Learning algorithms versus automatability of Frege systems

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July 2022

Abstract

We connect learning algorithms and algorithms automating proof search in propositional proof systems: for every sufficiently strong, well-behaved propositional proof system P, we prove that the following statements are equivalent,

1. **Provable learning.** P proves efficiently that p-size circuits are learnable by subexponential-size circuits over the uniform distribution with membership queries.
2. **Provable automatability.** P proves efficiently that P is automatable by non-uniform circuits on propositional formulas expressing p-size circuit lower bounds.

Here, P is sufficiently strong and well-behaved if I.-III. holds: I. P p-simulates Jeřábek's system WF (which strengthens the Extended Frege system EF by a surjective weak pigeonhole principle); II. P satisfies some basic properties of standard proof systems which p-simulate WF; III. P proves efficiently for some Boolean function h that h is hard on average for circuits of subexponential size. For example, if III. holds for $P = \mathsf{WF}$, then Items 1 and 2 are equivalent for $P = \mathsf{WF}$. We use the following modified notion of automatability in Item 2, the automating circuits output a P-proof of a given formula (expressing a p-size circuit lower bound for a function f) in nonuniform p-time in the length of a shortest P-proof of a closely related but different formula (expressing an average-case subexponential-size circuit lower bound for the same function f).

If there is a function $h \in \mathsf{NE} \cap \mathsf{coNE}$ which is hard on average for circuits of size $2^{n/4}$, for each sufficiently big n, then there is an explicit propositional proof system P satisfying properties I.-III., i.e. the equivalence of Items 1 and 2 holds for P.

1 Introduction

Learning algorithms and automatability algorithms searching for proofs in propositional proof systems are central concepts in complexity theory, but a priori they appear rather unrelated.

Learning algorithms. In the PAC model of learning introduced by Valiant [38], a circuit class $\mathcal{C}$ is learnable by a randomized algorithm L over the uniform distribution, up to error ϵ, with confidence δ and membership queries, if for every Boolean function f computable by a circuit from $\mathcal{C}$, when given oracle access to f, L outputs with probability $\geq \delta$ over the uniform distribution a circuit computing f on $\geq (1-\epsilon)$ inputs. An important task of learning theory is to find out if standard circuit classes such as $\mathsf{P/poly}$ are learnable by efficient circuits. A way to approach the question is to connect the existence of efficient learning algorithms to other standard conjectures in complexity theory. For example, we can try to prove that efficient learning of $\mathsf{P/poly}$ is equivalent to $\mathsf{P} = \mathsf{NP}$ or to the non-existence of strong pseudorandom generators. In both cases one implication is known: $\mathsf{P} = \mathsf{NP}$ implies efficient learning of $\mathsf{P/poly}$ (with small error and high confidence) which in turn breaks pseudorandom generators. However, while some progress on the opposite implications has been made, they remain open, cf. [2, 37].

Automatability. The notion of automatability was introduced in the work of Bonet, Pitassi and Raz [6]. A propositional proof system P is automatable if there is an algorithm A such that for every tautology ϕ, A finds a P-proof of ϕ in p-time in the size of a shortest P-proof of ϕ. That is, even if P does not prove all tautologies efficiently, it can still be automatable. Establishing (non-)automatability results for concrete proof systems is one of the main tasks of proof complexity. This led to many attempts to link the notion of automatability to other standard complexity-theoretic conjectures. For example, recently Atserias and Müller [3] proved that automating Resolution is NP-hard and their work has been extended to other weak proof systems, e.g. [12, 13, 14]. For stronger systems, it is known that automating Extended Frege system EF, Frege or even constant-depth Frege would break specific cryptographic assumptions such as the security of RSA or Diffie-Hellman scheme, cf. [23, 6, 5]. It remains, however, open to obtain non-automatability of strong systems like Frege under a generic assumption such as the existence of strong pseudorandom generators, let alone to prove the equivalence between such notions.

In the present paper we derive a conditional equivalence between learning algorithms for p-size circuits and automatability of proof systems on tautologies encoding circuit lower bounds.

1.1 Our result

An ideal connection between learning and automatability would say that for standard proof systems P,

"P is automatable if and only if $\mathsf{P/poly}$ is learnable efficiently".

We establish this modulo some provability conditions and a change of parameters. Additionally, we need to consider automatability only w.r.t. formulas encoding circuit lower bounds. More precisely, denote by $\mathsf{tt}(f, s)$ a propositional formula which expresses that boolean function f represented by its truth-table is not computable by a boolean circuit of size s represented by free variables, see Section 3. So $\mathsf{tt}(f, s)$ is a tautology if and only if f is hard for circuits of size s. Similarly, let $\mathsf{tt}(f, s, t)$ be a formula expressing that circuits of size s fail to compute f on $\geq t$-fraction of inputs. In our main result (Theorem 1) we use a slightly modified notion of automatability where the automating algorithm for a proof system P is non-uniform and outputs a P-proof of a given formula $\mathsf{tt}(f, n^{O(1)})$ in p-time in the size of a shortest P-proof of $\mathsf{tt}(f, 2^{n^{o(1)}}, 1/2 - 1/2^{n^{o(1)}})$, see Section 3.[1]

Theorem 1 (Informal, cf. Theorem 10)**.** *Let P be any propositional proof system which $\mathsf{APC_1}$-provably p-simulates WF and satisfies some basic properties, e.g. $P = \mathsf{WF}$. Moreover, assume that P proves efficiently*[2] *$\mathsf{tt}(h, 2^{n/4}, 1/2 - 1/2^{n/4})$ for some boolean function h. Then, the following statements are equivalent:*

1. **Provable learning.** *P proves efficiently that p-size circuits are learnable by $2^{n^{o(1)}}$-size circuits, over the uniform distribution, up to error $1/2 - 1/2^{n^{o(1)}}$, with membership queries and confidence $1/2^{n^{o(1)}}$.*

2. **Provable automatability.** *P proves efficiently that P is automatable by non-uniform circuits on formulas $\mathsf{tt}(f, n^{O(1)})$.*

WF is an elegant strengthening of EF introduced by Jeřábek [15], which corresponds to the theory of approximate counting $\mathsf{APC_1}$, a theory formalizing probabilistic p-time reasoning, see Section 2.2. Concrete proof systems which $\mathsf{APC_1}$-provably p-simulate WF and satisfy the basic properties from Theorem 1 include WF itself or even much stronger systems such as set theory ZFC (if we interpret ZFC as a suitable system for proving tautologies, see Section 5). The error and confidence of learning algorithms can be amplified

[1] We believe that the gap between $\mathsf{tt}(f, n^{O(1)})$ and $\mathsf{tt}(f, 2^{n^{o(1)}}, 1/2 - 1/2^{n^{o(1)}})$ can be almost closed (leaving only the gap between the worst-case and average-case lower bound and a small difference in the circuit size), if we use learning of subexponential-size circuits instead of p-size circuits in Item 1 of Theorem 1 and tt-formulas expressing subexponential-size circuit lower bounds in Item 2. This should follow directly from the proof of Theorem 1.

[2] We say that P *proves efficiently* tautologies ϕ_n, if P admits $poly(|\phi_n|)$-size proofs of ϕ_n.

'for free', see Section 2.1, but we did not make the attempts to prove that the amplification is efficiently provable already in WF. Perhaps the most unusual aspect of Theorem 1 is its usage of metamathematics: we do not prove the equivalence between automatability and learning but between *provable* automatability and *provable* learning.

Plausibility of the assumption. The main assumption in Theorem 1 is the provability of a circuit lower bound $\mathsf{tt}(h, 2^{n/4}, 1/2 - 1/2^{n/4})$. This assumption has an interesting status. Razborov's conjecture about hardness of Nisan-Wigderson generators implies a conditional hardness of formulas $\mathsf{tt}(h, n^{O(1)})$ for Frege (for every h), cf. [35], and it is possible to consider extensions of the conjecture to all standard proof systems, even set theory ZFC. A conditional hardness of tt-formulas (for EF) follows also from a conjecture of Krajíček [20, Conjecture 7.9]. On the other hand, it is not known how to prove hardness of $\mathsf{tt}(h, 2^{n/4}, 1/2 - 1/2^{n/4})$, for all h, for Frege, under any standard complexity-theoretic hardness assumption. Moreover, all major circuit lower bounds for weak circuit classes and explicit boolean functions are known to be effciently provable in EF [3], cf. [33, 25]. If we believe that explicit circuit lower bounds such as $\mathsf{tt}(h, 2^{n/4}, 1/2 - 1/2^{n/4})$, for some $h \in \mathsf{EXP}$, are true, it is also perfectly possible that they are efficiently provable in a standard proof system such as ZFC [4] or EF. Notably, if EF proves efficiently $\mathsf{tt}(h, 2^{n/4})$ for some boolean function h, then EF simulates WF, cf. [22, Lemma 19.5.4]. If there is a p-time algorithm which given a string of length 2^n (specifying the size of $\mathsf{tt}(h, 2^{n/4})$) generates an EF-proof of $\mathsf{tt}(h, 2^{n/4})$, then EF is p-equivalent to WF. To see that, combine Lemma 1 with the fact (proved in [15]) that APC_1 proves the reflection principle for WF.

As a corollary of Theorem 1 we show that, under a standard hardness assumption, there is an explicit proof system P for which the equivalence holds. This, follows, essentially, by 'hard-wiring' tautologies $\mathsf{tt}(h, 2^{n/4}, 1/2 - 1/2^{n/4})$ to WF.

Corollary 1 (cf. Corollary 3)**.** *Assume there is a* $\mathsf{NE} \cap \mathsf{coNE}$*-function* $h_n : \{0,1\}^n \mapsto \{0,1\}$ *such that for each sufficiently big* n*,* h_n *is not* $(1/2 + 1/2^{n/4})$*-approximable by* $2^{n/4}$*-size circuits.*[5] *Then there is a proof system* P *(which can be described explicitly given the definition of* h_n*) such that Items 1 and 2 from Theorem 1 are equivalent.*

The proof of Theorem 1 reveals also a conditional proof complexity collapse, which we discuss in Section 5.

Corollary 2 (cf. Corollary 4)**.** *Let* P, P_0 *be propositional proof systems which* APC_1*-provably p-simulate* WF *and satisfy some basic properties. Moreover, assume that systems*

[3] This has not been verified for lower bounds obtained via the algorithmic method of Williams [39].

[4] Efficient provability of $\mathsf{tt}(h, 2^{n/4}, 1/2 - 1/2^{n/4})$ in ZFC, for some $h \in \mathsf{EXP}$, would follow from the standard provability of this lower bound in ZFC.

[5] A circuit C with n inputs γ-approximates function $f : \{0,1\}^n \mapsto \{0,1\}$ if $\Pr_{x \in \{0,1\}^n}[C(x) = f(x)] \geq \gamma$.

P, P_0 prove efficiently $\mathsf{tt}(h_n, 2^{n/4}, 1/2-1/2^{n/4})$ for some boolean function h_n. Then, Item 1 implies Item 2:

1. **P-provable automatability.** *P proves efficiently that P is automatable by non-uniform circuits on formulas $\mathsf{tt}(f, n^{O(1)})$.*

2. **P_0-provable proof search.** *There are p-size circuits B such that P_0 proves efficiently that circuits B (given just $\mathsf{tt}(f, n^{O(1)})$) generate P-proofs of $\mathsf{tt}(f, n^{O(1)})$ or $2^{n^{o(1)}}$-size circuits $(1/2 + 1/2^{n^{o(1)}})$-approximating f.*

1.2 Outline of the proof

Our starting point for the derivation of Theorem 1 is a relation between natural proofs and automatability which goes back to a work of Razborov and Krajíček. Razborov [34, 32] proved that certain theories of bounded arithmetic cannot prove explicit circuit lower bounds assuming strong pseudorandom generators exist. Krajíček [19, 21] developed the concept of feasible interpolation (a weaker version of automatability, cf. [22]) and reformulated Razborov's unprovability result in this language, see [22, Section 17.9] for more historical remarks.

Theorem 2 (Razborov-Krajíček [34, 32, 19] - informal version)**.** *Let P be a proof system which simulates EF and satisfies some basic properties. If P is automatable and P proves efficiently $\mathsf{tt}(h, n^{O(1)})$ for some function h, then there are $\mathsf{P/poly}$-natural proofs useful against $\mathsf{P/poly}$.*

The second crucial ingredient we will use is a result of Carmosino, Impagliazzo, Kabanets and Kolokolova, who showed that natural proofs can be turned into learning algorithms [8]. This allows us to conclude the following.

Theorem 3 (Informal, cf. Theorem 6)**.** *Let P be a proof system simulating EF and satisfying some basic properties. If P proves efficiently $\mathsf{tt}(h, n^{O(1)})$ for some function h, then automatability of P implies the existence of subexponential-size circuits learning p-size circuits over the uniform distribution, with membership queries.*

Theorem 3 directly implies that if strong pseudorandom generators exist and EF proves efficiently $\mathsf{tt}(h, n^{O(1)})$ for some h, then EF is automatable if and only if there are subexponential-size circuits learning p-size circuits over the uniform distribution, with membership queries. The disadvantage of this observation is that, unlike in Theorem 1, its assumptions are known to imply that both sides of the desired equivalence are false.

We note that the proof of Theorem 3 can also be used to show that optimal and automatable proof systems imply learning algorithms. Here, a propositional proof system P is optimal, if for each propositional proof system R, an R-proof π of ϕ, implies the existence of a $poly(|\pi|)$-size P-proof of ϕ.

Theorem 4 (Optimality and automatability implies learning, cf. Theorem 7)**.** *If there is an optimal proof system which is automatable, then there are subexponential-size circuits infinitely often learning p-size circuits over the uniform distribution, with membership queries.*

In fact, it is possible to prove, unconditionally, that there is some propositional proof system P such that automatability of P is equivalent to the existence of subexponential-size circuits inifnitely often learning $\mathsf{P/poly}$ over the uniform distribution, cf. Theorem 8. The proof is, however, non-constructive so (unlike in Corollary 1) we do not know which system P satisfies the equivalence.

The entrance of metamathematics. Unfortunately, it is unclear how to derive the opposite implication in Theorem 3. We do not know how to automate, say, EF assuming just the existence of efficient learning algorithms. In order to get the reverse, we need to assume that an efficient learning algorithm is provably correct in a proof system P, which p-simulates WF. For simplicity, let $P = \mathsf{WF}$. If we assume that WF proves efficiently for some small circuits that they can learn p-size circuits, we can show that there are small circuits such that WF proves efficiently that these circuits automate WF on formulas $\mathsf{tt}(f, n^{O(1)})$. In more detail, we first formalize in $\mathsf{APC_1}$ the implication that WF-provable learning yields automatability of WF on $\mathsf{tt}(f, n^{O(1)})$ - if a learning circuit A does not find a small circuit for a given function f, the automating circuit uses WF-proof of the correctness of A to produce a short WF-proof of $\mathsf{tt}(f, n^{O(1)})$. Then, we translate the $\mathsf{APC_1}$-proof to WF and conclude that WF proves that WF-provable learning implies automatability of WF. This allows us to show that if we have WF-provable learning, then WF is WF-provably automatable on $\mathsf{tt}(f, n^{O(1)})$.

It is important that assuming WF-provable learning, we are able to derive WF-provable automatability of WF, and not just automatability of WF. This makes it possible to obtain the opposite direction and establish the desired equivalence: If we know that WF proves that WF is automatable, we can formalize the proof of Theorem 3 in WF and conclude the existence of WF-provable learning algorithms.

One could expect that WF-provable learning would yield just automatability of WF and WF-provability of WF-provable learning would be needed to get WF-provable automatability of WF. We note, however, that WF-provability of WF-provable learning follows from WF-provable learning because there are short WF-proofs of the fact that a formula (expressing that its atoms encode a correct WF-proof of learning) holds under a specific satisfying assignment.

Benefits of bounded arithmetic. The proof of Theorem 1 relies heavily on formalizations. Among other things we need to formalize the result of Carmosino, Impagliazzo, Kabanets and Kolokolova in $\mathsf{APC_1}$[6], and use an elaborated way of expressing complex

[6]We will actually formalize the result of Carmosino et al. [8] just conditionally, in order to avoid the

statements about metacomplexity by propositional formulas: existential quantifiers often need to be witnessed before translating them to propositional setting. The framework of bounded arithmetic allows us to deal with these complications in an elegant way: we often reason in bounded arithmetic, possibly using statements of higher quantifier complexity, and only subsequently translate the outcomes to propositional logic, if the resulting (proved) statement has coNP form. Notably, already propositional formulas expressing probabilities in the definition of learning algorithms require more advanced tools - the probabilities are encoded using suitable Nisan-Wigderson generators which come out of the notion of approximate counting in APC_1, cf. Section 3.2.

1.3 Related results

Learning algorithms and automatability have been linked already in the work of Alekhnovich, Braverman, Feldman, Klivans and Pitassi [1], who showed an informal connection between learning of weak circuit classes and automatability of some weak systems such as tree-like Resolution. As already mentioned, Atserias and Müller [3] proved that automating Resolution is NP-hard and their work has been extended to other weak proof systems, see e.g. [12, 13, 14]. A direct consequence of these results is that efficient algorithms automating the respective proof systems can be used to learn efficiently classes like P/poly. A major difference between these results and ours is that for our results to apply, the proof system needs to be sufficiently strong, while for the other results, the proof system needs to be weak (in the sense that lower bounds for the system are already known).

1.4 Open problems

Unconditional equivalence between learning and automatability. Is it possible to avoid the assumption on the provability of a circuit lower bound in Theorem 1 and establish an unconditional equivalence between learning and automatability?

Complexity theory from the perspective of metamathematics. Our results demonstrate that in the context of metamathematics it is possible to establish some complexity-theoretic connections which we are not able to establish otherwise. We exploit the metamathematical nature of the notion of automatability: efficient P-provability of the correctness of an algorithm implies efficient P-provability of automatability of P. Is it possible to take advantage of metamathematics in other contexts and resolve other important open problems in this setting? For example, could we get a version of the desired equivalence between the existence of efficient learning algorithms and the non-existence of cryptographic pseudorandom generators, cf. [27, 37, 29]? The question of basing cryptography

formalization of Bertrand's postulate. Moreover, we avoid the formalization of amplification procedures in [8].

on a worst-case assumption such as $\mathsf{P} \neq \mathsf{NP}$ could be addressed in this setting by showing that if a sufficiently strong proof system P proves efficiently that there is no strong pseudorandom generator[7], then P is p-bounded.

Circuit lower bound tautologies. How essential are circuit lower bound tautologies in our results? Consider fundamental questions of proof complexity (p-boundness, optimality, automatability) w.r.t. formulas $\mathsf{tt}(f, s)$. Do they coincide with the original ones? Are formulas $\mathsf{tt}(f, s)$ the hardest ones, do they admit optimal proof systems, or can we turn automatability on formulas $\mathsf{tt}(f, s)$ into automatability on all formulas?

Proof complexity magnification. Is it possible to obtain the collapse from Corollary 2 for formulas expressing standard conjectures? For example, is it possible to show that the hardness of $\mathsf{tt}(\mathsf{SAT}, n^{O(1)})$ for some proof system P_0, implies hardness of $\mathsf{tt}(\mathsf{SAT}, n^{O(1)})$ for stronger proof systems? An instance of such a magnification phenomenon appeared in [25] (with $P_0 =$ constant-depth Frege, $P =$ Frege and a different formalization of $\mathsf{tt}(\mathsf{SAT}, n^{O(1)})$ in P).

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Natural proofs and learning algorithms

$[n]$ denotes $\{1, \ldots, n\}$. $\mathsf{Circuit}[s]$ denotes fan-in two Boolean circuits of size at most s. The size of a circuit is the number of gates.

Definition 1 (Natural property [36])**.** *Let $m = 2^n$ and $s, d : \mathbb{N} \mapsto \mathbb{N}$. A sequence of circuits $\{C_m\}_{n=1}^{\infty}$ is a $\mathsf{Circuit}[s(m)]$-natural property useful against $\mathsf{Circuit}[d(n)]$ if*

1. Constructivity. *C_m has m inputs and size $s(m)$,*
2. Largeness. $\Pr_x[C_m(x) = 1] \geq 1/m^{O(1)}$,
3. Usefulness. *For each sufficiently big m, $C_m(x) = 1$ implies that x is a truth-table of a function on n inputs which is not computable by circuits of size $d(n)$.*

Definition 2 (PAC learning)**.** *A circuit class $\mathcal{C}$ is learnable over the uniform distribution by a circuit class $\mathcal{D}$ up to error ϵ with confidence δ, if there are randomized oracle circuits L^f from $\mathcal{D}$ such that for every Boolean function $f : \{0,1\}^n \mapsto \{0,1\}$ computable by a circuit from $\mathcal{C}$, when given oracle access to f, input 1^n and the internal randomness $w \in \{0,1\}^*$, L^f outputs the description of a circuit satisfying*

$$\Pr_w[L^f(1^n, w) \ (1-\epsilon)\text{-approximates } f] \geq \delta.$$

[7] The formalization of this statement would assume the existence of a p-size circuit which for any p-size circuit defining a potential pseudorandom generator outputs its distinguisher.

L^f uses non-adaptive membership queries if the set of queries which L^f makes to the oracle does not depend on the answers to previous queries. L^f uses random examples if the set of queries which L^f makes to the oracle is chosen uniformly at random.

In this paper, PAC learning always refers to learning over the uniform distribution. While, a priori, learning over the uniform distribution might not reflect real-world scenarios very well (and on the opposite end, learning over all distributions is perhaps overly restrictive), as far as we can tell it is possible that PAC learning of p-size circuits over the uniform distribution implies PAC learning of p-size circuits over all p-samplable distributions. Binnendyk, Carmosino, Kolokolova, Ramyaa and Sabin [4] proved the implication, if the learning algorithm in the conclusion is allowed to depend on the p-samplable distribution.

Boosting confidence and reducing error. The confidence of the learner can be efficiently boosted in a standard way. Suppose an s-size circuit L^f learns f up to error ϵ with confidence δ. We can then run L^f k times, test the output of L^f from every run with m new random queries and output the most accurate one. By Hoeffding's inequality, m random queries fail to estimate the error ϵ of an output of L^f up to γ with probability at most $2/e^{2\gamma^2 m}$. Therefore the resulting circuit of size $poly(s, m, k)$ learns f up to error $\epsilon+\gamma$ with confidence at least $1-2k/e^{2\gamma^2 m}-(1-\delta)^k \geq 1-2k/e^{2\gamma^2 m}-e^{-k\delta}$. If we are trying to learn small circuits we can get even confidence 1 by fixing internal randomness of learner nonuniformly without losing much on the running time or the error of the output. It is also possible to reduce the error up to which L^f learns f without a significant blowup in the running time and confidence. If we want to learn f with a better error, we first learn an amplified version of f, $Amp(f)$. Employing direct product theorems and Goldreich-Levin reconstruction algorithm, Carmosino et. al. [8, Lemma 3.5] showed that for each $0 < \epsilon, \gamma < 1$ it is possible to map a Boolean function f with n inputs to a Boolean function $Amp(f)$ with $poly(n, 1/\epsilon, \log(1/\gamma))$ inputs so that $Amp(f) \in \mathsf{P/poly}^f$ and there is a probabilistic $poly(|C|, n, 1/\epsilon, 1/\gamma)$-time machine which given a circuit C $(1/2+\gamma)$-approximating $Amp(f)$ and an oracle access to f outputs with high probability a circuit $(1-\epsilon)$-approximating f. We can thus often ignore the optimisation of the confidence and error parameter. Note, however, that the error reduction of Carmosino et al. requires membership queries.

Natural proofs vs learning algorithms. Natural proofs are actually equivalent to efficient learning algorithms with suitable parameters. In this paper we need just one implication.

Theorem 5 (Carmosino-Impagliazzo-Kabanets-Kolokolova [8])**.** *Let R be a $\mathsf{P/poly}$-natural property useful against $\mathsf{Circuit}[n^k]$ for $k \geq 1$. Then, for each $\gamma \in (0,1)$, $\mathsf{Circuit}[n^{k\gamma/a}]$ is learnable by $\mathsf{Circuit}[2^{O(n^\gamma)}]$ over the uniform distribution with non-adaptive membership queries, confidence 1, up to error $1/n^{k\gamma/a}$, where a is an absolute constant.*

2.2 Bounded arithmetic and propositional logic

Theories of bounded arithmetic capture various levels of feasible reasoning and present a uniform counterpart to propositional proof systems.

The first theory of bounded arithmetic formalizing p-time reasoning was introduced by Cook [10] as an equational theory PV. We work with its first-order conservative extension PV_1 from [24]. The language of PV_1, denoted PV as well, consists of symbols for all p-time algorithms given by Cobham's characterization of p-time functions, cf. [9]. A PV-formula is a first-order formula in the language PV. Σ^b_0 ($=\Pi^b_0$) denotes PV-formulas with only sharply bounded quantifiers $\exists x, x \leq |t|$, $\forall x, x \leq |t|$, where $|t|$ is "the length of the binary representation of t". Inductively, Σ^b_{i+1} resp. Π^b_{i+1} is the closure of Π^b_i resp. Σ^b_i under positive Boolean combinations, sharply bounded quantifiers, and bounded quantifiers $\exists x, x \leq t$ resp. $\forall x, x \leq t$. Predicates definable by Σ^b_i resp. Π^b_i formulas are in the Σ^p_i resp. Π^p_i level of the polynomial hierarchy, and vice versa. PV_1 is known to prove $\Sigma^b_0(\mathsf{PV})$-induction:

$$A(0) \wedge \forall x\ (A(x) \rightarrow A(x+1)) \rightarrow \forall x A(x),$$

for Σ^b_0-formulas A, cf. Krajíček [18].

Buss [7] introduced the theory S^1_2 extending PV_1 with the Σ^b_1-length induction:

$$A(0) \wedge \forall x < |a|, (A(x) \rightarrow A(x+1)) \rightarrow A(|a|),$$

for $A \in \Sigma^b_1$. S^1_2 proves the sharply bounded collection scheme $BB(\Sigma^b_1)$:

$$\forall i < |a|\ \exists x < a, A(i,x) \rightarrow \exists w\ \forall i < |a|, A(i, [w]_i),$$

for $A \in \Sigma^b_1$ ($[w]_i$ is the ith element of the sequence coded by w), which is unprovable in PV_1 under a cryptographic assumption, cf. [11]. On the other hand, S^1_2 is $\forall\Sigma^b_1$-conservative over PV_1. This is a consequence of Buss's witnessing theorem stating that $\mathsf{S}^1_2 \vdash \exists y, A(x,y)$ for $A \in \Sigma^b_1$ implies $\mathsf{PV}_1 \vdash A(x, f(x))$ for some PV-function f.

Following a work by Krajíček [20], Jeřábek [15, 16, 17] systematically developed a theory APC_1 capturing probabilistic p-time reasoning by means of approximate counting.[8] The theory APC_1 is defined as $\mathsf{PV}_1 + dWPHP(\mathsf{PV})$ where $dWPHP(\mathsf{PV})$ stands for the dual (surjective) pigeonhole principle for PV-functions, i.e. for the set of all formulas

$$x > 0 \rightarrow \exists v < x(|y|+1) \forall u < x|y|,\ f(u) \neq v,$$

where f is a PV-function which might involve other parameters not explicitly shown. We devote Section 2.3 to a more detailed description of the machinery of approximate counting in APC_1.

[8] Krajíček [20] introduced a theory BT defined as $\mathsf{S}^1_2 + dWPHP(\mathsf{PV})$ and proposed it as a theory for probabilistic p-time reasoning.

Any Π^b_1-formula ϕ provable in PV_1 can be expressed as a sequence of tautologies $||\phi||_n$ with proofs in the Extended Frege system EF which are constructible in p-time (given a string of the length n), cf. [10]. Similarly, Π^b_1-formulas provable in APC_1 translate to tautologies with p-time constructible proofs in WF, an extension of EF introduced by Jeřábek [15]. We describe the translation and system WF in more detail below.

As it is often easier to present a proof in a theory of bounded arithmetic than in the corresponding propositional system, bounded arithmetic functions, so to speak, as a uniform language for propositional logic.

We refer to Krajíček [22] for basic notions in proof complexity.

Definition 3 (WF (WPHP Frege), cf. Jeřábek [15])**.** *Let L be a finite and complete language for propositional logic, i.e. L consists of finitely many boolean connectives of constant arity such that each boolean function of every arity can be expressed by an L-formula, and let $\mathcal{R}$ be a finite, sound and implicationally complete set of Frege rules (in the langauge L). A WF-proof of a (L-)circuit A is a sequence of circuits $A_0, \dots, A_k$ such that $A_k = A$, and each A_i is derived from some $A_{j_1}, \dots, A_{j_\ell}$, $j_1, \dots, j_\ell < i$ by a Frege rule from $\mathcal{R}$, or it is similar to some A_j, $j < i$, or it is the dWPHP axiom,*

$$\bigvee_{\ell=1}^{m} (r_\ell \neq C_\ell(D_1, \dots, D_n)),$$

where $n < m$ and r_ℓ are pairwise distinct variables which do not occur in circuits A, $C_{\ell'}$, or A_j for $j < i$, but may occur in circuits $D_1, \dots, D_n$.

The similarity rule in Definition 3 is verified by a specific p-time algorithm which checks that circuits A_i and A_j can be 'unfolded' to the same (possible huge) formula, cf. [15, Lemma 2.2.]. Intuitively, the NLOG ($\subseteq \mathsf{P}$) algorithm recognizes if two circuits are not similar by guessing a partial path through them, going from the output to the inputs, where on at least one instruction the circuits disagree. As defined WF depends on the choice of Frege rules and language L, but for each choice the resulting systems are p-equivalent, so we can identify them. The dWPHP axiom refers to 'dual weak pigeonhole principle' postulating the existence of an element $r_1, \dots, r_m$ outside the range of a p-size map $C_\ell : \{0,1\}^n \mapsto \{0,1\}^m$. The dWPHP axiom comes with a specification of circuits $C_\ell, D_1, \dots, D_n$ so that we can recognize the axiom efficiently. The role of circuits $D_1, \dots, D_n$ in the dWPHP axiom is to allow WF to postulate not only that $r_1, \dots, r_m$ is not the output of C_ℓ on a specific input $x_1, \dots, x_n$ but to postulate that $r_1, \dots, r_m$ is not the output of C_ℓ on other inputs (which could depend on $r_1, \dots, r_m$) either.

The translation of a Π^b_1 formula ϕ into a sequence of propositional formulas $||\phi||_{\overline{n}}$ works as follows (full details can be found in [22, Section 12.3]). For each PV-function $f(x_1, \dots, x_k)$ and numbers $n_1, \dots, n_k$ we have a p-size circuit C_f computing the restriction $f : 2^{n_1} \times \cdots \times 2^{n_k} \mapsto 2^{b(n_1,\dots,n_k)}$, where b is a suitable 'bounding' polynomial for

f. The formula $||f||_{\overline{n}}(p,q,r)$ expresses that C_f outputs r on input p, with q being the auxiliary variables corresponding to the nodes of C_f. The formula $||\phi(x)||_{\overline{n}}(p,q)$ is defined as $||\phi'(x)||_{\overline{n}}(p,q)$, where ϕ' is the negation normal form of ϕ, i.e. negations in ϕ' are only in front of atomic formulas. The formula $||\phi'(x)||_{\overline{n}}(p,q)$ is defined inductively in a straightforward way so that $||\dots||$ commutes with $\vee,\wedge$. The atoms p correspond to variables x, atoms q correspond to the universally quantified variables of ϕ and to the outputs and auxiliary variables of circuits C_f for functions f appearing in ϕ. Sharply bounded quantifiers are replaced by polynomially big conjuctions resp. disjunctions. For the atomic formulas we have[9],

$$||f(x)=g(x)||_{\overline{n}} :=||f(x)||_{\overline{n}}(p,q,r)\wedge||g(x)||_{\overline{n}}(p,q',r')\rightarrow\bigwedge_i r_i=r'_i,$$

$$||\neg f(x)=g(x)||_{\overline{n}} :=||f(x)||_{\overline{n}}(p,q,r)\wedge||g(x)||_{\overline{n}}(p,q',r')\rightarrow\neg\bigwedge_i r_i=r'_i,$$

$$||f(x)\leq g(x)||_{\overline{n}} :=||f(x)||_{\overline{n}}(p,q,r)\wedge||g(x)||_{\overline{n}}(p,q',r')\rightarrow\bigwedge_i(r_i\wedge\bigwedge_{j>i}(r_j=r'_j)\rightarrow r'_i),$$

$$||\neg f(x)\leq g(x)||_{\overline{n}} :=||f(x)||_{\overline{n}}(p,q,r)\wedge||g(x)||_{\overline{n}}(p,q',r')\rightarrow\neg\bigwedge_i(r_i\wedge\bigwedge_{j>i}(r_j=r'_j)\rightarrow r'_i).$$

2.3 Approximate counting

In order to prove our results we will need to use Jeřábek's theory of approximate counting. This section recalls the properties of APC_1 we will need.

By a definable set we mean a collection of numbers satisfying some formula, possibly with parameters. When a number a is used in a context which asks for a set it is assumed to represent the integer interval $[0,a)$, e.g. $X\subseteq a$ means that all elements of set X are less than a. If $X\subseteq a$, $Y\subseteq b$, then $X\times Y:=\{bx+y\mid x\in X,y\in Y\}\subseteq ab$ and $X\dot{\cup}Y:=X\cup\{y+a\mid y\in Y\}\subseteq a+b$. Rational numbers are assumed to be represented by pairs of integers in the natural way. We use the notation $x\in Log\leftrightarrow\exists y,\ x=|y|$ and $x\in LogLog\leftrightarrow\exists y,\ x=||y||$.

Let $C:2^n\rightarrow 2^m$ be a circuit and $X\subseteq 2^n, Y\subseteq 2^m$ definable sets. We write $C:X\twoheadrightarrow Y$ if $\forall y\in Y\exists x\in X,\ C(x)=y$. Jeřábek [17] gives the following definitions in APC_1 (but they can be considered in weaker theories as well).

Definition 4. *Let $X,Y\subseteq 2^n$ be definable sets, and $\epsilon\leq 1$. The size of X is approximately less than the size of Y with error ϵ, written as $X\preceq_\epsilon Y$, if there exists a circuit C, and $v\neq 0$ such that*

$$C:v\times(Y\dot{\cup}\epsilon 2^n)\twoheadrightarrow v\times X.$$

$X\approx_\epsilon Y$ stands for $X\preceq_\epsilon Y$ and $Y\preceq_\epsilon X$.

[9]Formally, we should allow terms, not just function symbols f,g, in atomic formulas.

Since a number s is identified with the interval $[0, s)$, $X \preceq_\epsilon s$ means that the size of X is at most s with error ϵ.

The definition of $X \preceq_\epsilon Y$ is an unbounded $\exists\Pi^b_2$-formula even if X, Y are defined by circuits so it cannot be used freely in bounded induction. Jeřábek [17] solved this problem by working in HARD^A, a conservative extension of APC_1, defined as a relativized theory $\mathsf{PV}_1(\alpha) + dWPHP(\mathsf{PV}(\alpha))$ extended with axioms postulating that $\alpha(x)$ is a truth-table of a function on $||x||$ variables hard on average for circuits of size $2^{||x||/4}$, see Section 3.2. In HARD^A there is a $\mathsf{PV}_1(\alpha)$ function $Size$ approximating the size of any set $X \subseteq 2^n$ defined by a circuit C so that $X \approx_\epsilon Size(C, 2^n, 2^{\epsilon^{-1}})$ for $\epsilon^{-1} \in Log$, cf. [17, Lemma 2.14]. If $X \cap t \subseteq 2^{|t|}$ is defined by a circuit C and $\epsilon^{-1} \in Log$, we can define

$$\Pr_{x<t}[x \in X]_\epsilon := \frac{1}{t} Size(C, 2^{|t|}, 2^{\epsilon^{-1}}).$$

The presented definitions of approximate counting are well-behaved:

Proposition 1 (Jeřábek [17])**.** *(in PV_1) Let $X, X', Y, Y', Z \subseteq 2^n$ and $W, W' \subseteq 2^m$ be definable sets, and $\epsilon, \delta < 1$. Then*

i) $X \subseteq Y \Rightarrow X \preceq_0 Y$,

ii) $X \preceq_\epsilon Y \wedge Y \preceq_\delta Z \Rightarrow X \preceq_{\epsilon+\delta} Z$,

iii) $X \preceq_\epsilon X' \wedge W \preceq_\delta W' \Rightarrow X \times W \preceq_{\epsilon+\delta+\epsilon\delta} X' \times W'$.

iv) $X \preceq_\epsilon X' \wedge Y \preceq_\delta Y'$ *and* X', Y' *are separable by a circuit, then* $X \cup Y \preceq_{\epsilon+\delta} X' \cup Y'$.

Proposition 2 (Jeřábek [17])**.** *(in APC_1)*

1. *Let $X, Y \subseteq 2^n$ be definable by circuits, $s, t, u \leq 2^n$, $\epsilon, \delta, \theta, \gamma < 1, \gamma^{-1} \in Log$. Then*

   i) $X \preceq_\gamma Y$ *or* $Y \preceq_\gamma X$,

   ii) $s \preceq_\epsilon X \preceq_\delta t \Rightarrow s < t + (\epsilon + \delta + \gamma)2^n$,

   iii) $X \preceq_\epsilon Y \Rightarrow 2^n \backslash Y \preceq_{\epsilon+\gamma} 2^n \backslash X$,

   iv) $X \approx_\epsilon s \wedge Y \approx_\delta t \wedge X \cap Y \approx_\theta u \Rightarrow X \cup Y \approx_{\epsilon+\delta+\theta+\gamma} s + t - u$.

2. (Disjoint union) Let $X_i \subseteq 2^n$, $i < m$ be defined by a sequence of circuits and $\epsilon, \delta \leq 1$, $\delta^{-1} \in Log$. If $X_i \preceq_\epsilon s_i$ for every $i < m$, then $\bigcup_{i<m}(X_i \times \{i\}) \preceq_{\epsilon+\delta} \sum_{i<m} s_i$.

3. (Averaging) Let $X \subseteq 2^n \times 2^m$ and $Y \subseteq 2^m$ be definable by circuits, $Y \preceq_\epsilon t$ and $X_y \preceq_\delta s$ for every $y \in Y$, where $X_y := \{x | \langle x, y\rangle \in X\}$ and $\langle x, y\rangle$ is the pairing function $\langle x, y\rangle := (x + y)(x + y + 1)/2 + x$. Then for any $\gamma^{-1} \in Log$,

$$X \cap (2^n \times Y) \preceq_{\epsilon+\delta+\epsilon\delta+\gamma} st.$$

When proving Σ^b_1 statements in APC_1 we can afford to work in $\mathsf{S}^1_2 + dWPHP(\mathsf{PV}) + BB(\Sigma^b_2)$ and, in fact, assuming the existence of a single hard function in PV_1 gives us the full power of APC_1. Here, $BB(\Sigma^b_2)$ is defined as $BB(\Sigma^b_1)$ but with $A \in \Sigma^b_2$.

Lemma 1 ([25]). *Suppose* $\mathsf{S}^1_2 + dWPHP(\mathsf{PV}) + BB(\Sigma^b_2) \vdash \exists y A(x,y)$ *for* $A \in \Sigma^b_1$. *Then, for every* $\epsilon < 1$, *there is* k *and* PV*-functions* g, h *such that* PV_1 *proves*

$$|f| \geq |x|^k \wedge \exists y, |y| = ||f||, C_h(y) \neq f(y) \rightarrow A(x, g(x,f))$$

where $f(y)$ *is the* y*th bit of* f, $f(y) = 0$ *for* $y > |f|$, *and* C_h *is a circuit of size* $\leq 2^{\epsilon||f||}$ *generated by* h *on* f, x. *Moreover,* $\mathsf{APC}_1 \vdash \exists y A(x,y)$.

3 Formalizing complexity-theoretic statements

3.1 Circuit lower bounds

An 'almost everywhere' formulation of a circuit lower bound for circuits of size s and a function f says that for every sufficiently big n, for each circuit C with n inputs and size s, there exists an input y on which the circuit C fails to compute $f(y)$.

If $f : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ is an NP function and $s = n^k$ for a constant k, this can be written down as a $\forall\Sigma^b_2$ formula $\mathsf{LB}(f, n^k)$,

$$\forall n,\ n > n_0\ \forall \text{ circuit } C \text{ of size } \leq n^k\ \exists y,\ |y| = n,\ C(y) \neq f(y),$$

where n_0 is a constant and $C(y) \neq f(y)$ is a Σ^b_2 formula stating that a circuit C on input y outputs the opposite value of $f(y)$. The intended meaning of '$\exists y, |y| = n$' is to say that y is a string from $\{0,1\}^n$. This is a slight abuse of notation as, formally, $|y| = n$ fixes the first bit of y to 1.

If we want to express $s(n)$-size lower bounds for $s(n)$ as big as $2^{O(n)}$, we add an extra assumption on n stating that $\exists x,\ n = ||x||$. That is, the resulting formula $\mathsf{LB}_{\mathsf{tt}}(f, s(n))$ has form '$\forall x, n; n = ||x|| \rightarrow \ldots$'. Treating x, n as free variables, $\mathsf{LB}_{\mathsf{tt}}(f, s(n))$ is Π^b_1 if f is, for instance, SAT because $n = ||x||$ implies that the quantifiers bounded by $2^{O(n)}$ are sharply bounded. Moreover, allowing $f \in \mathsf{NE}$ lifts the complexity of $\mathsf{LB}_{\mathsf{tt}}(f, s(n))$ just to $\forall\Sigma^b_1$. The function $s(n)$ in $\mathsf{LB}_{\mathsf{tt}}(f, s(n))$ is assumed to be a PV-function with input x (satisfying $||x|| = n$).

In terms of the *Log*-notation, $\mathsf{LB}(f, n^k)$ implicitly assumes $n \in Log$ while $\mathsf{LB}_{\mathsf{tt}}(f, n^k)$ assumes $n \in LogLog$. By chosing the scale of n we are determining how big objects are going to be 'feasible' for theories reasoning about the statement. In the case $n \in LogLog$, the truth-table of f (and everything polynomial in it) is feasible. Assuming just $n \in Log$ means that only the objects of polynomial-size in the size of the circuit are feasible. Likewise, the theory reasoning about the circuit lower bound is less powerful when working with $\mathsf{LB}(f, n^k)$ than with $\mathsf{LB}_{\mathsf{tt}}(f, n^k)$. (The scaling in $\mathsf{LB}_{\mathsf{tt}}(f, s)$ corresponds to the choice of parameters in natural proofs and in the formalizations by Razborov [33].)

We can analogously define formulas $\mathsf{LB}_{\mathsf{tt}}(f, s(n), t(n))$ expressing an average-case lower bound for f, where f is a free variable (with $f(y)$ being the yth bit of f and $f(y) = 0$ for

$y > |f|$). More precisely, $\mathsf{LB}_{\mathsf{tt}}(f, s(n), t(n))$ generalizes $\mathsf{LB}_{\mathsf{tt}}(f, s(n))$ by saying that each circuit of size $s(n)$ fails to compute f on at least $t(n)$ inputs, for PV-functions $s(n), t(n)$. Since $n \in LogLog$, $\mathsf{LB}_{\mathsf{tt}}(f, s(n), t(n))$ is Π^b_1.

Propositional version. An $s(n)$-size circuit lower bound for a function $f : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}$ can be expressed by a $2^{O(n)}$-size propositional formula $\mathsf{tt}(f, s)$,

$$\bigvee_{y \in \{0,1\}^n} f(y) \neq C(y)$$

where the formula $f(y) \neq C(y)$ says that an $s(n)$-size circuit C represented by $poly(s)$ variables does not output $f(y)$ on input y. The values $f(y)$ are fixed bits. That is, the whole truth-table of f is hard-wired in $\mathsf{tt}(f, s)$.

The details of the encoding of the formula $\mathsf{tt}(f, s)$ are not important for us as long as the encoding is natural because systems like EF considered in this paper can reason efficiently about them. We will assume that $\mathsf{tt}(f, s)$ is the formula resulting from the translation of Π^b_1 formula $\mathsf{LB}_{\mathsf{tt}}(h, s)$, where $n_0 = 0$, n, x are substituted after the translation by fixed constants so that $x = 2^{2^n}$, and h is a free variable (with $h(y)$ being the yth bit of h and $h(y) = 0$ for $y > |h|$) which is substituted after the translation by constants defining f.

Analogously, we can express average-case lower bounds by propositional formulas $\mathsf{tt}(f, s(n), t(n))$ obtained by translating $\mathsf{LB}_{\mathsf{tt}}(h, s(n), t(n)2^n)$, with $n_0 = 0$, fixed $x = 2^{2^n}$ and h substituted after the translation by f.

3.2 Learning algorithms

A circuit class $\mathcal{C}$ is defined by a PV-formula if there is a PV-formula defining the predicate $C \in \mathcal{C}$. Definition 2 can be formulated in the language of HARD^A: A circuit class $\mathcal{C}$ (defined by a PV-formula) is learnable over the uniform disribution by a circuit class $\mathcal{D}$ (defined by a PV-formula) up to error ϵ with confidence δ, if there are randomized oracle circuits L^f from $\mathcal{D}$ such that for every Boolean function $f : \{0,1\}^n \mapsto \{0,1\}$ (represented by its truth-table) computable by a circuit from $\mathcal{C}$, for each $\gamma^{-1} \in Log$, when given oracle access to f, input 1^n and the internal randomness $w \in \{0,1\}^*$, L^f outputs the description of a circuit satisfying

$$\Pr_w[L^f(1^n, w) \ (1-\epsilon)\text{-approximates } f]_\gamma \geq \delta.$$

The inner probability of approximability of f by $L^f(1^n, w)$ is counted exactly. This is possible because f is represented by its truth-table, which implies that $2^n \in Log$.[10]

[10]It could be interesting to develop systematically a standard theory of learning algorithms in APC_1 and WF, but it is not our goal here. Note, for example, that when we are learning small circuits it is not clear how to boost the confidence to 1 in APC_1, because we don't have counting with exponential precision.

Propositional version. In order, to translate the definition of learning algorithms to propositional formulas we need to look more closely at the definition of HARD^A.

PV_1 can be relativized to $\mathsf{PV}_1(\alpha)$. The new function symbol α is then allowed in the inductive clauses for introduction of new function symbols. This means that the language of $\mathsf{PV}_1(\alpha)$, denoted also $\mathsf{PV}(\alpha)$, contains symbols for all p-time oracle algorithms.

Proposition 3 (Jeřábek [15]). *For every constant $\epsilon < 1/3$ there exists a constant n_0 such that APC_1 proves: for every $n \in LogLog$ such that $n > n_0$, there exist a function $f : 2^n \to 2$ such that no circuit of size $2^{\epsilon n}$ computes f on $\geq (1/2 + 1/2^{\epsilon n})2^n$ inputs.*

Definition 5 (Jeřábek [15]). *The theory HARD^A is an extension of the theory $\mathsf{PV}_1(\alpha) + dWPHP(\mathsf{PV}(\alpha))$ by the axioms*

1. *$\alpha(x)$ is a truth-table of a Boolean function in $||x||$ variables,*
2. *$\mathsf{LB}_{\mathsf{tt}}(\alpha(x), 2^{||x||/4}, 2^{||x||}(1/2 - 1/2^{||x||/4}))$, for constant n_0 from Proposition 3,*
3. *$||x|| = ||y|| \to \alpha(x) = \alpha(y)$.*

By inspecting the proof of Lemma 2.14 in [17], we can observe that on each input $C, 2^n, 2^{\epsilon^{-1}}$ the $\mathsf{PV}_1(\alpha)$-function *Size* calls α just once (to get the truth-table of a hard function which is then used as the base function of the Nisan-Wgiderson generator). In fact, *Size* calls α on input x which depends only on $|C|$, the number of inputs of C and w.l.o.g. also just on $|\epsilon^{-1}|$ (since decreasing ϵ leads only to a better approximation). In combination with the fact that the approximation $Size(C, 2^n, 2^{\epsilon^{-1}}) \approx_\epsilon X$, for $X \subseteq 2^n$ defined by C, is not affected by a particular choice of the hard boolean function generated by α, we get that APC_1 proves

$$\mathsf{LB}_{\mathsf{tt}}(y, 2^{||y||/4}, 2^{||y||}(1/2 - 1/2^{||y||/4})) \wedge ||y|| = S(C, 2^n, 2^{\epsilon^{-1}}) \to \ Sz(C, 2^n, 2^{\epsilon^{-1}}, y) \approx_\epsilon X,$$

where Sz is defined as *Size* with the only difference that the call to $\alpha(x)$ on $C, 2^n, 2^{\epsilon^{-1}}$ is replaced by y and $S(C, 2^n, 2^{\epsilon^{-1}}) = ||x||$ for a PV-function S. (S is given by a subcomputation of *Size* specifying $||x||$, for x on which *Size* queries $\alpha(x)$.)

This allows us to express $\Pr_{x<t}[x \in X]_\epsilon = a$, where $\epsilon^{-1} \in Log$ and $X \cap t \subseteq 2^{|t|}$ is defined by a circuit C, without a $\mathsf{PV}_1(\alpha)$ function, by formula

$$\forall y \, (\mathsf{LB}_{\mathsf{tt}}(y, 2^{||y||/4}, 2^{||y||}(1/2 - 1/2^{||y||/4})) \wedge ||y|| = S(C, 2^{|t|}, 2^{\epsilon^{-1}}) \to Sz(C, 2^{|t|}, 2^{\epsilon^{-1}}, y)/t = a).$$

We denote the resulting formula by $\Pr^y_{x<t}[x \in X]_\epsilon = a$. We will use the notation $\Pr^y_{x<t}[x \in X]_\epsilon$ in equations with the intended meaning that the equation holds for the value $Sz(\cdot, \cdot, \cdot, \cdot)/t$ under corresponding assumptions. For example, $t \cdot \Pr^y_{x<t}[x \in X]_\epsilon \preceq_\delta a$ stands for '$\forall y, \exists v, \exists$ circuit $\hat{C}$ (defining a surjection) which witnesses that $\mathsf{LB}_{\mathsf{tt}}(y, 2^{||y||/4}, 2^{||y||}(1/2 - 1/2^{||y||/4})) \wedge ||y|| = S(C, 2^{|t|}, 2^{\epsilon^{-1}})$ implies $Sz(C, 2^{|t|}, 2^{\epsilon^{-1}}, y) \preceq_\delta a$'.

The definition of learning can be now expressed without a $\mathsf{PV}_1(\alpha)$ function: If circuit class $\mathcal{C}$ is defined by a PV-function, the statement that a given oracle algorithm L (given

by a PV-function with oracle queries) learns a circuit class $\mathcal{C}$ over the uniform distribution up to error ϵ with confidence δ can be expressed as before with the only difference that we replace $\Pr_w[L^f(1^n, w)\ (1-\epsilon)\text{-approximates } f]_\gamma \geq \delta$ by

$$\Pr_w^y[L^f(1^n, w)\ (1-\epsilon)\text{-approximates } f]_\gamma \geq \delta.$$

Since the resulting formula A defining learning is not Π_1^b (because of the assumption $\mathsf{LB}_{\mathsf{tt}}$) we cannot translate it to propositional logic. We will sidestep the issue by translating only the formula B obtained from A by deleting subformula $\mathsf{LB}_{\mathsf{tt}}$ (but leaving $||y|| = S(\cdot,\cdot,\cdot)$ intact) and replacing the variables y by fixed bits representing a hard boolean function. In more detail, Π_1^b formula B can be translated into a sequence of propositional formulas $\mathsf{lear}_\gamma^y(L, \mathcal{C}, \epsilon, \delta)$ expressing that "if $C \in \mathcal{C}$ is a circuit computing f, then L querying f generates a circuit D such that $\Pr[D(x) = f(x)] \geq 1-\epsilon$ with probability $\geq \delta$, which is counted approximately with precision γ". Note that C, f are represented by free variables and that there are also free variables for error γ from approximate counting and for boolean functions y. As in the case of tt-formulas, we fix $|f| = 2^n$, so n is not a free variable. Importantly, $\mathsf{lear}_\gamma^y(L, \mathcal{C}, \epsilon, \delta)$ does not postulate that y is a truth-table of a hard boolean function. Nevertheless, for any fixed (possibly non-uniform) bits representing a sequence of boolean functions $h = \{h_m\}_{m>n_0}$ such that h_m is not $(1/2 + 1/2^{m/4})$-approximable by any circuit of size $2^{m/4}$, we can obtain formulas $\mathsf{lear}_\gamma^h(L, \mathcal{C}, \epsilon, \delta)$ by substituting bits h for y.

Using a single function h in $\mathsf{lear}_\gamma^h(L, \mathcal{C}, \epsilon, \delta)$ does not ruin the fact that (the translation of function) Sz approximates the respective probability with accuracy γ because Sz queries a boolean function y which depends just on the number of atoms representing γ^{-1} and on the size of the circuit D defining the predicate we count together with the number of inputs of D. The size of D and the number of its inputs are w.l.o.g. determined by the number of inputs of f.

If we are working with formulas $\mathsf{lear}_\gamma^h(L, \mathcal{C}, \epsilon, \delta)$, where h is a sequence of bits representing a hard boolean function, in a proof system which cannot prove efficiently that h is hard, our proof system might not be able to show that the definition is well-behaved - it might not be able to derive some standard properties of the function Sz used inside the formula. Nevertheless, in our theorems this will never be the case: our proof systems will always know that h is hard.

In formulas $\mathsf{lear}_\gamma^y(L, \mathcal{C}, \epsilon, \delta)$ we can allow L to be a sequence of nonuniform circuits, with a different advice string for each input length. One way to see that is to use additional input to L in Π_1^b formula B, then translate the formula to propositional logic and substitute the right bits of advice for the additional input. Again, the precise encoding of the formula $\mathsf{lear}_\gamma^y(L, \mathcal{C}, \epsilon, \delta)$ does not matter very much to us but in order to simplify proofs we will assume that $\mathsf{lear}_\gamma^y(L, \mathsf{Circuit}[n^k], \epsilon, \delta)$ has the from $\neg\mathsf{tt}(f, n^k) \to R$, where n, k are fixed, f is represented by free variables and R is the remaining part of the formula expressing that L generates a suitable circuit with high probability.

3.3 Automatability

Let Φ be a class of propositional formulas and $s : \Phi \to \mathbb{N}$ be a function. We say that a proof system P is automatable w.r.t. Φ up to proofs of size s if there is a PV-function A such that for each $\phi \in \Phi$ and each t-size P-proof of ϕ with $t \leq s(\phi)$, $A(\phi, 1^t)$ is a P-proof of ϕ.

In our main theorem we will need a slightly modified notion of automatability where the automating algorithm outputs a proof of a given tautology ϕ which is not much longer than a proof of an associated tautology ψ. (Formula ψ will be closely related to ϕ: while ϕ will express a worst-case lower bound, ψ will express an average-case lower bound for the same function.)

Let Φ be a class of pairs of propositional formulas and $s : \Phi \to \mathbb{N}$ be a function. We say that a proof system P is automatable w.r.t. Φ up to proofs of size s if there is a PV-function A such that for each pair $\langle \psi, \phi \rangle \in \Phi$ and each t-size P-proof of ψ with $t \leq s(\langle \psi, \phi \rangle)$, $A(\phi, 1^t)$ is a P-proof of ϕ.

Propositional version. If Φ is defined by a PV-function and s is a PV-function, the statement that an algorithm A (given by a PV-function) automates system P w.r.t. Φ up to proofs of size s is Π^b_1. Therefore, it can be translated into a sequence of propositional formulas $\mathsf{aut}_P(A, \Phi, s)$. Again, in formulas $\mathsf{aut}_P(A, \Phi, s)$ we can allow A to be a sequence of nonuniform circuits and s to be arbitrary, possibly nonuniform, parameter depending only on the length of given pairs.

4 Lower bounds versus learning in proof complexity

In this section we show how automatability together with efficient provability of a lower bound, or together with optimality, implies efficient learning. This shows some of the methods used in the proof of Theorem 10, but the proof of Theorem 10 can be read independently. Then, we proceed with a formalization of the transformation of natural proofs into learning algorithms, which is one of the cornerstones of Theorem 10.

Theorem 6. *Let $k \geq 1$ be a constant and P be a proof system which simulates* EF *such that: I. for each P-proof π_0 of ϕ and each P-proof π_1 of $\phi \to \psi$, there is a poly$(|\pi_0|, |\pi_1|)$-size P-proof of ψ; II. for each P-proof π of ϕ and a possibly partial substitution ρ of atoms of ϕ by arbitrary formulas, there is a poly$(|\pi|, |\phi|_\rho|)$-size P-proof of $\phi|_\rho$, where $\phi|_\rho$ is the formula ϕ after applying substitution ρ.*

Assume that P proves efficiently $\mathsf{tt}(h, 3n^k)$, for some boolean function $h = \{h_n\}_{n>n_0}$ and some n_0. Then, automatability of P implies that for each $\gamma \in (0, 1)$, $\mathsf{Circuit}[n^{k\gamma/a}]$ is learnable by $\mathsf{Circuit}[2^{O(n^\gamma)}]$ over the uniform distribution, with non-adaptive membership queries, confidence 1, up to error $1/n^{k\gamma/a}$, where a is an absolute constant.

Proof sketch. By Theorem 5, it suffices to construct a $\mathsf{P/poly}$-natural property useful against $\mathsf{Circuit}[n^k]$. This is achieved by the proof of Theorem 2, which we sketch - more details can be found in the proof of Theorem 10 (direction 2. $\rightarrow$ 1.). Assume P proves efficiently $\mathsf{tt}(h_n, 3n^k)$ for some boolean function $h = \{h_n\}_{n>n_0}$. If P simulates EF and satisfies properties I.-II., then P proves efficiently also

$$\mathsf{tt}(g, n^k) \vee \mathsf{tt}(h_n \oplus g, n^k), \tag{4.1}$$

where g is represented by free variables and $h_n \oplus g$ is a bitwise XOR of h_n and g. This is because an n^k-size circuit C_1 computing g and an n^k-size circuit C_2 computing $h_n \oplus g$ can be combined into a $3n^k$-size circuit $C_1 \oplus C_2$ computing h_n. (Properties I.-II. can be used to simulate Frege rules, see Lemma 3.) Automatability of P now implies the existence of a $\mathsf{P/poly}$-natural property useful against $\mathsf{Circuit}[n^k]$: For each boolean function g, we can either find efficiently a P-proof of $\mathsf{tt}(g, n^k)$ or we recognize that $\mathsf{tt}(h_n \oplus g, n^k)$ holds (if $\mathsf{tt}(h_n \oplus g, n^k)$ did not hold, we could use properties I.-II. to substitute its falsifying assignment to the proof of (4.1) and obtain a short P-proof of $\mathsf{tt}(g, n^k)$ - formally, we use here also the fact that P-proves efficiently $\phi(b)$, whenever b is a satisfying assignment of ϕ, see Lemma 3, Item 2.), and one of these options happens for at least $1/2$ of all functions g. □

Theorem 7 (Optimality and automatability implies learning)**.** *If there is an optimal proof system which is automatable, then for each $\gamma \in (0,1)$, each $k \geq 1/\gamma$, for infinitely many n, $\mathsf{Circuit}[n^{k\gamma}]$ is learnable by $\mathsf{Circuit}[2^{O(n^\gamma)}]$ over the uniform distribution, with non-adaptive membership queries, confidence $1/2^{4n^\gamma}$, up to error $1/2 - 1/2^{3n^\gamma}$.*

Proof sketch. If $\mathsf{SAT} \in \mathsf{Circuit}[3n^k]$ for infinitely many n, then there is a $\mathsf{P/poly}$-natural property useful against $\mathsf{Circuit}[n^{\log n}]$, for infinitely many n, and the conclusion of the theorem follows from the proof of Theorem 5, see Theorem 9. Assume $\mathsf{SAT} \notin \mathsf{Circuit}[3n^k]$ holds for all sufficiently big n. Then there is a proof system P which proves efficiently $\mathsf{tt}(\mathsf{SAT}, 3n^k)$ for all sufficiently big n: P is by definition allowed to derive every substitutional instance of $\mathsf{tt}(\mathsf{SAT}, 3n^k)$ (which is a formula recognizable in $2^{O(n)}$-time) and, otherwise, it proceeds as EF. Therefore, we can follow the proof of Theorem 6, noting that the automatability of P can be replaced by the automatability of the optimal system, and obtain the desired conclusion. □

Theorem 8. *For each $\gamma \in (0,1)$, each $k \geq 1/\gamma$, there is a proof system P such that* 1.) *P is automatable if and only if* 2.) *for infinitely many n, $\mathsf{Circuit}[n^{k\gamma}]$ is learnable by $\mathsf{Circuit}[2^{O(n^\gamma)}]$ over the uniform distribution, with non-adaptive membership queries, confidence $1/2^{4n^\gamma}$, up to error $1/2 - 1/2^{3n^\gamma}$.*

Proof. Let $\gamma \in (0,1)$ and $k \geq 1$. If Item 2.) from the statement of the theorem holds, then let P be a proof system with exponentially long proofs of all tautologies, so P is trivially automatable and the equivalence holds. Suppose Item 2.) does not hold. Then, similarly

as in the proof of Theorem 7, we conclude that $\mathsf{SAT} \not\in \mathsf{Circuit}[3n^{ka}]$ for all sufficiently big n and constant a from Theorem 6. It remains to observe that the proof system P from the proof of Theorem 7, with $\mathsf{tt}(\mathsf{SAT}, 3n^{ka})$ instead of $\mathsf{tt}(\mathsf{SAT}, 3n^k)$, is not automatable. This follows by Theorem 6. Alternatively, in the case that Item 2.) fails, we can use the fact that $\mathsf{P} \neq \mathsf{NP}$ implies the existence of a non-automatable proof system, cf. [30, Lemma 5.3]. □

The disadvantage of Theorem 8 in comparison to Corollary 3 is that it does not provide an explicit definition of P. It is possible to get an explicit construction of P based on a hardness assumption, but the hardness assumption would then itself falsify both sides of the desired equivalence. Another advantage of Corollary 3 is that it applies to all well-behaved proof systems simulating a 'ground' system P.

4.1 Learning algorithms from natural proofs in APC_1

An essential component of the transformation of natural proofs into learning algorithms is the Nisan-Wigderson generator and specific combinatorial designs on which it is based, cf. [26]. In order to formalize the transformation in APC_1 we would need to construct combinatorial designs in APC_1. A construction of combinatorial designs has been formalized already in [15], but our transformation requires algebraic construction of designs obtained by evaluating polynomials on a finite field. A complication is that the algebraic construction uses Bertrand's postulate of the existence of a prime between x and $2x$. We will bypass the problem of proving Bertrand's postulate in APC_1 simply by assuming the existence of such a prime.[11] That is, we will not prove the existence of combinatorial designs unconditionally, but only under the assumption of the primality of a number in the interval $[x, 2x]$. Fortunately, in our setting, we will have $2^x \in Log$, so once we translate the resulting statements to propositional logic, we will use Bertrand's postulate (even though we have not formalized it in APC_1) to conclude that the assumption will have a trivial WF-proof. The construction of Nisan and Wigderson otherwise does not require developing new methods, but we need to verify that each step is doable in APC_1. In fact, PV_1 will suffice.

For $x \in \{0,1\}^n$ and $S \subseteq [n]$, denote by $x|S$ an $|S|$-bit string consisting of x_i's such that $i \in S$ (in the natural order).

Lemma 2 (in PV_1)**.** *Let $d \geq 2$. If $2^n \in Log$ and $n^d \leq p \leq 2n^d \in Log$ is a prime, there is a $2^n \times m$ 0-1 matrix A with n^d ones per row and $m = pn^d$ which is also an (n, n^d)-design meaning that for $J_i(A) := \{j \in [m]; a_{i,j} = 1\}$, for each $i \neq j$, $|J_i(A) \cap J_j(A)| \leq n$ and $|J_i(A)| = n^d$. Moreover, for sufficiently big n, there are n^{9d}-size circuits which given $i \in \{0,1\}^n$ and $w \in \{0,1\}^m$ output $w|J_i(A)$.*

[11] It is possible that the desired formalization of Bertrand's postulate can be obtained from the work of Paris, Wilkie and Woods [28].

Proof. Let $n^d \leq p \leq 2n^d$ be a prime and F a field of size p. F can be constructed in PV_1, cf. [16, Section 4.3]. We construct the matrix A so that the i-th row consists of positions (u, v), for $u \in \{0, \ldots, n^d - 1\}, v \in F$, with 1's exactly on positions $(u, q(u))$, for $u \in \{0, \ldots, n^d - 1\}$, where q is a polynomial of degree n with binary coefficients corresponding to the binary representation of i. Formally, an n-degree polynomial is represented by a sequence of its coefficients. The evaluation of an n-degree polynomial on an element from F can be done in $poly(n)$-time and is well-defined in PV_1, cf. [16, Section 4.3]. By definition, A is a $2^n \times m$ 0-1 matrix with n^d ones per row. $|J_i(A) \cap J_j(A)| \leq n$, for $i \neq j$, follows from the fact that a non-zero n-degree polynomial over F has $\leq n$ roots, which is provable in PV_1, cf. [16, Lemma 4.3.6].

It remains to prove the 'moreover' part. The n^{9d}-size circuit first evaluates the i-th polynomial on inputs $0, \ldots, n^d - 1$. This way it obtains $J_i(A)$ and $w|J_i(A)$. Evaluating an n-degree polynomial on an input from F can be done PV_1-provably by a circuit of size $n \cdot poly(d \log n)$. (In more detail, we compute $x, x^2, \ldots, x^n$ over F in a standard way by an $n \cdot poly(d \log n)$-size circuit, then multiply x^i's with the corresponding coefficients and sum the results over F, which takes another $n \cdot poly(d \log n)$-size circuit.) Thus, given i, the n^d indices from $J_i(A)$ can be generated by a circuit of size $n^{d+1} poly(d \log n)$. Given w and indices from $J_i(A)$, the bits $w|J_i(A)$ can be generated by a circuit of size $O(n^d pd \log n)$ so the total size of the circuit generating $w|J_i(A)$ on i and w is $\leq n^{d+2} + O(dn^{2d+1}) \leq n^{9d}$. □

The formalization of the transformation of natural proofs into learning algorithms follows from a straightforward inspection of the original proof as well.

Theorem 9. *There is a* PV*-function* L *such that* APC_1 *proves: For* $k \geq 1$, $d \geq 2$, $2^{n^d}, n^{dk}, \delta^{-1} \in Log$, $\delta < 1/N^3$ *and a prime* $n^d \leq p \leq 2n^d$, *let* R_N *be a circuit with* $N = 2^n$ *inputs such that for sufficiently big* N,

1. $R_N(x) = 1$ *implies that* x *is a truth-table of a boolean function with* n *inputs hard for* $\mathsf{Circuit}[n^{10dk}]$,
2. $\{x \mid R_N(x) = 1\} \succeq_\delta 2^N/N$.

Then, circuits with n^d *inputs and size* n^{dk} *are learnable by circuit* $L(R_N, p)$ *over the uniform distribution with membership queries, confidence* $1/N^4$, *up to error* $1/2 - 1/N^3$. *Here, the confidence is counted approximately with error* δ *using* PV*-function* Sz *and the corresponding assumptions* $\mathsf{LB}_{\mathsf{tt}}$ *expressing hardness of a boolean function* y *with a suitable length* $||y|| = S(\cdot, \cdot, \cdot)$, *i.e. using formulas* $\Pr^y[\cdot]_\delta$.

Proof. We reason in APC_1. Consider a Nisan-Wigderson generator based on a circuit C which we aim to learn. Specifically, for $d \geq 2$ and $n^{2d} \leq m = pn^d \leq 2n^{2d}$, let $A = \{a_{i,j}\}_{j \in [m]}^{i \in [N]}$ be an $N \times m$ 0-1 matrix with n^d ones per row. Then define an NW-generator $NW_C : \{0,1\}^m \mapsto \{0,1\}^N$ as

$$(NW_C(w))_i = C(w|J_i(A)).$$

We can assume that A is, in addition, a combinatorial design from Lemma 2. Therefore, if C has n^d inputs and size n^{dk}, then for each $w \in \{0,1\}^m$, $(NW_C(w))_x$ is a function on n inputs x computable by circuits of size n^{10dk}, for sufficiently big n. We want to learn C by a circuit $L(R_N, p)$ of size $2^{O(n)}$.

We will use circuits R_N which function as distinguishers for NW_C: By the assumption of the theorem, a trivial surjection witnesses that $\{w \mid R_N(NW_C(w)) = 1\} \preceq_0 0$. Hence, by Proposition 1 *ii*), $2^m \cdot \Pr^y_w[R_N(NW_C(w)) = 1]_\delta \preceq_\delta 0$, and by Proposition 2 1.*ii*), $\Pr^y_w[R_N(NW_C(w)) = 1]_\delta < 2\delta$, for universally quantified y. Similarly, by the assumption of the theorem $\{u \mid R_N(u) = 1\} \succeq_\delta 2^N/N$, and $\Pr^{y'}_u[R_N(u) = 1]_\delta > 1/N - 3\delta$. Therefore,

$$\Pr^{y'}_u[R_N(u) = 1]_\delta - \Pr^{y}_w[R_N(NW_C(w)) = 1]_\delta > 1/N - 5\delta.$$

$L(R_N, p)$ chooses a random $i \in [N]$, random bits $r_1, \ldots, r_N$, random $w' \in \{0,1\}^{m-n^d}$ and queries the bits $C(w|J_1(A)), \ldots, C(w|J_{i-1}(A))$, for all $w \in \{0,1\}^m$ such that $w|[m]\backslash J_i(A) = w'$. Since A is an (n, n^d)-design, there are just $2^{O(n)}$ such queries. For $w \in \{0,1\}^m$, let $p_i := R_N(C(w|J_1(A)), \ldots, C(w|J_{i-1}(A)), r_i, \ldots, r_N)$. Then $L(R_N, p)$ outputs a circuit L' which on $x \in \{0,1\}^{n^d}$ constructs $w \in \{0,1\}^m$ such that $w|J_i(A) = x$ while $w|[m]\backslash J_i(A) = w'$ and predicts the value $C(x)$ by outputting $\neg r_i$ iff $p_i = 1$.

We want to show that L' approximates C with high probability.

First, note that by Proposition 1 *iii*), inequality $\{u \mid R_N(u) = 1\} \succeq_\delta 2^N/N$ implies $\{w, r_1, \ldots, r_N \mid p_1 = 1\} \succeq_\delta 2^{m+N}/N$, so we have $\Pr^{y'}_{w,r_1,\ldots,r_N}[p_1 = 1]_\delta > 1/N - 3\delta$ and $\Pr^{y}_{w,r_1,\ldots,r_N}[p_{N+1} = 1]_\delta < 2\delta$. Consequently, there exists $y_1, \ldots, y_{N+1}$ and $i \in [N]$ such that

$$\Pr^{y_i}_{w,r_1,\ldots,r_N}[p_i = 1]_\delta - \Pr^{y_{i+1}}_{w,r_1,\ldots,r_N}[p_{i+1} = 1]_\delta > 1/N^2 - 5\delta/N. \tag{4.2}$$

Otherwise, for all $y_1, \ldots, y_{N+1}$, for all i, $\Pr^{y_i}[p_i = 1]_\delta - \Pr^{y_{i+1}}[p_{i+1} = 1]_\delta \leq 1/N^2 - 5\delta/N$, and by $\Sigma^b_0(\mathsf{PV})$-induction $\Pr^{y_1}[p_i = 1]_\delta - \Pr^{y_{N+1}}[p_{i+1} = 1]_\delta \leq 1/N - 5\delta$. As APC_1 proves that some $y_1, \ldots, y_{N+1}$ satisfy the assumptions of $\Pr^{y_j}[\cdot]_\delta$, for all $j = 1, \ldots, N+1$, this would be a contradiction. (The existence of $y_1, \ldots, y_{N+1}$ is proved analogously as Proposition 3 and the proof does not require sharply bounded collection scheme - we can construct $y_1, \ldots, y_{N+1}$ from the string w in [16, Lemma 4.1.8][12].) That is, (4.2) means that y_i's satisfy formulas $\mathsf{LB}_{\mathsf{tt}}$ (with suitable parameters), have the right length $||y_i||$ and the corresponding functions Sz witness that the difference of the respective probabilities is big.

Since trivial surjections witness that, for $i \in [N]$, $z = w', x, r_1, \ldots, r_N < 2^{m+N}$,

$$\{z \mid L'(x) = C(x)\} \succeq_0 \{z \mid p_i = 1 \wedge r_i \neq C(x)\} \cup \{z \mid p_i \neq 1 \wedge r_i = C(x)\},$$

[12]While N does not have to be in *LogLog*, the string $y_1, \ldots, y_{N+1}$ can be composed from just *LogLog* many different strings y_j because each y_j represents a truth-table whose length is a power of 2.

and $\{z \mid p_i = 1 \wedge r_i \neq C(x)\} \cap \{z \mid p_i \neq 1 \wedge r_i = C(x)\} \approx_0 0$, by Proposition 2 1.*iv*) and Proposition 1 *ii*),

$$2^{m+N} \Pr_z^y[L'(x) = C(x)]_\delta \succeq_{4\delta} 2^{m+N} \Pr_z^{y'}[p_i = 1 \wedge r_i \neq C(x)]_\delta + 2^{m+N} \Pr_z^{y''}[p_i \neq 1 \wedge r_i = C(x)]_\delta.$$

Notably, when we applied Proposition 2 1.*iv*), we switched the domain of surjections from 2^{m+N} to 2^{m+N+1}. This does not affect our inequalities because surjections witnessing $X \preceq_\delta Y$, for $X, Y \subseteq 2^{m+N}$ can be used to witness $X \preceq_\delta Y$, where we see X, Y as subsets of 2^{m+N+1} (and consider the error δ w.r.t. 2^{m+N+1}, not w.r.t. 2^{m+N}), but we need to take it into account when we now apply Proposition 2 1.*ii*) to conclude that[13]

$$\Pr_z^y[L'(x) = C(x)]_\delta > \Pr_z^{y'}[p_i = 1 \wedge r_i \neq C(x)]_\delta + \Pr_z^{y''}[p_i \neq 1 \wedge r_i = C(x)]_\delta - 10\delta.$$

Further, we have $\{z \mid p_i = 1 \wedge r_i = C(x)\} \cup \{z \mid p_i \neq 1 \wedge r_i = C(x)\} \approx_0 2^{m+N}/2$, so $\Pr_z^{y''}[p_i \neq 1 \wedge r_i = C(x)]_\delta > 1/2 - \Pr_z^{y'''}[p_i = 1 \wedge r_i = C(x)]_\delta - 8\delta$ and

$$\Pr_z^y[L'(x) = C(x)]_\delta > \Pr_z^{y'}[p_i = 1 \wedge r_i \neq C(x)]_\delta + \frac{1}{2} - \Pr_z^{y'''}[p_i = 1 \wedge r_i = C(x)]_\delta - 18\delta. \quad (4.3)$$

Next, we similarly derive $\{z \mid p_i = 1\} \approx_0 \{z \mid p_i = 1 \wedge r_i = C(x)\} \cup \{z \mid p_i = 1 \wedge r_i \neq C(x)\}$ and

$$\Pr_z^{y_i}[p_i = 1]_\delta - 10\delta < \Pr_z^{y'''}[p_i = 1 \wedge r_i = C(x)]_\delta + \Pr_z^{y'}[p_i = 1 \wedge r_i \neq C(x)]_\delta. \quad (4.4)$$

Now, observe that $\{z \mid p_i = 1 \wedge r_i = C(x)\} \approx_0 \{w, r_1, \ldots, r_N \mid p_{i+1} = 1 \wedge r_i = 1\}$. This yields $2^{m+N} \Pr_z^{y'''}[p_i = 1 \wedge r_i = C(x)]_\delta \preceq_{2\delta} 2^{m+N} \Pr_{w,r_1,\ldots,r_N}^{y''''}[p_{i+1} = 1 \wedge r_i = 1]_\delta$. Analogously, $2^{m+N} \Pr_z^{y'''}[p_i = 1 \wedge r_i = C(x)]_\delta \preceq_{2\delta} 2^{m+N} \Pr_{w,r_1,\ldots,r_N}^{y'''''}[p_{i+1} = 1 \wedge r_i = 0]_\delta$. As $\{w, r_1, \ldots, r_N \mid p_{i+1} = 1 \wedge r_i = 1\} \cup \{w, r_1, \ldots, r_N \mid p_{i+1} = 1 \wedge r_i = 0\} \approx_0 \{w, r_1, \ldots, r_N \mid p_{i+1} = 1\}$, we have also $2^{m+N} \Pr_{w,r_1,\ldots,r_N}^{y''''}[p_{i+1} = 1 \wedge r_i = 1]_\delta + 2^{m+N} \Pr_{w,r_1,\ldots,r_N}^{y'''''}[p_{i+1} = 1 \wedge r_i = 0]_\delta \approx_{4\delta} 2^{m+N} \Pr_{w,r_1,\ldots,r_N}^{y_{i+1}}[p_{i+1} = 1]_\delta$. It follows that

$$2 \Pr_z^{y'''}[p_i = 1 \wedge r_i = C(x)]_\delta - 18\delta < \Pr_{w,r_1,\ldots,r_N}^{y_{i+1}}[p_{i+1} = 1]_\delta. \quad (4.5)$$

Combining (4.2) - (4.5) shows that for some $i \in [N]$,

$$\Pr_{w',x,r_1,\ldots,r_N}^{y}[L'(x) = C(x)]_\delta > 1/2 + 1/N^2 - 5\delta/N - 46\delta, \quad (4.6)$$

where L' is generated by $L(R_N, p)$ on $w', x, r_1, \ldots, r_N$ and i. As in the case of (4.2), y is quantified existentially in (4.6) and satisfies the assumptions of $\Pr^y[\cdot]_\delta$.

[13] If we worked on the domain 2^{m+N} the resulting error would not be 10δ but 5δ.

It remains to observe that (for universally quantified y)

$$\Pr^{y}_{w',i,r_1,\ldots,r_N}[L(R_N,p)\ (1/2+1/N^3)\text{-approximates } C]_\delta > 1/N^4.$$

For the sake of contradiction, assume this is not the case. Then

$$\{w',i,r_1,\ldots,r_N \mid L'\ (1/2+1/N^3)\text{-approximates } C\} \preceq_\delta 2^{m-n^d+n+N}/N^4$$

and by averaging (Proposition 2, Item 3),

$$\{w',x,i,r_1,\ldots,r_N \mid L'\ (1/2+1/N^3)\text{-approximates } C\} \preceq_{2\delta} 2^{m+n+N}/N^4.$$

Therefore, for each $i \in [N]$,

$$\{w',x,r_1,\ldots,r_N \mid L'\ (1/2+1/N^3)\text{-approximates } C\} \preceq_{2\delta} 2^{m+N}/4N^2. \tag{4.7}$$

(Otherwise, by Proposition 2 1.ii), there is a surjection witnessing the opposite inequality, which can be used to witness also $\{w',x,i,r_1,\ldots,r_N \mid L'\ (1/2+1/N^3)\text{-approximates } C\} \succeq_{2\delta} 2^{m+N}/4N^2$ and $2^{m+N}/4N^2 \preceq_{4\delta} 2^{m+n+N}/N^4 = 2^{m+N}/N^3$, contradicting Proposition 2 1.ii) for $\delta < 1/N^3$.)

On the other hand, for each $w',i,r_1,\ldots,r_N$,

$$\{x \mid L'(x) = C(x) \wedge L' \ < (1/2+1/N^3)\text{-approximates } C\} \preceq_0 (1/2+1/N^3)2^{n^d},$$

which can be counted exactly because $2^{n^d} \in Log$. Hence, by averaging, for each $i \in [N]$,

$$\{w',x,r_1,\ldots,r_N \mid L'(x) = C(x) \wedge L' \ < (\frac{1}{2}+\frac{1}{N^3})\text{-approximates } C\} \preceq_\delta (1/2+1/N^3)2^{m+N}.$$

The last approximation together with (4.7) imply that for each $i \in [N]$,

$$\{w',x,r_1,\ldots,r_N \mid L'(x) = C(x)\} \preceq_{3\delta} (1/2+1/2N^2)2^{m+N},$$

which in turn implies that (for universally quantified y) $\Pr^{y}_{w',x,r_1,\ldots,r_N}[L'(x) = C(x)]_\delta < 1/2+1/2N^2+5\delta$, contradicting (4.6) if $\delta < 1/N^3$ and N is sufficiently big. □

5 Main theorem

Our main theorem holds for any 'decent' proof system p-simulating WF, which is well-behaved in the sense that it APC_1-provably satisfies some basic properties.

Definition 6 (APC_1-decent proof system)**.** *A propositional proof system P is APC_1-decent if the language L of P is finite and complete, i.e. L consists of connectives of constant arity such that each boolean function of every arity can be expressed by an L-formula, P proves efficiently its own reflection principle, i.e. formulas stating that if π is a P-proof of ϕ then ϕ holds, cf. [22], and there is a PV-function F such that APC_1 proves:*

1. *P p-simulates* WF*, i.e. F maps each* WF*-proof of ϕ to a P-proof of ϕ.*

2. *P admits substitution property: F maps each triple $\langle \phi, \rho, \pi \rangle$ to a P-proof of $\phi|_\rho$, where π is a P-proof of ϕ and $\phi|_\rho$ is the formula ϕ after applying substitution ρ which replaces atoms of ϕ by formulas.*

3. *F maps each pair $\langle \pi, \pi' \rangle$, where π is a P-proof of ϕ and π' is a P-proof of $\phi \to \psi$, to a P-proof of ψ.*

In Definition 6, WF refers to some fixed system from the set of all WF systems. It follows from the proof of Lemma 3 that if APC_1 proves that P p-simulates a WF-system Q, then for every WF-system R, APC_1 proves that P p-simulates R, so the particular choice of the WF-system does not matter. When we use connectives $\wedge, \vee, \neg, \to$ in an APC_1-decent system P, we assume that these are expressed in the language of P.

Lemma 3. *Each* WF *system is* APC_1*-decent. Moreover, for each* APC_1*-decent proof system P the following holds.*

1. *For every Frege rule which derives ϕ from $\phi_1, \ldots, \phi_k$, there is a* PV*-function F such that* APC_1 *proves that F maps each $(k+1)$-tuple $\langle \pi_1, \ldots, \pi_k, \rho \rangle$ to a P-proof of $\phi|_\rho$, where π_i is a P-proof of $\phi_i|_\rho$ for a substitution ρ replacing each atom of $\phi, \phi_1, \ldots, \phi_k$ by a formula.*

2. *There is a* PV*-function F such that* APC_1 *proves that F maps each pair $\langle \phi, b \rangle$, for assignment b satisfying formula ϕ, to a P-proof of $\phi(b)$.*

3. *Let π be a P-proof of $E \to \phi$, where E defines a computation of a circuit which is allowed to use atoms from ϕ as inputs but other atoms of E do not appear in ϕ, i.e. E is the conjunction of extension axioms of* EF *built on atoms from ϕ. Then, there is a $poly(|\pi|)$-size P-proof of ϕ.*

Proof. WF is known to prove efficiently its own reflection principle, cf. [15]. In order to show that it is APC_1-decent, it thus suffices to prove that it satisfies Items 1-3 from Definition 6.

Item 2 is established already in PV_1 by Σ^b_1-induction on the length of the proof π (which can be used because of $\forall\Sigma^b_1$-conservativity of S^1_2 over PV_1): F replaces each circuit C from π by $C|_\rho$ and preserves all WF-derivation rules.

Item 1 holds trivially if the given WF-system P is the WF-system P' from Definition 6. Otherwise, we use implicational completeness of P and the completeness of the language of P to simulate all $O(1)$ Frege rules of P' by $O(1)$ steps in P. (This does not require that the implicational completeness of P is provable in APC_1 because we need to simulate only $O(1)$ Frege rules of finite size). Similarly, by Σ^b_1-induction and the completeness of the language of P, we simulate each circuit in the language of P' by a circuit in the language

of P and show that this simulation preserves the similarity rule. Then, given an s-size P'-proof of ϕ, we obtain a $poly(s)$-size P-proof of ϕ using the simulation of Frege rules of P', the similarity rule and dWPHP axiom, together with substituting the right circuits in Frege rules. This is done again in PV_1 by Σ^b_1-induction on the length of the P'-proof.

Item 3 follows by simulating modus ponens as in the proof of Item 1.

For the 'moreover' part, we consider three cases:

Item 1: As in the case of WF, observe that by completeness, P proves $\phi_1 \to \dots \phi_k \to \phi$ and that this fact is provable in PV_1. By Definition 6, Item 2, APC_1 can construct a P-proof of $\phi_1|_\rho \to \dots \phi_k|_\rho \to \phi|_\rho$. The claim then follows from k applications of Definition 6, Item 3.

Item 2: By Definition 6, Item 1, it suffices to prove the claim for WF. This follows from a Σ^b_1-induction on the complexity of ϕ, where we strengthen the claim to: "For each multi-output circuit C and complete assignment b, F outputs a $k|C|^2$-size WF-proof which contains every single-output circuit $C'(b)$ such that C' is a subcircuit of C satisfied by b or C' is $\neg C''$ for a subcircuit C'' of C falsified by b. Here, k is an absolute constant". The strengthened claim holds for literals by simulating $O(1)$ Frege rules, which we have by Item 1. Further, $O(1)$ Frege rules (and their substitutional instances) suffice to prove that if the claim holds for a multi-output circuit B and we extend B by one gate to a multi-output circuit B', then the claim holds for B' as well. (The length of the proof corresponding to B' is $\leq k(|B|)^2 + O(|B'|) < k|B'|^2$, for sufficiently big k, where we use the choice of WF which guarantees linear increase of proof-size when applying substitutions and modus ponens.)

Item 3: This is easy to see for $P = \mathsf{EF}$, since EF can introduce extension axioms. For APC_1-decent system P, observe that a P-proof π of $E \to \phi$ implies the existence of a $poly(|\pi|)$-size EF-proof of $Ref_P \wedge E \to \phi$, where Ref_P postulates the reflection principle for P instantiated by π, which further implies the existence of a $poly(|\pi|)$-size EF-proof of $Ref_P \to \phi$, and finally a $poly(|\pi|)$-size P-proof of ϕ. □

APC_1-decent proof systems can be much stronger than WF. For example, consider ZFC as a propositional proof system: a ZFC-proof of propositional formula ϕ is a ZFC-proof of the statement encoding that ϕ is a tautology. We can add the reflection of ZFC to WF, i.e. we will allow WF to derive (substitutional instances of) formulas stating that "If π is a ZFC-proof of ϕ, then ϕ holds." The new system is as strong as ZFC w.r.t. tautologies[14] and it is easy to see that it is APC_1-decent. (The reflection of the system can be proved in APC_1 extended with an axiom postulating the reflection for ZFC.)

Theorem 10 (Learning versus automatability)**.** *Let P be an APC_1-decent proof system and assume there is a sequence of boolean functions $h = \{h_n\}_{n>n_1}$, for a constant n_1,*

[14] In fact, it is equivalent to ZFC because ZFC proves efficiently its own reflection [31]. [31] also implies that ZFC itself is APC_1-decent.

such that P proves efficiently $\mathsf{tt}(h_n, 2^{n/4}, 1/2 - 1/2^{n/4})$. Then, for each constant K and constant $\gamma < 1$, the following statements are equivalent.

1. **Provable learning.** *For each $k \geq 1$ and $\ell \geq K + 1$, there are 2^{Kn^γ}-size circuits A such that for each sufficiently big n, P proves efficiently*

$$\mathsf{lear}^h_{1/2^{\ell n^\gamma}}(A, \mathsf{Circuit}[n^k], 1/2 - 1/2^{Kn^\gamma}, 1/2^{Kn^\gamma}).$$

2. **Provable automatability.** *For each $k \geq 1$, for each function $s(n) \geq 2^n$, there is a constant K' and $s^{K'}$-size circuits B such that P proves efficiently*

$$\mathsf{aut}_P(B, \Phi, s),$$

where Φ is the set of pairs $\langle \mathsf{tt}(f, 2^{Kn^\gamma}, 1/2 - 1/2^{Kn^\gamma}), \mathsf{tt}(f, n^k)\rangle$ for all boolean functions f with n inputs.

Proof. (1. $\to$ 2.) We first prove the following statement in APC_1.

Claim 5.1 (in APC_1)**.** *Assume that π is a P-proof of $\mathsf{lear}^y_{1/2^{\ell n^\gamma}}(A, \mathsf{Circuit}[n^k], 1/2 - 1/2^{Kn^\gamma}, \delta)$ for a circuit A and a boolean function y represented by fixed bits in formula $\mathsf{lear}^y_{1/2^{\ell n^\gamma}}(\cdot, \cdot, \cdot, \cdot)$. Further, assume that the probability that A on queries to f outputs a circuit D such that $\Pr[D(x) = f(x)] \geq 1/2 + 1/2^{Kn^\gamma}$ is $< \delta$, where the outermost probability is counted approximately with error $1/2^{\ell n^\gamma}$ using PV-function Sz and the corresponding assumptions $\mathsf{LB}_{\mathsf{tt}}$ expressing hardness of y with a suitable length $||y|| = S(\cdot, \cdot, \cdot)$, i.e. using formulas $\Pr^y[\cdot]_{1/2^{\ell n^\gamma}}$ for the same y as above - we treat y as a free variable here. Then there is a $poly(|\pi|)$-size P-proof of $\mathsf{tt}(f, n^k)$ or y does not satisfy the assumptions of $\Pr^y[\cdot]_{1/2^{\ell n^\gamma}}$.*

To see that the claim holds, we reason in APC_1 as follows. Assume π is a P-proof of $\mathsf{lear}^y_{1/2^{\ell n^\gamma}}(A, \mathsf{Circuit}[n^k], 1/2 - 1/2^{Kn^\gamma}, \delta)$ but A on queries to f outputs a circuit $(1/2 + 1/2^{Kn^\gamma})$-approximating f with probability $< \delta$. Then, either y does not satisfy the assumptions of $\Pr^y[\cdot]_{1/2^{\ell n^\gamma}}$ or there is a trivial $2^{O(n)}$-size P-proof of $\neg\mathsf{tt}(f, n^k) \to \neg R(b)$, for predicate R from the definition of $\mathsf{lear}^y_{1/2^{\ell n^\gamma}}(A, \mathsf{Circuit}[n^k], 1/2 - 1/2^{Kn^\gamma}, \delta)$ and a complete assignment b. The P-proof is obtained by evaluating function Sz which counts the confidence of A - note that functions f, y and algorithm A are represented inside P by fixed bits so the P-proof just evaluates a $2^{O(n)}$-size circuit on some input, which is possible by Lemma 3, Item 2. (We use here also the fact that APC_1 knows that the probability statement expressed by function Sz translates to $\neg R$ in the negation normal form.) The formula $\neg\mathsf{tt}(f, n^k) \to \neg R(b)$ is obtained from $\neg R(b)$ by an instantiation of a single Frege rule, which is available by Lemma 3, Item 1. Applying again Lemma 3, Item 1, from a P-proof of $\mathsf{lear}^y_{1/2^{\ell n^\gamma}}(A, \mathsf{Circuit}[n^k], 1/2 - 1/2^{Kn^\gamma}, \delta)$ and a P-proof of $\neg\mathsf{tt}(f, n^k) \to \neg R(b)$, we construct a $poly(|\pi|)$-size P-proof of $\mathsf{tt}(f, n^k)$. This proves the claim.

Next, observe that APC_1 proves that "If for a sufficiently big n and $\ell \geq K+1$ the probability that a circuit A on queries to f outputs a circuit $(1/2+1/2^{Kn^\gamma})$-approximating f is $\geq 1/2^{Kn^\gamma}$, where the probability is counted approximately with error $1/2^{\ell n^\gamma}$ using PV-function Sz and the corresponding assumptions $\mathsf{LB}_{\mathsf{tt}}$, then there is a circuit of size $|A|$ $(1/2+1/2^{Kn^\gamma})$-approximating f or y does not satisfy the assumptions of $\Pr^y[\cdot]_{1/2^{\ell n^\gamma}}$." This is because, if such a circuit did not exist, a trivial surjection would witness that 2^m times the probability that A outputs a circuit $(1/2+1/2^{Kn^\gamma})$-approximating f, counted approximately with error $1/2^{\ell n^\gamma}$ using function Sz, is $\preceq_{1/2^{\ell n^\gamma}} 0$. Here, 2^m is the domain of the surjection. By Proposition 2 1.ii), this would imply $2^m/2^{Kn^\gamma} < 2^{m+1}/2^{\ell n^\gamma}$, which is a contradiction for $\ell \geq K+1$ and sufficiently big n.

Therefore, Claim 5.1 implies that APC_1 proves that "For sufficiently big n and $\ell \geq K+1$, if π is a P-proof of $\mathsf{lear}^y_{1/2^{\ell n^\gamma}}(A, \mathsf{Circuit}[n^k], 1/2-1/2^{Kn^\gamma}, 1/2^{Kn^\gamma})$ for circuits A of size 2^{Kn^γ}, then there is a P-proof of $\mathsf{tt}(f, n^k)$ or there is a 2^{Kn^γ}-size circuit $(1/2+1/2^{Kn^\gamma})$-approximating f or there is a $2^{||y||/4}$-size circuit $(1/2+1/2^{||y||/4})$-approximating y or $||y|| \leq n_0$ or $||y|| \neq S(\cdot, 2^m, 2^{2^{\ell n^\gamma}})$;" for n_0 from Definition 5. Since this is a Σ^b_1-statement, by Lemma 1, PV_1 proves the same statement with the existential quantifiers witnessed by PV-functions assuming they are given a boolean function h' which is hard for circuits of size $2^{||h'||/4}$, for sufficiently big $|h'|$.

The last statement provable in PV_1 is Π^b_1 so we can translate it to EF. This gives us $poly(|\pi|, 2^n)$-size circuits B_0 such that for sufficiently big n, EF proves efficiently

"If $\ell \geq K+1$,
h' is not computable by a particular circuit of size $2^{||h'||/4}$, $|h'|$ is sufficiently big,
y is not $(1/2+1/2^{||y||/4})$-approximable by a particular circuit of size $2^{||y||/4}$, $||y|| > n_0$,
$||y|| = S(\cdot, 2^m, 2^{2^{\ell n^\gamma}})$
and π is a P-proof of $\mathsf{lear}^y_{1/2^{\ell n^\gamma}}(A, \mathsf{Circuit}[n^k], 1/2-1/2^{Kn^\gamma}, 1/2^{Kn^\gamma})$ for 2^{Kn^γ}-size A,
then B_0 (given π, h' and formula $\mathsf{tt}(f, n^k)$) outputs a P-proof of $\mathsf{tt}(f, n^k)$
or B_0 outputs a 2^{Kn^γ}-size circuit $(1/2+1/2^{Kn^\gamma})$-approximating f.".[15]

If we now assume that P proves efficiently $\mathsf{tt}(h_n, 2^{n/4}, 1/2-1/2^{n/4})$ and that Item 1 holds, then by Definition 6, Items 1-3, for each k, there are p-size circuits B_1 such that for each sufficiently big n, P proves efficiently "B_1 (given just formula $\mathsf{tt}(f, n^k)$) outputs a P-proof

[15]Formally, the statement 'If a particular assignment a satisfies formula ϕ, then formula ψ holds' means that 'If a is the output of a computation of a specific circuit W (where W is allowed to use as inputs atoms from ψ, but other atoms of W do not appear in ψ), and a satisfies ϕ, then ψ'. By Lemma 3, Item 3, if we assume that the statement is efficiently provable in P and that P proves efficiently ϕ, then P proves efficiently ψ. Note also that for $A, B \in \Sigma^b_0$, the translation $||A \to B||$ is $\neg||\neg A|| \to ||B||$, which might not be the same formula as $||A|| \to ||B||$. Nevertheless, EF proves efficiently that $E \to (||A|| \leftrightarrow \neg||\neg A||)$, where E postulates that auxiliary variables of $||A||$ encode the computation of a suitable circuit. Therefore, in systems like EF or P, if we have a proof of $||A||$ and $||A \to B||$, we can remove the assumption E after proving $E \to ||B||$, assuming 'non-input' variables of E do not occur in $||B||$, and ignore the difference between $||A||$ and $\neg||\neg A||$.

of $\mathsf{tt}(f, n^k)$ or B_1 outputs a 2^{Kn^γ}-size circuit $(1/2 + 1/2^{Kn^\gamma})$-approximating f." (We use here also the fact that PV_1 knows that $S(\cdot, 2^m, 2^{2^{\ell n^\gamma}})$ depends just on n.) Consequently, since P proves efficiently its own reflection, for each sufficiently big n, P proves efficiently that "if π is a P-proof of $\mathsf{tt}(f, 2^{Kn^\gamma}, 1/2-1/2^{Kn^\gamma})$ then B_1 outputs a P-proof of $\mathsf{tt}(f, n^k)$".[16] Finally, we make the P-proofs work for all n by increasing the size of B_1 by a constant. This finishes the proof of case (1. $\to$ 2.).

(2. $\to$ 1.) The opposite implication can be obtained from Lemma 4 and 5 which formalize Theorem 3.

Lemma 4. *For each $d \geq 2$, each $k \geq 10d$ and each sufficiently big c, there is a PV-function L such that for each PV-function B the theory APC_1 proves: Assume the reflection principle for P holds, π is a P-proof of*

$$\mathsf{tt}(h_n \oplus g, 2^{Kn^\gamma}, 1/2 - 1/2^{Kn^\gamma}) \vee \mathsf{tt}(g, 2^{Kn^\gamma}), \tag{5.1}$$

where g is represented by free variables, and that B automates P on Φ up to size $|\pi|^c$. Then, for prime $n^d \leq p \leq 2n^d$, where $2^{n^d} \in Log$, for $\delta^{-1} \in Log$ such that $\delta < N^{-3} = 2^{-3n}$, $L(B, \pi, p)$ is a $poly(2^n, |\pi|)$-size circuit learning circuits with $m = n^d$ inputs and size $m^{k/10d}$, with confidence $1/N^4$, up to error $1/2 - 1/N^3$, where the confidence is counted approximately with error δ using PV-function Sz and the corresponding assumptions $\mathsf{LB}_{\mathsf{tt}}$ expressing hardness of a boolean function y with a suitable length $||y|| = S(\cdot, \cdot, \cdot)$, i.e. using formulas $\Pr^y[\cdot]_\delta$.

Lemma 5 ('XOR trick')**.** *PV_1 proves that for all boolean functions g, h'' with n inputs, for sufficiently big n, $\mathsf{LB}_{\mathsf{tt}}'(h'', 3 \cdot 2^{Kn^\gamma}, 2^n(1/2 - 1/2^{Kn^\gamma}))$ implies $\mathsf{LB}_{\mathsf{tt}}'(h'' \oplus g, 2^{Kn^\gamma}, 2^n(1/2 - 1/2^{Kn^\gamma})) \vee \mathsf{LB}_{\mathsf{tt}}'(g, 2^{Kn^\gamma})$, where $\mathsf{LB}_{\mathsf{tt}}'$ is obtained from $\mathsf{LB}_{\mathsf{tt}}$ by setting $n_0 = 0$ and skipping the universal quantifier on n, i.e. all formulas $\mathsf{LB}_{\mathsf{tt}}'$ refer to the same n.*

The proof of Lemma 5 is almost immediate: By Σ^b_1-induction, a 2^{Kn^γ}-size circuit C_1 computing g and a 2^{Kn^γ}-size circuit C_2 $(1/2 + 1/2^{Kn^\gamma})$-approximating $h'' \oplus g$ can be combined into a circuit $C_1 \oplus C_2$ of size $3 \cdot 2^{Kn^\gamma}$ which $(1/2 + 1/2^{Kn^\gamma})$-approximates h''.

The implication (2. $\to$ 1.) can be derived from Lemma 4 and 5 as follows. Since the APC_1-provable statement from Lemma 4 is Σ^b_1, similarly as above, we can witness it and translate to EF at the expense of introducing an additional assumption about the hardness of a boolean function h'. That is, for each p-size circuit B there are $poly(|\pi|, 2^{n^d})$-size circuits A and $poly(|\pi|, 2^{n^d})$-size EF-proofs of

"If the reflection principle for P is satisfied by a particular assignment,
π is a P-proof of (5.1),
h' is not computable by a particular circuit of size $2^{||h'||/4}$, $|h'|$ is sufficiently big,

[16] It is assumed that the encoding of the statement coincides with the encoding of aut_P.

y is not $(1/2 + 1/2^{||y||/4})$-approximable by a particular circuit of size $2^{||y||/4}$, $||y|| > n_0$,
$||y|| = S(\cdot, \cdot, 2^{|\delta^{-1}|})$
and $n^d \leq p \leq 2n^d$ is a prime,
then, for $\delta < 1/N^3$, $\mathsf{lear}^y_\delta(L(B, \pi, p), \mathsf{Circuit}(m^{k/10d}), 1/2 - 1/N^3, 1/N^4)$
or $A(B, \pi, h')$ outputs a falsifying assignment of $\mathsf{aut}_P(B, \Phi, |\pi|^c)$.".

Analogously, the PV_1-proof from Lemma 5 yields p-size EF-proofs of the implication "$\mathsf{tt}(h_n, 3 \cdot 2^{Kn^\gamma}, 1/2 - 1/2^{Kn^\gamma})$ is falsified by a particular assignment or (5.1) holds". By the assumption of the theorem, there are p-size P-proofs of $\mathsf{tt}(h_n, 3 \cdot 2^{Kn^\gamma}, 1/2 - 1/2^{Kn^\gamma})$ for sufficiently big n. Hence, by Definition 6, Items 1-3, there are p-size P-proofs of (5.1) for sufficiently big n. As P proves efficiently also its own reflection, this yields $poly(2^{n^d})$-size P-proofs of

"If h' is not computable by a particular circuit of size $2^{||h'||/4}$, $|h'|$ is sufficiently big,
y is not $(1/2 + 1/2^{||y||/4})$-approximable by a particular circuit of size $2^{||y||/4}$, $||y|| > n_0$,
$||y|| = S(\cdot, \cdot, 2^{|\delta^{-1}|})$
and $n^d \leq p \leq 2n^d$ is a prime,
then, for $\delta < 1/N^3$, $\mathsf{lear}^y_\delta(L(B, \pi, p), \mathsf{Circuit}(m^{k/10d}), 1/2 - 1/N^3, 1/N^4)$
or $A(B, \pi, h')$ outputs a falsifying assignment of $\mathsf{aut}_P(B, \Phi, |\pi|^c)$.".

By Bertrand's postulate there is a prime $n^d \leq p \leq 2n^d$, so EF proves that p is a prime by a trivial $2^{O(n^d)}$-size proof which verifies all possible divisors. Therefore, choosing $d > 1/\gamma$, Item 2 and p-size P-proofs of $\mathsf{tt}(h_n, 2^{n/4}, 1/2 - 1/2^{n/4})$ imply Item 1.

It remains to prove Lemma 4.

Suppose π is a P-proof of (5.1). Assuming that B automates P on Φ, we want to obtain a $\mathsf{P/poly}$-natural property useful against $\mathsf{Circuit}[n^k]$. To do so, observe (first, without formalizing it in APC_1) that for each g, B can be used to find a proof of $\mathsf{tt}(h_n \oplus g, n^k)$ or to recognize that $\mathsf{tt}(g, 2^{Kn^\gamma})$ holds - if $\mathsf{tt}(g, 2^{Kn^\gamma})$ was falsifiable, there would exist a $poly(|\pi|)$-size P-proof of $\mathsf{tt}(h_n \oplus g, 2^{Kn^\gamma}, 1/2 - 1/2^{Kn^\gamma})$ obtained by substituting the falsifying assignment to the proof of (5.1) and thus B would find a short proof of $\mathsf{tt}(h_n \oplus g, n^k)$, for sufficiently big c. Since for random g, both $h_n \oplus g$ and g are random functions, we know that with probability $\geq 1/2$ B finds a proof of $\mathsf{tt}(h_n \oplus g, n^k)$ or with probability $\geq 1/2$ it recognizes that $\mathsf{tt}(g, 2^{Kn^\gamma})$ holds. In both cases, B yields a $\mathsf{P/poly}$-natural property useful against $\mathsf{Circuit}[n^k]$.

Let us formalize reasoning from the previous paragraph in APC_1. Let $N = 2^n$ and B' be the algorithm which uses B to search for P-proofs of $\mathsf{tt}(h_n \oplus g, n^k)$ or to recognize that $\mathsf{tt}(g, 2^{Kn^\gamma})$ holds. B' uses π to know how long it needs to run B. Assume for the sake of contradiction that

$$G_0 := \{g \oplus h_n \mid B'(g) \text{ outputs a } P\text{-proof of } \mathsf{tt}(h_n \oplus g, n^k)\} \preceq_0 2^N/3$$

$$G_1 := \{g \mid B'(g) \text{ recognizes that } \mathsf{tt}(g, 2^{Kn^\gamma}) \text{ holds}\} \preceq_0 2^N/3.$$

It is easy to construct a surjection S witnessing that $2^N \preceq_0 G_0 \cup G_1$: S maps $g \in G_1$ to g and $g \in G_0$ to $g \oplus h_n$. Following the argument above we conclude that S is a surjection: for each g, either $g \in G_1$ (and $S(g) = g$) or $g \oplus h_n \in G_0$ (and $S(g \oplus h_n) = g$). Here, we use the assumption that APC_1 knows that P admits the substitution property and simulates Frege rules. Thus, by Proposition 1 *iv*), $2^N \preceq_0 2 \cdot 2^N/3$, which yields a contradiction by Proposition 2 1.*ii*). Consequently, by Proposition 2 1.*i*), $G_0 \succeq_\delta 2^N/3$ or $G_1 \succeq_\delta 2^N/3$ for $\delta^{-1} \in Log$. Since $g \in G_0$ and $g \in G_1$ are decidable by p-size circuits and we assume the reflection principle for P (which implies that G_0 is useful), this means that either G_0 or G_1 defines a $\mathsf{P/poly}$-natural property useful against $\mathsf{Circuit}[n^k]$.

Finally, by the APC_1-formalization of [8], Theorem 9, we obtain $poly(2^n, |\pi|)$-size circuit $L(B, \pi, p)$ learning circuits with $m = n^d$ inputs and size $n^{k/10}$, over the uniform distribution, with membership queries, confidence $1/N^4$, up to error $1/2 - 1/N^3$. □

Corollary 3. *Assume there is a* $\mathsf{NE} \cap \mathsf{coNE}$*-function* $h_n : \{0,1\}^n \mapsto \{0,1\}$ *such that for each sufficiently big* n*,* h_n *is not* $(1/2 + 1/2^{n/4})$*-approximable by* $2^{n/4}$*-size circuits. Then there is a proof system* P *(which can be described explicitly*[17] *given the definition of* h_n*) such that for each constant* K *and* $\gamma < 1$*, Items 1 and 2 from Theorem 10 are equivalent. Moreover, the equivalence holds for each* APC_1*-decent system simulating* P*.*

Proof. We want to construct an APC_1-decent proof system P which proves efficiently $\mathsf{tt}(h_n, 2^{n/4}, 1/2 - 1/2^{n/4})$, for some h_n. By the assumption, there is $h_n \in \mathsf{NE} \cap \mathsf{coNE}$, which is hard to approximate. Let H_ϵ, for $\epsilon \in \{0,1\}$, be the P-time predicates defining h_n, i.e. $h_n(x) = \epsilon \leftrightarrow \exists y, |y| \leq 2^{O(|x|)},\ H_\epsilon(x, y)$. Define P as WF extended by a rule, which allows to derive every substitutional instance of $||L||$, where $||\cdot||$ is the propositional translation from Section 2.2 and L is the formula

$$\left[\forall x < 2^{||z||},\ \left((H_0(x, y^0_x) \vee H_1(x, y^1_x)) \wedge \bigwedge_{\epsilon=0,1} (H_\epsilon(x, y^\epsilon_x) \to z_x = \epsilon)\right)\right]$$

$$\to \mathsf{LB}_{\mathsf{tt}}(z, 2^{||z||/4}, 2^{||z||}(1/2 - 1/2^{||z||/4})),$$

for sufficiently big n_0 in $\mathsf{LB}_{\mathsf{tt}}$. By definition, P proves efficiently $\mathsf{tt}(h_n, 2^{n/4}, 1/2 - 1/2^{n/4})$ for each sufficiently big n (we can hardwire the hardness of a boolean function for remaining n, if needed) and satisfies Items 1-3 from the definition of APC_1-decent systems. To see that P proves its own reflection principle we reason in APC_1: given a P-proof π, each circuit in π is derived either by a WF-rule or it is a substitutional instance of $||L||$, so by Σ^b_1-induction on the length of π and the APC_1-provability of the reflection of WF, cf. [15], L implies that each circuit from π holds. Similarly as in the proof of Theorem 10, we can now translate the resulting Σ^b_1 theorem of APC_1 (the statement that L implies that each

[17] More formally, there is a p-time algorithm R such that given predicates H_0, H_1 defining h_n (see the proof of Corollary 3), R outputs a p-time algorithm defining system P.

circuit from π holds) to EF and remove the assumptions after moving to P. This shows that P proves efficiently its own reflection and is APC_1-decent. □

Corollary 4. *Let P, P_0 be APC_1-decent proof systems and assume there is a sequence of boolean functions $h = \{h_n\}_{n>n_1}$, for a constant n_1, such that systems P, P_0 prove efficiently $\mathsf{tt}(h_n, 2^{n/4}, 1/2 - 1/2^{n/4})$. Then, for each constant K and constant $\gamma < 1$, Item 1 implies Item 2:*

1. ***P-provable automatability.*** *For each $k \geq 1$, for each function $s(n) \geq 2^n$, there is a constant K' and $s^{K'}$-size circuits B such that P proves efficiently $\mathsf{aut}_P(B, \Phi, s)$, where Φ is the set of pairs $\langle \mathsf{tt}(f, 2^{Kn^\gamma}, 1/2 - 1/2^{Kn^\gamma}), \mathsf{tt}(f, n^k)\rangle$ for all boolean functions f with n inputs.*

2. ***P_0-provable proof search.*** *For each $k \geq 1$, there is a constant K' and $2^{K'n}$-size circuits B such that P_0 proves efficiently "B (given just $\mathsf{tt}(f, n^k)$) outputs a P-proof of $\mathsf{tt}(f, n^k)$ or B outputs a 2^{Kn^γ}-size circuit $(1/2 + 1/2^{Kn^\gamma})$-approximating f.".*

Proof. Suppose Item 1 holds. By Theorem 10, Item 1 of Theorem 10 holds. Then, following the proof of $(1. \to 2.)$ of Theorem 10 with P_0 instead of P in the last paragraph, we obtain Item 2. (The provability of the reflection principle in P_0 is not needed because we are not deriving automatability of P.) □

Remark on the collapse. Denote by $P \vdash \phi_n$ the existence of $poly(|\phi_n|)$-size P-proofs of ϕ_n. Corollary 4 exploits the fact (captured by Lemma 3, Item 2) that for PV_1-decent proof systems P (defined analogously as APC_1-decent systems, with APC_1 replaced by PV_1 and WF replaced by EF) there is a p-time algorithm B such that

$$\mathsf{EF} \vdash SAT(x, y) \to Prf_P(B(x, y), \lceil SAT(x, y)\rceil), \tag{5.2}$$

where formula $SAT(x, y)$ says that propositional formula (encoded by) x is satisfied by assignment y, $Prf_P(z, x)$ says that z is a P-proof of x, and $\lceil\phi\rceil$ is a code of formula ϕ. Importantly, while y stands for free atoms in the assumption $SAT(x, y)$, it represents fixed bits (determined by y) w.r.t. P in $\lceil SAT(x, y)\rceil$.

Using (5.2), it is possible to obtain a collapse similar to Corollary 4 which is *unconditional*: If there are p-size circuits A such that $P \vdash \neg SAT(x, A(x)) \vee Prf_P(A(x), x)$ (in other words, there are short P-proofs of P being p-bounded and automatable by p-size circuits), then there are p-size circuits A' such that $\mathsf{EF} \vdash \neg SAT(x, A'(x)) \vee Prf_P(A'(x), x)$. For example, if there are p-size ZFC-proofs of ZFC being p-bounded and automatable by p-size circuits, then there are p-size EF-proofs of ZFC being p-bounded and automatable by p-size circuits.

Intuitively, the proof proceeds as follows. Assume that, for some p-size circuits A,

$$\mathsf{ZFC} \vdash \neg SAT(x, A(x)) \vee Prf_{\mathsf{ZFC}}(A(x), x).$$

Then,

$$\mathsf{EF} \vdash Prf_{\mathsf{ZFC}}(\pi, \lceil \neg SAT(x, A(x)) \vee Prf_{\mathsf{ZFC}}(A(x), x) \rceil), \tag{5.3}$$

for a $poly(|x|)$-size assignment π which is fixed for each length $|x|$.

Similarly, as ZFC proves efficiently its own reflection principle, there are p-size proofs π' such that $\mathsf{EF} \vdash Prf_{\mathsf{ZFC}}(\pi', \lceil Prf_{\mathsf{ZFC}}(z, x) \to SAT(x, y) \rceil)$. Moreover, there are p-size circuits C which given x EF-provably output a ZFC-proof of $Prf_{\mathsf{ZFC}}(z, x) \to \phi$, where $\lceil \phi \rceil = x$. That is,

$$\mathsf{EF} \vdash Prf_{\mathsf{ZFC}}(C(x), \lceil Prf_{\mathsf{ZFC}}(A(x), x) \to \phi \rceil). \tag{5.4}$$

Since ZFC is PV_1-decent, by (5.2),

$$\mathsf{EF} \vdash \neg SAT(x, A(x)) \vee Prf_{\mathsf{ZFC}}(B(x, A(x)), \lceil SAT(x, A(x)) \rceil). \tag{5.5}$$

Therefore, by (5.3)-(5.5), there are p-size circuits B' such that

$$\mathsf{EF} \vdash \neg SAT(x, A(x)) \vee Prf_{\mathsf{ZFC}}(B'(x), x).$$

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Moritz Müller, Jan Krajíček, Iddo Tzameret and anonymous reviewers for comments on a draft of the paper. Ján Pich received support from the Royal Society University Research Fellowship URF\R1\211106. Rahul Santhanam was partially funded by the EPSRC New Horizons grant EP\V048201\1: "Structure versus Randomness in Algorithms and Computation". This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodovska-Curie grant agreement No 890220.

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