1.     Semantics in Law

 

  1. Hart, H., The Concept of Law, Preface, Ch. 1, Postscript
  2. Hart, H., ‘Jhering’s Heaven of Concepts and Modern Analytical Jurisprudence’, in Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy
  3. Dworkin, R., Law’s Empire, Chs. 2 – 3
  4. Dworkin. R., ‘Hart’s Posthumous Reply’, unpublished manuscript (Desk)
  5. Stavropoulos, N., Objectivity in Law, Ch. 1

 

2.     Some Views on Concepts

 

  1. Burge, T., ‘Intellectual Norms and Foundations of Mind’, 83 J.Phil. 697 (Desk)
  2. Burge, T., ‘Wherein is Language Social?’, in George, A. (ed.), Reflections on Chomsky, 175 (Desk)
  3. Stavropoulos, N., Objectivity in Law, Ch. 2
  4. Raz, J., ‘Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law: a Partial Comparison’, 4 Legal Theory, 249 (Desk)
  5. Dworkin, R., ‘Criterial and Interpretive Concepts’, excerpt from unpublished manuscript; also in ‘Justice for Hedgehogs’, unpublished manuscript.  (Desk)
  6. Fodor, J., In Critical Condition, Ch. 3 (review of Peacocke’s Concepts)
  7. Greenberg, M. D., ‘Geography’, draft chapter of Thoughts Without Masters, forthcoming, OUP. (Desk)

 

3.     The Application of Legal Concepts

 

  1. Coleman, J., ‘Incorporationism, Conventionality, and the Practical Difference Thesis’, 4 Legal Theory 381, Section VI (Desk)
  2. Shapiro, S., ‘On Hart’s Way Out’, 4 Legal Theory 469, Sections IV and V (Desk)
  3. Endicott, T., ‘Herbert Hart and the Semantic Sting’, 4 Legal Theory 283 (Desk)
  4. Greenberg, M. D. and Litman, H., ‘The Meaning of Original Meaning’, 86 Georgetown Law Journal 569
  5. Dworkin, R., ‘Comment’ on Scalia (Scalia, A., in Amy Gutmann (ed.), A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law,) (Desk)

 

4.     Theory and Practice

 

  1. Moore, M., ‘Hart’s Concluding Scientific Postscript’, 4 Legal Theory, 301 (Desk)
  2. Raz, J., ‘Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law: a Partial Comparison’, 4 Legal Theory, 249, Section VI (Desk)
  3. Dworkin, R., ‘Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It’, 25 Philosophy and Public Affairs 88-139  (Desk)
  4. Dworkin, R., ‘In Praise of Theory’, 29 Arizona St. L. J., 353
  5. Stavropoulos, N.,  Objectivity in Law, Oxford OUP 1996, 179-98
  6. Eisgruber, C., ‘Should Constitutional Judges Be Philosophers?’, unpublished manuscript (Desk)
  7. Eisgruber, C., ‘Why Is Dworkin’s ‘Moral Reading of the Constitution so Moral?’, unpublished manuscript (Desk)

 

 

 

5.     Description and Evaluation in Theory

 

  1. Perry, S., ‘Hart’s Methodological Positivism’, 4 Legal Theory, 427 (Desk)
  2. Postema, G., ‘Jurisprudence as Practical Philosophy’, 4 Legal Theory, 329 (Desk)

 

 

6.     Interpretivism

 

  1. Moore, M., ‘The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: a Turn for the Worse?’, 41 Stanford Law Review 871
  2. Kress, K., ‘The Interpretive Turn’, 97 Ethics, 834
  3. Perry, S., ‘Interpretation and Methodology’, in Law and Interpretation, Marmor, A. (ed.)
  4. Raz, J., ‘Why Interpret?’, 9 Ratio Juris 349

 

Further Reading

 

  1. Hurley, S., Natural Reasons, Chs. 5, 10
  2. Raz, J., Ethics in the Public Domain, Ch. 13

 

 

 

7.     Conceptual Analysis

 

  1. Leiter, B., ‘Realism, Hard Positivism, and Conceptual Analysis’, 4 Legal Theory, 533 (Desk)
  2. Dworkin, R., ‘Reply to Soper’, in Cohen, M. (ed.), Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary Jurisprudence, 250-2
  3. Jackson, F., From Metaphysics to Ethics; a Defence of Conceptual Analysis, Chs. 1 – 3
  4. Yablo, S., Review of Jackson’s book, unpublished manuscript, (Desk), also available at http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/consciousness/papers/fmterev.pdf

 

 

8.     The Nature of Theory

 

  1. Raz, J., ‘Can There Be a Theory of Law?’ at: http://users.ox.ac.uk/~raz/H00/theory1-1.pdf