

MONETARY POLICY AND WEALTH EFFECTS: THE ROLE OF RISK AND HETEROGENEITY

Nicolas Caramp and Dejanir H. Silva


Discussion by Rustam Jamilov
All Souls, Oxford

15th Annual Paul Woolley Centre Conference
9 June, 2023


SUMMARY

- ▶ Monetary policy transmission via:
 1. (Time-varying) background rare disaster risk
 2. Risky household debt
 3. MPC heterogeneity
- ▶ Large indirect effects from (1) and (2)
- ▶ Fiscal function important

BIG PICTURE: MOLL'S HANK SUMMARY



Monetary transmission to individual consumption



DISASTER-HANK

$$y_t = \underbrace{\sigma^{-1}\hat{y}_t}_{\text{IS}} + \underbrace{\chi_d \epsilon_\lambda \hat{y}_t}_{\text{Risk}} + \underbrace{(\rho - \underline{\omega})e^{\underline{\omega}t}\Omega_0}_{\text{Outside Wealth}} + \underbrace{\frac{\mu_b \chi_r}{1 - \mu_b} \bar{\psi}_m \bar{d}_p \hat{y}_t}_{\text{Inside Wealth}}$$

1. Output response decomposition: $dy = 7\% + \boxed{39\% + 47\%} + 7\%$
2. Amplification relative to RANK: 20% heterogeneity, 50% time-varying risk, 10% interaction
3. Interaction term very interesting

BACKGROUND DISASTER RISK

- ▶ Precautionary savings motive
- ▶ Normally, from uninsured idiosyncratic shocks
- ▶ Can be cyclical: e.g. labor income risk (Ravn-Sterk)
- ▶ This paper: rare disasters in the background
- ▶ Counter-cyclical by construction: intensifies when MP tightens

WHAT DISASTERS?

1. Real activity (Rietz-Barro-Gabaix)
2. Banking runs/crises (Bernanke-Diamond-Dybvig-Gertler-Kiyotaki-Prestipino)
3. Inflation (Hilscher-Raviv-Reis)

REAL ACTIVITY

This paper, main text:

$$\underbrace{\lambda_t}_{\text{Disaster Risk Arrival Rate}} = F(i_t - r_n), \quad F'(\cdot) > 0$$
$$\frac{\dot{C}_{j,t}}{C_{j,t}} = \underbrace{\sigma^{-1}(i_t - \pi_t - \rho_j)}_{\text{Intertemporal Substitution}} + \underbrace{\frac{\lambda_t}{\sigma} \left[\left(\frac{C_{j,t}}{C_{j,t}^*} \right)^\sigma - 1 \right]}_{\text{Precautionary Savings Motive}}$$
$$i_t = r_n + \phi_\pi \pi_t + u_t$$

Realistic?

BANK RUNS


This paper, major extension in appendix:

$$\lambda_t = F_2(i_t - r_n)$$

F_2 = function of bank balance sheet characteristics

$$\underbrace{(Q_{t+1}^* + Z_{t+1})K_t^b}_{\text{Realized Return on Capital}} < \underbrace{\bar{R}_t D_t}_{\text{Promised Payment to Depositors}}$$

Realistic?



Picture Credit: Mike Bostock (<https://observablehq.com/@mbostock>)

INFLATION DISASTERS

- ▶ Background inflation disaster risk
- ▶ Very bad one-time cost push shock: $Pr_t (|\pi_{t,t+1} - \bar{\pi}| > d)$
- ▶ Persistent deviation from target: $Pr_t (|\frac{\pi_{t,t+h}}{H} - \bar{\pi}| > d)$
- ▶ $\lambda_t = F_3(Pr_t)(i_t - r_n)$

SCARS

- ▶ After monetary contractions the present discounted value of time-varying risk is zero:

$$\int_0^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} \chi_d \epsilon_{\lambda} \hat{y} dt = 0$$

- ▶ Timing of risk, not present value. Just shifting risk over time
- ▶ Could add irreversible scars of anticipated/realized disasters?

INSURANCE

Is there anything agents could do to protect from background disaster risk?

- ▶ Derivatives
- ▶ Deposit insurance
- ▶ Inflation options
- ▶ *Domestic* disasters? FX exposure

EIS

- ▶ With $EIS < 1$, anticipated decline in disposable income in disaster states \Rightarrow higher savings
- ▶ Jacobsen-Jacobsen-Kleven-Zucman: $EIS > 1$ out of *wealth* tax
- ▶ That's why direct effects unimportant?
- ▶ Robustness. Epstein-Zin? Why not just set to 1 throughout?

NEWS SHOCKS

- ▶ Monetary policy contraction impulse acts as news of a possible future disaster
- ▶ Recasting the paper as a Beaudry-Portier situation
- ▶ The BP view: jointly explaining stock prices and real macro
- ▶ This paper accomplishes something similar
- ▶ Pure news shock: disaster doesn't need to ever materialize

(T)HANK

- ▶ The model is a really a TANK. DTANK?

CONCLUSION

- ▶ Thought-provoking paper
- ▶ Strong contribution to the HANK literature
- ▶ The disaster risk angle a new, general channel
- ▶ Empirics, analytics, quantitative ✓