often the best articles are to be found reprinted in more than one of them.General Notes
- Your essay should not be much longer than about 2000 words (an excellent essay might well be shorter).
- Set out the main thesis of your essay at the start.
- Conclude your essay with a restatement of the main thesis/theses that you have argued for and a summary of the way in which you have argued for it/them. Indicate any outstanding problems.
- Please bring your copy of the Meditations to tutorials.
- Please remember to check e-mail.
1 Scepticism
Describe, explain and assess each of the sceptical arguments of the First Meditation.Reading
- The Meditations: Preface to the Reader, the Synopsis, Meditation I.
- Cottingham, Descartes, Ch. 2, pp. 22-35.
- Hatfield, Descartes and the Meditations, Ch. 3.
- Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry, Ch. 2, and appendix 3.
Further Reading
- B. Stroud, The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism (OUP, 1984), Chs 1 & 2 (esp. pp. 11-23).
- Hatfield, Descartes and the Meditations, Ch. 2.
- M. Wilson, Descartes, Ch. 1.
- N. Malcolm, `Dreaming and Scepticism', Philosophical Review 65 (1965), 14-37. Reprinted in Doney (ed.).
- Descartes, Discourse on Method, II & III.
Tips
Specific questions to consider:- Why does Descartes offer a number of distinct arguments?
- What are we meant to conclude from each argument?
- How successful is each argument?
- What is their role, individually and taken together, in Descartes' larger project?
- Is Descartes entitled to dismiss the possibility that he is mad, and if so, why?
2 The Cogito
"Accordingly this first piece of knowledge - I am thinking, therefore I exist - is the first and most certain of all to occur to anyone who philosophizes in an orderly way." (DESCARTES, Principles of Philosophy)Comment.
Reading
- The Meditations: Meditation II, first 9 paras only (= up to AT 29).
- Cottingham, Descartes, Ch. 2, pp. 35-42.
- Hatfield, Descartes and the Meditations, Ch. 4, but especially pp. 99-117.
- P. Markie, `The Cogito and Its Importance', in The Cambridge Companion to Descartes and Descartes (Oxford Readings in Philosophy), both Cottingham (ed.).
- Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry, Ch. 3.
Further Reading
- Descartes, Discourse on the Method IV; Principles I: 7-11; selections from Objections and Replies (see Selected Philosophical Writings pp. 126-9), especially, 2nd Replies AT 141 (CSM II 100), 6th Objections AT 413 (CSM II 278) & Replies AT 422 (CSM II 285)
- E. M. Curley, Descartes Against the Skeptics, (Blackwell, 1978), Ch. 4.
- M. Wilson, Descartes, pp. 50-71.
- J. Harrison, `The Incorrigibility of the Cogito', Mind 93 (1984): 321-35.
- S. Shoemaker, `Self-Reference and Self-Awareness', Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968): 555-67. Reprinted in his Identity, Cause, and Mind (OUP, 1984, 2003).
- J. Hintikka, `Cogito, Ergo Sum: Inference or Performance?' Philosophical Review 71 (1962): 3-32. Reprinted in Doney (ed.) and Sesonske & Fleming (eds).
Tips
- It is especially useful for this topic to look at some of Descartes' other writings. See Further Reading for some suggestions.
- What is supposed to be certain? The argument or the conclusion?
- On what grounds does Descartes claim certainty? Is he justified?
- What is the relation between the propositions `I am thinking' and `I exist'? (Is one inferred from the other?)
3 God
Analyse and assess Descartes' arguments for the existence of God. (NB: The so-called `Cartesian Circle' gets its own essay, so do not spend too much (any?) time on that problem in this week's essay.)Reading
- The Meditations: Meditations III & V. First Objections (AT 96-100), First Replies (AT 112-19), Fifth Objections (AT 332-7), Fifth Replies (AT 382-4).
- Cottingham, Descartes, Ch. 3, pp. 47-64.
- Hatfield, Descartes and the Meditations, Chs 5 (but NOT pp. 169-80, which concern the circle) & 7 (pp. 203-25).
- Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry, Ch. 5.
- Kenny, Descartes, Ch. 7 (6 is also relevant, but 7 is particularly recommended).
- J. L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism, Chs 2 & 3.
Further Reading
- M. Wilson, Descartes, Ch. 3, esp. §6 & Ch. 5, esp. §3.
- Curley, Descartes Against the Skeptics, (Blackwell, 1978), Ch. 6.
- L. Nolan, `Descartes' Ontological Argument', The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL
=
http://www.seop.leeds.ac.uk/entries/descartes-ontological/.
- W. Alston, `The ontological argument revisited', Philosophical Review 69 (1960): 452-74. Reprinted in Doney (ed.).
- A. Plantinga, `Alston on the Ontological Argument' in Doney (ed.).
Tips
The arguments of Meditation III (note that there is more than one argument in this Meditation: aim to be clear and explicit about the various differences) involve a number of stages and/or presuppositions. Distinguish and critically examine each stage carefully. Be sure to give Descartes' arguments as sympathetic a reading as you can: there is little point in criticizing obviously weak arguments that Descartes probably did not advance.4 Mind-Body Dualism
Is Descartes right to assert that there is a real distinction between mind and body? Does the distinction leave Descartes with insoluble problems about their interaction?Reading
- The Meditations: Meditations II & VI; Fourth Objections (AT 197-205), Fourth Replies (AT 219-301); Fifth Objections (AT 334-45), Fifth Replies (AT 388-90); Principles I: 51-4, 60-2.
- Cottingham, Descartes, Ch. 5.
- Hatfield, Descartes and the Meditations, Ch. 4, pp. 117-38; & Ch. 8, esp. pp. 237-58.
- M. Wilson, Descartes, Ch. 6.1
- Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry, Chs 4 & 10.
Further Reading
- J. Bennett, `Descartes' Dualisms' in his Learning from Six Philosophers, Vol. 1, Ch. 4.
- Cottingham, `Cartesian dualism: theology, metaphysics and science', in The Cambridge Companion to Descartes.
- N. Malcolm, `Descartes' proof that his essence is thinking', Philosophical Review 74 (1965): 315-38. Reprinted in Doney (ed.).
- S. Schiffer, `Descartes on his essence', Philosophical Review 85 (1976): 21-43.
- G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind, Ch. 1. Reprinted in Doney (ed.).
- D. Armstrong, Materialist Theory of Mind, (Ch. 1 &) Ch. 2.
- T. Nagel, The View from Nowhere, Ch. 3.
- S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Blackwell, 1980), Lecture III, esp. pp. 144-55.
- T. S. Gendler & J. Hawthorne, `Introduction: Conceivability and Possibility' in Gendler & Hawthorne (eds) Conceivability and Possibility (OUP, 2002), pp. 13-39.
Tips
This week's essay prompts a number of distinct questions and it is important to recognize them as distinct: What does Descartes believe is his essence? (What does "essence" mean in this context?) Why does he believe this? Are his arguments good ones? How, exactly, does his argument for the real distinctness of mind and body (of himself and his body) work? (Commentators have identified a number of different arguments: which, if any, do you think match Descartes' texts?) Finally, if mind and body are distinct substances, how should we understand their interaction?5 The Cartesian Circle
"I cannot but admit that it would be easy for [God], if he desired, to bring it about that I go wrong even in those matters which I see clearly with my mind's eye" (DESCARTES, Meditations III).How does Descartes' seek to allay this doubt? Is his attempt circular?
Reading
- Descartes, Meditations III, IV & V. Second Objections (AT 125), Second Replies (AT 140-2, 146), Fourth Objections (AT 214), Fourth Replies (AT 245).
- Cottingham, Descartes, Ch. 3, pp. 64-73.
- Hatfield, Descartes and the Meditations Ch. 5, pp. 169-80; Ch. 7, pp. 226-34.
- M. Wilson, Descartes, Ch. 3, esp. pp. 131-8.
- Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry, Ch. 7.
- J. Van Cleve, `Foundationalism, epistemic principles, and the Cartesian Circle', Philosophical Review 88 (1979): 55, PART ONE. Reprinted in Descartes (Oxford Readings in Philosophy).
Further Reading
- L. Loeb, `The Cartesian Circle', in The Cambridge Companion to Descartes.
- J. Bennett, `Descartes's Search for Security' and `Descartes's Stability Project' in his Learning from Six Philosophers (OUP, 2001), Vol. 1, Chs 19 & 20.
- H. G Frankfurt, Demons, Dreamers and Madmen (Garland, 1987), Chs 14-16.
- A. Kenny, Descartes, Ch. 8, esp. pp. 188-96.
Footnotes:
1Alternatively: M. Wilson, `The epistemological argument for mind-body distinctness', Noûs 10 (1976): 3-15. Reprinted in Cottingham (ed.), Descartes (Oxford Readings in Philosophy).File translated from TEX by TTH, version 3.63.
On 19 Oct 2004, 22:19.