

Political Sociology Lectures: Ethnicity and Ethnic Minorities

Stephen Fisher

stephen.fisher@sociology.ox.ac.uk

<http://users.ox.ac.uk/~nuff0084/polsoc>

- ▶ Concepts and theory
- ▶ Measurement
- ▶ Inequality, Segregation and Integration
- ▶ Change over time—Immigration
- ▶ Ethnicity and Political Participation
- ▶ Ethnicity and the Vote
- ▶ Ethnic Representation
- ▶ Conclusions

Concepts

Race: A group of common origin with common genetic characteristics.

Racialism: Belief that race is important in determining human behaviour.

Racism: Self-identification with race and hostility to other races.

Ethnicity: Common consciousness of shared origins and traditions.

- ▶ Cultural and not biological
- ▶ From *ethos* meaning tribe or nation
- ▶ Ethnic identity is often linked to national, linguistic and religious identity though not in any consistent manner.

Tend to be concerned with ethnicity rather than race, since

- ▶ Most social science hypotheses are not racial even if we do use the term race casually to distinguish between people on the basis of colour.
- ▶ Whilst measurement of ethnicity is on the basis of self-identification, measurement of race is clearly problematic.

Social Identity Theory

Very roughly ...

- ▶ People form groups (note Fukuyama on chimps)
- ▶ Groups have boundaries (in-groups and out-groups)
- ▶ People form psychological attachments to groups they are members of
- ▶ The strength and importance of those attachments can vary for many different reasons
 - ▶ Typically people emphasise identities they like
 - ▶ Strength of identity with a group can be affected by external influences and sometimes manipulated
- ▶ (Strength of) identity affects behaviour and attitudes
 - ▶ Typically people trust in-groups more than out-groups and conform to in-group norms (see Habyarimana et al APSR 2007)
 - ▶ This can make co-operation between groups difficult
- ▶ These processes play themselves out in many different ways with respect to class, gender, nation, religion, party, ethnicity etc.

Measurement

1991 UK Census measure was . . .

- ▶ White
- ▶ Black
 - ▶ Caribbean
 - ▶ African
 - ▶ Other
- ▶ Indian
- ▶ Pakistani
- ▶ Bangladeshi
- ▶ Chinese
- ▶ Other Asian
- ▶ Other-Other

Problems with this include . . .

- ▶ White is not an ethnic group; need to distinguish between Irish and British
- ▶ Major divisions within Indian e.g. Tamils, East Africans, Sikhs
- ▶ Self-identification of second generation people of Caribbean origin frequently Black-British, not Black-Caribbean

2011 and 2021 Census question

16 What is your ethnic group?

→ Choose **one** section from A to E, then tick **one** box to best describe your ethnic group or background

A White

- English/Welsh/Scottish/Northern Irish/British
- Irish
- Gypsy or Irish Traveller
- Any other White background, write in

B Mixed/multiple ethnic groups

- White and Black Caribbean
- White and Black African
- White and Asian
- Any other Mixed/multiple ethnic background, write in

C Asian/Asian British

- Indian
- Pakistani
- Bangladeshi
- Chinese
- Any other Asian background, write in

D Black/African/Caribbean/Black British

- African
- Caribbean
- Any other Black/African/Caribbean background, write in

E Other ethnic group

- Arab
- Any other ethnic group, write in

Consultation for the 2021 Census

“From across the consultation responses specific requests for additional options within the ethnicity question included; Anglo-Irish, Cornish, Cypriot, Eastern European, English, Gypsy, Irish Traveller, Jewish, Kashmiri, Latin American, Orthodox Jewish, Roma, Sikh, Somali, Turkish, Western European, White Cornish, White European and Yemeni. Some respondents also advocated allowing respondents to tick multiple categories and removal of the use of colour terminology.”

<https://www.ons.gov.uk/census/censustransformationprogramme/consultations/the2021censusinitialviewoncontentforenglandandwales>

Population by ethnic group, UK

2024/25


Ethnic group	UK %
White	84%
All other ethnic groups	16%
Asian/ Asian British	8%
Black/ Black British	4%
Mixed/ Multiple ethnic groups	2%
Other ethnic groups	2%

Source: Nomis, Annual Population Survey, April 2024 - March 2025 [data collection].

Source: House of Commons Library Research Briefing on Ethnic diversity in politics and public life 2025

Figure 2: Differences in typical household incomes by ethnicity are longstanding but not immutable

Median equivalised disposable income before housing costs (2016-17 prices), two year average



Notes: GB only. Prior to 2001-02, all 'White' groups are included in the 'White British' grouping, and questionnaire changes in 2010-11 and 2011-12 may have produced small recategorisations between the 'White British' and 'White other' groups.

Source: RF analysis of DWP, Households Below Average Income

Source: Resolution Foundation (2017)

US racial wage gaps cannot be explained by gender, education, or full-part-time work

POVERTY AND RACIAL INEQUALITY

Table 3.12


Median Earnings for Blacks and Whites, 1993, by Sex and Educational Attainment

		Year-Round, Full-Time Workers				
All Workers (full-time & part-time)		Total	Non-High School Graduates	High School Graduates	Some College	Bachelor's Degree or Higher
Blacks						
Both sexes						
	\$17,121	\$21,707	\$16,349	\$18,459	\$23,098	\$32,362
Male	\$19,644	\$24,105	\$18,594	\$20,584	\$26,562	\$35,853
Female	\$15,146	\$20,304	\$13,148	\$16,459	\$21,082	\$31,157
Whites						
Both sexes						
	\$22,761	\$29,467	\$19,022	\$24,124	\$27,932	\$41,094
Male	\$29,681	\$33,776	\$21,980	\$28,367	\$32,425	\$47,177
Female	\$17,061	\$23,482	\$14,653	\$19,489	\$23,399	\$32,919

Source: Claudette E. Bennett, *The Black Population in the United States: March 1994 and 1993*, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-20, no. 480 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1995).

There is also research from other developed societies showing that ethnic minorities face an 'ethnic penalty' in the labour market, both in the chances of getting a job and in wages (e.g. Heath et al.) ...

Discrimination against ethnic minority job applicants in Britain has not improved much



Call back ratios from field experiments

Source: Heath et al. *Social Progress in Britain*

Unemployment typically higher among immigrants




Figure 1

Foreign-born unemployment rate relative to native-born unemployment rate (2009 or latest available year). Source: OECD (2011).

Source: Dancygier and Laitin, AnRevPolSci, 2014

Ethnic Agendas in Britain: Heath et al 2013

Table 4.3. Attitudes to minority opportunities and affirmative action by ethnic group
Percentage favouring the 'progressive' side of the debate (cell percentages)

Ethnic background	Improve opportunities for minorities	Give priority to minorities	N
White British	20	1	2761
Indian	65	26	586
Pakistani	71	28	665
Bangladeshi	70	37	271
Black Caribbean	74	20	603
Black African	75	36	530
Mixed white/black	62	25	80
All ethnic minorities	70	28	2775
Majority/minority difference	-51	-27	

Notes: For the scale item on improving opportunities, the percentage gives those who place themselves to the left of the mid-point. For the item on giving priority, it is the percentage who agree or agree strongly with the statement. Figures in bold are ones where there is a significant difference from the white British percentage. χ^2 for improving opportunities = 1543.2, for giving priority = 1010.9, 6 df, $p < 0.001$ for both analyses.

Sources: BES 2010, EMBES 2010, weighted data

- ▶ Discrimination provides a basis for politicisation of ethnicity in Britain and elsewhere
 - ▶ Labour passed all minority protection legislation in Britain
- ▶ Also distinct ethnic agenda on foreign policy, anti-terror, and ethno-religious cultural protection

Ethnic Agendas and Intersectionality in the US




Figure 3. Interactive effects of gender, race and partisanship on policy priorities


Source: Yildirim (BJPS, 2021)

Ethnic Agendas depend on priming: McCauley, APSR 2014

- ▶ Ethnic, religious, national and linguistic divisions often all seen as ethnic identities, but they can be associated with different policy preferences
- ▶ In Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire ethnic priming leads to preferences for local goods, while religious (Muslim vs Christian) priming leads to preferences for high moral standards
- ▶ McCauley supposes this is because ethnic groups are more geographically bounded in these countries
- ▶ [Beiser-McGrath et al \(BJPS, 2021\)](#) show that geographical boundedness does matter:
 - ▶ “government co-ethnics are in the majority, public goods benefit all locals regardless of their ethnic identity. Outside of these strongholds, incumbents pursue discriminatory strategies and only their co-ethnics gain from favoritism. . . . implications in the local incidence of infant mortality.”
 - ▶ based on data from 22 sub-Saharan African countries from 1960-2013.

Ethnic Agendas depend on priming: McCauley, APSR 2014

FIGURE 2. Treatment Effects



Notes: The x axis depicts differences in the proportion of affirmative responses among treated groups, compared to the control category (control means set at zero). In Question 1, the moral candidate is pitted against a development candidate (control group mean = 0.662). In Question 2, the figure indicates the proportion selecting a community in which everyone has strong morals over one in which everyone is wealthy (control group mean = 0.798). In Question 3, the figure indicates the proportion stating a willingness to pay a small bribe for schooling (control group mean = 0.378). Bars indicate 95-percent confidence intervals.

Coexistence of Ethnic Groups

Segregation

- ▶ Groups live apart, either by minority choice or majority imposition.

Assimilation

- ▶ Disappearance of cultural and other distinctions and restrictions of movement and marriage between ethnic groups
- ▶ Segregated Assimilation: Minorities may be assimilated, but not equally into all sections of society (Portes, *Economic Sociology of Immigration*, 1995)
 - e.g. to middle-class or to under-class

Integration

- ▶ Occurs when all barriers to full participation in a society have been dismantled (Kymlicka 1995)
- ▶ Integration may happen faster in certain spheres (public/private)
- ▶ *Multiculturalism*: diversity of groups which are expected to remain culturally distinct and differences may even be supported by the state.

Multiculturalism, assimilation and segregation have all been held as normative ideals.

Political Integration of EM in Britain: Heath et al 2013

Table 3.3. Generational differences in political orientations and knowledge
Cell percentages

	Ethnic minorities				White British	
	1st generation	Quasi-parents	1.5 generation	2nd + generation	All	Age 18–45
Agree every citizen's duty to vote	92	90	88	81	78	66
Disagree family/friends think voting waste of time	78	75	70	68	70	67
Interested in homeland politics	35	24	19	10	–	–
Interested in British politics	38	36	41	37	41	33
Knowledge of British politics (mean scores)	2.5	2.5	2.7	2.7	2.9	3.0
<i>N</i>	1313	332	449	997	2761	1021

Notes: The percentages are for 'agree' or 'strongly agree' about duty to vote, 'disagree' or 'disagree strongly' for norms of voting, 'a great deal' or 'quite a lot' of interest in homeland and British politics. Quasi-parents defined as respondents born abroad who were aged fifty-five or over in 2010 and had been resident in Britain for twenty-five years or more. For columns 1 to 3, figures in bold are significantly higher than the overall ethnic minority expectation. χ^2 (duty) = 67.4, $p < 0.001$; (family/friends) = 48.2, $p < 0.001$; (interest in homeland) = 146.3, $p < 0.001$; (interest in British politics) = 5.9, $p > 0.05$ (all with 2 df).

Sources: BES 2010, EMBES 2010, weighted data

- ▶ Democratic norms stronger among 1st generation
- ▶ Knowledge stronger among 2+ generation

European Immigration (Crouch, 1999) I

Few European countries had any sizeable immigrant minority in 1950s.

In 1950s and 1960s migrants were temporary single men and with (near) full employment in the host country, the arrangement was clearly mutually beneficial.

By 1970s, high unemployment and increasing presence of migrant families led to demand for greater restrictions on immigration.

European Immigration (Crouch, 1999) II

Three kinds of immigration

1. European periphery to core, e.g. Irish to UK, Italians and Spanish to Germany, Portuguese to France
2. Colonial: e.g. from Caribbean and S Asia to UK, N Africa and Indochina to France, SE Asia and Caribbean to NL
3. (Other) Labour migration e.g. from Turkey to Germany and Austria

Different policy issues depending on varying conception of citizenship.d

- ▶ Britain: inclusive imperial concept
- ▶ USA: by birth in USA (*jus solis*)
- ▶ Germany: by parentage (*jus sanguinis*)

Those traditions are changing (e.g. France in 1993 shifted focus from soli to sanguinis with elements of both) with the evolving politics of citizenship law [Goodman, AnRevPolSci, 2023](#).




Figure 1

Global *jus soli* policies, 2020. Germany is marked as “allowance” because citizenship is given to a person born in Germany to a noncitizen, so long as the parent has been a resident for 8 years. Data from Vink et al. (2021b), variable: birth in country (A02a).

Source: Goodman, *AnRevPolSci*, 2023.


Ethnicity and Protest Participation in US

- ▶ Despite recent waves of Black Lives Matter and related protest, historically and on average ethnic minorities have been less likely to participate in protest politics in US and elsewhere.
- ▶ This is partly due to these groups having less of the resources etc. that facilitate participation generally.
- ▶ As well as grievances relating to discrimination and police, important historical and contemporary contests over citizenship and voting rights
 - ▶ For Blacks most notably the Civil Rights movement, Voting Rights Act (1965), and recent regulatory changes after *Shelby County v Holder* (2013).
 - ▶ For Latinos, contest primarily over citizenship, especially with Trump proposal to end birthright citizenship
- ▶ Santoro et al. (2012) argue that Mexican Americans are most likely to protest when they have some but not too many social ties with whites.
 - ▶ In part because cross-cutting ties increase ethnic identity and political interest
 - ▶ Too much bridging social capital can be a bad thing for minority participation

Xenophobia effects on participation (Perez, AJPS, 2014)

- ▶ Xenophobic rhetoric against Latinos raises the salience of ethnic identity
- ▶ Identity threat leads high-identifying group members to trust government less and engage in political efforts that assert their group's positive value
- ▶ Survey experiment: xenophobic treatment includes the bit in italics
 - ▶ Before moving on to the next set of questions, I want you to read a comment made recently by a politician in our nation's capital. A prominent member of Congress made the following statement to reporters the other day: "The issue of illegal immigration needs to be addressed by this Congress. *Illegal immigrants are taking away American jobs, threatening American culture, and endangering America's national security. We need to secure our borders immediately.*"

FIGURE 1 Effect of Immigration Rhetoric on Probability of "Trust Most of the Time" by Latino Identity (with 90% Confidence Intervals)




Ethnicity and Turnout in the US

- ▶ Ethnic minorities (especially Latinos) have a lower turnout than Whites on average, but there are exceptions.
 - ▶ African-American turnout was about the same as for whites when Obama was a candidate
- ▶ Verba et al. (1993) argue that the differences in turnout can be explained by differences in education, class and religious activity.
- ▶ Many of the same factors related to high turnout for whites (e.g. socioeconomic status, political interest, efficacy, social connectedness) also apply to ethnic minorities

Higher voter turnout among White and Black voters in presidential elections

% of ___ eligible voters who say they voted



Note: Eligible voters are adult U.S. citizens. The 2000 Voting and Registration Supplement of the Current Population Survey collapses Asian and Pacific Islanders into one category. White, Black and Asian adults include those who report being only one race and are not Hispanic. Hispanics are of any race.

Source: Pew Research Center analysis of 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012 and 2016 Current Population Survey, November Voting and Registration Supplement.

"The Changing Racial and Ethnic Composition of the U.S. Electorate"


PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Source: Pew 2020

Figure 2.

Voter Turnout by Race and Hispanic Origin, Presidential Elections 2008-2020

(Percentage of citizens 18 and over)



Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, November supplement, 2008 to 2020.

Source: US Current Population Survey, 2020

Ethnicity and Political Participation in Britain

Political participation levels of minorities slightly lower than those of Whites but the turnout gap largely explained by registration rates (partly due to citizenship and temporary status).

Table 2: Self-reported turnout (among registered electors) by ethnic group

Row percentages

	1997	<i>N</i>	2010	<i>N</i>
White British	80.8	3347	81.2	2703
Other White	-	13	78.7	40
Mixed (B/W)	-	24	55.1	76
Indian	85.4	220	80.9	538
Pakistani	85.0	111	80.9	598
Bangladeshi	80.3	42	81.2	250
B Caribbean	73.2	140	72.6	542
B African	74.0	85	74.3	425
All EM	81.0	654	77.7	2460

Sources: BES, EMBES

Notes: weighted percentages, unweighted *N*s. Respondents who reported that they were not registered have been excluded from the base. DKs and refusals excluded. EMs are defined as all the non-white groups.

Although turnout overall is lower in constituencies with more ethnic minorities, ethnic minority turnout is greater in such places (Cutts et al. 2006).

Ethnicity and Vote Choice: Britain

- ▶ Minorities consistently around 80% Labour from 1974 to 2001, and little fluctuation with the overall popularity of Labour.
- ▶ However, the Labour vote among ethnic minority vote dropped, especially among Pakistanis; probably due to the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.

Table 6. Vote choice by ethnic group, 2010

Row percentages	Lab	Cons	Lib Dem	Others	<i>N</i>
White British BES	29	40	24	7	2095
Other White BES	21	56	21	3	30
Mixed B/W	66	20	14	0	48
Indian	62	24	13	2	439
Pakistani	60	12	25	3	458
Bangladeshi	73	16	10	1	191
Black Caribbean	79	9	11	1	380
Black African	86	6	7	1	313
All EM	69	15	15	2	1884

More recent surveys less good, but minorities particularly unlikely to vote UKIP in 2015 and still overwhelmingly Labour.

Key findings from Heath et al. (JEPOP 2011)

- ▶ Ethnic differences in turnout are much larger than those of class, housing tenure or religion.
- ▶ Age, educational qualifications, social class and organisational involvement are not the strong predictors of turnout among minorities that they are among the majority.
- ▶ Membership of the petty bourgeoisie is not associated with support for the Conservatives among minorities in the same way that it is among the majority, nor is council housing generally associated with stronger Labour support among minorities.
- ▶ There was no evidence of a distinctive general Muslim effect either on turnout or on vote choice.
- ▶ But generational differences are important among minorities for both outcomes, with first generation immigrants being less likely to vote but more Labour if they do than 2nd or 3rd generation immigrants.

Ethnic-group contextual effects: Heath et al 2013

The Political Integration of Ethnic Minorities in Britain




Figure 6.1. Ethno-religious group consensus on Labour policies and Labour partisanship

Sources: BES 2010, EMBES 2010

- ▶ Ethnic differences in Labour partisanship are explicable by the extent of pro-Labour attitudes in the group
 - ▶ A group contextual effect that goes beyond individual-level attitudes
 - ▶ Also group level fraternal relative deprivation matters

Ego- and Socio-tropic perceptions of discrimination: Sanders et al (PolStud 2013)

- ▶ Voting calculus of ethnic minorities similar to that of white British after controlling for Labour partisanship, thereafter . . .
- ▶ Personal experience of discrimination has a negative effect on Labour voting
- ▶ but those who have high levels of British cultural practices and also perceive other members of their group being discriminated against are more likely to vote Labour
- ▶ Note that at the 2010 election was that Labour had been in power for 13 years
- ▶ [Goerres et al \(BJPS, 2022\)](#) find that the voter calculus of ethnic minorities in Germany is similar to that for the majority, with no evidence for specifically ethnic factors at play.

Ethnicity and 2024 British General Election (Martin, ParlyAff, 2025)

Table 13.3. Average change in vote share in constituencies according to ethnic diversity

Change 2019-24	All seats	Top 25% diversity	Black >=15%	Indian >=15%	Pakistani >=15%	Bangladeshi >=15%	Muslim >=15%	Hindu >=15%
Turnout	-7.7	-9.3	-10.7	-9.5	-10.6	-12.6	-9.9	-7.4
Conservatives	-20.6	-14.3	-9.0	-11.5	-15.2	-8.8	-12.7	-5.1
Labour	+1.9	-7.6	-11.3	-16.0	-23.1	-26.0	-16.9	-10.9
Liberal Democrats	+0.4	-1.8	-2.2	-1.6	+0.5	-2.0	-0.9	-1.4
Green	+4.2	+7.0	+10.5	+4.4	+5.8	+9.3	+6.8	+3.7
Reform UK	+12.6	+8.3	+5.1	+6.9	+9.2	+4.4	+7.6	+5.0
All others	+2.6	+8.3	+6.9	+17.7	+22.8	+23.1	+16.1	+8.7
N	632	158	28	20	20	5	64	5

Ethnicity and vote choice: US (Manza and Brooks, 1999)

Before 1930 those Blacks with a vote were almost all Republican (the party of Lincoln).

Realignment of Blacks to FDR's Democrats in 1930s with the New Deal.

Further reinforcement in 1964 with the Civil Rights act and a racist Republican candidate (Goldwater).

- ▶ Since then Black voters have been around 80% Democrat with a small exception of McGovern.


While race is clearly the major cleavage in the US,

- ▶ Blacks are only 13% of the population and have a much lower turnout than Whites.
- ▶ Blacks are concentrated in safe Democratic congressional districts, especially since the practice of creating minority-majority districts, thereby limiting their political influence.
- ▶ Hispanic population about two-thirds Democrat, but exit poll figures disputed

All major racial and ethnic voter groups lean Democratic, except Whites

% of registered voters who identify as/lean toward ...

■ Rep/lean Rep. ■ Dem/lean Dem.



*Asian adults were interviewed in English only.

Note: Based on registered voters. Due to smaller sample sizes in 2018 and 2019, the data from those years has been combined.

Respondents who didn't offer an answer not shown. White, Black and Asian adults include those who report being only one race and are not Hispanic. Hispanics are of any race.


Source: Annual totals of Pew Research Center survey data (U.S. adults).

"The Changing Racial and Ethnic Composition of the U.S. Electorate"

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Source: Pew 2020

US 2008 Exit Poll



Source: NY Times


US 2014 Exit Poll

U.S. House

Democrat

Republican

Change from 2010




Source: NY Times


US 2016 Exit Poll I

Hillary Clinton
DEMOCRAT

Donald J. Trump Change from 2012*
REPUBLICAN



US 2016 Exit Poll II



Source: NY Times

US 2020 Exit Poll

What is your gender and racial or ethnic heritage?

White men 35% of voters	61	38
White women 32%	55	44
Black men 4%	19	79
Black women 8%	9	90
Latino men 5%	36	59
Latino women 8%	30	69
All other races 8%	38	58



Donald Trump



Joseph R. Biden Jr.

What is your race and education level?

White college graduate 32% of voters	48	51
White noncollege graduate 35%	67	32
Nonwhite college graduate 10%	27	70
Nonwhite noncollege graduate 24%	26	72

Source: [New York Times](#)

How old are you?

18-24 9% of voters	31	65
25-29 7%	43	54
30-39 16%	46	51
40-49 16%	44	54
50-64 30%	52	47
65 or over 22%	52	47

How old are you?

18-44 40% of voters	42	56
45+ 60%	51	48



Donald Trump



Joseph R. Biden Jr.

What is your racial or ethnic heritage? How old are you?

White 18-29 8% of voters	53	44
White 30-44 14%	57	41
White 45-59 19%	61	38
White 60+ 26%	57	42
Black 18-29 3%	10	89
Black 30-44 4%	19	78
Black 45-59 3%	10	89
Black 60+ 3%	7	92
Latino 18-29 4%	28	69
Latino 30-44 4%	34	62
Latino 45-59 3%	30	68
Latino 60+ 2%	40	58
All other 8%	38	57

Source: [New York Times](#)

Is your opinion of the Black Lives Matter movement:

Favorable 57% of voters	20	78
Unfavorable 37%	86	14



Donald Trump



Joseph R. Biden Jr.

Is racism in the U.S.:

Most important problem or one of many important problems 69% of voters	30	68
A minor problem or not a problem at all 28%	84	14

Do you think the country's criminal justice system:

Treats all people fairly 40% of voters	84	14
Treats Black people unfairly 53%	17	82

Source: [New York Times](#)

Is racism in the U.S.:

The most important problem 18% of voters	11	87
One of many important problems 51%	37	61
A minor problem 18%	81	18
Not a problem at all 10%	91	8



Donald Trump



Joseph R. Biden Jr.

Source: [New York Times](#)

US 2024 Exit Poll

Race					
22,966 total respondents					
	White 71%	Black 11%	Latino 11%	Asian 3%	Other racial/ethnic groups 3%
● Harris	42%	86%	51%	55%	41%
● Trump	57%	13%	46%	40%	55%


Updated 5:07 p.m. ET, Dec. 13

Source: [CNN](#)

Hispanic voters disproportionately swung to Trump in 2024

Change in Democratic share of two-party vote from 2020, by Hispanic share of county, % points

At November 6th 2024, 06.30am GMT



Sources: Decision Desk HQ; American Community Survey


CHART: THE ECONOMIST

Source: [The Economist](#)

Ethnocentrism and Obama support, Kam and Kinder (2012)

- ▶ Obama won in 2008 despite losing support from White ethnocentric Democrats and Independents

FIGURE 2 Ethnocentrism and Vote for Obama in 2008 among Democrats, Independents, and Republicans



Source: 2008 American National Election Study.


- ▶ Ethnocentrism effect seems to operate through racial resentment (anti-African American) and anti-Muslim sentiment

Racialised perceptions of candidate ideology: Jacobsmaier (Pol Behav. 2014)

- ▶ Direct racial prejudice by Whites against African American candidates is outweighed by the indirect effects via perceived candidate ideology
- ▶ Black candidates are seen as more liberal (left-wing) than White candidates with similar policy positions
- ▶ This leads some White voters to be less likely to vote for Black candidates because of greater perceived policy distance
- ▶ By contrast, “Asian candidates have comparatively strong crossover appeal, winning at higher rates than Blacks or Latinos for any given percentage of the reference group. All else equal, Asian American candidates fare best in multiracial districts.” (Lublin and Wright, APSR, 2023)

Non-white MPs in Latin America are more left wing (Acquarone & Di Landro, LegStudQ, 2024)

FIGURE 1 Ideological self-placement of legislators from HMGs in Latin America (1998–2019).



HMG = Historically Marginalised Group


... but Non-white MPs in Latin America are not more more left wing than other MPs from their parties (Acquarone & Di Landro, LegStudQ, 2024)

TABLE 1 Presence of legislators from HMGs and party ideology.

	Dependent variable								
	Party left-right ideology _{t+1}								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
% Women _t	-0.020*	0.005	0.001						
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.003)						
% Non-white _t				-0.037***	-0.026**	0.002			
				(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.002)			
% Young adults _t							0.019	0.019	-0.003
							(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.003)
Constant	0.471	0.256	-0.139	-0.201	11.599***	-2.431***	-0.350	0.444	-0.126
	(1.276)	(1.020)	(0.302)	(1.934)	(3.250)	(0.202)	(1.258)	(1.254)	(0.299)
Controls	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Observations	217	202	217	68	64	68	217	202	217
R ²	0.159	0.515	0.982	0.384	0.578	0.999	0.145	0.218	0.982
Adjusted R ²	0.007	0.409	0.967	0.157	0.367	0.995	-0.009	0.054	0.968

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$;

Parties moving to the right on immigration simultaneously increase ethnic minority MPs as reputational shields (van der Wardt et al, EPSR, 2024)



“Looking at parliaments of eight European countries between 1990 and 2015, we find that parties that shifted to the right in response to a public mood swing to the right are indeed significantly more likely to bring more ethnic minority politicians into parliament.”

Representation of Ethnic Minorities

Ethnic minorities tend to be under-represented in legislatures. Comparative work is difficult due to data availability and considerations of functional equivalence,

- ▶ e.g. Norris (2004) compares the England-Scotland-Wales ethno-national division in Britain with Jewish-Arab division in Israel.

Institutional arrangements can make a difference

- ▶ Mixed evidence for Lijphart's claim that PR improves minority representation.
- ▶ Majoritarian systems can help if minorities are clustered.
- ▶ Systems of reserved seats (e.g. India) and minority-majority districts (USA) can be established.

Dancygier 2017: *Dilemmas of Inclusion*

- ▶ Muslims in Europe get included (represented in local government) when left parties think that doing so would win them more seats
- ▶ Parties think that when the local Muslim population is large enough, given the electoral system
- ▶ When left parties do include Muslims, it burnishes their ideological 'inclusion' credentials but creates tensions elsewhere:
 - ▶ Muslims more socially authoritarian, especially on homosexuality and gender
 - ▶ The Muslim candidates and councillors are overwhelmingly male
 - ▶ End up with the spectacle of sex-segregated Labour party rallies (Birmingham 2015)
- ▶ Note that the argument depends on there being a block Muslim vote and the strategic logic might not work the same way at the national level.

Effect of quotas: Hughes (APSR, 2011)

TABLE 5. Summary of Effects of Quota Policies for Minority and Majority Women and Men

Quota Type	Primary Beneficiaries	Not Beneficial For
Party gender quotas	Majority women	Minority men
National gender quotas	Women (majority more)	Minority men
Minority quotas	Minorities (men more)	Majority women
Mixed quotas	Minority men and majority women	Minority women
Tandem quotas	Minority women	Majority men and women


- ▶ Minority quotas tend to be better for minority men than minority women
- ▶ But the conjunction of national gender and ethnicity quotas are good for minority women because they can satisfy both.
- ▶ Minority women can sometimes be more successful than minority men without quotas.

Intersectionality in candidate preference in Bihar (Hankla et al, CPS, 2022)

“Scheduled Caste and Muslim voters also prefer candidates from their in-groups. At the same time, we identify evidence of intersectional effects, namely, that Muslim women candidates suffer from a disadvantage vis-a-vis women candidates from other backgrounds. We also show that women voters prefer candidates who offer security, especially when the candidates are women. Finally, we demonstrate that personal experience with caste discrimination increases support for women candidates.”

Minority ethnic MPs


By gender & party



MPs from minority ethnic groups

Elected at general elections since 1987

	LAB	CON	LD	Other	Total
Number					
1987	4	0	0	0	4
1992	5	2	0	0	7
1997	9	0	0	0	9
2001	12	0	0	0	12
2005	13	2	0	0	15
2010	16	11	0	0	27
2015	23	18	0	0	42
2017	32	20	1	0	53
2019	41	23	2	0	66
2024	66	15	5	4	90



Ethnic Minority Candidates and MPs in Britain

- ▶ Increase in EM representation for Tories mainly by placing more EM candidates in safe seats despite an electoral penalty, initially as part of a 'modernisation' drive in 2010.
- ▶ Labour EM candidates tend to do at least as well as white candidates in diverse areas, and EM Labour MPs tend to be elected from diverse constituencies.
- ▶ [Farrer and Zingher \(JEPop, 2018\)](#) show that nomination of ethnic minorities as candidates is more strongly linked to district ethnic diversity for centre-left than centre-right parties in UK, US and Australia, because, they argue, centre left parties reap greater electoral rewards from descriptive representation of minorities.




Figure 1. Difference in the probability of nominating an ethnic minority candidate between center-left and center-right parties.

Farrer and Zingher (JEPOP, 2018)

Ministers from minority ethnic backgrounds attending the Cabinet

By year first attended Cabinet

Name	Year	Party	First position appointed
Paul Boateng	2002	Labour	Chief Secretary to the Treasury
Baroness Amos	2003	Labour	Secretary of State for International Development
Baroness Scotland	2007	Labour	Attorney General
Baroness Warsi	2010	Conservative	Minister without Portfolio
Sajid Javid	2014	Conservative	Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport
Priti Patel	2016	Conservative	Secretary of State for International Development
Alok Sharma	2019	Conservative	Secretary of State for International Development
James Cleverly	2019	Conservative	Minster without Portfolio
Rishi Sunak	2020	Conservative	Chancellor of the Exchequer
Suella Braverman	2020	Conservative	Attorney General
Kwasi Kwarteng	2021	Conservative	Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Str
Nadhim Zahawi	2021	Conservative	Secretary of State for Education
Shailesh Vara	2022	Conservative	Secretary of State for Northern Ireland
Kemi Badenoch	2022	Conservative	Secretary of State for International Trade
Ranil Jayawardena	2022	Conservative	Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs

Source: Members Names Information Service, House of Commons Library research

Source: Commons Library Briefing Paper (2022)

3 (13%) of the Starmer's first cabinet are from ethnic minorities.

Voting for Ethnic Minority Candidates in Britain: Fisher et al. (BJPS 2014)

- ▶ Ethnic minority candidates suffered an average electoral penalty of about 4 per cent of the three-party vote from whites
 - ▶ mostly because those with anti-immigrant feelings were less willing to vote for Muslims.
- ▶ No significant effects of candidate ethnicity for non-Muslim Indian and black voters,
- ▶ Pakistani candidates benefited from an 8-point average electoral bonus from Pakistani voters.
- ▶ Bradford West in 1997 saw a swing against the national tide to a Muslim Tory standing against a Hindu Labour candidate

Ethnicity and Vote Choice in Norway: Bergh and Bjorklund (PolStud 2011)

Table 4: Support for Candidates with Immigrant Backgrounds, among All Voters and Voters with an Immigrant Background

	<i>All voters, weighted^a</i>		<i>Immigrant voters</i>			
	<i>Chose a ballot with immigrant candidate(s)</i>	<i>Chose another ballot</i>	<i>Chose a ballot with immigrant candidate(s)</i>	<i>Chose another ballot</i>	<i>Chose a ballot with candidates from native country^f</i>	<i>Chose another ballot^g</i>
Total percentage	75	25	86	14	62	38
Percentage who cast a preferential vote	36	42	65	61	76	58
Percentage supporting one of the three left-wing parties ^h	51	14	79	36	84	78
N	1,519		392		190	

As elsewhere in Europe, immigrants in Europe much more likely to vote for the left. Table also shows that they use the PR open-list preferential voting system to vote for candidates from their native country.

Conclusion

Ethnicity is perhaps the most important cleavage in terms of arbitrary inequality, strength of identity, and political polarization.

Despite their in-group cohesion and distinct political preferences, their relatively small numbers limit the electoral power of ethnic minorities in Western Europe.

Political representation of ethnic minorities varies between countries partly as a result of institutional differences, especially quotas, and party strategies.