Empowering Youth or Reshaping Compliance? Star Magazine, Symbolic Production, and Competing Visions of Shabab in Syria
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M.Phil Thesis in Modern Middle Eastern Studies |
| Thesis in PDF format (no images) 1.16 MB |
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2. Privatizing Symbolic Production: New Space for Commercial Brands, New Means for Regime Control
Introduction: Star as a Site of Symbolic Contest
Reading Regime Intention from Symbolic Production and Social Discourse.
Widening the Space for Brands to Play In.
The Needs of Corporate Capital versus the National-Regime Imaginary.
Part-Privatization of Symbolic Production: A Solution Emerges.
Alignments between the Corporate Realm and the Regime.
Producing Self-Generated Goods and Brands.
Re-appropriating New Advertising Space: Propagating Regime Messages Through Private Means
Introduction: Syrian-produced content does battle with Lebanese Star News.
Too ÔPaparazziÕ for the Syrian Copy: Lebanese Material Rejected from Star News
One Step Removed: Why DuddlyÕs Column is Included in Star News.
Star in Context: the Motivation for a Magazine of Opposing Codes.
Mobilizing Musalsals to the Defence of National Canons.
StarÕs Mechanics of Canonization.
4. Shaping New Authority Structures: Carole, Star Writers, and the Privatized Corporatist Consensus
Introduction: No Ordinary Stars.
The Star Consensus Under Threat from Within.
Building the Corporatist Consensus: Yousef and Carole See Eye to Eye.
The Privatized Corporatism in Text and Image: the Contours of a Discourse.
5. Down at Inhouse Coffee: Star Magazine in its Site of Consumption.
Acknowledgements
To Kathleen, mum and dad, friends and family, and to all those who helped me research this thesis in Syria. A particular thank you to Walter Armbrust whose support and supervision have been invaluable.
1
As far as Syrian press vendors were concerned, the copy of Star magazine that arrived on 2 July 2005 was just another weekÕs instalment of the paparazzi title. A brief glance at the magazineÕs front cover would present little to suggest otherwise: the brand title retained its five-pronged star in place of the letter ÔA;Õ the issue number – 30 – registered the magazineÕs continuity; the faces of selected celebrities still radiated youth and vitality. But a closer inspection of the cover would point to the fundamental change that had taken place within: gone was the English-language banner reading ÔWeekly paparazzi magazineÕ to be replaced by an Arabic phrase, ÔWe have achieved changeÉ and we have not been changed (Gheyirna É wa ma tagheyirna).Õ The Lebanese and Western celebrities who graced the cover of the Lebanese-produced magazine had been largely exchanged for Syrian stars of a different kind. Turning to the first page, an English-language editorial written by a member of the new all-Syrian team raved about the implications of StarÕs transformation. ÔWow,Õ it began, Ôa phone call which costs only 4 S.Y.P [Syrian Pounds] can cause all this?Õ Dedicated to Ôintroducing youth work,Õ the editorial spoke directly to its intended young Syrian reader: ÔI know youÕd probably think that we arenÕt good enough for this work, but É weÕll prove to you that weÕre worth your time.Õ
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Star magazine began life in Lebanon during the summer of 2004. Produced by Integra Publishing and Marketing Solutions, the Lebanese subsidiary of Syrian-based conglomeration United Group, the magazine was packed with paparazzi snaps and gossip from Lebanon, the Arab world, and the West. Catering mostly to a young female readership, Star combined celebrity news, exclusives, gossip-based interviews, and fashion with film and TV reviews, games, and horoscopes in the mould of any Western celebrity magazine. In December the same year, the magazine was brought out in Syria with a new issue number and different adverts, but otherwise exactly the same content. However, 29 issues later, in July 2005, the Syrian magazine was transformed in a bid to reflect Syrian interests and values. The Lebanese content was dramatically trimmed down, and the focus was channelled towards Syrian actors and public figures. Other features concentrated on issues deemed important for young people such as preparing for interviews, making lifestyle choices, and pursuing relationships. The writers who contributed most of the Syrian-produced material were not high-flying paparazzi journalists, but young student amateurs brought in to form what was called the Star Team. According to the current editorial manager, Carole Ibrahim Bashara, who joined in July after the change, the Lebanese issue was Ônot appropriateÕ for young Syrians. [1] In her version of events, StarÕs general manager Khaldoun Qita` Al-Na`l had the idea to adapt the magazine to the Syrian market on the basis of statistics indicating an appetite for a more authentic magazine amongst potential readers. Syrian culture, according to Carole, is more local and Arab-focused than cosmopolitan Lebanese culture. The intense political context, in which Syria was being widely blamed for orchestrating the murder of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Al-Hariri in February 2005, was also a factor in persuading Star SyriaÕs management to tone down the Lebanese content. Certainly, cooperation remains between the two offices – for example, Star Syria continues to offer a package of pages from the Lebanese version. But the marked differences between the Syrian- and the Lebanese-produced magazines offer a unique insight into the cultural differences between the two societies, and point to the enduring desire of Syrian cultural producers to authenticate representations of social life.
A study of Star Syria is not only pertinent to the prevailing cultural and political order; it can also contribute to an understanding of the broader historical narrative of the modern Middle East. The Syrianization of the magazine, a process which has continued apace since the new version was first established in July 2005, articulates with other periods and countries where popular-culture forms adopted from the West have been gradually authenticated. Ryzova has documented how the construction the Ôwoman-as-a-bodyÕ[2] in popular illustrated magazines of early- to mid-twentieth century Egypt began in the 1920s with imported sexualized images of Western women. These were replaced gradually over the next few decades by Ôlocalized, personalizedÕ images of Egyptian womenÕs bodies Ômade capable of relating directly to specifically Egyptian publics.Õ[3] This authentication lag in popular culture is observable in numerous other realms. Wise has shown that Reality TV formats and entertainment programming bought in the first case directly from Western formats is increasingly becoming authenticated as ÔethicalÕ and consistent with Islamic principles.[4] In a bid to mimic and improve on the success of Western reality TV formats Super Star (Future TV) and Star Academy (LBC), a new religious channel, Al-Risella (The Message), will launch in Cairo during 2006. It will be dedicated to producing authentic entertainment programming compatible with Islam. Similar trends could well hold for the establishment of fast food outlets, the development of satellite news channels, and the production of video clips in the Middle East. Star can be located within this broad historical trend, and is therefore a valuable source for considering modernity in the region.
Indeed,
a study of Star aligns well with the
broad thrust of studies which have considered popular culture and mass media as
crucial realms of social contest and experimentation in the modern Middle
East. What is at stake in an
analysis of popular culture goes far deeper than many assume; it has potential
repercussions for understanding shifting state-society relations, changing
perceptions of West-East incompatibility (or alternatively, productive
synthesis), and emergent responses to the pace of globalization. In short, popular culture is a fertile
field for gaining an appreciation of the Middle EastÕs experiences of
modernity. As high cultural
production is often linked to the national cause, the contest between
elite-high and mass-low cultural visions elucidated by Twitchell in the Western
context[5]
is all the more dramatic in the Middle East where national identities remain
emergent and malleable. This
thesis has a firm contribution to make to understandings of cultural contests
in Syrian society. In addition,
class contests are also relevant.
Despite the fact that media professionals in the Middle East habitually
claim to speak to all levels of society, the cultural output they have produced
throughout the twentieth century has consistently shown class biases and
presented class-based role models to be emulated.[6] The ongoing relevance of the paradigm
in which the emerging middle classes are drivers of an authentically Arab
modernity is compellingly confirmed by Star magazine.
Furthermore, no group could be more representative of the vanguard than
the young middle classes. It is precisely this group to which Star magazine claims to speak, and it is all the more
didactic as a result. Because the
young are equated with the future of national progress, contests over how
society should look are played out more urgently amongst those who seek to
speak to and shape the young. The
notion of ÔyouthÕ (shabab), which
in the Middle East has tended to refer to unmarried adolescents and young
adults, is a modern concept which emerges with the advent of mass education.[7] Intervening between childhood and
marriage, mass education provides for a period of social and personal
transformation in which social relations and experimentation can take place
outside the home. Consequently,
young people (shabab) are prime
targets for those both within and beyond the state who seek to raise public
morality, as well as for private companies forging new patterns of leisure
consumption. For all these
reasons, a popular-culture youth magazine is an ideal avenue for exploring
changing social relations and cultural visions within Syrian society.
Studies examining the role of mass media in shaping social perceptions in the Middle East have tended to focus on the consumption of widely-consumed media events, particularly dramatic serials (musalsals), and largely during the fasting month of Ramadan.[8] But, as Salamandra notes, the fragmentation of audiences brought about by the rapid increase in accessible programming has rendered such ethnographies and analyses problematic at best. What is needed to trace developments in the media landscape of the Middle East is ethnography which looks instead at the processes of production.[9] Such ethnographies are, to date, rare. It is acutely difficult to maintain regular contact with busy media professionals, let alone observe their practices at work. However, because Star magazine is largely produced by young amateur writers who are more willing to share their time than professionals, it offers a unique opportunity to engage with the process of production and gain an otherwise unattainable insight.[10] Moreover, the ethnographic element of this thesis, which is developed particularly in chapter 4, provides an occasion to revisit and question the theoretical assumptions of the neo-Marxist Frankfurt School. A study which details the interactions and experiences of young amateurs involved in producing a popular-culture magazine they might themselves consume can vividly highlight the flaws of an analysis which posits that popular culture is mobilized by a small clique of managers who aim to dupe the masses into passive consumption.
Star is also problematic for Frankfurt-School theories of popular culture because it defies easy categorization. In the first instance, it is problematic to claim that Star is a mass-consumed product. With a print run of 10,000 copies in Syria, half of which are distributed for free according to the magazineÕs website,[11] the magazine has clearly yet to reach a mass audience in the way that, for example, satellite television has. Indeed, it might be inferred that the magazineÕs impact in Syrian society is limited at best. Yet, Star is relevant to the study of contemporary mass media in Syria because it aspires to reach a mass audience. As we will see, contests played out within the Star Team to determine the proper role of the magazine in Syrian society demonstrate that those who produce it consider it a national magazine of national importance. It is, unmistakably, the first Syrian-produced magazine in many decades to combine celebrity culture with commercial advertising. Moreover, although accurate readership and audience ratings are notoriously hard to obtain in Syria, many of SyriaÕs urban young know about the magazine. Distributed in cafes, restaurants, and hairdressers, the magazine has located potential readers and entered the inventory of domestically-produced print media in a country where such publications are rare. Since domestic print media have been overtly linked to the ruling regime for decades, Star is testimony to a new kind of publication which can neither be defined as uniquely regime-driven nor as singularly driven by commercial interests. Certainly, the drive towards sales and profitability is taken very seriously by StarÕs managerial team, and the magazine is clearly geared to exploiting advertising revenues. Perhaps more importantly, the company which owns the brand, United Group (UG), is business-oriented and keen to make its investments succeed. The range of brands the company has built up in Syria within the fields of marketing and media is testimony to this: the telephone directory Yellow Pages is a proven commercial venture world-wide; the classified advertising publication Al-Waseela promotes trade and commerce; the outdoor-media company Concord which specializes in billboard advertising is highly lucrative. Unlike the commercially unviable political magazine Abyad wa Aswad (Black and White) owned by Bilal Turkmani son of Defence Minister Hasan Turkmani, Star magazine aims to lure a mass readership and make big money.[12] Yet UG is also close to the regime and in part seeks to promote political continuity as any state-owned publication would.
What UG and the other
private media companies in Syria are busy advancing is a corporate social
responsibility which bolsters the ruling regime. UGÕs website claims the company is Ôproud to belong to our
[Syrian] community É to share its needs and to efficiently contribute to its
development.Õ[13] One of its chief publications is the
English-language WhatÕs On, a free
magazine which looks at cultural and recreational events in Syria. Like the highly didactic Star
magazine, WhatÕs On presents a very positive image of Syria and its
cultural infrastructure which, given the timing of the two publicationsÕ
emergence on the scene, points to another agenda within UGÕs remit. Not only is UG dedicated to commercial
growth, but also to maintaining the Ôstable and secure [political] environment
that has characterized Syria,Õ which, as its website suggests, is essential for
commercial opportunities and economic prosperity. But this is not the only reason why UG is keen to maintain
the political status quo. UGÕs founder and current Chairman, Majid Suleiman, is
the son of the former head of the Internal Security Branch (Mukhabarat), Bahgat Suleiman. This is important because, during a period of great
political, economic, and cultural turmoil, the Syrian regime headed by the
young Bashar Al-Asad has sought to widen the public sphere whilst
simultaneously mobilizing new techniques of state control. Many of the methods
of maintaining power (with the exception of patronage) previously favoured by
BasharÕs late father, Hafiz Al-Asad – the overwhelming cult of
personality focused on the President, the stringent socialist economic model,
the corporatist institutions of state – seem increasingly untenable. Private corporations with close links to
the regime, as this thesis will argue, are central to the regimeÕs bid to
produce a new generation of politically-compliant, culturally-confident,
wealth-generating young Syrians.
The
part-privatization of authoritarianism is seemingly a model which has been
harnessed elsewhere. As chapter 2
will tentatively suggest, Egypt has for some time been developing techniques of
control in which private corporations are active and relied upon. Although it is beyond the scope of this
thesis, it is possible that the use of private capital in the reproduction of
the legitimating structures of authoritarian rule has a history within the
Middle East which extends back to the 1970s. The Infitah policies
of economic liberalization pursued in Egypt first by Anwar Sadat and more
recently Hosni Mubarak may contain the seeds of the dynamic I describe. It is clear that MubarakÕs campaign
during the first contested Presidential elections to ever take place in Egypt
in the summer 2005 was greatly enhanced by the validation he received from the
private sector in an ostensibly voluntary show of support. Nevertheless, this mechanism of control
is being all the more urgently mobilized in Syria because of the profound
threats it is facing.
The pressures facing the Syrian regime are three-fold. Firstly, the Syrian economy is struggling to find alternatives to the oil revenues and Soviet financial support so crucial in previous decades. Having been forced to terminate its thirty-year military and political presence in Lebanon – the financial hub of the Levant – Syria now has reduced access to world markets and capital. With a staggeringly young population, SyriaÕs overwhelming priority is to find young people jobs and opportunities within the country. Secondly, the regime faces on the one hand, a growing Islamist threat domestically, and on the other hand, unprecedented and hostile American and Israeli influence in the region – American forces have occupied Iraq since 2003, Israeli military strength continues to grow, and now Lebanon, once the backyard of Syrian interests, is a de facto US satellite. Thirdly, perceived political threats to the regime are replicated in the cultural sphere. With the advent and spread of satellite, mobile telephone, and internet technology, Western and Lebanese cultural production has not been so prevalent in Syria for over forty years. The regimeÕs ability to shape the cultural consciousness and national identity is further eroded by the growing strength of sectarian and Islamists trends which have risen again in Lebanon and Iraq, and are thought to be growing in Syria as well.
These pressures should be understood within the context of a changing political environment in Syria. Since the early nineties, the Syrian regime has been pursuing a policy of guarded economic liberalization in an attempt to adapt to post-Cold War realities. However, it was not until the death of Hafiz Al-Asad in 2000, bringing to an end his thirty-year tenure as President and the passing of power to his son, that commentators saw an opportunity for media development and political change. The period which followed, dubbed the ÔDamascus Spring,Õ seemed to suggest that widespread liberalization in the spheres of politics and media was inevitable. Civil society groups were permitted to meet in public and discuss SyriaÕs future for the first time in three decades. Yet many of these reforms have been reversed, and the imprint of authoritarianism remains. Despite this, the regime has made clear its intention to pursue a gradualist but consistent policy of economic liberalization. Reforms enabling greater foreign investment and the establishment of private banks indicate this consistency on the macro-economic scale.[14] As for the employment of young people, the Syrian regime has set up a number of agencies, such as Bidaya (Beginning) and the Syrian Young Entrepreneurs Association (SYEA), to encourage wealth creation. Meanwhile, the Junior Chamber International (JCI), the youth version of the International Chamber of Commerce, has recently been established in Damascus providing a node around which business interests can coalesce and young people can be encouraged to volunteer.
It is in the context of this partial economic liberalization that Star has emerged. It is one of a growing range of lifestyle and specialist magazines produced privately in Syria. In addition to UGÕs WhatÕs On, three privately-owned magazines were established in 2005: Shabablek, Jouhaina, and the English-language Syria Today. This trend can be aligned with the emergence of SyriaÕs first private radio station - Al Madina FM – and the freeing up of access to internet, mobile phone and satellite technology. These are trends Bashar Al-Asad has been encouraging since the late nineties when he was acting president of the Syrian Computer Society.[15] Indeed, he continues to publicly encourage widening media access as Syrian President today. In a keynote speech given at Damascus University in November 2005 he spoke of mobilizing SyriaÕs young to take advantage of new media for the Syrian national benefit:
ÔThe world is moving very fast. And
there are challenges produced by these changes. There have been new opportunities for
achievement. Since at the heart of these changes lie information,
communications and the digital revolution, we have all to work in order to
integrate young people into this information age and to provide the integration
mechanisms in all our institutions, É cultural and media structuresÉÕ[16]
His message, it seems, is being heard by those media professionals dedicated to widening the scope of domestic media.[17] But, as will be argued in this thesis, this development is small and highly controlled by the government. The range of publications to be established in recent years is miniscule by comparison to other periods and places experiencing genuine media freedom. The new media – the internet and satellite television – pose a tangible threat to the stateÕs control of citizensÕ access to symbols, products and information, as is attested by Bashar Al-AsadÕs accusations against the ÔArabic language media É which adopt the causes of the enemies and the opponentsÕ of Syria and wage a Ôhuge media campaignÕ to inflict Ômoral defeatÕ on Syria. The threat has been met with three strategies: first, the expansion of Syrian-produced output through these new media; second, the controlled development of domestically-produced media; and third, the continued censorship and scrutiny of domestic publications.
Star is remarkable precisely because it encapsulates these three strategies. Firstly, it is dedicated to building national confidence by harnessing the energies of young people towards engaging with Western-inspired popular satellite television through the lens of Syrian-produced output. Secondly, it is part of the widening scope of domestically-produced media, to which Al Madina FM and WhatÕs On also contribute. Thirdly, it shows the continued insistence within the Syrian regime towards censorship in print. In Syria, publications produced domestically have been inextricably attached to the machinery of the regime for over thirty years. The three major newspapers in the country, Tishriin, Al-Ba`th and Al-Thawra, are overtly controlled by government, and private publications have been strictly limited.[18] One solitary private newspaper dedicated to examining and critiquing the regime – Al-Domary – surfaced in 2001 to great international fanfare. Produced by the celebrated Syrian cartoonist, Ali Farzat, the paper was eventually brought to its knees in 2003 after provoking censors with a thoroughly negative depiction of Saddam Hussein during the build up to the US-led invasion which Syria opposed. One result of censorship is that domestically-produced publications are scrutinized intensely.[19] What is represented, claimed, discussed arouses more intense reactions because it is seen as emanating from some internal national conscious.[20] Indeed, perhaps because of censorship, contests over representations of social life which take place in print are all the more intense. Star, then, is a very useful starting point for understanding social change in Syria today.
Combining
interview, ethnographic, and textual sources, this thesis will consider the
magazineÕs content and production in order to determine the extent to which Star and the changing media landscape in Syria is
testimony to the empowerment of young people through media development. I will argue that Star magazine reflects shifting state-society relations
in Syria whereby the regime is seeking to widen the public and commercial
spheres whilst concomitantly reshaping and enhancing the techniques it uses to
constrain them. Due to the
methodological problems associated with mapping and interpreting reactions
amongst consumers and readers of the magazine, as well as time considerations,
the thesis will not make substantive claims about how the magazine is being
received in Syria. Rather, the
discussion will focus on how the magazine is produced and what it intends for its readers. Indeed, one significant area of investigation which could
provide a productive field for future study is the magazineÕs relationship with
religious norms and discourse.
This thesis touches only on religion in so far as to say that Star is an avowedly secular magazine devoted to
bolstering secular visions of society.
Chapter 2 looks at the relationship in Star between national-regime symbols and commercial
symbols, and argues that the magazine is testimony to the part privatization of
national symbolic production in Syria as an efficient technique of
control. It tentatively suggests
that similar techniques of control are observable in other Arab states, notably
Egypt, such that the mechanisms of authoritarianism may be converging across
the Middle East. Chapter 3
considers the relationship between the Lebanese- and the Syrian-produced
material in the magazine, and suggests that Star is part of a cultural war in which Syrian cultural
producers seek to engage with global media and popular culture on their own
terms for national ends. Finally,
Chapter 4 is ethnographic and focuses on the dynamics within the team of young
amateur writers, comparing the consensus within the team to the consistencies
of the magazineÕs didactic discourse.
It claims that Star seeks
to displace patriarchal norms with a new privatized corporatist consensus by
displaying a group of middle-class modern young Syrians to be emulated.
2
Privatizing Symbolic
Production: New Space for Commercial Brands, New Means for Regime Control
God protect
Syria. The final words of Bashar Al-AsadÕs speech to Damascus University, 10
November 2005
God protect
Syria. The slogan adorning the front cover of Star magazine, issue 50, 19-26
November 2005
God protect
Syria. The name and chorus line of a rousing song played as an exclusive on
SyriaÕs first private radio station, Al-Madina
FM, in late November 2005
Introduction: Star as a Site of Symbolic Contest
One
way of understanding commercial lifestyle magazines is as a space for competing
symbols. Star magazine is one of a group of magazines which have
made available and are circulating such a space. The magazine collects and orders these symbols, whilst also
creating its own and recycling others (particularly from the internet) which it
claims as its own. The space for
competing symbols which Star has
created is, therefore, overtly managed by its design and editorial staff. Nevertheless, this space represents in
microcosm what is taking place more generally in Syrian society where broadly
two sets of actors – state and what might be termed private-corporate
– are vying to imprint their images in the consciences of young
people. This is not just some
market-place battle for brand supremacy, but part of the on-going web of
contests which will decisively shape the future of Syrian society and its
relationship with the state.
A central role of the public space Star circulates is to expand further the reach of commercial advertising and therefore, at least theoretically, allow for the development of rival publications and media. This has happened with tacit state approval and is part of the regimeÕs changing strategies for maintaining power.[21] But the wave of new commercial publications in Syria, of which Star is a part, is tiny in comparison to media developments in other periods and regions where commercial freedoms have been greater. For example, Martin details the emergence of an unprecedented variety and number – at least 260 separate titles – of periodicals published in the ÔDemocratic YearsÕ in Syria between 1954 and 1958.[22] Similar developments took place in pre-Shah Iran.[23] More recently, Perthes has noted that in the aftermath of the civil war, over 100 radio stations and 50 television networks were established in Lebanon.[24] The wave of new journals in Syria today numbers only in the tens at most. This goes to show either that the conditions needed for a wider range of commercial publications to take root have not materialized, or that the regime is both involved in producing and containing the commercial media development as it grows.
Star, it will be argued, is evidence for the latter. A tension at the heart of regime thinking in Syria for over a decade has been how to liberalize the economy in order to generate new revenue without undermining regime authority. According to Hinnebusch, the fear is that, as the Syrian bourgeoisie grows and develops resources through private capital, so the regimeÕs authoritarian rule will be contested. In order Ôto be economically effective and politically unthreateningÕ, he notes, Ôeconomic liberalisation É [has] required the emergence of a reconstructed bourgeoisie on good terms with the regime [italics added].Õ[25] The Ôextent, depth and rapidity of economic liberalizationÕ then has been Ôconstrained by the interest of the regime.Õ[26] As Heydemann notes, ÔIt is the state, not capital, that defines the private sectorÕs terms of engagement and the boundaries of its participation.Õ[27] Regime interests may have been playing a dual game of liberalization and constraint with private capital interests for some time, but the job of constructing a wealth-generating secular middle class on good terms with the current political order is still very much in its embryonic stages, a theory which Star confirms. How this task is played out in Star is the subject of this chapter. It will seek to show that the magazine is testimony to the part-privatization of regime symbolic production and has opened up a space for commercial advertising that is crucially constrained by regime rhetoric.
Reading Regime Intention from Symbolic
Production and Social Discourse
Such a close emphasis on the regime as an actor in social change in Syria has come in for criticism. Salamandra has argued that studies of Syria have tended to over-emphasize state centrality.[28] To redress this, she proposes an Ôethnography of elite groupsÕ which avoids regurgitating Ôa story of economically or socially disenfranchised groups battling a hegemonic state.Õ[29] But, as any cultural history of print media in Syria would show, the state has been central to events, restricting the range of publications produced domestically and managing the output of the three lead dailies – Tishriin, Al-Ba`th, and Al-Thawra. As for media specifically aimed at young people, there has been very little to speak of largely because of the nature of state power in Syria over the last three decades. Indeed, to gain an understanding of the regimeÕs strategies for maintaining its power does not entail the assumption that across society all groups are disenfranchised and see the state as the Ôenemy,Õ an assumption Salamandra quite rightly seeks to avoid.[30] Rather those at the heart of government emanate from a Ôbourgeoisie-in-formation, partly official É with a foot in both public and private sectors.Õ[31]
Elsewhere, studies have tried to diminish the relevance of the state to cultural and social analysis. Appadurai is a leading proponent of an idea that sees global society in terms of flows, or Ôscapes,Õ of ideas, people and capital.[32] Whilst compelling on the level of those global flows states are largely powerless to impede from crossing borders or to shape unilaterally, such as capital flows, this theory drastically underestimates the continuing relevance of states for understanding domestic social change. As a brief comparison of Star magazine in Syria and in Lebanon will show, the Middle East is far from impervious to mass-mediated, popular and hybrid cultural innovations from outside the region. But that comparison will also show how widely state preoccupations can infuse media representations of society, not least because the symbolic field Star generates is acted upon by the state, as well as by other non-state actors. Another pressing question concerning the state revolves around the much debated viability of distinguishing between the state and society. Mitchell argues that the state, far from being a coherent structure imposed on society, is a metaphysical effect of the disciplinary powers which characterise the modern age.[33] Grounded in the idea that modern methods of power – ordering space, partitioning time, systematizing surveillance – worked to endow modern institutions, such as armies, schools and hospitals, with the appearance of having an independent existence greater than the sum of their parts, MitchellÕs argument dismisses any notion that the state is really an independent or unified structure.[34] Mitchell is indeed right to think that the idea of the state is powerful because it attaches Ôunity, morality and independenceÕ to what is in fact Ôdisunited, amoral and dependent.Õ[35] But, although Mitchell shows that ultimately a complete definition of the state is a hopeless task, he does not show how continuities and discontinuities in structures, functions, and goals attributed to the state work through complex interactions with social forces and actors around them.[36] What this chapter seeks to understand is how discontinuities (changes in engagements with private capital) are managed to the maintenance of continuities (the ongoing authority of the Al-Asad line, its close cohorts and mechanisms of power such as the Ba`th Party) through symbolic production.
A study which takes symbolic production very seriously is Lisa WedeenÕs Ambiguities of Domination.[37] In this book, which seeks to understand the cult of SyriaÕs late President, Hafiz Al-Asad, as a form of power, Wedeen argues that official discourses must be read as Ôstrategies without strategists.Õ[38] In this, she borrows from FoucaultÕs formulation that
ÔÉthe significance of official discourses is to be found É in Òthe conditions of their manifest appearance,Ó the Òtransformation which they have effected,Ó and Òthe field where they coexist, reside, and disappear,Ó rather than in Òsilently intended meanings,Ó or in the explicit intentions of leaders who formulate these discourses.Õ[39]
Yet, I argue that WedeenÕs theory, in seeking to claim the middle ground between Ôtotal constructionism and total voluntarism,Õ[40] actually conflates two issues. Thus, on the one hand, she bases her argument on voluntarism, claiming that materialist, ideational, and punitive theories of state power fail to understand the role of Hafiz Al-AsadÕs cult, since they Ôdo not explain why the Syrian government expends exorbitant sums of money and scarce resources on symbolic production.Õ[41] Here, Wedeen is arguing that we should study the regimeÕs symbolic production as a mechanism of power precisely because it is a deliberate strategy. Yet, on the other hand, she claims that the cultÕs effectiveness – its ability to engender compliance through rituals of uncommitted adulation on the part of citizens – is discursively constructed. Thus, she argues Ôit is unlikely that anyone specifically designed a policy calling for transparently phony rituals of obeisance.Õ[42] It is my contention that these two positions, as far as is possible, have to be unravelled because they simultaneously confirm and deny the significance of intention in forms of power. Firstly, we should argue that, although a policy of spending exorbitant amounts of state money on symbolic production to bolster the regime is a policy with a cultural and discursive legacy that extends far beyond SyriaÕs borders, nevertheless the policy has been actively selected out of a range of possible policies. Secondly, we should argue that the effects of that policy are constitutive of the cult of Hafiz al-Asad and must be read from the conditions of the cultÕs Ômanifest appearance.Õ The task in this thesis, then, is to look broadly at phenomena relating to the former which are decipherable through the latter. In other words, this thesis assumes that Star is testimony to the ways in which the Syrian regime is trying to reshape society. It is far too soon to posit the effects of Star and magazines like it for Syrian society, but it is not too soon to try and analyze what such published material strives to achieve through the interaction of state and private actors, discourses and symbols.
Widening the Space for Brands
to Play In
As has been pointed out, the emergence of a host of new commercial magazines is not a novel experience in Syria. As Martin has demonstrated, the mid-1950s saw a rapid and unprecedented growth in published material, although the experience did not last.[43] For young Syrians today – the target readers of Star – there has been no comparable period of commercial freedom during their lifetimes.[44] The current period, then, is new for the young Syrians Star concerns itself with. More commercial freedom entails more space for commercial symbols (brands), which suggests that brands, and their managers, are accumulating a growing power in shaping social life in Syria. An example of this is the growing competition between DamascusÕs eateries. Salamandra has examined the growing trend in which old Damascus is being commercialized for bourgeois leisure through the establishment of new restaurants in renovated traditional houses.[45] This development continued apace during the time in which she wrote her book,[46] and has continued since then. During my research visits to Damascus, at least three new bar-restaurants were established in the old town, and one new restaurant was being built.[47] What has accompanied this development more recently has been a growing competition amongst the restaurants and bars of Damascus, and Syria more widely, to win the struggle for customers, a struggle which centres on the battle to achieve brand supremacy. Star is testimony to this latest development, which has seen restaurants and cafes advertising themselves in published material like Star, particularly during times when consumption is encouraged, such as the fasting month of Ramadan. Issue 44, for example, published during Ramadan, features three adverts for one of the most popular restaurants in Old Damascus, Haretna,[48] an advert for a fast food joint, Batata, and one for an open-air restaurant in Aleppo, The Roof (figure 2). Issue 58, published during `Id Al-Adha, contains adverts for Barada Sport CafŽ, Inhouse Coffee (a cafŽ), as well as Haretna. But even during non-festival periods, eateries and cafes make a strong showing in StarÕs advertising space. What this contest demonstrates is that commercial media and forms of commercial enterprise which revolve around consumption, particularly leisure consumption, depend on each other to develop. As Ohmann has argued for the US, advertising (and the lifestyle magazines through which advertising developed rapidly in the second half of the nineteenth century) played a crucial role in
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Ôsmoothing out the course of
[capitalist] accumulation.Õ
[49]
For the capitalist, advertising ensured
that new markets could be forged and consolidated, and new production lines
could be adapted to the more precise predictions of demand. For the magazine
producer specifically, readersÕ attention was traded for advertising revenue at
a profit. If OhmannÕs thesis is an
accurate indication of the integral role magazines played in consolidating
AmericaÕs rapid march to industrialize, then we can make some tentative
inferences about StarÕs intended role in
widening the playing field for corporate and capitalist development in Syria.
Star is not the only space available to advertisers in
this widening field. Billboards
are now an established feature of SyriaÕs urban landscape and line road
networks (figure 3).[50] There is no more flamboyant and ironic
example of this than the stalled building site of a state-funded mosque in
central Damascus which has now become the largest advertising fa�ade in the
city, and probably the country, as the supporting structure for an enormous
banner promoting Areeba (the
telecommunications company). Al-Madina FM, SyriaÕs first private radio station, is a favourite of Syrian
advertisers and is perhaps so aware of the prevalence of advertising on its
schedule that it advertises its own brand in Star with the slogan ÔFriday without advertising.Õ Satellite television, although regional
in its reach, has exposed Syrians to greater brand diversity than was
previously possible in a country where still many Western brands are not widely
available or are proscribed.[51] At the same time as the space available
for brands to lodge themselves in the popular consciousness has been widening,
a small elite of domestic companies dedicated to very contemporary branding
techniques has emerged to dominate the key commercial spheres of
communications, media and leisure consumption. This core group of domestic companies, including United
Group (UG) which runs Star,
joined forces to sponsor the website www.salam.sy devoted to encouraging the defence
of the regime
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during the international crisis over SyriaÕs suspected role in the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minsiter, Rafik Al-Hariri. UG holds a commanding hand of brands across the media, advertising and marketing spectrum, Areeba and Syriatel jointly dominate the market for mobile telephone service providers, SCS-NET is the strongest private internet service provider and so on. What these companies share is a foundational belief in their brands as vehicles for sales, a national reach and a willingness to use their strategic position in developing media to promote themselves. But there is also room to play at their margins: Syria has witnessed a considerable growth in private advertising agencies. [52] The website of Chilli adverts, the agency which produces ads for Al-Madina FM, is testimony to the role of smaller players in building awareness of domestic brands and confirming the advertising prophecy that brand is more important than product. Above all else, the students with whom I mixed while researching this thesis were aware of the new domestic brands, as well as foreign ones, and were more than willing to participate in this unequal game, shared by corporations and individuals, of entrenching brands in public life.
But we should not get carried away. The growth in both advertising and the space in which advertising is to manoeuvre is quite small. By comparison with the magazines of 1950s Syria, the range of adverts, products and services, as well as the number of new publications available to advertisers and consumers, is very narrow.[53] Martin details the Ôbewildering variety of cars, home appliances, cosmetics, fragrances, cleansers, medications, entertainment media and venues, travel opportunities, and financial servicesÕ on display in a selection of magazines from the period which he describes as Ôcomparable [for a Syrian] to that seen by his contemporary American or British counterpart.Õ[54] This range is not replicated in either Star or the crop of new Syrian magazines, which focus on other media (mobile phones, radio, internet services), soft drinks (Fayruz, pepsi), and restaurants (Haretna). Advertising in Star consists of one of two things: either an advert will fill a whole page or it will feature as a sponsor along the bottom margin of a page. But because the same advertisers straddle both spaces, the number of total adverts on offer remains relatively small. Of course, Star may not need much advertising to cover its production costs, but considering that UG manage one of the few market research companies, IPSO-STAT, in addition to Star, it seems likely that Star would be able to advance its advertising revenue where others could not go. Indeed, if we turn to another growing realm for advertisers to compete – the internet – domestically-produced websites are conspicuously short of advertising on their pages. This points not just to the limitations of the medium in a country lacking the infrastructural, technological and economic resources to maximize the internet, but also to the role the state is playing as a constraining force on the very commercial growth it seeks to generate.
Nevertheless, the space available for competing commercial brands to vie for public attention is expanding. Although the Syrian regime is partly responsible for overseeing this development, the growth of advertising and private capital does pose a number of dilemmas for it. In what follows, I will lay out four broad dilemmas which present themselves to the Syrian regime as it seeks to widen advertising space. I will do this by setting commercial developments in their immediate historical and sociological contexts and by comparing the historical legacy of Ba`thist visions of society with the logic of the capitalist imaginary. I will seek to show that theoretically the two visions are incompatible and antagonistic. Subsequently, I will seek to show how the regime intends to resolve these concerns.
The Needs of Corporate Capital
versus the National-Regime Imaginary
Studies of consumption and advertising in the Middle East have stressed that the state and private-corporate world can work in partnership towards the goal of building patterns of consumption around national events.[55] State-managed Ramadan television in Egypt, for example, has long succeeded in Ôbundling commercial and state ideologies with entertainmentÕ in ways which go unnoticed by the audience.[56] Elsewhere, Neo-Marxist theorists have maintained that the state and private capital can function ideologically in concert because they present two sides of the same structural equation: bourgeois capitalist control over the means of production.[57] Yet, in Syria, the logic of unheeded capitalism and of the regimeÕs vision of society continues to grate with profound effects. This dynamic is particularly true of the potentially conflicting ways in which the regime and corporate capital imagine the individual. Ba`thism, which continues to provide the rhetorical material of much official discourse and the doctrinal DNA, at least in theory, of many of SyriaÕs institutional structures, places socialism and the national collectivity above the individual.[58] Despite the ideological weakening of Ba`thist resolve during the Presidency of Hafiz Al-Asad, and the concomitant rise of the cult of personality around him,[59] Bashar Al-Asad has inherited the discursive, institutional, and ideological legacy of Ba`thism,[60] and has to confront that legacy in order to assert his own position and power. He cannot simply wipe the slate clean and start again; rather he has to find a way to incorporate or adapt the rhetorical infrastructure of Ba`thism towards a new politics of control. This is clear from the keynote speech he gave at Damascus University in November 2005 in which he responded to international pressure on Syria over its suspected role in the murder of Rafik al-Hariri. He repeatedly appealed to the unifying concept of pan-Arab nationalism as part of and indivisibly linked to Syrian nationalism, claiming that current threats were Ôcampaigns É waged on the Arab nation, and Syria in particularÉÕ[61] The rhetorical legacy of Ba`thism continues to provide guidelines for proper national conduct, since the fear of Ômoral defeat is half, if not three quarters, of the real defeat in any battle, whether it is military, [or] culturalÉ[italics added]Õ[62] This rhetoric potentially places limits on the kinds of consumption individuals can pursue.
The national-regime imaginary has often translated into certain set roles for young men and women. In the first case, achieving manhood has hinged on the expectation that men should be fighters and defenders of the nation. During the three decades of Hafiz al-AsadÕs rule, the possibility of military confrontation with Israel loomed large. Regime rhetoric defined Syrians as the steadfast defenders of the Palestinian cause and of Pan-Arab nationalism. The state instrument to implement these rhetorical ideals, the army, was massively expanded by years of ambitious military spending, and the numbers in the army as a proportion of the national population reached unprecedented heights.[63] Even today, it is compulsory for most men to serve two years of military service, providing the state with a powerful opportunity to shape, on the one hand, the way that young men think of themselves as defenders of the nation, and on the other hand, to mould popular understandings of masculinity around notions of honour, duty, warrior-ship and obedience to the superior and compelling will of the state. Military service remains a pivotal moment in young menÕs lives.[64] Indeed, it is not uncommon to see men in military uniform across Damascus. A uniform is a social signifier which marks men as soldiers in the national army first and individuals second. Despite army cutbacks, the regime has found few concrete alternatives with which to re-order its rhetorical structuring of what it means to be a man. Hence, images of the President show Bashar Al-Asad in military uniform not just to construct him as an authority figure, but as a man and as a defender of the nation.
In the case of women, studies have shown that national movements in the Middle East of the late-nineteenth and twentieth centuries emphasized womenÕs roles as disciplined mothers and managers of the domestic space.[65] Najmabadi has shown the modernist trajectory of what she calls the Ôdomestic sciencesÕ in Iran which sought to transform women from being Ôpart of the householdÕ to being Ômanager of the household.Õ[66] WomenÕs education was given high priority by nationalists and modernists because women were in turn seen to be the educators of the nationÕs sons and daughters.[67] Similar trends have been noted for Egypt. Shakry has argued that in order for Egypt to become modern, women had to be educated both in the science of child rearing and the authentic customs of the nation – only then could the health and prosperity of future generations of Egyptian men and women be achieved.[68] The long legacy of modernism in Middle Eastern states then has been to define women as mothers whose proper place and roles reside in the home. National movements have further entrenched womenÕs roles by incorporating religious personal law and paternalistic family structures, into the machinery of state.[69]
Of course, these
concepts, both for men and women, have been contested and challenged, but the
broad schema of how the State relates to the individual has never been
completely unravelled.
Corporate capitalism, conversely, seeks to propagate the idea that the
individual is either determined by lifestyle consumption choices or
professionally as a member of a private corporation. The crucial point is that stressing motherhood roles for
young women and military roles for young men take both out of the social realm
where they can be encouraged to consume.
Developing a lifestyle, and therefore an individuality according to the capitalist principle, depends on
being able to make, and being aware of others making, lifestyle choices about
consumption – buying and wearing certain clothes, taking part in certain
leisure practices and so on.
Similarly,
the national-regime vision and the private-corporate vision differ on both
method and content in the social instruction which renders the individual
effective and useful. Mass
education is widely seen as a powerful tool of Middle Eastern states for
inculcating a national conscious and for producing disciplined, obedient
citizens.[70] For example, Starrett has shown how the
Egyptian state appropriated religious instruction in order to manage the proper
social and moral content of its citizens.[71] In Syria, the regime has constructed a
whole institutional machinery over and above state-run mass education for the
purpose of socializing young people to its norms from an early age. Children are virtually obliged to join
the Vanguard of the Ba`th (TalaÕi`
al-Ba`th) in elementary school and the Revolutionary Youth Organization (Shabibat al-Thawra) in senior school.[72] These organizations overtly seek to
inculcate nationalist and socialist beliefs from a very early age, and provide
structures which logically direct young people towards Ba`th Party membership.[73] Meanwhile, university campuses are
monitored by members of the studentsÕ union to ensure that students are not
involved in activities which might be socially threatening to authority.[74] No other associations are permitted to
recruit or organize students.[75] The crucial point is that these
institutions practically and rhetorically divert young people from pursuing
consumption practices associated with leisure. Indeed, despite Ba`thist rhetorical claims that such state
institutions are designed to eliminate social distinctions, the regime has
traditionally used these institutional hierarchies to forge social hierarchies
and elites in wider society. That
consumption and lifestyle choices now seem to be more important for defining
social status in Syria[76]
implies that the regime is losing control over society. Indeed, practices of consumption are
set to increase. In the United
States – the main source of all-pervasive global popular culture –
advertisers, marketers, and producers of popular culture have sought to
dominate the material which inspires young peopleÕs use of leisure time. Consumption practices associated with
youth leisure time and state structures for regulating youth are not easily
reconciled, not least because countercultures which mock institutional checks
on leisure have been cultivated for commercial profit in Western media.[77]
According to Wedeen, the central mechanism for
maintaining Hafiz Al-AsadÕs authoritarian rule in Syria until his death in 2000
was not institutional; rather it relied upon citizens self-regulating their own
compliance to regime norms.[78] This mechanism was the cult of
personality surrounding the President.
In WedeenÕs theory, Hafiz Al-AsadÕs cult worked to discipline citizens
Ôby occasioning continual demonstrations of external obedienceÕ in which they
acted Ôas if they revere their
leader.Õ[79] This Ôpolitics of as ifÕ does not require that citizens actually believe the
PresidentÕs material claims, rather it Ôproduces guidelines for acceptable
speech and behaviour.Õ[80] It is according to these guidelines
generated by the politics of as if
that atomized citizens regulate their own public behaviour, though there may
also be intervening state officials who punish particularly outlandish
behaviour and dissent.[81] Social anxiety and feelings of
isolation can only be properly countered in private. If WedeenÕs theory correctly interprets the power of
symbolic production and the cult of Hafiz Al-Asad in the persistence of
authoritarian rule in Syria over the last thirty years, it also suggests that
mechanisms of authoritarian control through symbols are incompatible with the
capitalist imaginary. How can the
consumer learn to conform socially by relieving social anxieties and desires
through consumption if the overwhelming state-generated mechanism of public
display is atomizing and discourages acting upon social anxieties? Indeed, how can consumption patterns
– which depend on consumers perceiving themselves to voluntarily choose
certain products because they are glamorous, youthful, or sexy – make any
sense in a political environment where patently absurd symbols are geared to
reinforcing citizensÕ acknowledgement of involuntary obedience, as WedeenÕs
theory suggests?
Moreover, in the private-corporate vision,
professionals use their experience and education as indexes of social
capital. Upward mobility hinges on
professionals mobilizing their experience as social capital towards furthering
professional goals and responsibilities, a dynamic which underpins concepts of
meritocracy. Notions of meritocracy are theoretically, if not practically,
gaining ground in Syria today, as features in Star magazine which validate effort and ability – Real
Star and Sport Star – suggest. Of course, the notion of meritocracy
can be seen as a legitimizing ideology for the reproduction of middle- and
lower-class divisions. Yet, it
powerfully undermines the logic of authoritarian rule where a father –
Hafiz Al-Asad – passes power on to his son – Bashar.
Another
field of contention between the private-corporate imaginary and the
regime-national imaginary concerns public association and communication. The Syrian regime has invariably been
hostile to new communication technologies and media because they are seen to
threaten state control. For
example, mobile phones were only made legal after Hafiz Al-AsadÕs death in
2000, many in the regime have been unwilling to pursue the expansion of the
internet and IT infrastructure, and satellite dishes were initially banned
before their widespread distribution rendered the law meaningless.[82] The long legacy of the 1979 Islamic
Revolution in Iran, where opponents to the ShahÕs regime exploited new
technologies – photocopiers, faxes, tape cassette recorders – to
distribute subversive messages and propaganda, appears to live in the memory of
SyriaÕs regime elite.[83] Yet, as far as the private-corporate
world is concerned, more communication, which is either a form of consumption
or vital business practice, is better.
But it is not just in communication technologies that
these two broad visions are on a collision course. Since the Emergency Laws of 1963, the regime has kept tight
reins on the freedom of association.
Many kinds of public meetings, such as assemblies of unions and
unofficial political parties, are prohibited.[84] In the private-corporate vision, not
only do professionals need to associate freely to get business done, but
aspiring professionals need to build their social capital by mimicking
professional experiences. In other
words, in order to get valuable experience, young people are expected to
volunteer. In Syria today, groups
linked to the corporate world are seeking to complement the state-run education
system by providing young people with a wider range of volunteering
opportunities.[85] This kind of managed association is not
immediately compatible with prevailing national-regime interests; volunteerism
is a form of public association managed by private organizations. There is, of course, another kind of
public association the private sector relies on to produce and attract new
consumers: leisure. Not only does
association through leisure directly encourage consumption practices (friends
meet for a cup of coffee and a cigarette), it also provides the meeting place
in which consumers are to keep abreast of new consumption patterns (they come
into contact with new fashions, new gadgets, new beverages) and the brands
which sell those consumption patterns (via television and radio, in
menus). But, as Rojek notes in a
discussion of the work of Victor Turner,
Ôone
of the serious features of leisure is that it constitutes the time and space in
which cultural values can be objectified and subject to reflexive investigationÉ
it is no accident that many of the important political movements of the
industrial period have their origins in taverns and public houses.Õ[86]
If
perhaps it is rather deterministic to claim that the Ôloosening of inhibitionsÕ
in leisure spaces could lead to citizens Ôquestioning the values underpinning
normality,Õ[87] it is
nevertheless likely that such an eventuality would concern the regime. At the very least, loosening of
inhibitions would seem to undermine the power of regime symbols to generate
public dissimulation amongst atomized citizens.
If,
as Wedeen argues, one of the most potent elements of the regimeÕs authority is
its ability to manage the symbolic domain, then those symbols produced
privately will be scrutinized heavily.
Indeed, in the national-regime imaginary, authentic national symbols
which validate the regime are to be celebrated. Conversely, Western symbols which imply subjugation to
foreign ideas, imports, and capital are to be suppressed or rejected – as
the wide discrepancy between Western access to LebanonÕs urban markets and
Syrian markets testifies. Even
today, McDonalds is banned in Syria.[88] But for the private-corporate world,
the most embedded image is the most powerful. Western brands are able to penetrate even the Syrian market
as they have such a wide array of advertising streams to pursue, and present
Syrian businesspeople with opportunities for profit. But, these brands are impossible to authenticate and thus
are problematic for a regime that wants to manage the symbolic sphere.
Part-Privatization of Symbolic
Production: A Solution Emerges
These various unsettling incongruities between the
regime-national and the private-corporate imaginaries – over the ability
to shape the young individual, over the right to provide individuals with
social instruction in how to be effective and useful, over the shaping of
public association and communication, and over the orientation and management
of symbols – are stirred by the expansion of space purposefully
designated for commercial symbols to compete in. This space is a threat to the regimeÕs control of meaning,
to its management of the popular inventory of symbols, and to its role in
shaping public life. Yet, as has
been argued, the regime needs and in fact wants commerce to grow to increase
its revenues and cement its power.[89] So a resolution is needed – some
kind of mechanism in the symbolic field which can both constrain the commercial
space opening up in Syria and align it firmly within the regimeÕs orbit.
Just
as space is opening for brands to compete, so the regime is concurrently
part-privatizing its symbolic production.
This development is diffuse, and should not be seen as overtly
state-orchestrated at every turn.
Rather, although its outlines are managed by the regime, its detail and
dissemination are effected by a range of non-state actors in concert with the
government. The mechanism works on three levels: firstly, it mediates
alignments between the private-corporate world and the regime; secondly, it
influences choices over the production of goods; and thirdly, it merges the
boundaries between private-corporate and regime-national symbols within
Syria. Although it is beyond the
scope of this thesis, it is possible to claim that these techniques have been
widely developed for some time in Egypt.
If so, it may be that Syrian and Egyptian styles of authoritarianism are
converging.
Alignments between the
Corporate Realm and the Regime
Towards
the back of issue 52 is what appears to be an unusual advert (Figure 4). On closer inspection, it becomes clear
that this is not an advert at all – there is no product on sale here, no
prominent brand to convey – rather this is a political statement of United
GroupÕs support for the regime. It is beyond the scope of this thesis
to discuss the developments and implications for Syrian politics associated
with either the death of Rafik al-Hariri, the former Lebanese Prime Minister
and business tycoon of the Middle East, or the U.N. commission which led the
investigation into his death and pointed a finger of suspicion at the Syrian
regime. Certainly, the period,
which is far from complete, has seen a growing chorus of international
political pressure mount on the regime, and on Bashar al-Asad in particular,
all of which is worthy of comment.
But what I hope to do is use this period of political pressure to
understand the shifting implications for symbolic production, for the
commercial space I have identified, and for the regimeÕs efforts to navigate
some of the challenges of encouraging economic liberalization whilst
maintaining authoritarian rule.
These challenges are deeper rooted than the current political crisis,
and will very probably outlast it.
Yet, through this period of political crisis, some of the fault-lines of
these challenges emerge more clearly than ever. Thus, I propose to analyze symbolic production in Star and elsewhere during the period without detailed
analysis of the political crisis itself.
In short, I am arguing that the kinds of material I analyze are not just
a response to short term political pressures, but also to longer term dilemmas
created by economic liberalization in an authoritarian world.
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The page displays five Syrian faces, three women and
two men. They are young (probably
in their mid- to late-twenties) and visibly middle class (there are no hijabs
or items of religious significance on display here, and the subjects are
dressed casually but in ways which mark them as educated – they look
fashionable but not so sharp as to mark them as particularly rich). Two of the women are smiling, the
others look at the camera unflinchingly but without firm expressions. At the top of the page, it says, ÔMake
your voice (sautak) heard,Õ where
voice could also mean Ôvote.Õ
Subsequently, it says, ÔNo to threatening Syria.Õ The ÔnoÕ – la in Arabic – is emphasized so that it jumps out
from the page as if it were a solidarity ribbon akin to the red ribbon used in
AIDS awareness. It is pertinent to
note that the ribbon, as a symbol of solidarity and awareness, has been
appropriated by wide ranging political movements over the last decade or more,
most successfully on the international scene by the movement for democracy in
Ukraine. This appeal to the ribbon
takes on further connotations of national solidarity for Syrians in light of
its use in Israel by the rightwing settler movement which opposed withdrawal
from the Gaza settlements. There,
the ribbon was coloured orange as a link to the Ukrainian movement which
garnered wide international solidarity; here it is coloured blue. At the bottom of the page, a webpage is
advertised – www.salam.sy
– and to the right, beside United GroupÕs emblem, is some
commentary. It reads,
ÔThey
have accused us of being silent
And
that we have no voice
Thousands
have voted for Peace. For respect.
Have
you taken part?
DonÕt
be silent as they are trying to squeeze you under their political pressure
It
is you who is the target.
We
have watched the results of those who were silent and decided to wait
And
we have decided to stand by Syria.
Enter
the website and take part
Because
your vote is importantÉÕ
This page is testimony to the part-privatization of
symbolic production, a multi-faceted mechanism which has complex implications
for advertising in Syria. In the first case, this political advert shows that
the elite of domestic companies which controls the strategic sectors of media,
communications technologies and marketing, is close to or part of the regime. On the one hand, state monopolies
increasingly posture as private companies by projecting a strong brand and
media image. The private
companies, on the other hand, do not just have strategic interests for
cosying-up to state authorities; some are close to the regime through blood or
patronage. For example, Syria Tel,
the dominant mobile phone company in Syria, is owned by Rami Makhlouf, a second
cousin of President Bashar Al-Asad.
Majad Suleiman, one of the founders and chairmen of United Group –
the company which produces Star
along with numerous other publications – is son of Baghat Suleiman,
former head of the Intelligence Services (Mukhabarat) and close friend of the President. Elsewhere, entrepreneurs in the leisure
industry are also close to the regime.
The company which runs a 24-hour American cafŽ, Pit Stop, the nightclub, Underground, and restaurant, Gemini, is owned by the son of the former Vice President,
Abd Al-Halim Khaddam.[90] Many of these companies are firm
backers of the regime, as their involvement in the salam.sy website
confirm. In return, these
companies are granted virtual monopolies within their sectors. The charge is even made that in order
to establish any kind of business in these sectors the consent of Makhlouf or
one of the leading lights is a must.[91] The job which Star is dedicated to involves producing a new generation
of entrepreneurs and professionals both sold to capital accumulation and the
necessity of authoritarian rule.
Producing Self-Generated Goods
and Brands
The regime is keen that brands be produced in
Syria. There is a long legacy of
import substitution, the practice of imitating foreign brands or products
domestically so as to generate jobs and revenue at home. For instance, Syrian-produced 3M
bars, which consist of three chocolate fingers in a red packet, are quite
overtly modelled on the (four-finger) Nestle brand Kit Kat. Many international products, from televisions to
soft drinks to cereals, have their Syrian counterparts. And although the regime is beginning to
allow access to some global brands previously prohibited – PepsiÕs
arrival in the Syrian market was greeted with much fanfare by Star who published a Pepsi advert replete with Amr Diab,
the Egyptian popular singer – designing and promoting domestic brands
which overtly imitate international brands is still common. Thus, Pepsi is copied to produce Fire
and Prima Cool (Figure 5), McDonaldÕs and Burger King are reproduced as
Batatas, and Starbucks re-emerges as Inhouse Coffee.[92] The beauty of such a strategy is that
it fuses within the brand a sense that it is both modern and authentically
Syrian; or, to put it another way, these brands allow for a self-generated
modernity and avoid reliance on and subservience to Western
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products. The delicate balance of such an
operation was expressed to me when I visited Said al-Jaafari the Chief
Operating Officer of Inhouse Coffee, the cafŽ chain which has emerged as
perhaps the most visibly derivative and consciously branded commercial leisure
space today in Syria.[93] Al-Jaafari was quick to point out that
the idea for Inhouse came whilst he and a friend were living and working in the
United States at a time when Starbucks was booming. But the challenge was, he insisted repeatedly, to create
something new since creativity was, apparently, the only Ôproof youÕre a human
being.Õ ÔWe donÕt believe in
imitation,Õ al-Jaafari confirmed.
Inhouse, then, is a brand customized to the Syrian market. Although the coffee is imported, the
blends – which took a painstaking five or six months to perfect before
the chain opened (remember, Ôyou canÕt imitateÕ) – are Syrian-designed to
suit Syrian tastes. The standards
of service offered in store are, I am told, higher than you might expect in the
US. To achieve this, staff were
hired six months before the first cafŽ opened and trained on service
alone. Indeed, every aspect of
Inhouse – the marketing, the branding, the dŽcor – was produced by
Syrians. Even the architectural
design was produced by Syrians living and working in Germany. Thus, although al-Jaafari describes the
ÔfundamentalsÕ of the Inhouse coffee shop brand as foreign (just as he argues
fast food is not culturally Syrian and Oriental food in the US is not
American), he argues that his coffee shop is appropriate for the Syrian market
because it was creatively designed by Syrians with Syrians in mind.
Re-appropriating New
Advertising Space: Propagating Regime Messages Through Private Means
Perhaps the most powerful aspect of the mechanism I am
describing relates to the merging of regime rhetoric and national symbols with
private advertising. The evidence
for this dynamic, which was apparently completely lacking in Syria symbolic production
of the nineties according to WedeenÕs study,[94]
is compelling. In the first case,
just as new advertising space has been opening up for commercial brands in
public space,[95] so the
regime has been re-appropriating such space for its own symbolic display. Hence, in Damascus, it is not uncommon to
find bus-stop shelters, lamp-post hoardings, and shop-front posters displaying
national regime symbols (images of the flag, President, the regimeÕs crest),
even though they are designed to display commercial material (Figure 6). At the Jisr al-RaÕis bus stop in
central Damascus, a station visited by thousands every day, there is a new
dynamic billboard which continually rotates to show three different images, as
well as telling the time. I
observed this hoarding in early December 2005 displaying an unidentified image
of children waving the Syrian flag interspersed with two other commercial
images (Figure 6). Elsewhere,
space in Star magazine, in
accordance with all UG publications, has been used to display regime
symbols. In Issues 50 and 51,
produced shortly after Bashar Al-AsadÕs Damascus University speech in November
2005, the Syrian flag covers almost the entire front page. Overlaid with the closing slogan of the
PresidentÕs speech, ÔGod protect Syria,Õ these covers evoke an earlier issue in
which the entire front page was used as an advert for Pepsi featuring Egyptian
pop legend, Amr Diab.[96]
This points to two further features of the
privatization of symbolic production: first, private companies themselves are
recycling regime images and rhetoric apparently of their own accord; and
second, the regime is increasingly exploiting techniques of advertising to
further compliance. Star is not the only commercial outlet recycling regime
symbols; the private companies listed as sponsors of the www.salam.sy website
are also involved. Indeed,
magazines and websites are not the
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only media used to perform this task – radio is involved too. The
much recycled phrase taken from Bashar Al-AsadÕs Damascus University speech,
ÔGod Protect Syria,Õ also cropped up as the chorus refrain of a determinedly
militaristic song sung almost as an army chant by gravely aggressive male
voices. This song was broadcast as
an ÔexclusiveÕ in December 2005 on SyriaÕs first private radio station, Al-Madina
FM. Demonstrating allegiance with the national cause becomes such
a preoccupation of commercial enterprises that some resort to combining their
brand with the national flag. Even
mundane household products – such as washing powder – come to be
tagged to the regime symbolically (figure 3).
[97]
As regime symbols are recycled, so the
perceived distance from their source is increased. This effect allows for regime symbols to take on a
credibility and legitimacy seen to be lacking in those Ôtransparently phonyÕ
symbols it manufactures itself.
[98]
Indeed, national-regime symbols are
being put to work along the lines of commercial advertising. Commercial advertising, as Richard
Ohmann has argued, works to index values to a product so that the two are seen
to be associated by the consumer.
[99]
Hence the front cover image of Star issue 50 aims to attach the product (the regime,
Bashar Al-Asad) to a set of values (national stability, progress, freedom,
GodÕs will) which resonate with Syrian nationals. By displaying the national flag on its front cover with a
slogan widely accredited to the President, Star magazine inverts the advertising code of the Pepsi
cover (Figure 7). Whereas Pepsi
uses Amr Diab to attach the values of sex appeal, charisma, style and youth to
the Pepsi brand, the Syrian flag – which is loaded with nationalist
meaning – gives meaning to Bashar Al-Asad. The underlying code – a code which advertising has
made familiar – remains the same.
Readers, as Ohmann notes, have learned how to read advertising, how to
Ôsupply connections, fill gaps, participate in the construction of meaning.Õ
[100]
The meaning to be inferred is that
maintaining the security and integrity of Syria necessitates maintaining the
security of the regime. It is the
propagation of this message in ambiguous spaces which cut across
commercial-state, public-private divides that makes this technique
possible.
Finally, it should be noted that Star is not only using its pages to further regime symbols and blur the lines between brands, regime symbols, and popular aphorisms. Issue 52, produced in December 2005, comes with a rubber wrist band designed as the national flag and a CD of national songs within a sheath bearing the same image of the Syrian flag as the previous weekÕs front cover (Figure 7). These techniques signal the exploitation of marketing tactics characteristic of the corporate world, a development which is central to understanding
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current trends in regime message-making. CDs are mass consumer goods which newspaper publishers in the West have long been offering to readers for free in order to promote their product. The wrist band has seen a global rebirth of late as US fashion giant, Nike, has cashed in on ethical awareness by selling bands which mark solidarity to certain ethical campaigns. Star is also exploiting this development, demonstrating it is tuned in both to global youth fashions and to regime needs.
Privatized Symbolic Production
in Egypt: the Convergence of Syrian and Egyptian Styles of Authoritarianism?
It
is possible that privatized techniques for legitimating authoritarian power as
evidenced by Star have their roots, as
far as the Middle East is concerned, in EgyptÕs Infitah (Opening).
This period of economic reform led by Anwar Sadat in the 1970s led many
commentators to assume that Syrian and Egyptian styles of authoritarianism were
quite separate; at the time of EgyptÕs Infitah, Syria was experiencing the consolidation of regime
power by Hafiz Al-Asad in ways which sought far-reaching state involvement in
all matters economic and social.
It was not until the early nineties – a period which witnessed the
demise of the USSR and questioned the very viability of the state socialist
model – that economic liberalization really took shape in Syria in the
form of Investment Law Number 10 of 1991.
By this stage, economic shifts were well under way in Egypt although
authoritarianism was not. It is
perhaps sensible, then, to suggest that the mechanisms of control described
here and illustrated in Star
– close alignments between capitalists and regime officials, ostensibly
ÔvoluntaryÕ shows of support for regime continuity propagated through the media
by private businesses, and the authentication of consumer products – have
been developed for some time in Egypt.
Indeed, it is common knowledge that Gamal Mubarak, son of the current
president Hosni Mubarak, is being groomed to take the reins in a stable
transition of authoritarian rule reminiscent of the Hafiz-Bashar transition.
Capitalists seem to be involved in making this transition possible. Certainly
the sophistication of Hosni MubarakÕs media campaign which helped him to
victory in the first contested presidential elections ever in Egypt in 2005
point to the fact that the convergence of regime and private-corporate
interests through media is well-established there.[101]
Economic liberalization is a necessary evil for the
ruling regime in Syria today.
Although economic change in no way implies the inevitability of
political change, it nevertheless presents a threat to the regimeÕs discursive,
symbolic, and ideological infrastructure of control. An emerging resolution, legible in Star magazine, seeks to widen the space for commercial
brands to compete within a constraining framework of state control. Central to this development are three
mechanisms which collectively aim to bind those economic forces unleashed by
liberalization into securing the continuity of SyriaÕs political status
quo. First, the regime is
encouraging the development of an entrepreneurial class capable of generating
new wealth which is tied to the regime by blood and patronage. Second, domestic companies are being
supported to produce authentic domestic brands which imitate global
brands. Third, regime-national
symbolic production – so prolific during the rule of Hafiz Al-Asad
– is being part-privatized.
That these mechanisms appear well developed in Egypt suggests that the
two styles of authoritarianism may be converging.
3
Constraining Star News: the Lebanese Paparazzi Pages Wedged between
Syrian Musalsals and National Canons
ÔThe world
is developing and progressing around us and we Arabs need to keep abreast of
the positive changes in this world whilst keeping in line with our authentic
Arabic traditions and being on our guard so as to keep at bay western mass
media which are destroying the minds of the children of our Arab generation.Õ
Star
Magazine, issue 48, 2-9 November 2005
Introduction: Syrian-produced
content does battle with Lebanese Star News
Star magazine is testimony to the on-going contest in Syria between two discourses engaged in what is seen to be a struggle for youth consciousness. By juxtaposing Syrian- and Lebanese-produced material, the magazine itself becomes a site of that contest. These opposed discourses orient the reader in radically different ways, one geared to constructing and affirming a vivid national imagination, the other directed towards an imagined world of celebrity culture that virtually erases Syria as a sphere of cultural production. Moreover, the ways in which these opposing discourses and modes of representation are physically ordered in the magazine suggest that Star is designed to reassert a vision of national confidence in the face of growing pressures on youth consciousness from Lebanese and global media production.
The Syrian version of Star magazine has retained a number of pages from its Lebanese sister publication. These pages broadly fall into two camps: on the one hand, those with a primary focus relating only tangentially to celebrity – Star style, Star horoscopes, Top Movies, Mots FlechŽs and Faux Jumeaux – are ordered to the back of the magazine (as in the Lebanese version) and are interspersed with other Syrian material; on the other hand, those pages directly devoted to celebrity news and gossip are shuffled to the middle of the magazine and treated as a coherent whole called Star News. That this collection of pages is not in fact sequential in the Lebanese magazine is testimony to the process of selection and reordering in the transfer of pages. As the great majority of the Lebanese celebrity pages borrowed to create the Syrian magazineÕs Star News concentrate on stars from the West or from Lebanon itself, Star Syria creates for itself a window on the world which effectively discounts a Syrian-conceived celebrity culture. This window is both internally ordered and externally constrained. Internally, it moves broadly from a Western-only focus in English to an Arab world focus in Arabic via a section which fuses Western and Arab topics in both languages. Externally, this section is shuffled to the middle of the magazine, hemmed in by overtly Syrian pages, wedged into the constraining framework of a Syrian agenda which, in its avowedly nationalistic self-reliance, seeks to impose both material and ideational boundaries on its opposed Lebanese ÔotherÕ. The Syrian pages which achieve this effect - Star Zaman and Double Star – were not original features of the Syrian magazine but are now firmly established in its repertoire. Both speak a voice antithetical to the paparazzi thrust of the Lebanese section: Star Zaman charts institutional, social, architectural, and technological history in twentieth-century Syria whilst Double Star displays a young Syrian professional complete with a familiar inventory of personal details – age, profession, studies, hobbies – and a handy slogan for life. These pages work to contain the paparazzi section not just because they deny the relevance of mass-mediated stardom to cultural and national progress, but because they point away from the west to an indigenous legacy of modernity and a home-grown class of wealth-generating professionals.
Too ÔPaparazziÕ for the Syrian
Copy: Lebanese Material Rejected from Star News
Star News, the unit of Lebanese pages addressed to celebrity
news within the Syrian magazine, is characteristic of the paparazzi tone and
approach of the Lebanese magazine more broadly, a tone which is markedly at
odds with Syrian Star
material. Carole, the editor of Star Syria, argues that the paparazzi magazine embodied
by Star Lebanon is not
ÔappropriateÕ for Syrians, claiming that a purely paparazzi magazine is not
reflective of Syrian culture or popular demand.[102] Instead, in her view Syrians want a
magazine with news, taste, and both serious and funny articles. It is certainly true that Syrian Star
offers a duality that its Lebanese
counterpart does not – the Lebanese magazine is an unashamed paparazzi
magazine, whilst, by contrast, the Syrian magazine works to impose constraining
borders on paparazzi culture through a self-generated counter-ethic and
tone. Indeed, in some ways Star demonstrates that a paparazzi culture generated
within modern Syria is for the time being non-existent.
Star News, then, makes selective use of Star LebanonÕs paparazzi ethic. Most obviously missing from Star News are the exclusives in which Star Lebanon pursues an Arab (almost always Lebanese) celebrityÕs private life over two pages or more. This component of Star Lebanon has seen many formats – Got Cha, Busted on Cam, Star Live, Star Shots, and Happy Hunting – all of which catch celebrities unawares in public or private. Many do little more than display a celebrity with family, spouse or father, but some offer a more provocative insight. For example, one issue shows Lebanese singer Tina relaxing with friends on a yacht wearing nothing but a bikini and sarong, a view of lavish celebrity culture and female exposure far removed from anything Star Syria would produce (Figure 8).[103] Other issues display celebrities kissing in public, arguing in fashion boutiques or making up after a row with a partner.[104] Or then thereÕs the Got Cha report on Mr Lebanon 2003 As`ad TarbihÕs birthday celebration in Downtown Beirut (Figure 9).[105] The reader is presented with a sequence of photographs which are constructed to form a narrative in pictures. Attached to each photograph is the time it was taken and a caption which pokes fun at Tarbih. For example, at 1.36 pm we see him sitting alone slumped in his chair at a street cafŽ table. The photograph shows him with his jaw extended forward and both
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hands
on his chin as if he is deeply impatient.
The caption reads ÔAs`ad Tarbih knows how to occupy himself while he
waits!Õ Then at 1.50 a female
friend arrives. The photo shows
Tarbih launching himself at her, his neck craned forward to kiss her and back
arching out of his chair which he still holds with one hand, his right armwrapped around her. The caption reads,
ÔHe hasnÕt got used to sitting alone, especially on his birthday É so she
quickly comes to join him sitting out.Õ The narrative continues: we see him
gleefully receive and open a birthday present from her, we watch her feeding
him with an outstretched hand, and at 2.10, we witness him arch across the
table to show her something on his mobile phone, a gesture which brings their
heads into contact. The caption
reads, ÔHe knows how to get her close to him!Õ To complete the story, we see her leave the cafŽ walking off
into the distance, back to the camera, at 3.12, and then, apparently a whole 13
minutes later, we are shown Tarbih again slumped in his chair, this time with
hands on his head, looking away from the camera. The implication is that Tarbih is gazing in the
direction his partner walked away, his body language signalling that he is
completely overcome with adoration for her. The caption poses a rhetorical question: ÔWaiting for
another present?!Õ Finally, the
magazine shows Tarbih pursuing his celebrations later that evening but with Ôno
traceÕ of the female friend caught on camera earlier in the day. But there is no use celebrities trying
to hide their romantic escapades – Got Cha will get Ôem.
The power of the
sequence of photographs is to build a narrative without text. The captions only confirm what the
pictures already say. The
photographs are no more than disparate images of fleeting moments; it is their
selection and ordering on the page as a coherent sequence which moulds the story and works to frame the
celebrity interaction. The
sequence of pictures – Tarbih waiting impatiently, then launching himself
at his partner when she arrives, then opening her present with an ecstatic expression– can only make sense if we assume that Tarbih is madly in love. This assumption gives added meaning to
the image of him craning forward to show her his mobile phone: he wants to get
close to her. This is precisely
what the caption imagines – showing her his mobile phone is only a tactic
Tarbih employs to achieve his real goal. But the caption goes one step further:
by proposing that Tarbih Ôknows how to get her close to him,Õ it insinuates
that he is a good lover, experienced in the strategies of romantic persuasion. That those very same strategies revolve
around a mobile phone points to the captionÕs lively irony. The caption, then, takes the
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narrative built by the photograph sequence as its point of departure and uses it to mock the celebrity it simultaneously builds up.
In addition to the Lebanese exclusives in the Got Cha mould, Star Syria also rejects the Lebanese celebrity interview, LÕInterview. The motivation behind LÕInterviewÕs omission cannot be explained only by the fact that its focus is Lebanese; the overtly paparazzi tone and approach are also important factors. LÕInterview does give space for artists to discuss their work and careers, but more potently it takes a provocative, confrontational angle on the star. A pertinent example of this is an interview with the Lebanese singer, Carole Samaaha (Figure 10).[108] Each of the three pages of the interview is divided into two columns, one of which is text, the other photographs of the celebrity. The photographs, which span roughly two thirds of the width of each page, dominate the piece much as in the Lebanese exclusives, but here they are promotional pictures taken in a studio. They show Samaaha part-concealed by blue net curtains in the intimate surroundings of what looks like a bedroom. Deliberately racy, the pictures display Samaaha in provocative poses, titillating and alluring the reader with smiles and glances from a variety of camera angles. Indeed, her outfits are all revealing. Speech bubbles convey bite-size extracts from the text as if she were talking intimately with the reader.
As for the interview itself, it seeks both to buttress her celebrity and intrude on her private life at the same time. Take, for example, the following exchange about her personal finances:
Star: What about your fortune?
Samaaha: IÕm not rich, IÕve got enough. I do very few concerts out of choice, but not because there is no demand É
Star: IsnÕt artistic prestige sometimes bought by money?
Samaaha: To tell the truth IÕm not materialistic, and money matters donÕt bother meÉ
Star: Would you therefore buy an old car?
Samaaha: We donÕt have to go that far, if I am not rich that doesnÕt mean that I am a beggar. Money provides comfort but not happinessÉ
The first question bluntly takes for granted the fact that Samaaha is rich. This assumption couched in such an open-ended question grossly oversteps the margins for decency and respect upheld in Star Syria. The second question makes a further assumption Star Syria would find problematic: that artistic prestige is enhanced by material wealth. Finally, the third question overtly mocks Samaaha, throwing back at her the evasive responses she gives. By claiming she is not materialistic, she attempts to deflect attention from her finances. But this only adds fuel to the fire, allowing the journalist to posit an extreme interpretation of her non-materialistic streak and build it into a patently absurd question for a celebrity, ÔWould you therefore buy an old car?Õ The only way she can extract herself is by claiming the question is unwarranted.
This aggressive approach designed to corner the celebrity and so expose her publicly works on the basis that the readerÕs attention is caught by revelation and controversy. In Star SyriaÕs pursuit of national canons, revelation and controversy can only be unhelpful, as we will see. But LÕInterview is not only intrusive and assertive; it is also dogged in its pursuit of salacious gossip, exclusive detail, and celebrity exposure. Here, for example, are the final five questions of the interview with extracts of SamaahaÕs responses:
Star: You were rejected from the play by the artist Mansur Al-Rahbani Hukm Al-Ra`ian: any bad feelings?
Samaaha: Not at all. My leaving acting was a personal choice – nobody forced me to it. I watched the play and I loved the acting of Latifa in itÉ
Star: It has been said that the play was not as successful as the rest of MansurÕs works.
Samaaha: No on the contrary I liked the play more than Maluk Al-TuaÕifÉ.
Star: If your opinions about the work were negative, would you have been brave enough to admit it publicly?
Samaaha: I would have said that the work was good but not the best.
Star: Your new album is entitled ÔI am freeÕ. So to what extent are you really free?
Samaaha: To the furthest degree, because I am not scared of expressing my views and feelings publiclyÉ
Star: You always sing about love, so whereÕs the man in your life?
Samaaha: There is love, but I
always run away from it because men are selfish and art is selfish. And IÕm worried love will steal me away
from my big artistic ambition. But
I cannot deny that love and starting a family is what IÕm dreaming of.
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Each of the five questions is a test for Samaaha, and collectively they put her under intense scrutiny and judgement. The whole basis for this interview is incompatible with Star Syria which seeks only to buttress its Ôstars,Õ not to tease and interrogate them. In this section of LÕInterview five further aspects of the paparazzi ethic emerge. First, Star Lebanon is not afraid to accuse the celebrity of failure as, in this case, Samahaa is reminded of her rejection from a play. Second, celebrities are given opportunities, indeed encouraged, to pour scorn on one another. Here, Samaaha is given numerous opportunities to disparage the director Mansur Al-Rahbani, the man responsible for her public rejection from Hukm Al-Ra`ian. Third, Star Lebanon consistently seeks evidence of hypocrisy in the responses of its interviewees. In this interview, Star goes one step further, intimating hypocrisy in the question, ÔYou always sing about love, so whereÕs the man in your life?Õ The question implies that the romance of SamaahaÕs songs does not relate to her actual love life. Hence, it suggests that her songs are emotionally vacuous or unfelt. The veiled accusation of hypocrisy is just one more technique for extracting gossip; it forces Samaaha either to refute the idea that she lacks a man, or to contest the basis of the question. Fourth, LÕInterview posits hypothetical questions which the celebrity has to resolve. This is yet one more means of scrutinizing the star, and it proves difficult to escape. Samaaha is asked whether she Ôwould have been brave enough to admit itÕ had she disliked Hukm Al-Ra`ian, leaving her in a no-win situation. Either she refuses to play the game and comes out as a bad sport, or she accepts the conundrum and puts her future actions under greater paparazzi scrutiny. Finally, these questions, as with the financial questions before them, are deeply personal, and give celebrities no room to hide the awkward or painful aspects of their personal lives. Since Star Syria is geared to presenting its celebrities in a purely positive light, these five aspects of the paparazzi ethic evident in LÕInterview – the acknowledgment of celebrity failure, intimations of hypocrisy, encouragement towards disparaging other stars, and the intrusive elaboration on problematic hypothetical situations and personal questions – are incompatible with the central thrust of the Syrian magazine.
One Step Removed: Why DuddlyÕs
Column is
Included in Star News
The Syrian Star News, composed of pages borrowed from across the Lebanese magazine, comprises broadly three sections. First, is the unmistakably Westernized DuddlyÕs Column. Bright, colourful and breezy, these four pages of short English-language features on Western celebrity gossip are a consistent component of Star News. That the vast majority of these features are copied wholesale from celebrity-gossip websites does not diminish the significance of their selection for the Syrian magazine. Second, there is almost always a component of between two and six pages in Arabic devoted to news in the Arab celebrity world. Undoubtedly, these pages focus predominantly on Lebanese stars. These two distinct elements seem to merge through a series of pages which fuse both Arabic and English language, Arab and Western stars. The third Lebanese section which Star News incorporates into the Syrian Magazine is a longer feature of perhaps four pages on the career of a specific Western star.
Of the three components that comprise Star News, DuddlyÕs Column is the most tightly tied in to a paparazzi ethic. The features, taken from Western entertainment websites, are invariably devoted to detailing the private lives of the stars they present. Indeed, many are salacious, radically compromising notions of female modesty. Take for example a piece entitled ÔHelena ChristensenÕs lesbian dance:Õ
ÔHelena Christensen reportedly
performed a raunchy dance with lesbians at a gay nightspot. The catwalk queen was at New YorkÕs
trendy Cubbyhole bar with a group of fellow models when she launched into a
spot of dirty dancing. The 36 year
old supermodel stunned partygoers with her sizzling antics and according
to onlookers Helena was a hit with drinkers at the bar É earlier this year, the
Danish born beauty É revealed she often goes out without any underwearÉ(Figure
12)Õ[109]
Not only is homosexuality a highly controversial issue in Syria, as I discovered when I raised the issue of representing gay and lesbian celebrities in the magazine with Star SyriaÕs writers, but female independence and social behaviour are intensely contested issues as well.[110] Here we have the image of a woman drinking, socializing late at night without a male guardian, dirty dancing and even wearing no underwear, not to mention implications of homosexuality. This feature is not unique; rather Star regularly publishes similarly sensationalist gossip stories in DuddlyÕs Column. Thus Star turns out stories such as Ellen DeGeneres revealing her childhood experiences of sexual harassment by her father and her impressions of her burgeoning lesbian relationship with Portia de Rossi, Goldie Hawn urging women to Ôaccept that infidelity is inevitableÕ and explaining how to have a fulfilling sex life – Ôput on really pretty clothes and make love. And do it differentlyÕ – not to mention Eva Longoria whose Ôextreme bikini wax is worth the painÕ considering Ôit improves her prowess in the bedroomÕ – Ôit makes sex betterÕ she informs us.[111]
What renders this Lebanese material acceptable in Star Syria, unlike the Lebanese pages in the Got Cha mould, is that it concentrates solely on Western stars and is written in English. These two factors combine to perform a distancing effect: it is assumedthat Western stars under no circumstances provide role models to young Syrians. A similar dynamic has been observed in the development of popular magazines through the first half of the twentieth century in Egypt.[112] The racy images that illustrated magazines began to publish from the 1920s onwards were initially only of foreign women; over the next three decades a process of import substitution took
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place whereby foreign women were replaced by Egyptian women. But as far as Star magazine is concerned, the flip side of this dynamic is that, more than ever, Syrian stars are expected to behave appropriately. Even if Star shows that values of appropriate public behaviour in Syria are in constant flux, nevertheless the more Western licentiousness filters in, the more urgent the need to define and legitimize an alternative code of public behaviour deemed ÔappropriateÕ for Syrians. Star News and the Syrian material which surrounds it appear directly opposed and antagonistic, yet in terms of the rationale behind the magazine, they are counterparts. By opening a window on the West, Star News allows for a spectrum of public behaviour and representation that only the Syrian material can filter.
Star in Context: the Motivation for a Magazine of
Opposing Codes
Star News is far from an anomaly in the Syrian version of Star; rather it has an integral part to play in pursuing the magazineÕs agenda. This is because Star, as part of a growing corpus of publications in Syria which seek to generate a modern secular wealth-generating class who can harness globalization for the Syrian national benefit, is designed to enable an engagement with Western popular culture on Syrian terms. That Star Syria is the first magazine of its kind in over thirty years openly pursuing this engagement is perhaps an indication of how far the regime of Hafiz Al-Asad was able to tighten its grip on print media and the public sphere in Syria. Of course, SyriaÕs print media – particularly magazines – have embraced a Western-style popular culture before, not least in the ÔdemocraticÕ years of the 1950s.[113] Martin shows that popular magazines of the period regularly published ÔracyÕ images of Western stars, as well as reviewing entertainment and leisure activities for the young middle classes.[114] Yet, Ba`thism, the ruling political force in Syria from 1963, pursued a vision of revolutionary socialism which sought alternatives to Western commodities and consumer lifestyles, and hence virtually eliminated print as a vehicle for Western popular culture. Instead, a number of rhetorically socialist magazines emerged whose purpose was to further national socialism.
Ba`thist
rhetorical pre-eminence in youth publications was alive and well as late as
1970 when on the first of April, seven months before Hafiz al-Asad launched his
ÔCorrective MovementÕ to take control of the country, a new magazine was
published entitled ÔYouthÕ (Shabiba). In stark contrast to notions of youth
in Star magazine, Shabiba saw the youth as the vanguard of socialist
awakening, claiming that the Ôcommitted mass of the youthÕ was Ôamongst the
greatest achievements of the new socialist societyÕ which could Ôraise the
ideology of the Revolution.Õ[115] The category of youth, as Armbrust has
noted, is a modern category which only came into being with the advent of mass
education intervening between childhood and marriage.[116] Shabiba, then, proclaims the construction of SyriaÕs youth
as the unique achievement of Ba`thist mass education. The magazine, designed as the ideological fuel to drive the
SyriaÕs revolutionary youth as the engine to further progress, is
Ôcommitted to nationalist socialist thinking, believing in the goals of the Arabic masses and their revolution, it will be a revolutionary expression of their aspirations and É the fight for our people and our youth, and to deal with them in the spirit of responsibility and commitment to the spirit of the Revolution and the People.Õ[117]
This rhetorical bent is almost completely lacking in Star, although it does seek to shape society by way of young people in keeping with Shabiba magazine of the 1970s. Both Star and Shabiba were launched expressly to take Ôa stake in the creation of this new [young] person.Õ[118] Yet, ShabibaÕs means for achieving this were very different: it advocated Ôsocialist educational effortsÕ as opposed to endorsing privately-financed routes to academic and professional success. Indeed, unlike Star, it saw no place for consumption lifestyles and Western popular culture in young peopleÕs lives. The three decades of Hafiz al AsadÕs rule, as those who grew up in these years attest, saw a near complete decline of publications for young people under stringent authoritarian conditions. Thus, Star emerges in a near vacuum for indigenously produced youth publications in Syria with the only legacy in near view that of magazines absorbed by the rhetoric of revolutionary socialism. Because of this, Star comes in for intense social scrutiny, and those involved in its production know it. Nevertheless, dealing with the Western popular culture which knocks increasingly loudly at the door is a pressing task, made ever more urgent by the spread of new media technologies in Syria.
As the focus of studies over the last ten years shows, television has become the dominant medium for engaging in and contesting national representations in the Middle East.[119] The stateÕs extensive role in producing popular television has been possible for so long because terrestrial television can be closely controlled within national borders in a similar way to print and radio. This involves, firstly, stringent, even arbitrary, censorship powers to control what can be said and to eliminate uncomfortable news and content, and secondly, the production of cultural output designed to affirm a sense of national community, which in Syria means dramatic serials (musalsalat). Satellite television, which spread rapidly across the Middle East in the course of the 1990s, poses the most immediate threat to the role the state has enjoyed in terrestrial television. It has enabled consumers to choose from a much larger range of external channels and production, making it virtually impossible to build national audiences around a single state-backed production. The thesis that ritualistic consumption of national media plays a central role in building national identity was most famously made by Benedict Anderson for print capitalism in the European context.[120] Subsequently, studies of media in the Middle East have made similar arguments about the ritual aspect of terrestrial-television consumption in the region, particularly during Ramadan where the ritual of breaking fast at sunset (iftar) has provided an ideal opportunity for the transmission of dramatic serials.[121] In Syria, aligning viewers ritualistically with the transmission of a single national production has at least succeeded in uniting different social, religious, and sectarian groups around one national Ôevent,Õ although different viewer responses may produce new schisms and contests in society.[122] Nevertheless, satellite is posing a relentless challenge to the very possibility of serials as national events. Given enduring beliefs that audiences are infinitely malleable to state-backed messages[123] and that television should play a political role,[124] state producers see losing the ability to build audiences around national content as a threat to the very role of television in inspiring national community and cohesion. As access to foreign audiences and markets has grown, and scheduling time on satellite has increased, musalsal production has rocketed. According to Salamandra, this has Ôobliterated the annual media sensations that once É united the national audience in the act of viewing.Õ[125] The task of producing this increased output has fallen to private companies rather than those in the state sector,[126] again distancing state actors from the role of shaping national representations and discourse.
Satellite television poses other threats to those dedicated to the survival of the Syrian regime. Most notably, satellite renders the task of controlling what people watch, so long a primary concern of vulnerable governments in the Middle East, much more difficult.[127] In addition, satellite channels can bring external ideologies and hostile political messages into the homes of viewers. Syrian viewers will remember at least two occasions where this has taken place. On the first occasion during Hafiz al-AsadÕs funeral in June 2000, the Arab News Network (ANN), owned by the late PresidentÕs nephew, Somar Rifaat, was used as a vehicle to convey the political ambitions of HafizÕs banished brother (and would be successor), Rifaat.[128] On the second occasion, both the Lebanese channels, LBC and the Rafik Al-Hariri owned Future TV, used the international arena of reality TV to direct political anger over the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister at the Syrian regime widely deemed responsible.[129] Both FutureÕs Super Star and LBCÕs Star Academy produced and broadcasted patriotic Lebanese songs in the immediate aftermath, whilst LBC seemed to revel in the elimination from its show of the Syrian contestant, Joey.[130] Above all else, the advent of satellite television heralded an era in which it became much harder for regimes to dominate symbolic production and control meaning. Wedeen has argued that the symbolic production used to generate the cult of President Hafiz Al-Asad was a central mechanism of the Syrian regimeÕs domination.[131] Alterman has since claimed that such a mechanism is no longer possible in an era of satellite television, as evidenced by the more open approach to the media taken by Bashar Al-Asad.[132] Indeed, it has become much harder for regimes to control the religious and social realms of representation and discourse. Although the Bahraini Government succeeded in preventing the complete broadcast of MBCÕs Big Brother (Al-RaÕis) over religious objections, it could not prevent Lebanese reality television being broadcast regionally and consumed locally. Syria is of course different from the Gulf, but the regime is similarly incapable of guarding against the broadcast of coverage deemed unwholesome and divisive.
But, scholars
have warned against over-estimating the power and novelty of new media
technologies such as satellite television. Much of the satellite content that commentators claim to be
novel in the Middle East can in fact be traced to a long lineage of media
output through the twentieth century, not least the sexualized images of women
so prevalent in video clips.[133] Another claim frequently made of
satellite television in the Middle East is that it has an unprecedented
capacity to challenge state authority and encourage individual freedoms.[134] Yet, satellite channels are in many
cases financially dependent upon states, or indeed are owned by state actors
and their cohorts.[135]
As such, they have very little interest in undermining the dominant political
elites or threatening possible markets for advertising.[136] These trends have been largely borne
out by ten years of satellite operations within the Middle East. In current-affairs coverage, satellites
may have in fact contributed to a sharpening of the Ôred linesÕ of
censorship. Sakr argues that, by
enabling some criticism to be levelled at governments regionally, satellite
channels have provided national governments with an excuse to overlook
necessary changes to media laws domestically.[137] In terms of cultural production, mass
voting on regional reality TV shows, such as Star Academy, has had little impact on domestic politics, despite
widespread networking through new media technologies.[138] Popular culture is, as Twitchell
argues, so appealing to young people because it takes Ôsimple ideas seriously,Õ
because, unlike high culture or politics in the Middle East, it is
Ôauthentically democratic and classless,Õ and because it is Ôinfinitely
tolerant É and ultimately adaptive.Õ[139] Popular culture broadcast by satellite
does not provide some inherent catalyst for political debate, nor does it
necessarily seek to challenge state power even if it drives forward the use of
new, theoretically empowering technologies. The crucial development satellite television, and
particularly Lebanese cultural output, has brought to the Middle East, then, is
not political and social empowerment, nor some kind of novel process of
westernization; rather it has opened a wide and growing space for the emergence
of a genuinely classless popular culture which is capable of standing outside
canons of taste. Cultural shifts
towards an overtly popular
culture unchained by nationalist modernism have been identified before in the
Middle East. Armbrust points to
the advance of mass-appeal ÔvulgarityÕ in Egyptian cinematic and musical
production through the 70s and 80s.[140] But a shift on a scale similar to today
is, I argue, unprecedented.
In order to gain a more insightful understanding of how new media technologies – satellite television, the internet, and mobile telephones – are having an impact on social life in Syria, this thesis argues that an analysis of a new youth magazine and the experiences and attitudes of those who produce it can be enormously productive. What do these young people and the media professionals who guide them perceive as the threat inherent in popular satellite television formats such as Reality TV and video clips? And how are these attitudes reflected in the content of the magazine? This chapter will seek to answer the second question by showing the very real sense of threat amongst SyriaÕs cultural producers from the satellite onslaught.
The chief fear is the fragmentation of audiences and the loss of a cohesive national identity. To confront this, Syrian Star sets out to build a canon of national icons in the one field where Syrian producers are strong – musalsals. Part of this endeavour seeks to combat the classless adaptability of satellite popular culture by generating a new national confidence in a kind of national high culture packaged as popular culture. As Kraidy points out, in the Middle East cultural production is more contentiously contested as a field of national identity construction than in the West.[141] In a region where nationalisms are far from consolidated, and where processes of foreign occupation (the US and its partners in Iraq), annexation (Israel in the Golan Heights), and colonization (Israel in parts of the West Bank) are not only vivid in the memory but alive and well today, defending the national cause remains an existential task which touches the very core of public identities. For some this national vulnerability demands that energies be ploughed into the production of a national high culture. As popular Egyptian television preacher Amr Khaled puts it:
É I am sorry to say that the features of our Arab nation have been obliterated; they are lost to all of the wellsprings of our culture and art É What is needed, then, is that all creative artists employ their art to drive the wheels of progress in the area.[142]
For Khaled, the stakes are high. His talk of Arab
society being Ôobliterated,Õ of its descent into ÔflaccidityÕ and ÔcollapseÕ
through consumption of video clips points to how very seriously he associates
the prosperity of canons of taste with the very existence of the nation. It is pertinent to note that similarly
strident elite views were common in nineteenth century Europe and America,
where high culture was considered the apex of human evolution.[143] For Syrian cultural producers involved
in making musalsals, cultural production perceived to be high art is still
prized as well.[144] The mass popularity of the reality TV
formats harnessed by the Lebanese channels, LBC and Future, has unsettled
Syrian producers, and Star reflects
this.[145] Indeed, Star frames these competing codes – one unashamedly
popular, the other dressed in popular clothes but devoted unflinchingly to the
construction of national canons – in a highly orchestrated way so as to
enable an engagement with popular satellite content on terms which will favour
SyriaÕs national cause.
Star, then, should be understood as new in two specific ways. Firstly, it marks a radical departure in Syrian publications, particularly for young people, in that it openly attempts to engage with the global popular-culture production that Lebanese satellite channels have harnessed with such success in the Middle East. Secondly, it has emerged in a specific context in which Bashar Al-AsadÕs regime, in trying to come to terms with the global reach of American political and cultural hegemony, is determined to renegotiate state-society relations and redefine the role young people are to play in shaping the new order. These two factors combine to infuse the magazineÕs core agenda: to open up a space in which an entrepreneurial class can come to harness globalizing formations – media production, technology, services – without impinging on the regimeÕs political control. Star seeks both to open a liberal space and to contain it. One of the central components of achieving this aim is the interplay between the Western-oriented Star News and the Syrian-produced material which contains it.
Mobilizing Musalsals to the
Defence of National Canons
StarÕs Syrian material is geared to bolstering national confidence. Crucially, the pages most overtly geared to containing the paparazzi ethic evident in Star News – Star Interview, Real Star, Sport Star, and Star Exclusives – are concerned almost entirely with Syrians and are written in Arabic, in contrast with the Star News Western- or Arab-world celebrities dealt with either in English or an Arabic infused with English. This is testimony to their role in constructing the national within StarÕs pages. Star Interview poses highly formulaic questions to an artist of national relevance about his or her education and career. In the vast majority of issues, Star Interview is a three- or four-page article which turns the spotlight on actors who are considered important because they have appeared in national television productions, particularly musalsals, although directors, a singer, a dancer and a rock band have made appearances.[146] Real Star is a two-page interview with a successful professional, again focusing on career and education, while Sport Star is a two- or three-page piece that looks each week at a sportsperson involved in sports from table-tennis to kickboxing, from body building to show jumping. Both these features are highly formulaic from issue to issue. Finally, Star Exclusives offer a slightly different dynamic. They often revolve around either foreigners of note on short stay in Syria or ceremonies in which Star plays a role – for example the magazine has hosted whole teams from domestic television serials. These four features are central aspects of the weekly Syrian output.
The crucial aim of this Syrian content, particularly the flagship feature, Star Interview, is to construct a national canon out of a new generation of Syrian actors and professionals. In the Middle East, constructing cultural canons is tightly tied in to the dominant state ideology, modernist nationalism – a concept that involves an important dualism.[147] On the one hand, modernism involves a notion of progress: Middle Eastern states and societies are to develop on parallel lines to Western states and societies in order to compete with them. On the other hand, modernism can only be valid if it is authentic; it must be self-generated and tied in to a modern narrative of national heritage. This temporal dualism remains important today, inflecting political and cultural discourse alike. However, Arab cultural canons are more complex still, often straddling boundaries associated with national identity, age, gender and elite-mass culture. Two of the outstanding musical icons of the twentieth century, Umm Kulthum and Fayruz, are both still popular and respected in Syria because they fulfil these stringent cultural criteria. Fayruz dominates morning radio, including SyriaÕs first private radio station, Al-Madina FM, where virtually no other musician is aired until nine oÕclock. One friend mentioned how he was not ready to leave for work in the morning unless had heard his fill of Fayruz classics.[148] Umm Kulthum recordings can still be heard on radio and television sets most evenings around residential old Damascus. These two performers are representatives of the two states which dominated cultural production in the Middle East through much of the century: Egypt and Lebanon. Both states have had troubled, but nevertheless intimate, relations with Syria over this time. Lebanon is still seen as a sister state of Bilad Al-Sham (the former province of the Ottoman Empire that now encompasses the states of Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories) and was part-occupied by Syrian troops for over three decades. Egypt and Syria were the only two states to politically act upon the unifying visions of pan-Arabism, merging to form the United Arab Republic in 1958. Despite the rift that developed over Anwar SadatÕs independent peace agreement with Israel in the 1970s, Syria and Egypt have since resumed closer cooperation more recently. As such, it is not surprising that Umm Kulthum and Fayruz, neither of whom are or were Syrian nationals, are nonetheless taken as integral to Syrian national culture, not least because both can be tied into authentic Arab nationalism. In addition, Fayruz clearly straddles generation and gender divides. She is a favourite of the sixty-year old head of the Bab Tuma household where I stayed in Damascus over the summer 2005, just as she is hugely popular among Syrian female friends in their early twenties. As for Umm Kulthum, she was able to cross high and low culture divides by, on the one hand, appealing to classical poetic traditions, exploiting her talent and training in reciting the QuÕran and singing the work of established canonical writers in Classical Arabic, and on the other hand, appealing to folk traditions in Colloquial Egyptian Arabic.[149] This ambiguity allowed both performers to extend their popularity and influence. Yet, despite being popular figures tied to twentieth-century mass media for their success, they could not be pigeonholed as ÔvulgarÕ in the sense Twitchell uses to characterize popular cultural output of twentieth-century America, or Armbrust of some recent Egyptian cinema and music.[150] Most Syrians would firmly reject the idea that the bottom line for these two performers is ÔDoes it sell?Õ or indeed that their musicÕs purpose is simply Ôto entertain, not to enlighten.Õ[151] Of course, this is partly because Middle Eastern popular culture has been on quite a different trajectory from the American popular culture Twitchell studies even if similarly mass-mediated. The crucial point is that Umm Kulthum and Fayruz were canonized as national and pan-Arab icons through mass media. In other words, their producers were not simply driven by ÔcommercialÕ interests, but by national interests geared towards authenticating national modernization.
Although Egypt was for many decades the dominant force in musalsal production, since the 1990s Syrian-produced serials have been growing in influence and attracting audiences to such an extent that they may now out-rival their Egyptian competitors.[152] Ironically, the vehicle for this growth has been satellite television. Satellite channels from the Gulf proved lucrative buyers of Syrian musalsals which came to distinction in the mid-nineties.[153] Syrian-produced serials, both historical dramas and comedies, have become a ÔstapleÕ of television content in the Middle East, due in no small part to the competitive edge private production companies brought in harnessing new satellite advertising revenues.[154] But this phenomenon has not only been reflected in the flourishing market for dramatic production in Syria, but in the creation of a new generation of Syrian acting stars with a potential – in some cases a very real – pan-Arab appeal. Syrian casts dominate both Syrian and collaborative dramatic productions, such as the 2004 Road to Kabul.[155] As Dick remarks,
Ôif one is looking for someone to
play a medieval Arab poet or an extra who can say a few lines in classical
Arabic, one goes to Syria.Õ[156]
This development is ideal for the
Syrian regime. Musalsal content
combines regional and local interest and can therefore provide appropriate
output for domestic consumption as well as for sale regionally, building
SyriaÕs national image at home and abroad. The success of serials provides work and stardom for a new
generation of state-endorsed actors, many of whom have been trained at the
state theatre institution and so bring strong values about national canons,
authenticity in cultural production, and classical Arabic to a new generation
of viewers tempted by ever more channels. According to Lindsey, the government
has continued to play a strong role in determining suitable subjects for
musalsals and in vetting the final product before broadcast,[157]
perhaps in part because the most successful production companies are owned by
individuals close to the regime.[158] Indeed, Bashar Al-Asad appears to enjoy
being associated in foreign capitals with the more critical of these musalsals,
particularly the comedy series Maraya (Mirrors),
not least because it allows him to present himself as open and democratic.[159]
Yet, recently he made no effort to prevent the draconian seizure by censors of
two whole episodes of the very same programme.[160] This strategy has allowed the regime to
censor what it does not like in dramatic production whilst conveying its
messages to diverse audiences through private means, as the content of recent productions
attests. Nationally, musalsals for
Ramadan 2005 such as Al-Hawr Al-`Ayn
(Maidens of Paradise) preached against terrorism; regionally, historical dramas
such as Tariq (2004) implied that
Arabs must unite and be tolerant; globally, serials such as Faris
bi-la Jawad (Knight Without a Horse, 2002)
angered US diplomats with their negative stereotyping of Israelis.[161] The approach seems similar to the
strategy Bashar Al-Asad, as President in waiting, pursued for Syrian
involvement on the internet in the late-nineties. He clearly sought to harness the internet for the Syrian
national interest by seeking both to monitor use carefully, on the one hand,
and to develop SyriaÕs virtual resources, on the other.[162]
This dual strategy of harnessing media space whilst simultaneously constraining
it should not be read as the hallmark of a culturally confident nation. Rather, this strategy emanates not from
a position of confidence, but a position of extreme vulnerability in a period
where cultural identity, regime power, and national cohesion cannot be taken
for granted. Nevertheless, the
outlines of a plan emerge.
Cultural production and new media are being harnessed to make the right
messages as loudly and as confidently as possible, whilst the wrong messages are
confronted and constrained.
StarÕs Mechanics of Canonization
There is little doubt Star Interview is the flagship article in the Syrian magazine. Given central prominence in Star Syria, the feature covers the first three or four pages, in contrast to LÕInterview which is tucked away deep into the Lebanese magazine. Indeed, the featureÕs importance is reflected in the prominence given to the actor on the magazineÕs front cover. Dominating the page, the actorÕs image often appears as a figure cut-out overlaid above pictures promoting other features. With the exception of the double-spread Backstage feature which takes a look behind the scenes of a Syrian musalsal (figure 13), Star Interview is the only Syrian-produced piece focusing on a celebrity (figure 11). This indicates something of the scant resources Star Syria is produced with, but it also shows how important Star Interview is within the magazineÕs broad agenda. It is little wonder, then, that Star Interview is shot through with the mechanics of canonization. The questions, photographs, and format of the piece are all highly deferential and optimistic, and, in contrast with Star LebanonÕs LÕInterview, work to buttress the reputation of the actor on display. Produced with extensive input from the Star writers themselves, Star Interview displays photographs of the actor and Star staff together, often chatting round a table in an up-market cafŽ though sometimes outdoors facing the camera. In this way, the celebrity and Star writers appear as partners – a quite different relationship from the interrogation in LÕInterview. Indeed, unlike the paparazzi photography of the Lebanese Got Cha, here the actor is a figure of respect who, when captured surrounded by attentive young people, takes on a visible status of prestige – the reader is given a visual representation of the starÕs relevance to young people. These actors are not just performers or sex symbols, but personalities worth listening to and emulating. In addition, by picturing the stars in recognizably Syrian locations (at least for Damascenes), the magazine defines them as locals and insiders.
Star Interview makes no demands on celebrities; on the contrary, it gives them a chance to show off. It is unclear whether the interviewÕs highly formulaic questions, which differ little from issue to issue, are the result of editorial controls or Star staff input,[163] but we can be certain that the paparazzi-style dressing-down
Figure 13: Backstage (here called Star Kawalis) is one of four features (Star Interview, Real Star, Double Star) which precede the Lebanese-produced Star News. It cofirms the significance attached to Syrian-produced musalsals in Star.
characteristic of LÕInterview is not in view. The formulaic approach functions as a levelling tactic to reduce difference: each actor is treated as a national actor rather than a representative of a particular class or group. Moreover, there is no pressure on actors to reveal personal details; the tactics of paparazzi bullying so evident in LÕInterview are almost completely absent here. Typical questions include:
What are your future plans?
Do you like the cinema? Do you prefer it to the small screen?
What are your hobbies?
When did you start to dream of being an actor?
You have played a number of different parts and characters, what is the role you consider closest to your heart?
Invariably, the actors are asked to
list their own favourite Syrian actors and suggest which actor they would most
like to resemble. In this way, an
inventory of Syrian actors emerges from the actors themselves. Again in sharp
contrast with LÕInterview, questions
focus on successes rather than failures, demonstrating that unsettling the
celebrity or creating a scandal is not in the picture. For example, in issue 35 Qais Al-Shaykh
Najib is asked, ÔWhat in your opinion is the secret of the great success which
the serial Layali Al-Salihia
achieved?Õ[164] Nowhere is
the inverse of this question asked: ÔWhy did this serial fail?Õ The unwillingness to tackle any kind of
failure, conflict, suffering, or ignominy should be understood within the
context of feelings of national vulnerability, and can be seen in other
cultural fields. For example, the musalsal Al-Zeer Salim established new ground for its drastically negative
display of a conventional historical hero in Arab folklore, but only after its
producers axed some of the original scenes for being too negative and
controversial.[165] Similarly, in the socially conservative
Gulf, MBC is adapting the American reality TV show The Biggest Loser as The Biggest Winner so as to Ôkeep it positive, not to add a negative
twist.Õ[166] Every actor featured in Star
Interview comes out a winner too.
It is important to remember that the majority of Syrian actors appearing in musalsals have been trained within the state theatre institute.[167] Versed in the kind of national culture the Syrian regime supports (for example, they are highly competent in classical Arabic) these actors are state-endorsed cultural icons. Star Interview provides a forum for actors to promote their own notions of the national canon. Star selects actors who reaffirm its ethos and whom it deems worthy of national celebration. The interview itself is not in fact a news item – again pointing to a contrast with the Lebanese version which opens with celebrity news stories from the Middle East – nor is the interview a scoop in the style of the Lebanese Got Cha. Rather, Star Interview is a statement of national progress in which an actor is called upon to reflect on his or her role in, experiences of, and ideas about that national progress. In return, the actorsÕ sense of self-worth is reinforced, not least because they are registered within Star as national icons.
Actors stress time and time again the importance of study in harnessing acting talent. Education, as Armbrust has argued, is a central component of twentieth-century modernist thinking in the Middle East, not just because it is seen a powerful state mechanism of producing social change, but because it is tied both to visions of national progress and to the middle classes who are called upon to provide the engine room for that progress.[168] Yet more recent changes in Egyptian cultural production indicate that the value of education for personal achievement and upward mobility is no longer taken for granted. According to the actors who appear in Star, however, academic training remains highly valuable, pointing to the continuing relevance of modernism in Syria. Star Interview questions actors most weeks as to whether Ôtalent and experience is enough for an actor to get into the professionÕ or whether Ôhe also needs study and training.Õ[169] Actors usually profess that Ôan artist fundamentally needs talentÕ but that this Ômatures through studies.Õ[170] Qais Al-Shaykh Najib claims that you can learn in four years through college what takes ten years through experience alone and Ôin a more academic and better way.Õ[171] The institution which according to most actors retains the prime position in safe-guarding Syrian culture and ensuring the development of home-grown talent is the Academy of Higher Learning in the Performance Arts (Al-Ma`had Al-`Ali lil-Funun Al-Masrahia). The name of this institution itself indicates the values actors attribute to the kind of ÔartÕ they partake in producing. Indeed, the fact that its role in SyriaÕs acting profession gets such attention in Star Interview demonstrates that it remains perhaps the only institution of its kind in the country. Its pivotal position for the acting profession is not just in producing the next generation of actors, but in ensuring both the quality of cultural output and the notion of high culture in Syrian drama at all.
As state-trained icons of national progress, actors invariably articulate their role as one of producing high, rather than purely popular, art. When asked about the secret behind the popularity of the serial Layali Al-Salihia, Qais Al-Shaykh Najib responded:
ÔBecause the serial managed a balance between two things – it had a mass popular underpinning in addition to being consistently highly artistic on the levels of dŽcor, costume, camera work, directing, and acting. Added to this, the subject it addressed is popular and presents an important moral value.Õ[172]
This demonstrates the enduring
belief that a serial must impart high cultural ideals to its audience in order
to achieve popularity. Just as Umm
Kulthum achieved popularity by fusing high and low traditions, Qais believes
that mass appeal must be combined with high artistic merit which raises the
cultural consciousness of the audience.
High culture is not to be made elite, but employed by those who possess
competence in it to the ends of national affirmation and cultural enlightenment. Becoming a canonical actor depends
first on a process of initiation – learning the know-how in elite
cultural forms and being validated as a cultural icon – then on a process
of guarding cultural standards and instructing others in them. The two processes, initiation in the
tradition and passing on the tradition, are effectively two sides of the same
pattern of regenerating the national canon.
Star demonstrates the emerging response of the Syrian
regime to the perceived combined threats of new media (satellite television, the
internet, mobile telephones) and untrammelled Western-conceived popular culture
which is increasingly accessible.
These threats seem to signal the end of the stateÕs role in producing
and broadcasting terrestrial television whose goal is to align national
audiences around national output.
The regime response is as legible in Star as it is within the speeches and policies of state
officials. The energies of young
Syrians are to be put to harnessing new media –satellite television and
the internet in particular – to the national benefit. Devoted to achieving this engagement, Star
opens a space for Western, and particularly
Lebanese, popular culture whilst concomitantly constraining that space with a
mechanics of national canonization.
Thus, Syrian actors in the flourishing sector of musalsal production are
to be moulded as canons to combat the icons of (largely Lebanese) reality
television and video clips who cannot be authenticated.
4
Shaping New Authority
Structures: Carole, Star Writers, and the Privatized Corporatist Consensus
Restricting
freedom means dwarfing it, but regulating its practice means developing it and
making it healthyÉ Freedom and its regulations belong side by side. They do not live apartÉ Like everything
in this universe, freedom needs order.Õ Hafiz al-Asad on freedom at his 1990
Revolution Day address.[173]
Star magazine is only partly devoted
to buttressing the stardom of current celebrities. A consistent feature of the magazineÕs output and production
is geared to generating stars of a very different kind from an unusual
source. Rather than building
exclusively on the careers, habits and private lives of celebrities in music,
television, and drama, Star sets out to
mould and display a team of young role models – the amateur writers, many
students with no previous experience or training in journalism,
who contribute much of the Syrian
content to the magazine – whose only success is to have confidently
located the right path to personal progress. The path they have found revolves
around the pursuit of higher education, professional ambition and a secular
consumption lifestyle. If these
are the building blocks of national modernity in Syria, then it is the young
middle classes, epitomized by the writers in Star, who are to ensure the safety of SyriaÕs passage to that
modernity. In other words, StarÕs young writers contribute to the magazineÕs mission
on two levels: first, by taking
part in StarÕs production they
guarantee their own position within SyriaÕs own evolving modernity; second, as
students of the Star way, they
can be displayed and projected outwards to the reader as role models to be
emulated. This implies that even
the magazineÕs title – Star –
is part of its agenda of engaging with global media on Syrian terms. Taking an English word which is now
widely established in the youth repertoire of foreign vocabulary thanks to the
massively popular Star Academy
and Super Star on Lebanese
satellite TV, the magazine aims to redefine the concept of a ÔstarÕ to
encompass the role models and bringers of national success that readers
discover in its pages.
It is not hard to locate the young writers in the magazine because they are almost everywhere; they comprise the yarn which weaves the magazineÕs fabric together and gives coherence to its diverse content. Facing the inside cover is a piece written in English accredited to one of StarÕs young contributors. This piece is mirrored by a final commentary in Arabic opposite the inside back cover again written by one of the amateur team. Turning to ÔInside this weekÕ on page 2, the eye is drawn to a photograph on the opposite page encapsulated in the red outline of a five-point star. It shows the team grouped in front of the UG offices in Mezze Village Sharqia and is entitled ÔOur team DamascusÕ in English (Figure 14). Trails of smaller red and yellow stars encircle the picture. In it, more than twenty writers from the team face the camera smiling and laughing; this is a really positive image which speaks cheerful youth, confidence, and fulfilment. Females are generally brought to the front, males to the back, though there is some intermixing. Many of the males have arms around each other and hands on each othersÕ shoulders in an overt display of camaraderie. Moreover, these young people are dressed up for the occasion. There are no hijabs here; rather the women display earrings, jewellery, painted fingernails and lipstick. One carries a trendy handbag; another is wearing sunglasses seated on her forehead. All are wearing jeans and colourful, revealing tops. As for the men, style seems to be equally significant. One is proudly wearing sunglasses, another a ÔLes Angels LakerÕ t-shirt. Beneath this photograph is a second, smaller star displaying four well-groomed young faces. Below, it reads ÔAleppoÕ. But the display of the young writers does not stop there. Star Interview and Star Exclusives almost always show members of the team interviewing a celebrity in a public space, such as a cafŽ or restaurant. Me, my friends and Star, a series of pages displaying young people out socializing in DamascusÕs restaurants and bars, often shows Star writers joining in the fun or even as party hosts.[174] Indeed, the Star writers are always on show at official publicity events for the magazine, not least a promotional concert performed by Nancy `Ajram and sponsored by Star (Figure 14).[175] Finally, Star writers contribute much of the
content for the second half of the magazine following Star News. Often a writerÕs name and picture will be attached to the article.
The Star Writers
The team of young amateur writers consists of a pool of perhaps forty young people whom Carole Ibrahim Bashara, the magazineÕs editorial manager, draws on for content. They are not officially employees of United Group (UG), but are paid for whatever they have published. StarÕs managerial team is a small unit of roughly twenty full-time professional employees in marketing, sales, distribution, public relations, photography, and design. The magazine is led by a general manager, but it is Carole as chief editor who relates most directly to the team of amateur writers. According to Carole, the Lebanese version is produced by a similarly sized professional team which begs the question of why Star Syria needs its team of amateur writers at all.[176] The extent to which they are used to keep costs low is not clear. It is clear, however, that the writers are invaluable in furthering StarÕs core agenda: they are not just there to save money and render the magazine profitable, but to stand as role models for a new generation. This much seems clear from their centrality in the magazine, a centrality acknowledged by Carole and stridently proclaimed in the first issue of the Syrian magazine. Announcing the magazineÕs arrival with a ÔWOWÕ, the Star teamÕs front page editorial speaks of its mission in Ôintroducing youth workÕ and loudly pronounces itself ÔThe Voice of the Youth.Õ[177]
The overwhelming majority of these young writers are university and school students. Many have attended or are currently attending foreign language schools in Damascus, such as the American and French schools, and consequently speak either English or French fluently. The majority are undoubtedly middle class and from privileged backgrounds. These writers were recruited from a variety of sources. Most, it seems, were brought in through informal contacts and chance meetings with StarÕs professional team.[178] According to Carole, the prospective writer has first to complete an application form explaining why he or she wants to work for Star and then pass an interview with Carole to demonstrate writing ability and willingness to talk. This process is far from standard practice, however. Ghalia and Lina, for example, had good enough grades not to need an interview.[179] It is too soon to say how the group renews itself (certainly no-one has been fired to date and it is unclear whether Carole could fire anyone), but it appears that some members, having been involved for some months, have moved on to pursue new interests whilst others have joined more recently. Of the forty, ten writers are part-time employed with UG as trainee journalists. This goes to show the extent to which UG and Star are keen to reinforce their professionalizing mission for the youth of Syria by offering genuine opportunities for young people within the company.
The
Star writersÕ involvement in the
magazine broadly comprises producing articles and attending the team meeting,
both of which are managed by Carole.
Having conducted some research, mostly on the internet, and written a
draft article, the Star writers
pass their work to Carole for editing.
She reads the draft article, adds notes to it, and gives it either to a
sub-editor (a full time UG employee) or to the writer again. Thus, the formal text is altered to
meet her requirements. Where there
are major linguistic or stylistic faults in the text, or where the ideas are
not appropriate for the magazine, Carole returns the piece to the writer giving
ideas of how to re-write the text from scratch. As we will see below, editing
is one of the ways in which Star
enforces the bounds of compliance and justifies its corporatist agenda.
The routine is punctuated by two meetings during the week, except during exam time when the group meets once-a-week and Carole takes on the greater burden of conducting interviews and producing content. Functionally, the meeting allows the group to discuss and make preparations for the following weekÕs issue. The ideas tend to come from Carole who asks the writers to prepare articles on a certain topical subject, such as the cultural celebration of Christmas, or a certain area of interest, such as love or psychology. In this way, she manages magazine content and provides the ideological lynchpin for the magazineÕs agenda. As for the standard pages, Carole asks the writers whether they know anyone appropriate for this weekÕs piece. So, for example, to find an appropriate sportsperson for Sport Star, Carole asks if anyone has a friend who plays the chosen sport. This procedure is central to the magazineÕs pursuit of content; the groupÕs network of friends and relatives becomes an active resource for a commentary on the state of modernity in Syria. Thus, members of StarÕs informal extended network both widen and delineate the margins of the middle class snapshot Star seeks to portray of modern Syrian youth. Indeed, it constructs stars and role models from the ranks of the successful, ambitious and productive, drawing a wide array of young people into furthering StarÕs core mission: to produce a self-confident generation of young, middle class Syrians.
The other, perhaps more significant, role of meetings is less concerned with the immediate preparation of the following weekÕs content. This role is an ideological one. Carole, it must be remembered, is perhaps only five or ten years older than the majority of Star writers, and is therefore able to straddle diverse roles within a meeting. She can simultaneously act the manager, the teacher, the role model and the social peer, fusing messages which might not initially seem incoherent, but on closer inspection often appear contradictory. So, as social peer and mentor devoted to the retreat of patriarchy, she encourages her young team members to challenge the social norms of their parents by trying everything at least once, right up to drugs (hata al-hashiish);[180] yet as a professional authority figure – someone who has achieved a managerial position in a dynamic company – she encourages the writers to pursue their professional dreams, often shared by their parents, through study and work experience. As a social engineer and modernizer, she encourages greater Ôfreedom,Õ saying confidently, Ôwe are free men so we have the right to choose,Õ[181] yet as manager accorded her role on the understanding that she evades political controversy, she is a staunch backer of the regime and actively seeks to relegate politically contentious discussion from meetings and the pages of the magazine. As a proud Syrian nationalist she talks of defending Ôour traditionsÕ and Ôour pure mindÕ by knowing Ôour history,Õ and works to introduce a page to the magazine which explicitly explores Syrian institutional history in the twentieth century (Star Zaman), whilst as bringer of modernity she is concerned with opening the eyes of young Syrians to the outside world, arguing of young Syrians that Ôyou should look around you and decide to be what you want; you canÕt decide if youÕre closed.Õ[182] As a Christian she openly refers to Biblical parables to confirm her point during meetings, as if conducting a sermon, yet as a manager devoted to SyriaÕs secular modernity she calls on her writers to avoid using religious phrases in articles, such as Insha Allah and Masha Allah, threatening to reject any such pieces that come her way.[183] It is not accurate to claim that there is some coherent meta-discourse which can even out these inconsistencies. On the contrary, such inconsistencies may be necessary components of modernist middle class thought in the Middle East. Armbrust, for example, has mapped the development of the Ôconservative radicalÕ in Egypt where modernism combines a narrative of national progress with a counter-narrative of seeking an authentic national self through continuities with the past.[184] The important point is that Carole believes in the validity of her own ideological role within the Star team and actively pursues it during meetings. As she puts it, Star aims to Ôgive the youth information by the light way for them to accept it [in a light format so that they will accept it].Õ[185] Not only does Star seek a didactic and corporatist role in the lives of its readers, but in the social, professional, and educational lives of its writers as well.
Carole is
undoubtedly proud to work for United Group. Formerly a co-ordinator for the
marketing subsidiary, Concord, she has been in the group since 2002, and cites
its youthfulness and diversity as reasons for its success. Still in her late twenties, she is
young to be in a managerial position, but uses her age to form a closer rapport
with the Star writers who see her partly
as a peer. She is a graduate in
French literature and has travelled abroad, boasting a command of French and
English. Indeed, she is not
unwilling to point out her talents, claiming she is a good communicator and an
articulate Arabic user. In Carole,
Star possesses a confident,
direct, and effusive editor who is not afraid to say what she thinks. Other analyses of power structures in
Syria have used gender, ethnicity, and religious affiliation to understand
Syrian society.[186]
Whilst all three categories could provide useful explanations of CaroleÕs
relationship with the team, I argue that it is her class affiliation, pro-regime
stance, and professional experience which are most pertinent, not least for
understanding the corporatist consensus she enables within Star.
The team of amateur writers, as Carole puts it, represents a Ôsmall cell of Syrian society,Õ[187] albeit a highly privileged one. They are seen by Carole as a resource to provide both content for the magazine and StarÕs insight into the social life of SyriaÕs youth. But, as Carole and her professional team in Star are active in selecting and shaping the team of writers, there is an inbuilt self-reflexivity about the insight Star writers provide. In other words, the broad consensus of social attitudes which largely characterizes the teamÕs outlook only reconfirms what Carole and the managerial cadre of Star already thought they knew: Syria is modern, should be secular, and can be as dynamic a place for social experimentation amongst young people as anywhere in the West. Star, then, can be considered an introspective space for experimentation in which external observations merely reinforce internal certainties and expectations.
The Star Consensus Under Threat from Within
I was lucky enough to bump into Ahmed again on my second field work visit to Damascus in December 2005.[188] At first, it came as no surprise to find him hanging out not far from Bab Tuma in Inhouse Coffee, the most upmarket chain of coffee shops modelled on Starbucks. He had always struck me as well-spoken and confident, firmly grounded in DamascusÕs urban middle class, and not untypical of the clientele frequenting the Inhouse chain. When I was first introduced to the Star team of amateur writers at one of their meetings in August the summer before, it was Ahmed who most proactively responded to my questions in English.[189] The second time I attended a Star meeting later that summer to conduct an informal written questionnaire, Ahmed was the only writer who approached me to comment on my survey.[190] Jotting down his email address on the back of his form, he said ÔIÕd like to meet you again,Õ and proceeded to flatter me with the words in English, ÔI like the way you think.Õ Not long after, again during the summer, I ran into Ahmed and his closest friend at Star, Aladdin, conducting their own survey about touristsÕ impressions of Syria in the old town near Bab Tuma. Having filled in their survey as honestly as I could, I exchanged phone numbers and vowed to make contact soon. Alas, I failed to meet either Ahmed or Aladdin again during the summer.
So it was that I
came across Ahmed in Inhouse the following December confident I had found
someone who broadly represented the group of Star writers. But had I considered my exchanges with Ahmed more carefully,
I might have more accurately predicted his relationship with Star, the team and Inhouse Coffee. At my first meeting with the Star
team in the summer, I had been offered the
stage. I joined the group of
writers around an enormous glossy conference table in a long stylishly
furnished room with luxurious swivel chairs and glass panes lining one
side. Dona `Alam, the Public
Relations Manager, allowed me as long as I wanted to ask the team questions
about their work. I attempted this
in English, French and a little Arabic, but such was the general proficiency in
English, I tended to stick with the language I could use most clearly. I asked all kinds of questions about
social issues I thought pertinent – marriage, religion, their role in the
magazine – until I felt comfortable enough to ask something I knew would
be provocative. I asked the team
how they felt about displays of Western singers in their magazine who are
openly homosexual, such as Elton John.
It was Ahmed who responded first, claiming that homosexuality was
totally forbidden in Syria. His
outburst brought a range of responses, but most extraordinarily from a
prospective Star writer sitting
next to me who had come to be interviewed that day. He countered Ahmed directly, saying he had friends who were
openly gay and knew of social haunts where they were accepted. Fast-forward to my second meeting with
the Star team, and AhmedÕs
attempt to compliment my intellectual approach. As he left, I looked closer at his responses to my questions
– most of which dealt with trans-national media, reality TV formats, and
social values. The questionnaires,
though provisional, were undoubtedly a failure, but none more so than
AhmedÕs. He had refused to engage
with any of the questions on reality TV formats except to say, ÔI hate them, I
hate them all.Õ Ahmed, as I should
have realised early on, had far more unsettled opinions on the project he was
involved in than most of the other writers. When I told Carole that I would be speaking to Ahmed about
his typical experiences of the magazine, she cautioned me against the strategy
obviously fearing the negative spin he would give me, and described him as an
Ôextremist.Õ[191]
Ahmed
is a self-confessed success story.
Hailing from a government school, he considers himself special because
he is a strong learner and self-starter. A second-year economics student at
Damascus University and practising Muslim, he speaks excellent English and is
confident and out-going. Ahmed
lives with his father and sister although he also has two half sisters from his
motherÕs second marriage to a Palestinian man. His involvement in Star can partly be explained by the fact that he
pre-dates CaroleÕs appointment as editorial manager. He had taken it upon himself, with his close friend Aladdin,
to conduct some research on why students prefer certain English Language
Schools in Damascus over others, and subsequently wrote an article which was
partly published in the national newspaper Tishriin. Whilst Ahmed was working at one such school – Horizon
Language Centre – the manager recommended him to a member of StarÕs marketing staff who was on business selling
advertising there. Ahmed and
Aladdin received a call from Star
soon after and joined the team.
But CaroleÕs
arrival brought new problems for Ahmed.
He openly admits that she ÔhatesÕ him, not least because he challenges
her authority by questioning her social outlook and technical knowledge. For example, he frankly contested her
view during a meeting that digital cameras produce inferior results to
conventional cameras. Similarly,
he argued with her over whether Muslims celebrate Christmas by hanging up
decorations in their houses.
Hearing these stories over an extended conversation at Inhouse Coffee, I
asked Ahmed why he continues to work for Star.[192] He responded with three reasons: first,
he enjoys working as a Ôjournalist,Õ second, he is grateful for the income, and
third, he believes he has a message to deliver. When I asked what this message might be, he claimed that his
aim is to give the youth of Syria a role model. Of course, Carole also wants to give young Syrians positive
role models, and indeed, acts that part within Star herself.
The crucial point of divergence between Ahmed and Carole is precisely
who can and cannot be an appropriate role model. As we will see, this contest has crucial implications for
understandings of Syrian modernity, and cuts to the very core of the
competition over social values, visions of national progress, and
interpretations of SyriaÕs youth.
Ahmed
and Carole do, in fact, agree on a number of things. They are both enthusiastic about the nationalist modernist
narrative of twentieth century Syrian history, as their equal pride for Star
Zaman shows. This page, which traces the modern history of institutional
and technological developments in Syria, was introduced as a regular feature by
Carole, yet even Ahmed cites its presence as a reason for him remaining at the
magazine. This modernist bent
inflects their view that Star should
be a secular magazine. Indeed, they both prize high cultural ideals, and
believe firmly in the value of education.
Where they differ is over the role that patriarchal norms should play in
social life and in governing the kinds of mediated representations of young
people magazines like Star can
print. Carole, as a female
professional authority figure, who doubles up as a social mentor for her team
of young journalists, seeks to insert herself into the lives of the Star writers and, to some extent, replace parental
authority. Ahmed contests
this. He views parents as the
ultimate arbiters over the proper social behaviour of their children, and
rejects the claim Carole makes to impose herself irrespective of her managerial
role.
This much became
obvious at a meeting I attended in December in which Carole instigated a
discussion about parental roles.[193] There were twelve writers present,
though some came late and others left early. Due to college exams, the writers were not contributing as
much to the magazine as at other points of the year. Instead, Carole was publishing pieces from a reserve of
articles she had built up over a period of months, as well as contributing more
content herself. Because of this,
the meeting only briefly touched on the actual magazine. Instead, Carole used the time to
conduct a debate. Initially she part-elicited, part-delivered the agenda,
asking ÔWhat would you like to talk about today shabaab?Õ and writing bullet points on the board.
ÔOld and dying Customs: The differences between
expectation and young people; SocietyÕs view of relationships between guys and
girls; Free time (or when you have nothing to do).Õ
At first, the writers seemed to
lack interest and enthusiasm in the discussion, but as more of them offered
opinions, so the interaction gathered momentum. Despite the active involvement of all present, the meeting
nevertheless revolved around Carole who prodded the writers with questions,
offered ideas for discussion and consistently gave feedback, most of which was
affirmative, to the opinions being expressed. With the discussion in full swing, one of the female
writers, sitting next to Ahmed, spoke up to tell a story about her hair.[194] As an adolescent she had had long hair
that reached down to her legs, but she grew tired of it. So she sought the consent of her
parents to have it cut. When her
father refused to consent to this, she went ahead with the haircut anyway,
prioritizing her own wants over the risk of incurring her fatherÕs wrath. When she arrived home that day from the
hairdressers, her father took one look and said, ÔyouÕve just lost your
future!Õ This story elicited one
of the loudest bursts of laughter at the meeting. With renewed confidence she told of how she had upset her
parents by coming to the Star meeting
that evening in her new pink pyjamas for the first time. In response to this, Ahmed tried to
argue that parents are wiser than young people and should be respected
accordingly. Whereas young people think they know what is right, parents know what is right.
He gave the example of his decision to grow his hair long against the
wishes of his parents. After a
year or two he realised they had been right all along and had it cut, although
he admits that his current beard is not to the liking of his parents. Carole
met AhmedÕs defence of parental authority (and in particular patriarchal
authority) with disdain. She
contested his views and mobilized the gathering consensus amongst the Star writers against AhmedÕs position. Clearly, Carole felt her authority and
her message of encouragement for youth empowerment within the family to be
under threat. Thus, Ahmed received
a swift rebuke from the girl in the pink pyjamas who insistently asked, ÔWhy is
that true? Why is that true?Õ (Leish Sah?).
Under CaroleÕs supervision, the young female writer
was not only able to tell her story openly in public, but elicit the most
telling sign of peer approval: a laugh.
Studies of authoritarian regimes have pointed to the significance of
jokes in reminding those who tell and share them of their shared acknowledgment
of involuntary obedience to authority over them.[195] The hair story – essentially
poking fun at parental authority – and the approving peer response point
to a shared acknowledgment amongst the Star writers of unwanted parental intrusion. Not only by
telling the story, but also by appearing at the meeting wearing her new pink
pyjamas, this Star writer was
actively contesting parental norms.
In providing her this opportunity, the meeting constitutes a challenge to patriarchal norms and parental control. Ahmed is active in opposing this view from
within the group. He believes that
parents are right because they are
parents. It would be inaccurate to
claim that Ahmed respects all forms of authority at all times; he openly
opposes Carole and he even behaves in ways his parents disapprove of.[196] But he does strongly believe in the
moral scrutiny of parents and their right to set out moral guidelines for him
to follow. His view sees the
family as the correct framework for socialization and morality right into early
adulthood – indeed up until a shaab has married and started a family of his own.
AhmedÕs
alienation from the group of Star
writers is only partly due to his steadfast faith in the family over other
institutions of social control. It
is also partly to do with his conservative views on representations of women. On balance, Ahmed believes that Star
magazine is bad for Syrian
youth. He has set himself up to
defend patriarchal values from within the magazine. As he puts it, he does not want to change the team; he wants
to change the topics in the magazine.
But Ôalas, young people want to read this stuff,Õ he laments,
complaining that the appeal of the magazine is misguided. Underlying this view is the idea that
inevitably a youth magazine should be, indeed can only be, functionally
didactic. Media representations
constitute a zero-sum game; if Star encourages
the wrong kinds of behaviour, there needs to be another option correcting those
wrongs. In AhmedÕs view, Star without him would mark the unabated decline of high
moral values in Syrian society. As
he says, young people Ôshould concentrate on redirecting themselves,Õ rather
than reading this magazine. But
what is it precisely that Ahmed finds morally problematic about Star?
In
the Middle East, displays of womenÕs bodies often function as the site of
social contests over morality and control.[197] Ahmed deems many of the representations
of women in the magazine as Ôslutty.Õ
There are two implications of this view, as Graham Brown argues: first,
representations of women as Ôsexual objects and symbols of wealthÕ are often
objected to on the basis that they appear to display women Ôescaping male
control over their conformity to the norms of Ôgood behaviour;ÕÕ[198]
second, fears are expressed over the corrupting repercussions of such images in
which Ôother, less privileged women could be Ôled astrayÕ by aspiring to such
lifestyles.Õ[199] Although the idea that changing norms
of womenÕs representation lead directly to substantive changes in social
relations remains largely unfounded in the Middle East,[200]
Ahmed nevertheless has very little social experience of such images in Syrian
print and he is therefore, as he puts it,
ÔshockedÕ by them.
During our
discussion in Inhouse, he gave me some indication of which images he finds most
offensive by ranking a series of photographs within a single issue on a scale
of one (acceptable) to ten (totally unacceptable) (Figure 16).[201] He found the front cover image of a
Syrian actress, Laila Al-Atrash, perfectly acceptable even though she is
captured from above revealing her bra strap. Perhaps the high-culture role assigned to her by the
magazine as youthful national icon, and the fact that her image does not
overtly attempt to arouse the reader explain his view. But, he was not Ô100 percentÕ happy
with the picture of the Star team in
which young female colleagues can be seen wearing light, and revealing, summer
clothing. Next, he ranked cat-walk
images of Kylie Minogue, Elizabeth Hurley and Hilary Duff six out of ten.[202] Here the formality of both dress and
occasion appear to lessen the impact of open shoulders and cleavage. He ranked the explicitly sexual image
of Jessica Simpson perched provocatively on the Dukes of Hazard car in short
skirt eight out of ten.[203] But he reserved his greatest ire for
any image of Haifa Wahabi, the Lebanese singer and presenter of the Reality-TV
show, Al-Waadi, ranked ten purely
because of her sullied reputation as he saw it.[204] ÔWe guys hate her,Õ he told me, because
Ôshe acts like a slut.Õ
AhmedÕs feelings
have on occasions bubbled to the surface in Star team meetings. He
described to me how, during a meeting, he argued with Carole over the
appropriateness of the images Star
publishes. She said that Star does not publish Ôbad photosÕ of women, and asked
him to show her any such image from the magazine. Ahmed duly found a photo which he found offensive showing a
Western actress revealing a healthy amount of cleavage and flesh (Figure 16).[205] Unsurprisingly, the picture appears in DuddlyÕs
Column, a Lebanese feature in English at
the heart of Star News. At this
point Carole accused Ahmed of feeling this way because he only ever sees his
mother and sister covered by the hijab.
This, according to Ahmed, was not only factually incorrect – none
of his three sisters wears the hijab – but also patronizing. He rebuked Carole, arguing that he and
Aladdin ÔdonÕt live in a shell, we see, we know what is acceptable and what is
not É we canÕt just leave behind what we learnt.Õ[206]
What Ahmed has learnt is not simply a religious ethic, but an emotional belief in the importance of female modesty to underscore male honour. This
social belief, as the literature
on patriarchy in the Middle East often argues, cuts to the heart of family
structure and social control.[207] During our conversation, Ahmed
expounded his opinions on female modesty arguing that it is shameful for a girl
to lose her virginity before marriage.
If this happens, as he put it, Ôher future collapses.Õ He went on to
outline the legal-national grounding for this view, explaining that Shari`a
personal law condones honour killings where male family members murder a female
relative who is sexually promiscuous.
Ahmed fears the magazine because he feels it seeks to undermine his
views, views which he regards not only as vital to the moral health of Syrian
society, but deeply ingrained in SyriaÕs religious and cultural landscape:
ÔItÕs hard to reform a whole
current thatÕs been flowing for 14 hundred years – a tough job for a
magazine like star. ItÕs a big
thing to change, we canÕt change. To force youth to É dump their religion and
everything they used to know, itÕs like changing the UK into a Republic.Õ
Of StarÕs content, it is Star Zaman that Ahmed points to as appropriate material for SyriaÕs young generation (Figure 17). The page, which presents a morally unambiguous snapshot of SyriaÕs modern history, offers young Syrians the right kind of educational supplement. According to Ahmed, the featureÕs didactic message is clear: Ôyou youth, see what you used to have and try to stimulate itÕ. At our meeting in Inhouse, Ahmed went on to tell me a family story which for him only confirms the message brought out by Star Zaman that older generations were more morally upstanding in their defence of the national cause. Apparently, whilst touring the country during mandate occupation, his grandfather was caught by the French and offered a small fortune to work for them. He refused and fought on until his untimely death in prison. As Ahmed puts it, the moral of the story is that his grandfather did not Ôpay attention to seductions given to him.Õ This is a lesson Ahmed would like to promote amongst todayÕs youth who are now ÔirresponsibleÕ and Ôlooking for less
valuable things than they used to.Õ Indeed, it is a lesson he considers
almost totally lacking in Star.
Hence, his confession that he would love to work for one of the other emerging
publications in Syria – Shabablek or Al Ghuerbal – which are
completely divested of any of the ÔsluttyÕ images Ahmed detests.
AhmedÕs
story is significant not just because it shows how Star is unsettling patriarchal values, but because it
points to the common perception that youth magazines necessarily seek to
condition young people socially and morally. This is, in part, due to the long legacy of tight government
censorship in Syrian print media and the concomitant association of print with
state- and nation-building. But it
is also specific to the agenda and outlook of Star itself.
For example, all of the interview-based articles – Star
interview, Sport Star, Real Star
– include a question, most often positioned as a kind of moral
conclusion, which asks ÔstarsÕ what they want to say personally to Star and SyriaÕs young people. Most complement Star on its cultural mission and call on Syrian youth to have confidence
for the future. Moreover,
Carole actively promotes the magazineÕs didactic role in giving the youth ÔinformationÕ
in a Ôlight way.Õ[208] ÔCome on guys, see the world!Õ she
says, rallying Syrian youth to StarÕs
self-appointed role.[209] Ahmed interprets her aim as feeding young
people Ôthe facts covered with junk food,Õ and he argues that the magazine was
formed to Ôrestructure how youth think.Õ What AhmedÕs position demonstrates, in other words, is StarÕs attempt to replace patriarchy with an emerging kind
of privatized corporatism. By
selectively employing the vocabulary of Western celebrity fantasy – representations
of women (and men) as apparently free to express themselves through dress
– Star magazine offers a set
of guidelines with which young Syrians can locate the proper path to modernity.
Thus, through its content and dynamics of production, the magazine seeks to
replace patriarchal and parental roles with a different authority structure
based on a secular discourse of consumption and professionalism. I will first describe some of the ways
in which a privatized corporatist consensus is achieved within the staff, and
will then outline the contours of the magazineÕs corporatist discourse.
Building the Corporatist
Consensus: Yousef and Carole See Eye to Eye
Building
a consensus amongst the Star
writers is a crucial task for Carole, not least because it ensures the
viability and integrity of StarÕs
didactic mission and discourages both conservative dissent regarded as backward
and liberal behaviour deemed rebellious.
The fact that the only explicit threat to this consensus emanates from
AhmedÕs conservatism indicates that Star does not actually intend to grant social capital to unruly youthful
behaviour, despite its part use of the vocabulary of Ôfreedom.Õ In other words,
the message is not that sex, drugs, and rock and roll are cool. Rather, the message is for young people
to consume, to interact, and to pursue careers in ways which their parents may
find uncomfortable at first, but which ultimately lead to a better, brighter
Syria in which professional success and cultural confidence are the norm. Perhaps the writer most solidly bound
into CaroleÕs consensus is Yousef.
Despite
seeing Yousef on two occasions at Star meetings during the summer 2005, it was not until December on my
second study visit that I actually had the opportunity to meet him.[210] Following a Tuesday meeting I attended,
I invited as many writers as wanted to join me for a coffee the following
Thursday to discuss their role in the magazine. Most received my invitation positively, but Yousef was
particularly keen, and even suggested a location: Inhouse Coffee in Mezze. When he arrived, I was already there
chatting with two younger members of the team, Ghalia and Lina. They soon scuttled away, as the more
confident and affable Yousef, a 20-year old Business Administration student at
Damascus University (DU) of Muslim background who joined the team initially as
the guitar player for a promotional event, commanded a deeper knowledge of the magazine
and showed a greater willingness to talk.
He was accompanied by Dina, a female friend from the meeting whom Yousef
had only just introduced to the magazine.
Dina, 22 years old and studying English Literature at DU, was extremely
self-assured and effusive, and proved herself very comfortable speaking in
English, so we settled on my language, not theirs. We were soon joined by Mona, DinaÕs older sister, who,
though long involved in Star, was
much less out-going than the others.
I directed the conversation, asking questions and writing notes as we
discussed, but I tried to give them space to express themselves.
Having
heard CaroleÕs endorsement of social experimentation two days before in which
she urged her writers to try everything up to drugs, Yousef seemed in
particularly confident mood to challenge parental constraints. ÔWe should try everything to have an
experience in life,Õ he said, since Ôa person doesnÕt know [whatÕs right and
wrong] before trying.Õ When I
asked what exactly he meant by ÔexperienceÕ he mentioned parties and Ôliving on
the edge.Õ This sounded more like
the sex, drugs, and rock and roll of Western rebellious youth culture, but his
views were more complex than this.
When we considered the value of meetings, Yousef spoke positively of
Carole who apparently allows them to voice their opinions freely. But the
extent to which meetings involve consensus building and peer conformity around
CaroleÕs ideological axis soon became apparent. Yousef said that Star writers share essentially the same set of opinions
because they all want to be free.
Their determination to judge right and wrong for themselves, according
to YousefÕs account, hinged on Carole who Ôknows a lot about lifeÕ and is
therefore in a position to determine Ôhow we should think and whatÕs right and
whatÕs wrong.Õ Individuality is
subsumed by the consensus Carole, as social peer and mentor, is able to construct so that arriving at an
independent judgement depends on either CaroleÕs endorsement or peer consent at
Star meetings, a process which
encourages the affirmation of bourgeois feelings of class superiority. Thus, Yousef and Dina talked at length
about the Syrian class system in which the educated middle classes are the
bringers of modernity and freedom.
The educated middle classes who Ôwant their children to be free, to do
what they believe inÕ are wedged between, on the one hand, the backward lower
classes Ôstuck with old traditionsÕ which Ôwe should delete, erase form our
lives,Õ where parents Ôchoose the future partner of their sonÕ and Ôplant stuff
in his mindÕ so that Ôhe will be choked,Õ and, on the other hand, the rich
society of the upper classes who Ôtalk about nothingÕ except Ôhaving two cars.Õ
The point here is not to claim that Western rebellious youth culture, in
contrast to Syrian youth culture in Star, prioritizes individuality over conformity, which is patently not the
case. Rather, the extent to which StarÕs corporatism encourages rebellion through social
experimentation has set limits; Star
seeks to encourage young middle class Syrians to challenge patriarchal
authority, but patriarchy itself can be stigmatized, in this case, as a set of
backward social values located in the lower classes. In other words, Star rarely, if ever, encourages young middle class Syrians to challenge
middle class authority figures.
Ahmed,
then, as a middle class male sharing so many of the codes of a middle class
consumption lifestyle – his dress, his accessories, his interest in
basket ball – emerges as a particularly sharp thorn in CaroleÕs
side. He is the anomaly in the
group: the one who openly affirms the formulation of patriarchal values which Star seeks to relegate from its pages and its writersÕ
social outlook. Ahmed, therefore,
has to be sidelined. This helps to
explain both why Ahmed is so isolated in Star meetings and why Carole and Yousef were so severe in
their criticism of him. Thus, for
Carole, Ahmed is an ÔextremistÕ who I should not have sought as a
representative Star writer,
whilst for Yousef, Ahmed is Ôa very old fashioned guyÕ who apparently thinks
his mother will find him his future wife.
That Ahmed explicitly told me during our earlier meeting that he would
find his own partner in life, ask her to marry him directly (rather than asking
her father first), and also make no obligation on her to wear the hijab implies
that the impression of Ahmed as a fanatical defender of outdated values has
been exaggerated within the Star
team. Indeed, on many relevant
issues, he in fact shares in the Carole consensus (though he rarely would admit
this). For example, when I asked
Carole about notions of love and sex in Syria, she responded by claiming her
team of writers accepts that love and sex Ôare one unit,Õ as if this was an
important aspect of the team identity and togetherness.[211] Carole, it seems, would be surprised to
hear that Ahmed agrees with this consensus. In my interview with him, he claimed that love traditionally
followed marriage in Syria, but no longer should. Yet, despite the complexity of his views, Ahmed is
labelled as ÔstubbornÕ by Yousef because Ôhe doesnÕt have the skill of
discussing things.Õ YousefÕs view
of Ahmed is testimony to AhmedÕs alienation from the group due to the threat he
presents to the core principles of the group consensus. His views are simply too conservative
and his criticism of Carole too unsettling to the Star agenda.
Hence, for StarÕs
corporatist mechanisms to make headway, Ahmed has to be painted as the dogmatic
patriarch beyond the pale.
Carole
should not be seen as the sole architect of this privatized corporatism, rather
as the vehicle for its growth, consolidation and dissemination. This corporatism should be thought of
as a complex tendency which combines both an authority structure into whose
ranks young people should be urged and a diffuse discourse comprising
principles, rules and legitimations on which that structure is built. Carole herself, whilst deeply involved
in harnessing the operation of this corporatism to certain professed ends, is
not some grand manipulatrice commanding
events from on high, duping those below her so as they consume without
reflexion and partake inexorably in her domination. This equation might characterize the power attributed to the
generals of the Ôculture industryÕ so central to the drastically pessimistic
imagination of the neo-Marxist Frankfurt School.[212] But it would be a thoroughly misguided
equation in our explanation of CaroleÕs role in Star. Both
Carole and Star magazine are just
small cogs in the machinery that is attempting to accomplish the privatization
of authoritarianism in Syria. As
in all social histories, this machinery is liable to break down, to be
disturbed from within and to produce unresolved outcomes for new contests to
emerge.
Central to this thesis is the idea that authoritarianism in Syria, compelled by perceived threats both internal and external, is in the process of transforming the genesis of its domination. A regime that had previously sought control of symbolic production, of media, and of youth itself in order to maintain its power now seeks to regenerate the basis of its authoritarian rule through private means. Hence, the manufacture and dissemination of pro-regime national symbols and the production of media output that can compete regionally and bolster the Syrian national cause is taken up by private companies. The corporatism described in this chapter is one more case of the privatization of authoritarianism. Corporatism is a word often used in political science literature to define the machinery of the state in Syria, rather than to consider the role of private companies. As Hinnebusch argues, the enormous state institutions and organizations established under Hafiz al-Asad – the bureaucracy, the Ba`th Party, the army, the many intelligence services, the popular youth organizations – had the effect of incorporating and mobilizing large sections of society into the machinery of the state and created networks of patronage in which individuals and groups competed against each other rather than mobilizing against the state.[213] But despite their size and apparent strength, these associations were Ôinternally undemocraticÕ and Ôpowerless vis-ˆ-vis the regime to become effective instruments of mass political participationÕ.[214] As Perthes argues, they served only to reinforce regime power.[215] The Ba`th Party, which in the 1970s boasted a membership of one in thirteen Syrians,[216] provides two crucial functions to the maintenance of regime power: first, it channels the upwardly mobile into a structure which focuses their energies on further refining their commitment to the regime; second, it provides institutional mechanisms for continuous socialization of citizens along lines which benefit the regime.[217] This process begins from an early age as young Syrians are encouraged to join the Revolutionary Youth Organization (Ittihad Al-Shabiba Al-Thawri) where they attend training camps, perform infrastructure development tasks, and pursue Ôthe struggle against feudal and bourgeois mentalities.Õ[218]
The tasks facing the regime today are to generate new wealth and harness new media to SyriaÕs national benefit. These tasks are hard to integrate into the system of state corporatism as it stands. Indeed, they are hard to achieve in an economy which largely avoided the infitah policies that oversaw the privatization of state-owned industries, like banking and mining, in Egypt. What is needed is a privatized corporatism welded from similar networks of patronage which can reproduce itself for the future. The outlines of this approach have been in the making for over ten years. As Heydemann notes, Hafiz Al-Asad sought to Ôenhance the process of capital accumulationÕ while at the same time Ôminimizing the political instability that disengagement brought aboutÕ so that Ôliberalization becomes merely another means to maintain the existing system.Õ[219] But the approach has been pursued with renewed vigour in the last five years in the rein of Bashar Al-Asad. With increased threats from foreign media, a tense regional and international political environment, and domestic dissidents, and unable to re-establish a cult of personality to match the rule of Hafiz Al-Asad, BasharÕs Syria needs more than ever new mechanisms to solve old problems. The privatization of corporatism is that new mechanism.
It is my
contention that Star represents the
early stages of a developing privatized corporatist discourse. It is emerging from the tectonic shifts
produced by a strategy which views that authoritarianism must stay, but the
means of its domination must change.
Young people are no longer to be socialized to struggle against
Ôbourgeois mentalities,Õ but are to be encouraged to pursue bourgeois
lifestyles and professions.
Crucially, such lifestyles and professions are not only to be presented
as valuable, but possible and attainable within todayÕs Syria. In other words, the emerging privatized
corporatist discourse discourages any questioning of the regime because it
imagines that all that could be revered or desired is readily available within
the current political framework.
Progress means the invalidation of backwardness coupled with the pursuit
of self-generated middle class modernity.
Young people are to be awarded for being good consumers, productive
industrialists, and regime supporters by working their way up the professional
corporate hierarchy, a hierarchy which at its pinnacle involves close contacts
of blood and patronage between business and regime leaders. Experimentation in the realms of
consumption and work experience is encouraged, but criticism of those devoted
to the system, particularly authority figures within it, is certainly not. Star is both a mechanism for this privatized corporatism
(it works upon the Star writers)
and a vehicle for its dissemination through society (it seeks to work upon Star readers).
The Privatized Corporatism in
Text and Image: the Contours of a Discourse
The
consensus built around Carole is legible in the texts and images of the
magazine. It is this consensus
which provides form and coherence to the discourse of the magazine, and
underscores its corporatist guidelines.
Readers are offered a know-how with which to navigate their professional
and lifestyle choices – a passport enabling them to play their role in
furthering a specifically national modernity. The magazineÕs corporatism has two essential
features: first, it sets limits on what can and cannot be said and questioned,
in part by offering positive models to be valued, and second, it is didactic,
providing cogent but simple answers to adolescent angst, the unintelligibility
of the world, and problems of morality.
In both, it seeks to provide a replacement for parental role models and
constraints, whilst denying politics as a reasonable realm for the exploration
and transformation of social life.
In a sense then, Star magazine
offers the reader the chance to become a modern and successful individual by
way of a discourse of corporatist constraint.
One
of the most striking aspects of the Syrian content is it appears to be almost
entirely devoid of criticism or irony.
The commercial and acting professionals who dominate the early sections
of the magazine – Star Interview, Real
Star, and Double Star – are not only unthreatening, they are
presented, without exception, as successes rather than failures. This can be explained by the fact that
the magazine sets them up as national heroes, role models to be emulated, young
winners making a good job of it. Hence, its portrayal of professionals is
remarkably one-dimensional; there is very little probing into sensitive topics
(as in the Lebanese LÕInterview)
and ÔstarsÕ are allowed to present themselves as positively as possible. In Real Star, for example, questions such as Ôwhat do you dream
of,Õ Ôwhat is your slogan in life,Õ and Ôwhat were the steps to your successÕ[220]
are general and give the business professionals displayed the platform from
which to present themselves as successful, confident, and powerful. Any investigation of professional
inadequacies, social problems, disputes, corruption, and flailing careers (the
bread and butter of provocative journalism, not to mention paparazzi-based
journalism) has to be sidelined.
Indeed, the ÔstarsÕ on show, as well as the professions and lifestyles
they represent, cannot be mocked.
This dynamic should in no way be read as some specific Syrian cultural
trait; on the contrary, Syrians showed a huge appetite for the insightful and
cutting irony (Figure 18) of master cartoonist, Ali Farzat, whose short-lived
private newspaper Al-Domari regularly sold out. The lack of irony in Star magazine betrays its unwillingness to interrogate
middle class role models and lifestyles, and demonstrates that the magazine is
geared to promoting an unremittingly positive vision of both.
This has an important repercussion: displays of youth sub-cultures which might be seen to threaten the national modernist agenda can only qualify for a feature by being overtly deferent to StarÕs corporatism. An interview with actor Milad Yusuf demonstrates this dynamic very clearly (Figure 18).[221] Yusuf, who is performing in a musalsal, Hajiz al-Samat, about a group of young bikers who are fans of hard rock music, works hard to persuade the reader that the apparently rebellious sub-culture is not in fact threatening to society. Claiming that Ôpart of the role of actors and Syrian dramaÕ is in Ôcorrecting prevailing myths in society,Õ Yusuf makes two arguments about the sub-culture: first, he maintains that young bikers are just as normal as the rest of Syrian society, describing them as
Ôstudents of intelligent behaviour, who love the country and who cooperate with it fully in every way, all of whom have specialised work, proven financial security, and are not a burden on society as some people think;Õ[222]
second, he asserts that the sub-culture to which these young people subscribe is actually as capable of originality, skill, and finesse as Ôour Eastern musicÕ or any high culture. Describing hard rock as a Ôhighly developed music demanding high technical abilitiesÕ since it is Ôa creative music by distinction,Õ[223] he effectively claims it can be incorporated into Syrian national culture and valued within the same terms of reference. Perhaps most tellingly, he vehemently denies that young bikers are guilty of ÔSatan worship,Õ arguing that as Ôpart of our youthÕ these young people have no connection with such Ôperverted groups.Õ[224] Finally, to prove that such sub-cultures can be accepted into the fold, Yusuf is pictured in costume on a Harley Davidson style motorbike wearing black T-shirt and jeans, leather gloves, and sunglasses. To guarantee his credibility, he is also pictured in conversation with Star staff wearing a
more acceptable crisply ironed
white shirt. The juxtaposition of
the two images is a metaphor for the article – beneath the exterior
expressions of rebellious youth identity, young bikers are as normal, decent,
and devoted to the national cause as any other. In Star, any
behaviour that cannot be reconciled within the national image is systematically
placed in the category of foreign deviance or in that of local traditional
backwardness. There is no
ÔauthenticÕ deviance.
In
addition to rigid norms governing who can be the legitimate focus of a Star feature and how they can be presented, there are
also well-established norms of censorship governing suitable topics for
investigation. The ability of
regime censors to limit discussion in print of sensitive issues is so ingrained
that journalists and state officials alike repeat the tenets of censorship like
a mantra. These tenets have come
to be known in Syria as the Ôthree red linesÕ and cover, quite predictably, the
three no-go areas of politics, sex, and religion. Star writers,
Ahmed and Yousef, were equally as versed in the Ôthree red linesÕ of censorship
as their editor and manager, Carole.
Indeed, perhaps unsurprisingly, I was again acquainted with the
intricacies of the three red lines during an interview with Ahed Abuzeid at the
Ministry of Media.[225] In each case, although I brought up the
issue of censorship, my interviewee outlined the three red lines entirely
independently. The consistency of
response shown by state official, editor and the amateur writers points not
only to the fact that print censorship is entrenched in Syria, but also to the
active role Star writers play in
enforcing the bounds of what they can write. Star, then, is
itself a mechanism of control on the bounds of speech. Of course, as some Star writers argued, a censored magazine is better than no
magazine at all. Indeed, in the
long-term it may provide a site for contests and voices the regime finds deeply
unsettling. The point is, however,
that so far the magazine has sought to elaborate on, rather than diminish, the
ongoing relevance to public life of the three red lines of state censorship; it
has sought to obstruct and drown out voices emanating through new media, such
as the internet and satellite television, which are deemed threatening to regime control. Star, to borrow from Wedeen, Ôclutters public spaceÕ[226]
with what it does not say; it is a text deeply loaded in the denial of politics
and the de-legitimization of self-questioning.
It
might be argued, as Twitchell has argued, that popular culture makes no attempt
to engage with politics or religion, rather to sell what sells because it
entertains.[227] Yet, Star is not simply an artefact of the kind of popular culture Twitchell
charts. Rather, it is a
self-confessed manual in youth education devoted to Ôintroducing youth workÕ as
it says in its first Syrian-content issue.[228] So it might seem that StarÕs readers would benefit from pieces examining
religious authorities, answering readersÕ questions about sex, or discussing
possibilities for increasing youth participation in politics. But none of these is possible, not just
because they might contain the seeds of future threats to regime power and its
role in shaping social life, but because they unsettle the very purpose of Star
magazine – to help produce a new generation
of compliant young Syrians who aspire to a middle class consumption lifestyle
and professional achievement within the bounds of sustained regime
authority. The magazine, then,
provides the blueprint for youth regeneration within guidelines of constraint.
Star, whilst largely written by young amateurs, is
nevertheless determinedly didactic.
The features which further StarÕs didactic function most overtly are Real Star and Double Star which display professionally successful figures, including women, and
detail the secret to their success.
Real Star is a double-page
spread focusing on the personality, education, and career of a different
professional each week, whilst Double Star comprises two full-page photographs of other ÔstarsÕ with details of
their hobbies, studies, and career. The questions Real Star asks aim to persuade the reader to aspire to
corporate ideals, to value education, and to understand their personality as a
resource:
ÔWhat do people say about your
personality?Õ
ÔWhy did you study?Õ
ÔWhat are your next plans?Õ
ÔWhat are the areas of work that
you have become absorbed by?Õ
ÔWhat are the areas of work that
you have tackled courageously?Õ
Not only do these questions reinforce the idea that being fulfilled in life is to be professionally successful, they also confirm that middle class identity is founded on aspiration. For male ÔstarsÕ, the article uses a font based on handwriting to make the role model seem as personable and approachable as possible, but simultaneously establishes him as an authority figure by way of pictures of the ÔstarÕ at work – often in an office environment – answering the telephone, signing documents, and typing on the computer. In the office environments I observed space is geared to projecting the managerÕs centrality in it. Managers use the office to affirm their position relative to other employees, exploiting tools at their disposal – buzzers for summoning secretarial staff, telephones, televisions – to signal alertness and control. By presenting the professional as both powerful and approachable, Real Star seeks to persuade the reader not only that it is right and possible to aspire to such a role, but that self-empowerment requires the reader to emulate the ÔstarÕ on display (Figure 20). Women, though rarely the focus of Real Star, are displayed differently. Pictured in their homes, they are seen as role models because they have succeeded in establishing a warm domestic environment replete with the paraphernalia of modern bourgeois living – luxurious sofas, lavish furnishings, candles, and paintings (Figure 20).[229]
Representations of this sort are not new; rather the construction of women as managers of the domestic space has a long legacy in the modern Middle East [230] . What Star does is combine two codes – the professional and the consumptive – which are two complementary sides of the same know-how in middle class prosperity and achievement.
Other didactic
material is a result of a complex relationship in which Carole commissions and
selects articles but frequently refers to the young writersÕ interests for
ideas. The writers are role models
throughout the magazine; their dress, their enthusiasm, their ambition all
combine to provide the reader with a coherent package in how to be successful
and young in a modern secular Syria.
Moreover, they are responsible for writing the two pieces which might be
understood as the magazineÕs editorial comment. These two pieces are mirrors of one another: the former
opens the magazine in English whereas the latter closes the magazine in Arabic,
yet both deal with the same issues of romantic love, morality and fulfilment in
life. These commentaries
encapsulate the magazine and provide its moral shell. Indeed, they function so unmistakably as small
parables on life to help the reader negotiate lifeÕs traumas and obstacles that
they might strike the Western reader as patronizing in the extreme. Taking the angst of adolescence very
seriously, they are written as if the reader unavoidably shares similar
concerns and problems as Star writers. A
typical formula identifies a problem in life, questions why it should be so,
and concludes by offering the reader a bite-size maxim to take away. For example, one of AladdinÕs opening
editorial pieces could hardly begin on a more morose note: ÔIs life worth
it? Is life worth our tears?Õ[231] Devoid of context, this rhetorical
gambit could potentially divert the reader to the wrong answer, ÔNo.Õ But Aladdin is on hand to provide
reassurance and comfort, cajoling his audience to Ôcheer up, we have to
convince ourselves that this life is great.Õ As is so often the case in StarÕs editorial pieces, the guidelines offer routes to
contentment which remain ungrounded in social or political action. So we arrive at the moral of the
parable, unmistakably indicated in red print, which reads, ÔAlways remember
that we only live once. But if we do it right, once is enough.Õ Aladdin, and by extension Star, provides a resolution to angst, and therefore a
ladder to personal confidence and fulfilment.
Concluding aphorisms of this kind, highlighted in red, are not uncommon in Star editorials:
ÔDonÕt be so busy thinking about how could you be happier and forget the blessings we live every day, hour, or momentÉÕ
Ô[Winter] is truly a beautiful season. Try to live it and think about it positively for one time only, and you will see how much you will love and appreciate it.Õ
ÔKindness is the noblest weapon which you conquer with.Õ[232]
Raya Saba goes as far as offering the reader Ô21 rules 2 be happyÕ which not only seek to build the readerÕs self-confidence, reminding the reader to Ôspend time aloneÕ and Ôremember É respect for self,Õ but also elaborate a secular moral code which can replace religious codes.[233] Thus, the reader is told to Ôtake immediate steps to correctÕ a mistake and Ôgive people more than they expect and do it cheerfully.Õ And, as if this wasnÕt enough to chew on, the reader learns how to be truly fulfilled in life:
ÔLove deeply and passionately. You might get hurt but itÕs the only way to live life completely.Õ
Many of these editorials recycle slogans and even whole tracts from internet sites. Plagiarism is one way in which the magazine is constraining: it validates and endorses a process in which the writers look to simple answers for solutions, rather than self-generated thought and political action, and recycles them, along with their validation, through society. One of YousefÕs English-language editorials does just this, churning out aphorisms which call on the reader to have hope and live life to the full:
ÔWork like you donÕt need the money, love like youÕve never been hurt, dance like no one is watching and live like itÕs heaven on earthÕ[234]
YousefÕs aphorisms deny the acknowledgment of impossibility or failure, and therefore negate practical lived realities. Moreover, the aphorisms turn on binaries which do not reflect lived struggles and hardships: Ôif itÕs good, itÕs wonderful. If itÕs bad, itÕs experienceÕ and Ôeverything is okay in the end, if itÕs not ok, then itÕs not the endÕ. These binaries (predicated on the idea that all lived experience is positive and valuable) are not only false, they seek to divert readers from the possibility of improving their material and social lives through political action. In other words, they remove practical visions of critique and self-generated change from the map by offering unattainable goals devoid of local or historical actuality.
This sloganeering reoccurs throughout the magazine. In Real Star, Double Star, and Sport Star, professional and amateur successes are asked to reveal their slogan for life. These often validate hard work and a sense of social conscience, but also equip the reader with what seems to be a simple set of maxims which provide a passport into the world of professional fulfilment. Clearly, they are intended as part of the secular ethical and social code Star seeks to give its readers which can replace ÔbackwardÕ religious moral codes which are incapable of adapting to the modern world envisioned. Indeed, they are the flip side of a code which dominates the latter pages of the Syrian content, a code which, on the one hand, encourages bourgeois consumption as the key to fulfilment in life (rather than religious observance), and, on the other, points to hidden texts within the natural world as a secular explanation for why things are as they are. The Syrian content is riddled with endorsements for consumption, not only in advertising, but also in the articles Star writers produce. Thus, readers are informed about types of home gardens, how to keep beautiful, and how the way they dress can help reduce their defects.[235] In addition, pieces such as Star Kitchen, Top Music and Top Movies outline the contours of a productive and fulfilling bourgeois lifestyle. Perhaps even more common are articles which posit certain invisible meanings in human interactions and the social world. Star thus discloses for its readers the relationship between eye colour and personality, the hidden meanings of colours, how to discover yourself from your date of birth, how the way we apologize depends on our star sign, and how our voice points to our psychological state.[236] In addition, a four-page feature championed by Carole, Star Elak, offers readers an explanation of their palm and a detailed account of the personalities of all children born on each of the days in the week of issue (Figure 21). By providing readers with a secular tool kit for understanding the world about them, these texts seek to subvert and replace religious explanations of meaning. Moreover,
they explain the world as a system of incontrovertible signs in which outcomes are the products of fate. In this vision, political action is rendered unnecessary and futile.
Star is testimony to the emergence of a new privatized
corporatism in Syria which endorses a bourgeois professional and consumptive
lifestyle as a means of ensuring regime stability. This privatized corporatism provides an authority structure
(as well as a legitimating discourse) which aims to replace traditional
patriarchal family structures and state-based institutional corporatism. Because this corporatism is wedded to
the regime, cultural practices deemed threatening or incompatible are
marginalized as deviant either for being ÔbackwardÕ (as Yousef would describe
patriarchy) or for being foreign (as Milad Yusuf describes hard rock). Unlike in the hugely popular satirical
newspaper Al-Domari, the privatized corporatism evident in Star eliminates criticism of middle class authority
figures within the fold. Hence, a
discourse emerges wielding the vocabulary of meritocracy and aspiration towards
new mechanisms of constraint.
5
Down at Inhouse Coffee: Star Magazine in its Site of Consumption
Khalid was in his element in Inhouse coffee. Recounting tales of his sexual exploits, he mused energetically over the motivations for his latest romantic split, his mobile, embedded in the palm of his left hand, periodically alerting him to yet another music download from his ÔexÕ to which he would intermittently text back, his cigarette lodged between the index and middle fingers of his animated right hand, his strawberry milkshake in Inhouse-branded plastic cup in front of him, his almost seamless narrative punctuated only by here a drag, there a swig. By the time I arrived, he had already been hanging out in the cafŽ with his side-kick Abdul over an hour draining two ludicrously expensive milkshakes in the process. Having settled at a centrally located table clearly visible through the stylish glass-paned cafŽ front to evening shoppers looking in on the meticulously-designed and clinically-organized space that is the hallmark of Inhouse, Khalid was keen to be seen. Part of being in Inhouse is being seen in Inhouse, and Khalid, was both fastidiously groomed and suitably dressed in sharp Western attire plainly marking him out as one of DamascusÕs wealthy young. Son of a successful car salesman and brilliantly articulate in English, Khalid finds in Inhouse the exclusive space in which to be a young modern Syrian.
Khalid, indeed, is precisely the target consumer Inhouse seeks to attract. He is within the target age range of 18 to 35, he is wealthy by Syrian standards, and he is conversant in the codes of global consumer culture having spent three summers in the UK learning English. I met Khalid first in a quite different location – the suburban environs of Al-Nabk, a small town north of Damascus, where I was staying with the religiously observant cousin of my Arabic language conversation partner. Al-Nabk does not even boast a single cafŽ. Little wonder then that Khalid only goes there on short visits to see his family. The Damascus of Inhouse offers him a much more prestigious environment in which to pursue his social life. Part of this is to do with the cafŽÕs cosmopolitan feel. As Said Al-Jaafari, its Chief Operating Officer, explained to me in an interview, Inhouse seeks to attract Western students temporarily resident in Syria who account for over 20 percent of its sales. These foreigners, of whom I was one, are not out of place in Inhouse; rather they are seen to have social capital which adds value to the brand and rubs off on Syrian consumers there. For example, I was often greeted as a quasi-hero in Inhouse for nothing other than turning up. The staff seemed to love practising their latest English on me. On one occasion, a female server gave me a free promotional CD after I had asked for directions. On another, a group of four Syrian students observed me for some time before plucking up the courage to ask a question. Of course, Western tourists may receive attention wherever they go in Syria, but in Inhouse, they are seen positively such that a certain social capital is funnelled into the brand. Inhouse is where young Syrians, and not just the very wealthy, can go to be transported to a cosmopolitan world, to feel connected to the pulse of global culture. And everything in the cafŽ revolves around this, from the stylish modern furnishings to the expensive cappuccinos, from the predominance of English over Arabic to the ubiquity of the Inhouse brand, from the consumption-oriented iconography of the Inhouse pictograms to the endless music videos on MTV.
Moreover, Inhouse
is a place where social norms can be contested. This is partly because the chain itself contests social
norms in Syria. The Western-only
music television brings images fetishizing and eroticizing youth sub-cultures,
thus tagging Western consumerism to visions of youth experimentation and
selling the idea that to be young and connected is to pursue kinds of
consumption incompatible with the previous generation. As Thomas Frank notes, through
developments in advertising in 1960s America, the notion of youth came to be
Ôan attractive consuming attitude, not an ageÕ which was Ôpre-eminently defined
by the values of the countercultureÕ hinging on Ôtalk of rebellion, and
intimations of free love.Õ[237] In the United States, musical
countercultures endowed with rebellious attitude, in-group identity, and
disdain for conventions have been sought out and cultivated by advertisers and
pop producers. In a world where
individuality is defined by consumer identity, this dynamic makes perfect
business sense. If being young
hinges on a Ôconsuming attitudeÕ which distinguishes young people from their
parents, then countercultures provide ideal resources to shape what young
people consume. Countercultures
can thus be presented as young, innovative and ÔhipÕ because they unsettle
established norms. Frank describes
this process for 1960s America:
ÔThe counterculture seemed to have it all: the unconnectedness which would allow consumers to indulge transitory whims; the irreverence that would allow them to defy moral Puritanism; and the contempt for established social rules that would free them from the slow-moving, buttoned-down conformity of their abstemious ancestors.Õ [238]
Yet, through the far-reaching endeavours of global media and mass marketing, countercultures such as rap and hard rock have become essentially mainstream in the Western youth imagination. This, however, is not the case in Syria where such genres are widely seen either as unacceptable in or incompatible with Syrian culture. But their display in Inhouse through MTV and VHR1 hints at the emergence of widespread social changes in Syria allied to the advent of satellite television and the internet. If ever will be a time in which countercultures become ÔcoolÕ in the Middle East, it could be fast approaching.
Inhouse is not marginal, but neither is it a chain devoted to mass appeal in the mould of the Starbucks and Costa Coffees of the West – the prices are simply too expensive and the codes of display too hard to attain for most. Rather, Inhouse is high prestige. Some of my student friends would only need a weekly or monthly fix of Inhouse to feel included in its community, although others, such as Yousef, would be there most days. Yet, Inhouse clearly sets out to exclude some and cordially include others. This does not just work through pricing but socially as well. As I have argued, the clientele in part need somewhere exclusive in order to represent the vanguard of Syrian modernity and youth culture. For example, during one of my stints in the cafŽ, a customer sitting near the glass-paned cafŽ front objected to a homeless boy looking in at him. Almost immediately one of the numerous members of staff was outside chasing off the boy. A certain privilege and social capital pertains from being seen in Inhouse by those who cannot afford to be there, but this boy was off the scale. His presence – even though outside the cafŽ – intruded on the customerÕs space and undermined the logic of prestige accruing from social display. Another aspect of exclusion concerns the elimination of social codes of public display, religious observance, and political obedience which are the hallmark of public life in most of Syria. When, for example, I asked Said Al-Jaafari why he refuses to screen Arabic satellite music channels in all his cafes – a truly remarkable decision given the popularity of video clip channels, Rotana and Melody Maker, and reality TV formats, Star Academy and Super Star – he responded by saying Ôyou canÕt put something Arabian into the cafŽ.Õ Inhouse locates Syria in the west, seeking to undermine the national modernism which has long retained a place for preserving the authentic national self.
Indeed, Inhouse de-clutters leisure space, removing religious and political symbols and rhetoric, and re-stacking that space with a new iconography and language. Everything is branded - mugs, plastic cups, tissues, plates, ash trays, menus – to an extent largely unseen in any other Syrian leisure establishment (Figure 22). Even the serversÕ bodies provide legitimate space on which to display the brand – each has to wear full green uniform, apron and cap. Metallic lettering adorns the bar boldly pronouncing the Inhouse slogan in English, ÔJust a perfect day.Õ Taken from a Lou Reed song, this slogan further orients Inhouse towards the West. The three pictograms that form the core brand, an arrow for Ôin,Õ a house for Ôhouse,Õ and a mug for Ôcoffee,Õ are complemented by a set of further icons designed to reinforce the central themes of the brand. Thus, images variously depict musical notes, someone relaxing in a bath, and a heart to communicate that Inhouse is a place for friends, leisure, and romance. Inhouse branding does not stop there. The chainÕs slogan is recycled as part of a brand jingle repeated roughly every hour that says, ÔInhouse Coffee day, just a perfect day!Õ But, Inhouse is less remarkable for what it contains than for what it excludes. Unlike almost all other cafes, restaurants and shops in the capital, it resists displaying images of the President, of the Syrian flag, or of religious verses or icons. The wide glass-paned fronts which are typical of Inhouse provide for a dialogue of two-way display. It provides Inhouse clientele with a lens through which to inspect the cluttered world of authoritarian Syria from a distance whilst simultaneously displaying their social privilege in an active gesture of social differentiation. In this way, the glass fronts magnify processes of social exclusion and further reinforce InhouseÕs status as a youth retreat from cluttered public space.
It is into this politically de-cluttered, Western-oriented world that Star magazine is put, vying with a host of other media – satellite television, mobile phones, and newspapers – for the attention of young people. In Inhouse, unlike the core business of the American coffee chains it is derived from, most customers spend extended periods of time socializing and relaxing. Hardly anyone comes in to grab a quick coffee on their way elsewhere. This presents an excellent opportunity for the consumption of media products. The centre piece of the Inhouse media menu is the satellite television shown on stylish plasma screens. Set to Western music channels, MTV and VHR1 throughout the day except mornings when Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya are screened silently to Western music, this television output provides a window on the West and a set of guidelines for customers to replicate on how to be young, fashionable, and connected. The music allows for an atmosphere and continuity which helps sustain the brandÕs potency. But the televisions are also used to broadcast MTV recordings of live concerts of major pop stars, such as Elton John and Eric Clapton, in the early afternoon and mid-evening. These concerts combine the flow typical of MTV music videos with the display of spectacle. I noticed the customers of Inhouse to some extent taking part in the drama of these concerts as if they were there in person. For example, during a Brian Adams concert, customers tended to turn towards the television whenever a song finished. Two women sitting near me were visibly astonished by the camera angles which showed the size of the crowd. One muttered Ôwow.Õ Later, when Adams finished a song and brought a fan on stage, again these women were drawn to the television. They too were spectators to a spectacle. On another occasion, I saw a young man counting his prayer beads. Every time the music stopped he would turn to the television and watch still counting. Clearly, the televisions are very important to Inhouse and are capable of alluring customer attention. But there are other media playing the game as well, not least mobile telephones. Inhouse clientele seem to pride themselves on displaying their latest gadgets on the table in front of them. This not only adds social capital to those with enough money to afford expensive phones, but it also allows Inhouse customers to demonstrate that they are socially connected. In other words, even without the latest phone with which to accrue social prestige, young Inhouse regulars must display their phone to prove social credibility. Texting, phoning, taking photographs and sharing music downloads are regular practices which provide additional means for enhancing a customerÕs social standing amongst peers as well as amongst other customers in the cafŽ. Finally, it is not unusual to see groups gathered around a laptop computer, either working or discussing videos.
It should be obvious that the print media in Inhouse face very serious competition for the attention of the young clientele. Star is one of a number of magazines and newspapers made available for customers to browse for free in Inhouse cafes, but it is the only one which specifically sells itself as a youth magazine. Nevertheless, print is perhaps the only medium through which the nationalist, paternalistic pro-regime agenda of Star can realistically access the Inhouse audience within the cafŽ itself. Star reaches the Inhouse market only because it is distributed to certain cafes, restaurants, VIPs, and hairdressers for free. Carole puts the proportion of magazines distributed in this way at ten percent of the 10,000 print run, although on the UG website the figure is 5,000. The discrepancy points to the difficulties researchers have evaluating distribution and sales in Syria and the Middle East more generally because either the statistics are not collated or they are kept confidential. That Star claims to distribute up to 5,000 copies for free only reinforces the idea that it is not only a commercial venture, but also a strategy for conveying a message. Nowhere is this task more urgent than Inhouse, a veritable hunting ground for Star magazine.
When I first encountered Star in Inhouse early in my summer visit to Syria in 2005, I was convinced the two made ideal bed-fellows. But, through the course of my research, I have come to the view that this is misguided. If Star has two young target audiences that it seeks to transform, they are on the one hand the religiously conservative elements of the middle class, and on the other hand the Western-oriented bourgeois consumers of Inhouse. To the first group, Star preaches conformity to a secular, politically obedient, consumerist society in which patriarchal norms are viewed as backward. To the second group, Star preaches something quite different: that professional achievement and a modern, bourgeois lifestyle are not only attainable in Syria, but alive and well today. It reminds readers in this camp that national icons are important, that high culture is necessary, and that morality in part stems from constraining Western influence whilst promoting a self-generated national modernity.
Although the codes of Inhouse and Star do align in places – both are broadly secular, both endorse consumption, and both exploit derivative hybrid models to local ends – Star seeks to contest some central elements of the Inhouse vision for young Syrians. Firstly, Star brings political slogans, regime rhetoric and national emblems into the politically de-cluttered space of the Inhouse cafŽ. During the period of intense political crisis over the Al-Hariri affair through November and December 2005, the regime moved to reaffirm mass compliance. It propagated flags and banners in public places; it broadcast overtly political songs on the radio; it developed websites masking as petitions which encouraged ÔvirtualÕ acts of obedience; and it re-appropriated advertising space for political sloganeering and symbolic display. Throughout all of this, Inhouse remained almost impenetrable to the symbolic production of the regime. It was only Star and UGÕs lifestyle magazine, Layalina, which successfully breached the fortress of the Inhouse brand to supply messages of state control. In other words, the part-privatization of the regimeÕs symbolic production was crucial in furthering the regimeÕs message into new privately managed spaces.
Secondly, whereas Inhouse unashamedly orients its customers towards the West, Star seeks to draw them back into the national fold. In the Inhouse vision, customers accrue social prestige from consuming cultural forms which are globally mediated through satellite television. In the Star vision, such forms are not denied completely, but are constrained into the tight-jacket of nationally focused, morally didactic content. Star thus seeks to convince its young Syrian readers that their task is to consume and further products bound up in SyriaÕs pursuit of self-generated national modernity. The underlying claim affirms that the fruits of SyriaÕs secular modernity can be, indeed are, superior to those in the West.
But perhaps Inhouse and Star are aligned in a broader respect. Both are part of a new formulation in private-corporate practice which is energetically blurring the boundaries between cultural complexes once deemed separate. In other words, the walls which may once have separated bourgeois culture from, on the one hand, the state and, on the other, religion have been in both cases decisively breached. The common factor is the emergence of a powerful privatized corporatism that seems impossible for any cultural complex to ignore. Thus, the Inhouse advert in figure 22 mixes modern pictogram branding with ÔauthenticÕ religious inscriptions proclaiming ÔAdha MubarakÕ (Happy `Id Al-Adha) in a way which parallels the merging of corporate and regime-national symbols in Star. Merging religious and bourgeois cultural symbols (a practice which is certainly not new or uncommon in the Middle East) is useful both to those seeking to encourage liberal consumption around religious festivals (such as Inhouse) and those seeking to keep society in check (such as religious preachers who perform on glossy satellite television channels). A similar dynamic is true of the fusion of state and bourgeois symbols which apparently seem antagonistic but can work in harmony. Because of this, it is becoming increasingly hard to disentangle the vocabulary of bourgeois liberalism from forces which seek to keep society in check.
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[1] Interview, 8 December 2005
[2] 2005: 88
[3] Ibid: 82
[4] 2005
[5] 1992
[6] Armbrust, 1996
[7] Armbrust, 2005
[8] Salamandra, 2004, 1998; Abu-Lughod, 2004;
Seymour, 1999; Armbrust, 1996
[9] 2005: 8
[10] I must, of course, point out the obvious obstacles to my producing an in-depth ethnography. Limited time, my deficiencies in Syrian colloquial Arabic, and my restricted cultural literacy in Syrian public life all pose problems for the ethnographic insights I propose. Nevertheless, I attempt to posit measured conclusions with these qualifications in mind.
[11] http://www.united-group.org/home.html
consulted 2 May 2006
[12] I am grateful to Marlin Dick for this comparison.
[13] http://www.united-group.org/home.html
consulted 2 May 2006
[15] Alterman, 1998: 40
[16] http://www.cggl.org/scripts/document.asp?id=46245 consulted 2 May 2006
[17] It is
widely claimed that this development in SyriaÕs domestic media is a direct
result of refomrns brought by Bashar Al-Asad. For example, JouhainaÕs owner and chief editor, Fadia
Jabril, commented in an interview with me 13 December 2005 that an official in
government encouraged her to set up a magazine that tackles controversial
social issues, explaining that the regimeÕs change in approach has taken place
because the Ônew President is young and has an open-mind and is keen to reach
to the whole world to understand Ôus.ÕÕ
This was a view repeated to me time and again, not least by Ahed
Abuzeid, a government official I spoke to at the Wazarat Al-`Illam, the
ministry responsible for media.
[18] David Hirst (The Guardian, 21 August 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,,1026127,00.html consulted on 28 February 2006) claims that although the regime denies any role in censoring publications in Syria, it is able to achieve the same ends through its control of printing, distribution, and advertising. Certainly Syrian press vendors, media professionals, and young consumers I spoke to believed in the continuing relevance of state censorship.
[19] I should note that StarÕs licence and publication are still located in Lebanon. However, the Syrian magazine is distributed by the Syrian state agency, is designed by the Syrian office within UG, and is perceived as a strictly Syrian magazine. In other words, it faces the same press laws and social responses as other domestically-produced publications.
[20] For
example, in my recent trip to Syria in December, I saw a newspaper seller in a
prime location in central Damascus underline the headlines of Tishrin using a red pen. The headlines repeated Bashar Al-AsadÕs claim on French
television that Syria is completely innocent of involvement in Rafiq Al-HaririÕs
murder. The sellerÕs display did
not extend to foreign publications which were less clearly visible. The vendors display reflects the fact
that domestically-produced publications are scrutinized more intensely than
foreign publications. I similarly noticed
a tendency for young men to photocopy and distribute articles from the
government press if they believed the article to be of real significance,
something which seems unnecessary given the remarkable availability of the
three dailies and their low price.
[21] Any
publication that does not meet the regimeÕs criteria for acceptability is
likely to struggle. Al-Domary
– the satirical paper of cartoonist `Ali Farzat introduced during the
early years of Bashar al-AsadÕs Presidency – was eventually closed down
because it provoked regime sensibilities.
See Hirst (The Guardian, 21
August 2003), http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,,1026127,00.html
accessed on 28 February 2006.
[22] Unpublished
dissertation transcript, p22. See
also note 38, p22.
[23] Amin, 2001
[24] 1997: 20
[25] 2001: 132
[26] Ibid: 131
[27] 1999: 210
[28] 2004
[29] Ibid: 20,
24
[30] Ibid: 24
[31] Hinnebusch,
2001: 91
[32] In During,
ed., 1993: 220-230
[33] 1991
[34] Ibid
[35]
Quoted from Philip Abrams, ÔNotes on the difficulty of studying the stateÕ, Journal
of Historical Sociology 1/1 (March 1988 in
Sakr, 2001: 28
[36] Migdal, in Migdal,
Kholi and Shue (eds.), 1994
[37] 1999
[38] Ibid: 153
[39] Ibid,
quoted from Michel Foucault. 1991. ÒPolitics and the Study of Discourse.Ó In
Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (eds). The Foucault Effect:
Studies in Governmentality. London:
Harvester Wheatsheaf: 60
[40] Ibid: note 84, p.178, quoted from Sherry
B.Ortner. 1996. Making Gender: The Politics and Erotics of Culture. Boston: Beacon Press: 11
[41] Ibid: 5
[42] Ibid: 153
[43] Unpublished
dissertation transcript
[44] Most of the
young Syrians I spoke to see Bashar al-Asad as a reformer and understand the
current period as a continuation of the ÔDamascus Spring,Õ the honeymoon
immediately following Bashar Al-AsadÕs rise to President when media
restrictions were relaxed.
[45] 2004
[46] Ibid: see
the epilogue pp. 158-164
[47] The new eateries
and bars of old town Damascus include the sister restaurant of Bab Al-`Atiq (The Antique Door) only two doors away, Jupiter bar opposite Bab Tuma and the Oriental
Restaurant near Bab Sharqi. Another house near Hammam Al-Bakri was
being renovated to house a new restaurant.
[48] My
colloquial teacher, a Christian who lives in the old town east of Bab Tuma,
recommended Haretna as the best restaurant in Damascus. He said the food, atmosphere and
tobacco for the water pipes were of the highest quality.
[49] 1996: 85
[50] Salamandra,
2004: 161
[51] McDonalds
is a classic example of this, even though it is widespread in urban areas of
neighbouring Lebanon
[52] Salamandra
(2004: 50) notes that, although
only three television advertising agencies existed in Syria in 1990, within the
next year over sixty new agencies were established.
[53] Martin,
unpublished disstertation script: 43
[54] Ibid
[55] Armbrust,
in Meyer and Moors eds., 2006
[56] Ibid: 220
[57] Gramsci,
1971: 182; Althusser, 2001: 97
[58] Van Dam,
1996: 17
[59] Ibid: 144
[60] As Heydemann
(1999: 208) puts it, Ôseveral years after history was alleged to have ended
with the decisive victory of liberal market capitalism much of Syrian political
discourse remains archaically revolutionary in tone.Õ
[61] Translation available at http://www.cggl.org/scripts/document.asp?id=46245 consulted 19 January 2006
[62] Ibid
[63]
Hinnebusch (in Hinnebusch and
Ehteshami eds., 2002: 150)
suggests that by 1986 the Syrian army numbered 500,000 men – an
Ôenormous armed force for a state of its size.Õ
[64]
Conversations with young Syrian men of all backgrounds during my research
visits to the country often involved some mention of military service. Both positive and deeply cynical views
were expressed.
[65] Shakry, in
Abu Lughod ed., 1998; Najmabadi, in Abu Lughod ed., 1998
[66] Ibid: 95,
102
[67] Ibid: 110
[68] In Abu
Lughod ed., 1998: 156
[69] Joseph:
1996; Thompson: 2000
[70] Mitchell,
1988; Starrett, 1998
[71] 1998
[72] Wedeen,
1999: 161, note 5
[73] Hinnebusch,
1980: 149; Heydemann, 1999: 208
[74] Wedeen,
1999: 161, note 5. A good friend
and informant during my research visits to Syria told me quite openly about his
experience of being taken for questioning by the unionÕs prefects after he took
photographs of his class.
[75] Perthes,
1992: 16
[76] Salamandra,
2004: 2
[77] Frank, 1997
[78] 1999
[79] Ibid: 131,
6
[80] Ibid: 6
[81] Ibid: see
the story of M and the high ranking officer, p. 67
[82] My evidence
for the change in law concerning mobile telephones comes from conversations
with Syrians during my research visits to the country; for the regimeÕs initial
response to the internet see Alterman, 1998:41; for early regime attitudes to
satellite see Sakr, 2001: 19
[83] See
Sreberny and Mohammadi, 1994
[84] http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41732.htm,
consulted 9 April 2006
[85] The Junior
Chamber International (JCI), Bidaya, and the Syrian Youth Entrepreneur
Assocation (SYEA) are such organizations working to increase volunteering
opportunities for young Syrians. I
interviewed the presidents of both JCI and SYEA, 15 December 2005
[86] 2000: 147
[87] Ibid
[88] This was
confirmed during an interview I conducted with state official in the Ministry
of Media (Wizarat Al-`Ilam), Ahed Abu-Zied, 17 December 2005
[89] In addition
to falling oil rents, the loss of a superpower patron in the USSR, and failing
state-run industries (all widely cited as reasons for Syrian economic
difficulties), there may well be another grave economic challenge facing the
Syrian regime with its withdrawal from Lebanon. As Perthes (1997: 18) notes Lebanon has proved an invaluable
complement to the Syrian economy over the last decade, providing crucial access
to finance, services and the global market, whilst reducing the need for problematic
economic liberalization within Syria.
[90] Whitaker (The
Guardian, 3 April 2001), http://www.guardian.co.uk/elsewhere/journalist/story/0,7792,1072105,00.html consulted on 2 March 2006. Of course, Khaddam has more recently
been labelled as a traitor since his flight to France and vehement (and
opportunistic) criticism of the regime.
Yet, his sonÕs business interests were firmly established before his
departure, and therefore the fundamental point that building a commercial
foothold is made much easier by strong ties to the regime is not undermined by
KhaddamÕs defection.
[91] Ibid
[92] Star issues respectively 42, 24 September-1 October 2005:
13, 40, 31; 58, 14-20 January 2006: back cover
[93] 8 December
2005
[94] 1999
[95] Salamandra
(2004: 161) points to the growth of advertising agencies and billboards.
[96] Issue 44
[97] I observed
a billboard advertisement for washing powder displaying the national flag at
Jisr Al-RaÕis.
[98] This is
cited from Wedeen, 1999: 6
[99] 1996: 102
[100]
Ibid: 199
[101]
Levinson, 2005: 220
[102] From interview, 8 December 2005
[103] Star, issue 25, 28 May-03 June 2005: 10-13
[104] Star, issues 20, 23-29 April 2005: 12-14; 14, 12-18 March: 12-13; 0, 4-10 December 2004: 6-7
[105]
Star issue 1, 11-17 December: 16-18.
All the above are Syrian issue numbers, although the magazines
themselves are exact replicas of the Lebanese version. They hail from the period before July
2005 when Syrian Star became a different
magazine from the Lebanese copy.
[106] 1992: 10
[107] Ibid
[108] Star Issue 0, 4-10 December 2004: 24-26
[109] Star, issue 42, 24 September-1 October 2005
[110] Salamandra, 2004: 57; Armbrust, 2005: 22
[111] Star, issues 24, 21-27 may 2005: 33; 25, 28 may-03 june 2005: 30; issue 24: 34; issue 50, 19-26 November 2005: 21
[112] Ryzova, 2005
[113]
Martin, unpublished phd transcript
[114] Ibid: 234-236
[115] Quoted in Khadur, 1972: 502
[116] 2005: 21
[117] Quoted in Khadur, 1972: 502-503
[118] Ibid
[119] Armbrust, 1996 pp11-36, 2006; Abu-Lughod,
2004; Salamandra, 1998, 2004, 2005; Seymour, 1999 ; Diase, 1996
[120] 1991
[121] Armbrust, 1996, 2006; Abu-Lughod, 2004;
Salamandra, 2004
[122] Salamandra, 1998
[123]
Ibid, 2005: 11
[124]
Abu-Lughod, 2004: 196
[125] 2005: 6
[126]
Salamandra, 2005 : 10 ; Ayish, 2002
[127] Alterman, 2002
[128]
El-Hennawy, 2002
[129] Kraidy, 2005: 21
[130] Ibid
[131] 1999
[132] 2002
[133] Armbrust, 2005: 19-21
[134] Alterman (1998) concisely lays out the arguments for the powerful potential of new media technologies in the Middle East to bring widespread social change.
[135] Ibid; Sakr, 2002
[136] Sakr, 2001: 64; Kraidy, 2005: 22
[137] Sakr, 2005: 163
[138] Lynch, 2005: 41
[139] 1992: 10
[140] 1996: 165-220
[141] 2005: 9
[142] 2005: 30, 32
[143] Twitchell, 1992: 33
[144] Salamandra, 2005: 11
[145] Kraidy (2005: 18) points to market research companies in Dubai and Lebanon which have attested to the success of these shows. See note 42, p27
[146] For directors, see Hatim `Ali, Star issue 44, 8-15 October 2005, pp 6-10; Bashar Dahan Star issue 52, 3-10 December 2005, pp18-20; Basil al-Khatib, Star issue 58, 14-20 January 2006, pp4-8; for music, see the band Kulna Siwa, Star issue 41, 17-24 September 2005, pp 4-7 and Miada Basailis and Samir Kuwaifati, Star issue 53, 10-17 December 2005, pp 4-8; for dance, see Lawind Haju, Star issue 36, 13-20 August, 2005, pp 4-6
[147] Armbrust, 1996: 194, Salamandra, 2004: 17
[148] I think of a friend (and trained dentist) in the provincial town of Al-Nabk in particular. It is also noteworthy that young Syrian friends, Souha and Itab, offered me Fayruz as an introduction to Arabic music.
[149] Danielson, 1996
[150] 1992; 1996
[151] Twitchell, 1992: 43
[152] Lindsey, 2005: 203
[153] Dick, 2005: 179
[154] Ibid: 179, 180
[155] Ibid: 177
[156] Ibid: 180
[157] 2005: 201-202
[158] Salamandra, 2005: 6
[159] Ibid: 7-8
[160] Ibid: 10
[161] Lindsey, 2005: 199-200; Shoup, 2005: 195; Dick, 2005: 177
[162] Alterman, 1998: 40
[163]
The questions asked in Star Interview in
the December 2005 issues show much greater variation than at other times. This is because December is the
academic exam period in Syria when most of the Star writers are unable to work on producing the
magazine. In such circumstances it is left to Carole and her editorial staff to
conduct the interviews and write the articles. They tend to ask more varied and taxing questions. But this does not mean that Carole
gives the reins entirely to the young people at other times. The similarities between the questions
in Star Interview, Real
Star, and Sport Star show that there is an editorial bias against the
young writers experimenting and asking tough questions.
[164] 6-13 August 2005: p5
[165] Dick, 2005: 184
[166] The MBC producer Abdelfatah Al-Masry, quoted in Wise, 2005: 49
[167] Dick, 2005: 180
[168] 1996
[169] Interview with Qais Al-Shaykh Najib, Star 35, 6-13 August 2005: p5
[170] Ibid
[171] Ibid
[172] Ibid
[173] Quoted in Heydemann, 1993: 100
[174]
Issue 41, 17-24 September 2005: 62, 64. The pages are devoted to the birthday
celebrations at Cesar restaurant of Walaa `Alam, prominent Star writer and sister of the magazineÕs Public Relations
manager, Dona `Alam
[175]
Issue 36, 13-20 August 2005: 32-33.
The double page spread, which shows Nancy singing and dancing on stage,
includes several pictures of the Star
team at the concert, some waving promotional flags. Issue 42 (24 September-1October 2005: 34-35) goes one step
further. Advertising Star Night,
a party held to promote the magazine with sponsorship from Nokia and Fayrouz
soft drinks, the double page piece proudly announces that the night lasted
until eleven and shows selected members of the Star writers dancing with their friends. A slightly different example is a
six-page Star Exclusive (issue
45, 15-22 October 2005: 36-41) focusing on an event at which Star magazine hosted the team behind the musalsal Ashwak
Na`ima (Soft Thorns). Pictures show Star writers welcoming and interviewing their guests from
the serial wearing black promotional T-shirts bearing the magazineÕs name.
[176] Carole reported this to me in an English-language interview I conducted with her by telephone, 23 January 2006
[177] Issue 30, 9-15 July 2005: 1
[178] See below for the stories of Ahmed and Yousef detailing how they became involved in the magazine.
[179] Interview conducted with them at Inhouse Coffee in Mezze, 15 December 2005
[180]
This and most of the subsequent anecdotes about Carole come from a Star meeting I joined, 13 December 2005
[181] Interview with Carole, 8 December 2005
[182] Ibid
[183] Star meeting 9 August 2005. One of the Star writers, Ahmed, also provided me with a text he had rejected because of the religious phrases it included.
[184] 1996: 194
[185] Interview 8 December 2005
[186] For a study looking at state power structures through gender and paternalism see Thompson, 2000; for the role of kinship and ethnic group in state power see Batatu, 1982; for Sunni-Alawi tension over representations of Old Damascus see Salamandra, 2004
[187] Interview with Carole, 8 December 2005
[188] 7 December 2005
[189] 26 July 2005
[190] 9 August 2005
[191] Interview 8 December 2005
[192] 10 December 2005
[193] 13 December 2005
[194] Due to my deficiencies in Damascene Arabic, some of the details of this exchange were provided by Ahmed as we caught a taxi across town immediately after the meeting. Nevertheless, I made detailed notes on how speakers presented themselves, the responses Carole and the team gave to them, and the gist of the discussion.
[195] Wedeen, 1999: 120-129
[196] Ahmed told me a story he has also told the Star team about an occasion when he was caught by University prefects taking photos of the class. This was deemed unacceptable behaviour. But Ahmed openly confesses he has no respect for the prefects and would challenge them again. He has also challenged his parentsÕ authority by growing a beard and long hair.
[197] Graham Brown, 1988: 239, Armbrust, 1999: 107
[198] Graham Brown, 1988: 247. Though, as she points out, in practice these representations are the product of male control just as much as in most other domains. Take, for example, the number of male directors, producers, and camera-men who control the whole production of Arab video clips in which women star.
[199] Ibid
[200] Ibid: 245
[201]
Star, issue 45, 15-22 October 2005
[202] Ibid: Minogue appears on p21, the other Hurley and Duff on p67
[203] Ibid: p82
[204] Ibid: pp32-33
[205] Issue 47, 29 October-1 November 2005, p21
[206] He related this to me during our interview in Inhouse Coffee, 10 December 2005
[207]Bourdieu, in J.G. Peristiany ed.,
1965: 223-224
[208] Interview 8 December 2005
[209] Ibid
[210] 15 December 2005
[211] Interview on 8 December 2005
[212] Adorno and Horkheimer, in During ed., 1993: 31-41
[213] 2001: 80-87
[214] Perthes, in Kienle ed., 1994: 52
[215] Ibid
[216] Hinnebusch, 1980: 146
[217] Ibid: 145
[218] Ibid: 149-150
[219] 1993: 81-82, 79
[220]
From Issue 32, 16-22 July 2005, pp 8-9.
These questions are typical of Real Star.
[221]
Star Interview, Star issue 40, 10-17 September 2005: 4-6
[222] Ibid: 4
[223] Ibid: 5
[224] Ibid: 4
[225] 17 December 2005
[226] 1999: 6
[227] 1992: 43
[228] Issue 30, 2-7 July 2005: 1
[229] See issues 33, 23-30 July 2005: 8-9; 35, 6-13 August 2005: 8-9; 42, 24 September-1 October 2005: 8-9
[230] Najmabadi, in Abu-Lughod, ed., 1998
[231] Star issue 38, 27 August – 3 September 2005
[232]
Star issues respectively 44, 8-15
October 2005; 53, 10-17 December 2005; 47, 29 October – 1November 2005
[233]
Star issue 45, 15-22 October 2005
[234]
Star issue 36, 13-20 August 2005
[235] Star issues respectively 44, 8-15 October 2005: 56; 32, 16-22 July 2005: 42-43; 34, 30 July – 6 August 2005: 40
[236] Star issues respectively 33, 23-30 July 2005: 26; 35, 6-13 August 2005: 40; 38, 27 August-3 September 2005: 40; 47, 29 October-1November 2005: 40; 48, 2-12 November 2005: 52
[237] 1997: 118
[238] Ibid: 119