Anti-immigrant sentiment and populist right parties

Stephen Fisher

stephen.fisher@sociology.ox.ac.uk

http://users.ox.ac.uk/~nuff0084/polsoc

▶ Overview and some key issues
▶ Attitudes to minorities, immigrants and immigration
▶ Populist-Right parties
▶ Conclusions

Figure 1: **The rise of RWPPs has come at the expense of both mainstream left and right**

Source: Comparative Manifestos Project

Source: Halikiopoulu and Vlandas (2022)

FIGURE 1.2. *Vote share for Populist parties in Europe, 2000–2017*
Notes: The mean share of the vote won by Populist parties in national elections for the lower (or single) house of parliament from 1945 to 2017 in European societies containing at least one such party. For the classification of parties, see Chapter 7.
Sources: Holger Döring and Philip Manow. 2017. *Parliaments and Governments Database* (ParlGov). www.parlgov.org/; IFES Election Guide www.electionguide.org/.

Source: Norris and Inglehart (2019) *Cultural Backlash*

RWPP ELECTORAL RESULTS IN WESTERN EUROPE

Source: Halikiopoulu and Vlandas (2022)

RN 19% in the first round of the 2022 French legislative elections
Vlaams Belang 11.9% in 2019, close to all time high of 12.0% in
2007

RWPP ELECTORAL RESULTS IN THE NORDICS AND BALTICS

Source: Halikiopoulu and Vlandas (2022)
Sweden Democrats (SD) = 20.5% in 2022
Danish Peoples' Party (DF) = 2.6% in 2022

RWPP ELECTORAL RESULTS IN SOUTHERN EUROPE

Source: Halikiopoulu and Vlandas (2022)
Fratelli d'Italia + Lega = 35% in 2022

RWPP ELECTORAL RESULTS IN EASTERN EUROPE

Source: Halikiopoulu and Vlandas (2022)

Fidesz 54% in 2022, PIS 35% and SNS 6% in 2023. SNS in government led by pro-Russia Robert Fico.

Figure 3: **Cumulative share of RWPP votes received in most recent election**

Share of RWPPs votes in most recent election (Dated: 2021)

Source: Halikiopoulou and Vlandas (2022)

Partial updates for 2022-3: Hungary 54%, Poland 35%, Italy 35%, Sweden 20.5%, France, 19%

Narratives

- Backlash by . . .
  - authoritarian
  - ethnocentric
  - old white working class
  - less educated
  - "left behind"
  - voters in small towns and rural areas

  against . . .
  - globalisation
  - the liberal elite
  - immigration and ethnic diversity
  - inequality and economic hardship
  - indifference of mainstream politicians

- whipped up by . . .
  - populist politicians
  - sections of the media
  - fake news circulating on social media

Importance of analysis for the public debate

- ▶ Rise of populist right parties and causes (e.g. Brexit), and the turn of traditionally mainstream right parties to populism (e.g. Trump) is perceived as a major problem by many liberal graduates and traditional political elites, for social cohesion and democratic values

- ▶ Public debate includes many claims along the lines of, "the solution to the problem of X populist right party is more [insert pre-existing policy preference]"

- ▶ Emphasis on some causal factors lead people to advocate corresponding policy prescriptions, e.g.:
  - ▶ reduce immigration if immigration led to populist right parties
  - ▶ redistribute money if economic hardship was the cause
  - ▶ education if authoritarian and ethnocentric attitudes are key

- ▶ Some of these linked to a broader argument along the lines of, "if mainstream politicians listened and responded to voters they would realise they need to . . ."

Related hypotheses

- ▶ Parties do better when they take an anti-immigration stance (inter-party variation)
- ▶ People who want less immigration are more likely to vote for anti-immigration parties (inter-personal variation)
- ▶ Voting for anti-immigrant parties goes up when unhappiness about immigration increases (macro temporal variation)
- ▶ Anti-immigration parties are more successful in countries where people are more hostile to immigration (cross-national variation)

These are evaluated by different research designs, and the truth of any one does not necessitate the truth of any other.

Sentiments

Is the relevant sentiment, attitude, outlook, value, or emotion . . .

- ▶ Anti-immigration?
- ▶ Negative perceptions of the economic or cultural consequences of immigration?
- ▶ Ethnocentrism?
- ▶ Racism?
- ▶ Islamophobia?
- ▶ Authoritarianism?
- ▶ Social Conservatism?
- ▶ anti-elite?
- ▶ anti-woke?
- ▶ anger?
- ▶ alienation?
- ▶ a combination of (some) of the above?

How much to these things go together?

Attractions of populist parties as well as negative sentiments?

- charisma
- shared identity
- patriotism
- preference representation
- values
- refreshing change

FIGURE 2.1. *The theoretical framework*

Source: Norris and Inglehart (2019) *Cultural Backlash*

► *Brexitland* has a similar theoretical argument for Britain, but downplays economic factors and emphasises contingent political triggers (Sobolewska and Ford, 2020).

► Scäfer (BJPS 2021) shows cohort differences in authoritarianism are modest and those in populism non existent, using the same European ESS data as Norris and Inglehart.

Recent far right versus fascism, Golder (2016)

Figure 1

The circles represent the core ideological traits of the far right. The populism and nationalism circles are in gray to show that these traits are not shared by all far right parties and can also be found among mainstream parties. The purple area shows the combination of traits—radicalism, populism, and nationalism—that is increasingly dominant on the contemporary far right. The orange region indicates the location of fascism.

► Extremism: opposition to democracy
► Radicalism: seeking systemic political and economic reform
► Populism: claiming to speak for "the people" against a corrupt elite

Evolution of terms and mission creep

- In the 1980s and 1990s rising far-right parties in Western Europe, such as French Front National, Austrian Freedom Party, often referred to as extreme-right.
- The term "radical right" was an attempt to distinguish newer anti-immigrant parties from neo-facist anti-democratic "extreme-right" parties, e.g. compare with UKIP with the National Front.
    - The term "radical" previously much more commonly associated with the left
- Shift to "populist right" in more recent decades to emphasise the anti-elite nature of these parties.
- As some traditionally mainstream right parties appear to emulate smaller, niche, populist-right parties (e.g. Trump and US Republicans) and as Brexit was a populist-right cause, the task of explaining populist-right success has become bigger and broader. Too broad?

Source: Norris and Inglehart (2019) *Cultural Backlash*

Brexit, Trump and Right-wing Populism

- ▶ While mobilization of anti-immigrant sentiment is common to all of these, it is not necessarily helpful to see them all as part of one western trend or try to find a common explanation.
- ▶ Support for **Brexit** was primarily about reducing immigration, facilitated by nationalist demand for "taking back control" which also served as a reputational shield.
    - ▶ Being a high profile referendum with divisions in both main parties, party identification played a weaker role than in elections.
- ▶ By contrast **Trump's** success depended primarily on strength of long-standing Republican party identification.
    - ▶ 90+% of Trump voters were Romney voters, and were on average *richer* than Clinton voters.
    - ▶ Trump's election was clinched with additional mobilization of low-education, white, anti-immigration voters in the rust-belt
    - ▶ But this was on top of a much larger base of long-standing Republican groups, including higher-income voters and evangelicals
- ▶ Support for **radical-right parties in Western Europe** much smaller than for Brexit and Trump so unsurprisingly more socially distinctive.
    - ▶ e.g. UKIP 2015 vote 13% overwhelmingly "left-behind" voters, but Brexit 52% inevitably a broader set.

FIGURE 11.6. *Vote Leave and UKIP by authoritarian–libertarian values*

Notes: The libertarian–authoritarian standardized 10-point scale is constructed by summing the following items: '(1) Young people today don't have enough respect for traditional British values; (2) People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences; (3) For some crimes, the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence; (4) Schools should teach children to obey authority; (5) The law should always be obeyed, even if a particular law is wrong; (6) Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards.'

Source: British Election Study Internet Panel Waves 1-13. Wave 9 post-Brexit (24 June to 6 July 2016). www.britishelectionstudy.com/data-objects/panel-study-data/.

Source: Norris and Inglehart (2019) *Cultural Backlash*

FIGURE 11.7. *Vote Leave and UKIP by populist values*

Notes: The *Populist* standardized scale is a summary (Z-score) measured in BES W7 from the following 5 Likert-style agree/disagree items: '(1) The politicians in the UK Parliament need to follow the will of the people; (2) The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions; (3) I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician; (4) Elected officials talk too much and take too little action; (5) What people call "compromise" in politics is really just selling out on one's principles.'

Source: British Election Study Internet Panel Waves 1–13. www.britishelectionstudy.com/data-objects/panel-study-data/.

Source: Norris and Inglehart (2019) *Cultural Backlash*

Diversity between niche radical-right parties and politics

- Nature of anti-immigrant sentiment sustaining **radical-right parties in Europe** differs between countries
  - e.g. UKIP mainly anti-EU migration while most continental radical right parties emphasise Muslim immigration.
- Dealignment from mainstream parties important pre-cursor in the West, but little alignment to start with in the East.
  - Nature of distrust and dissatisfaction with government also varies
- Kind of relevant economic grievance also varies:
  - Unemployment, stagnation, relative deprivation, inequality, etc. all relevant in different contexts

How important is populism in explaining the success of populists?

- ▶ "Rise of Populism" supposedly includes not only Brexit, Trump and radical-right, but also left-wing populists, including Podemos, Syriza, 5-star movement and Corbyn.

- ▶ It is not clear whether populist strategies actually help explain the success of populist movements since there is populist rhetoric on all sides. For example,
  - ▶ Corbyn's "For the many not the few" was used by Blair and the Tories before him.
  - ▶ Cameron's 'big society' was pitched as anti-Westminster
  - ▶ Macron, hailed as an anti-populist, came to power claiming to be an outsider against the established old parties.
  - ▶ But could argue that these are not really populist appeals because those making them were not anti-pluralists (Müller 2016)

- ▶ Also some populist leaders clearly part of the economic elite, e.g. Trump, Farage.

Varieties of prejudice I

In no particular order:

- ▶ Ethnocentrism
    - ▶ 'a deep-seated psychological predisposition that partitions the world into ingroups and outgroups, into "us" and "them." '(Kam and Kinder 2012)
    - ▶ Measured for Kam and Kinder (2012) by tendency to have negative stereotypes of out-groups
    - ▶ Measured by Hooghe and Quintellier (PolBehavior 2013) as a anti-immigrant sentiment
- ▶ Self-declared prejudice against people of different races
- ▶ Social distance:
    - ▶ *How bothered would you be a close relative married a . . .*
- ▶ Symbolic Racism (Sears and Henry 2002)
    - ▶ *Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same?*
    - ▶ *Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten more economically than they deserve?*

Varieties of prejudice II

- ▶ Islamophobia
  - ▶ 55% of Britons think, "There is a fundamental clash between Islam and the values of British society" (YouGov, Nov 2015)
- ▶ Opinions on what ethnic minorities do or do not contribute to society, or the problems they may or may not cause.
  - ▶ E.g. Economic versus cultural threat
- ▶ Policy preferences on asylum, immigration and minority integration, e.g. affirmative action.

Social Identity Theory

Very roughly . . .

- ▶ People form groups (note Fukuyama on Chimps)
- ▶ Groups have boundaries (in-groups and out-groups)
- ▶ People form psychological attachments to groups they are members of
- ▶ The strength and importance of those attachments can vary for many different reasons
    - ▶ Typically people emphasise identities they like
    - ▶ Strength of identity with a group can be affected by external influences and sometimes manipulated
- ▶ (Strength of) identity affects behaviour and attitudes
    - ▶ Typically people trust in-groups more than out-groups and conform to in-group norms (see Habyarimana et al APSR 2007)
    - ▶ This can make co-operation between groups difficult
- ▶ These processes play themselves out in many different ways with respect to class, gender, nation, religion, party, ethnicity etc.

Measurement issues

- ▶ Social desirability bias
  - ▶ It is possible to overcome this to some extent with carefully designed survey experiments (e.g. Sniderman et al., APSR, 2004; Hainmueller and Hopkins, AnRevPolSci, 2014)
- ▶ Term immigration evokes images of particular kinds of immigrant, usually resulting in more negative responses
- ▶ As with other policy areas, public typically have poor knowledge of numbers involved

Attitudes to Racial Integration in USA. Dalton (Citizen Politics, 2014)

Support for racial integration is nearly universal today, but it was opposed by a majority of Americans until the 1960s.

Legend:
- Employment (solid line)
- Education (dashed line)
- Housing (long dashed line)

Sources: Adapted from Smith and Sheatsley 1984, and updated from Schuman et al. 1997.

Note: Figure entries are the percentages favoring integration in each area.

Attitudes to affirmative action in the USA

Hostility to positive discrimination in the US seems to be the result of perceptions of unfairness (race-neutral values) rather than racism (Sniderman and Carmines, 1997).

However, Banks and Valentino (AJPS 2012) argue that "anger [rather than disgust or fear] is uniquely powerful at boosting opposition to racially redistributive policies among white racial conservatives."

- ▶ i.e. anger triggers racism
- ▶ but anger doesn't affect economic left-right policy attitudes generally.

Attitudes to race and vote choice in the US: 2020 Exit poll

Vote for Trump vs. Biden by Attitudes on Race

■ Trump ■ Biden

Source: 2020 Early Exit Poll, New York Times; Chart by PRRI.

These are all minority opinions among on-the-day voters, but substantial minorities: 36% Unfavourable to BLM, 40% criminal justice fair and 26% racism minor or no problem. Further details: NY Times

Self-rated racial prejudice in Britain: BSA

Would you describe yourself as very prejudiced/a little prejudiced against people of other races? 1983-2013 (including 5 year moving average)

Perceived racial prejudice in Britain: BSA

Do you think there is generally more racial prejudice in Britain now than there was 5 years ago, less, or about the same amount?

Social Distance in Britain: Storm et al. (BJS, 2017) I

Figure I: *Percentage who mind if a close relative marries an Asian or Caribbean*

BSA 1983-2013 (only white respondents)

Social Distance in Britain: Storm et al. (BJS, 2017) II

Figure II: *Percentage who mind having an ethnic minority in-law by birth cohort*

Legend:
- Muslim
- Black African
- Asian
- Caribbean
- East European

BSA 2013 (only white respondents)

Various attitudes to Immigrants, Dalton (Citizen Politics)

Americans are somewhat more tolerant of immigrants, but all four publics display some negativity.

OPINION	UNITED STATES	GREAT BRITAIN	FRANCE	GERMANY
Attitudes toward Immigration				
Anyone can come	12	4	6	5
Come if there are jobs	45	34	34	33
Strict limits	39	49	50	56
Prohibit immigration	4	13	10	7
Illegal Immigration				
Stronger action to exclude illegals	69	83	70	84
Multicultural versus Assimilation of Immigrants				
Minorities preserve traditions	48	27	27	36
Should assimilate	52	73	73	64
Positive Attitudes toward Immigrants				
Immigrants good for economy	47	22	31	27
Immigrants bring new ideas	59	34	39	55
Immigrants (don't) take jobs away	57	54	73	58
Average	54	37	48	47

Sources: 1999–2002 European Values Survey/World Values Survey; 2003 International Social Survey Program.

Note: Table entries are the percentages agreeing with each statement. Missing data were excluded from the calculation of percentages.

Contact theory

McLaren (Social Forces, 2003) finds that attitudes towards immigrants are more positive among those who have friends from minority groups.

▶ An example of the Allport (1954) Contact Hypothesis.
▶ Also the effects of immigration levels on perceptions of threat seem to depend on the level of contact people have with minorities (as the following figure shows).

FIGURE 2: Interaction, Another View

Working Class Authoritarianism and Economic threat

Idea that working class and poorer people would be more racist and anti-immigrant goes back a long way. E.g. Lipset, 1960 *Political Man*)

▶ Economic deprivation breeds intolerance as a result of competition for scarce resources.

More recent US research discusses a more specific idea that anti-immigrant sentiment comes from experiencing a direct economic threat, which is stronger for the working class

Hainmueller and Hiscox (APSR, 2010)

This paper uses a survey experiment whereby half the sample, chosen at random, were asked about allowing more 'highly skilled' immigrants, while the other half were asked the same question but about 'low-skilled' immigrants.

The analysis compares the two groups to test theories that attitudes to immigration are based on economic self-interest.

They conclude otherwise saying, "The results are consistent with alternative arguments emphasizing noneconomic concerns associated with ethnocentrism or sociotropic considerations about how the local economy as a whole may be affected by immigration."

"the labor market competition hypothesis has repeatedly failed to find empirical support, making it something of a zombie theory." Hainmueller and Hopkins (AnRevPolSci, 2014). But that may be limited to the US if it is true at all.

Unemployment effects are conditional on education (Finseraas et al 2016)

Figure 2: Marginal Effect of Unemployment (Y-Axis) on Cultural Concern Over Immigration at Different Levels of Proportion Foreign Born (X-Axis)

Notes: The dashed line indicates low education, the full line high education. 'High education' is defined as years of education being two standard deviations above the country mean, while 'low education' is years of education being two standard deviations below the country mean. The estimates are derived from the coefficients presented in Table 2.

Similar to Golder (CPS, 2003) finding that populist right vote depends on the interaction effect between Unemployment and % Foreign Born, but suggesting the action is just among the least educated (see below).

Immigration in Britain: Ford et al (BSA 2012)

Source: Office for National Statistics, Long Term International Migration Estimates
2011 figure is estimate for year to September

Figures are thousands

Changing views on Immigration levels in Britain: Ford et al (BSA 2012)

Table 2.1 Views of immigration levels, 1995–2011

	1995	2003	2008	2011	Change 1995–2011	Change 2003–2011
The number of immigrants to Britain should …	%	%	%	%		
… increase a lot/a little	4	5	4	3	-1	-1
… remain the same	27	16	17	18	-9	+2
… reduce a little	24	23	23	24	0	+1
… reduce a lot	39	49	55	51	+12	+2

Structure of Attitudes to immigration in Britain: Ford & Heath (BSA 2014) I

Table 5.3 Views about the impact of immigration on Britain, by age, migrant heritage, region and number of migrant friends[3]

		Economic impact					Cultural impact		
		Positive	Neutral	Negative	Net score		Positive	Neutral	Negative	Net score
All	%	31	20	47	-16	%	35	19	45	-10
Age										
18–29	%	36	21	40	-4	%	40	19	38	+2
30–39	%	40	16	43	-3	%	44	18	36	+8
40–49	%	34	21	45	-11	%	38	17	45	-7
50–59	%	27	17	54	-27	%	30	17	51	-21
60–69	%	29	20	50	-21	%	29	28	50	-21
70 plus	%	17	29	53	-36	%	21	24	54	-33
Migrant heritage										
Migrant	%	51	26	20	+31	%	53	26	17	+36
Migrant parents	%	43	22	34	+9	%	50	17	33	+17
Native born, native parents	%	27	19	53	-26	%	30	18	51	-21
Region										
London	%	54	22	22	+32	%	55	20	24	+31
All other regions	%	28	20	51	-23	%	31	19	48	-17
Migrant friends										
Several	%	50	22	27	+23	%	53	20	25	+28
One/a few	%	33	22	43	-10	%	39	19	41	-2
None	%	18	18	63	-45	%	19	18	61	-42

The Net Score (in italics) is calculated by subtracting the percentage with a negative view of the impact of immigration from the percentage who have a positive view. The Net score (in italics) may not always reflect the percentage figures in the table, due to rounding

Structure of Attitudes to immigration in Britain: Ford & Heath (BSA 2014) II

- ▶ Also, graduates and professionals positive about immigration
- ▶ Used to have more negative cultural than economic impact attitudes but now similar, perhaps as a result of E European migration and recession

Economic and Cultural Threat perceptions Cross-nationally: Lucassen and Lubbers (CPS 2011)

Table 5. Parameter Estimates From Multivariate Models on Perceived Economic and Cultural Ethnic Threats in Europe

|	Economic threat		Cultural threat	
Social class (manuals = ref.)				
Technocrats	−0.156***	(0.016)	−0.213***	(0.017)
Sociocult. specialists	−0.250***	(0.022)	−0.400***	(0.023)
Routine nonmanuals	−0.131***	(0.018)	−0.152***	(0.019)
Self-employed	−0.063**	(0.024)	−0.052*	(0.027)
Other	−0.127***	(0.022)	−0.118***	(0.024)
Unemployed	0.096***	(0.030)	0.000	(0.032)
Contextual variables (centered)				
GDP	−0.017***	(0.001)	−0.009***	(0.001)
% Muslims	0.014***	(0.003)	−0.042***	(0.003)
Control variables				
Gender (male)	−0.085***	(0.012)	0.050***	(0.012)
Age	0.002***	(0.000)	0.006***	(0.000)
Religiosity	−0.009***	(0.002)	0.004*	(0.002)
Years of education	−0.030***	(0.002)	−0.042***	(0.002)
Migrant	−0.186***	(0.016)	−0.206***	(0.018)
Intercept	0.523		0.371	
Wilks's lambda[a]	.973			
F	33.395 (12)			
p <	.001			
η^2	.014			

Source: European Social Survey (2002–2003).
Unstandardized B coefficients of multivariate analysis. Standard errors in parentheses.
a. Wilks's lambda is a test statistic used in MANOVA as a direct measure of the proportion of variance in the combination of dependent variables that is unaccounted for by the independent variable.
*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.

Possible influences on populist-right performance I

- **Niche laissez-faire—authoritarian position** in a changed policy space (Kitschelt and McGann, 1995).

Fig. 1.1. The competitive space for political parties in Western Europe in the 1980s

From Kitschelt: Radical Right

- Most surveys show, economic and social liberalism only weakly correlated, and radical-right parties are rarely *laissez-faire* on economic policy.

Possible influences on populist-right performance II

Populist right parties vary hugely in how positive they are about welfare spending (as indicated by manifesto mentions).

Figure 23: **Most recent party manifesto position of RWPPs on welfare state**

MARPOR index of support for welfare state

Source: Halikiopoulou and Vlandas (2022)

Possible influences on populist-right performance III

- **Dealignment**

  The relative lack of strong party attachments to mainstream parties is often seen as an important prerequisite for the rise of niche parties of all kinds.

- **Anti-immigration stance**
  - Racism, ethno-centrism, anti-immigration and welfare chauvanism are the policies that most characterize relatively successful radical-right parties.
  - Ivarsflaten (CPS, 2007) shows immigration policy more important than populism, economic policy or Euroscepticism

Possible influences on populist-right performance IV

Figure 1
The Predicted Probability of Voting for the Populist Right in Seven Western European Countries, 2002 and 2003

Ivarsflaten (CPS, 2007)

Possible influences on populist-right performance V

- ▶ Attitudes to ethnic minorities and immigrants are typically the best predictor of who votes for the radical right, and this helps explain why people with different economic interests do so (Ivarsflaten, 2005).
- ▶ Moreover, "no populist right party performed well in elections around 2002 without mobilizing grievances over immigration ...but there are several examples of populist right parties experiencing electoral success without mobilizing grievances over economic changes or political elitism and corruption." (Ivarsfalaten 2008)
  However, ...
- ▶ It isn't so easy to mobilize anti-immigrant support.
  - ▶ Between 1985 and 2005 six out of seven anti-immigrant parties in Europe did badly; those that did well had 'reputational sheilds' from having existed before immigration became and issue (Ivarsflaten 2006).
  - ▶ Perhaps there is social desirability in voting for a party that can claim to be not just an anti-immigrant party.

Possible influences on populist-right performance VI

▶ e.g. UKIP had the repetitional shield of Euroscepticism, but among Eurosceptics immigration attitudes (and especially assessments of major party performance on the issue) matter a lot for UKIP support (Ford and Goodwin 2014)

▶ Puzzling that the growth of the radical-right has been accompanied by a decline in racism.
▶ It is also not the case that countries with the highest levels of immigration, ethnic-minorities or hostility to immigrants are those with the strongest radical-right parties (Norris, 2005)

Possible influences on populist-right performance VII

▶ **Economic hardship coupled by immigrant economic threat**
Golder (CPS, 2003) argues that higher unemployment is associated with greater support for *populist* radical-right parties only where there is sufficiently high levels of immigration.

Figure 4. **The effect of unemployment on populist party voteshare conditional on the percentage of foreign citizens.**

The effect doesn't work for what Golder classifies as non-populist neofacist parties, e.g. the BNP.

▶ More recently Finseraas et al (2016) showed a similar result for anti-immigrant sentiment (see above), but restricted to those with lower levels of education.

▶ Note that the radical-right did not do much better in the 2009 European Parliament elections despite the major recession.

Possible influences on populist-right performance IX

Bolet (EJPR, 2020) shows high-skilled immigrants competing for low-skilled jobs leads to greater FN voting where unemployment is higher in local labour market.

Figure 2. Marginal effects of local labour market competition and economic deprivation on radical right voting.

Lucassen and Lubbers (CPS 2011) - both economic and cultural threat perceptions matter.

Table 4. Parameter Estimates From Logistic Regression Models on Far-Right Preference

Models	Baseline: Control and class		1: + ethnic threats		2: + threats × class		3: Baseline + context		4: + threat		5: + threats × context	
Social class (manuals = ref.)												
Technocrats	-0.193*	(0.082)	0.028	(0.084)	-0.061	(0.096)	-0.302***	(0.083)	-0.071	(0.086)	-0.074	(0.086)
Sociocult. specialists	-0.934***	(0.160)	-0.523***	(0.163)	-0.696***	(0.180)	-1.090***	(0.161)	-0.690***	(0.164)	-0.707***	(0.164)
Routine nonmanuals	-0.133	(0.095)	0.026	(0.097)	-0.104	(0.113)	-0.284**	(0.096)	-0.123	(0.099)	-0.124	(0.099)
Self-employed	-0.019	(0.120)	0.006	(0.123)	0.134	(0.145)	0.143	(0.123)	0.245*	(0.126)	0.227*	(0.127)
Others	-0.118	(0.113)	-0.009	(0.115)	-0.204	(0.146)	-0.289*	(0.115)	-0.191	(0.119)	-0.186	(0.119)
Unemployed	-0.041	(0.149)	-0.103	(0.153)	-0.043	(0.183)	0.117	(0.152)	0.076	(0.157)	0.082	(0.158)
Perceived ethnic threats (centered)												
Cultural threat[a]			0.833***	(0.050)	0.764***	(0.088)			0.834***	(0.051)	0.922***	(0.060)
Economic threat[b]			0.116*	(0.051)	0.012	(0.083)			0.282***	(0.054)	0.254***	(0.057)
Contextual variables (centered)												
GDP							0.131***	(0.008)	0.151***	(0.008)	0.168***	(0.011)
% Muslims							-0.031	(0.018)	-0.004	(0.018)	0.027	(0.022)
Interaction class and cultural ethnic threat (centered)[c]												
Technocrats × cult. threat					0.134	(0.130)						
SC specialists × cult. threat					0.743*	(0.257)						
Routine × cult. threat					0.081	(0.148)						
Self-empl. × cult. threat					-0.478*	(0.196)						
Other × cult. threat					0.319*	(0.186)						
Unemployed × cult. threat					-0.288	(0.246)						
Interaction class and economic ethnic threat (centered)[d]												
Technocrats × econ. threat					0.074	(0.134)						
SC specialists × econ. threat					-0.025	(0.278)						
Routine × econ. threat					0.317*	(0.154)						
Self-empl. × econ. threat					0.359*	(0.186)						
Other × econ. threat					0.077	(0.186)						
Unemployed × econ. threat					0.184	(0.228)						

Table 4. (continued)

Models	Baseline: Control and class		1: + ethnic threats		2: + threats × class		3: Baseline + context		4: + threat		5: + threats × context	
Interaction context(centered) and ethnic threats (centered)												
GDP × cultural threat											−0.035*	(0.014)
GDP × econ. threat											0.016	(0.013)
% Muslims × cultural threat											−0.081*	(0.029)
% Muslims × econ. threat											0.032	(0.030)
Control variables												
Gender (male)	0.346***	(0.064)	0.329***	(0.066)	0.331***	(0.066)	0.308***	(0.065)	0.307***	(0.068)	0.305***	(0.068)
Age	−0.008***	(0.002)	−0.012***	(0.002)	−0.013***	(0.002)	−0.010***	(0.002)	−0.015***	(0.002)	−0.015***	(0.002)
Religiosity	−0.046***	(0.011)	−0.050***	(0.011)	−0.049***	(0.011)	−0.026*	(0.011)	−0.017	(0.011)	−0.019	(0.011)
Years of education	−0.102***	(0.010)	−0.068***	(0.011)	−0.068***	(0.011)	−0.110***	(0.010)	−0.072***	(0.011)	−0.071***	(0.011)
Migrant	−0.223*	(0.096)	−0.014	(0.098)	−0.015	(0.098)	−0.243*	(0.097)	−0.008	(0.100)	−0.010	(0.100)
Constant	−0.538		−1.046		−0.956		−0.500		−1.125		−1.185	
χ^2 (df) model	307.289	(11)	760.030	(13)	793.589	(25)	668.290	(13)	1209.247	(15)	1220.917	(19)
−2 log likelihood	8467.076		8014.335		7980.776		8105.442		7565.118		7553.448	
Nagelkerke R^2	.046		.112		.117		.099		.176		.177	

Source: European Social Survey (2002–2003).
Unstandardized B coefficients of logistic regression. Standard errors in parentheses.
a. Including this variable solely results in χ^2(model) = 754.734, df = 12, p < .001, −2 log likelihood = 8019.631, Nagelkerke R^2 = .111, B = 0.892, SE = 0.044, p < .001.
b. Including this variable solely results in χ^2(model) = 473.830, df = 12, p < .001, −2 log likelihood = 8300.535, Nagelkerke R^2 = .071, B = 0.559, SE = 0.043, p < .001.
c. Including this block exclusively results in χ^2(model) = 786.842, df = 19, p < .001, −2 log likelihood = 7987.523, Nagelkerke R^2 = .116.
d. Including this block exclusively results in χ^2(model) = 770.470, df = 19, p < .001, −2 log likelihood = 8003.895, Nagelkerke R^2 = .114.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Interactions don't really test the Golder (2003) hypothesis, but they do suggest that the effects of cultural threat perceptions are weaker in richer countries with more Muslims.

Possible influences on populist-right performance XII

Halikiopoulu and Vlandas (2022) argue that both cultural and economic attitudes to immigration are key predictors of Populist Right voting. Negative cultural attitudes might have more of an effect, but negative economic attitudes are more prevalent so account for more of the Populist Right vote total.

Figure 4: **Hypothetical representation of difference between predictive power and substantive importance**

- **Minority threat, mitigated by local contact**
  - Biggs and Knauss (ESR 2011) look at the geography of BNP members from the leaked list
  - Probability of membership is lower in neighbourhoods with a substantial proportion of non-whites (Contact theory).
  - But probability is higher in *cities* with a larger proportion of non-whites, where they are also highly segregated (Threat theory).
  - Results more sensitive to South Asian and Muslim population than Black population.

Possible influences on populist-right performance XIV

Figure 3 The effect of non-white proportion and segregation within authority

Possible influences on populist-right performance XV

- **Anti-system appeal**
  - Stable coalition government and/or pilarization have led to the (perception of) indifference and corruption among political elites.

    e.g. Freedom Party, Vlaams Blok/Belang.

- **Electoral System**
  Proportional Representation makes it easier than does simple-plurality for radical-right and other small parties to gain representation and be taken seriously.

    e.g. compare the UK and US with radical-right parties in other countries
  - also compare UKIP in Euro versus other British elections.
  - Note that the French run-off system might help small parties in a way that other majoritarian systems do not, by allowing voters to signal support in the first round.

- **Party funding and organization**
  State funding of parties can help small parties develop, and this is especially important in European Parliament elections which voters may treat as '2nd order'.
  Extreme-right parties have often been efficiently organized and mobilized on militaristic lines.

- **Leadership**
  Success is often associated with charismatic leadership, but it is difficult to identify causal direction since some leaders are only described by the media as charismatic once their movement has been successful.
  - There are some convincing cases though, e.g. UKIP did well when and only when Farage was leader.

Possible influences on populist-right performance XVII

▶ **Mainstream Party Strategy**
Meguid (APSR 2005) argues that the fortunes of radical-right (and other niche parties) are largely a product of the strategies pursued by their mainstream competitors. She outlines three main strategies:

  ▶ Dismiss the radical-right parties and pretend ignore the issues they raise
  ▶ Accommodate radical-right issues by changing policy.
  ▶ Argue against radical-right policies (Adversarial)

She hypothesizes their effects as follows.

TABLE 1.   Predicted Effects of Mainstream Party Strategies (in Isolation)

Strategies	Mechanism			Niche Party Electoral Support
	Issue Salience	Issue Position	Issue Ownership	
Dismissive (DI)	Decreases	No movement	No effect	Decreases
Accommodative (AC)	Increases	Converges	Transfers to mainstream party	Decreases
Adversarial (AD)	Increases	Diverges	Reinforces niche party's ownership	Increases

The following figure is an illustration of the more general model, but focusing on the French FN.

Possible influences on populist-right performance XVIII

FIGURE 1. Electoral Trajectory of the French Front National: Actual versus Predicted (With 95% Confidence Intervals)

Note: Predictions calculated for a centralized state with plurality rules and GDP/capita, unemployment levels and lagged FN vote as observed in France.

Experimental evidence suggests that accommodating AfD refugee ban policy would have made it costly for the AfD to soften their refugee policy: Chou et al (CPS, 2021)

Figure 5. Causal effects of AfD candidate attributes on AfD vote choice among AfD voters, interacted with status quo.
For AfD voters, the refugee policies proposed by other parties strongly moderate strategic voting and the effect of the AfD's proposed refugee policy. Only when another party proposes a ban do the *Chance of winning* and *Refugee policy* attributes have a statistically significant effect on the probability that AfD voters choose AfD candidate.

Also advocating a refugee ban would have been costly for other parties: Chou et al (CPS, 2021)

Figure 6. Causal effects of refugee issue positioning on AfD vote choice among AfD voters.
This figure shows that AfD voters are between 5 and 15 points less likely to select the AfD candidate when other candidates propose stricter refugee policies. The baseline policies for each party are set to their status quo policies, denoted by bold italicized labels, while restricted policies are denoted by gray italicized labels.

Mobilizing anti-immigrant sentiment in the mainstream

Thraenhardt (1995) argues that all parties have have become more anti-immigration (i.e. chosen accommodation)

Koopmans (1995) claims this has legitimized racist violence.

Even where there are no radical-right parties, mainstream right can benefit from taking a relatively anti-immigrant position (Prados Prado et al, *Pol. Behav.* 2013).

► *"Based on issue ownership theory and using panel and media data for Germany (1999-2009), we provide evidence that individual concern over immigration increases party attachment towards the centre-right CDU-CSU, especially when immigration debates are primed in the media."*

Prados Prado et al, (*Pol. Behav.* 2013)

Fig. 2 Simulations for conversion, mobilization and activation to CDU–CSU

FIGURE 3. Changes in Self-Reported Newspaper Readership in Merseyside and Control Counties Post- versus Pre-Hillsborough

Difference in proportion of self-reported newspaper readership post vs. pre boycott

Note: Control (*top row*) includes all Northern English counties except Merseyside; changes in predicted probabilities derived from multinomial logistic regression surrounded by 95% confidence intervals.

Source: Foos and Bischof (APSR, 2021)

FIGURE 4. Trends in Euroscepticism in Merseyside and Control Counties before and after Hillsborough

Source: Foos and Bischof (APSR, 2021)

FIGURE 6.   Remain Vote Share in the 2016 EU Referendum across England

"Merseyside":

Source: Foos and Bischof (APSR, 2021)

Consquences for Immig. Rights: Koopmans et al (2012) I

Immigrant rights have been improved in Europe, but more slowly, if at all, in recent years

TABLE 5
AVERAGE SCORES FOR DIFFERENT TYPES OF IMMIGRANT CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS
ACROSS 10 COUNTRIES, 1980–2008

	1980	1990	2002	2008
Naturalization	−.02	.02	.20	.05
Marriage migration	.71	.73	.45	.14
Expulsion	−.28	−.19	−.10	−.08
Public sector employment	−.60	−.43	−.09	−.06
Antidiscrimination	−.21	−.11	.33	.60
Political rights	−.43	−.29	−.20	−.08
Cultural rights in education	−.38	−.17	.17	.14
Other cultural and religious rights	−.29	−.22	−.07	−.01
Individual equality dimension	−.09	−.01	.15	.13
Cultural difference dimension	−.30	−.19	.04	.03

NOTE.—Higher scores indicate more inclusive policies.

Consquences for Immig. Rights: Koopmans et al (2012) II

TABLE 7
AVERAGE SCORES AND RANKINGS OF COUNTRIES ON IMMIGRANT CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS, 1980–2008

	1980	1990	2002	2008
Sweden	.27 (1)	.31 (2)	.48 (1)	.51 (1)
United Kingdom ...	.18 (2)	.22 (3)	.43 (3)	.44 (2)
Netherlands	−.17 (5)	.33 (1)	.47 (2)	.40 (3)
Belgium	−.22 (7)	−.13 (6)	.19 (5)	.34 (4)
Norway	−.11 (4)	−.06 (5)	.21 (4)	.12 (5)
Germany	−.54 (9)	−.49 (9)	−.11 (7)	−.12 (6)
France	−.18 (6)	−.14 (7)	−.16 (8)	−.15 (7)
Denmark	−.09 (3)	−.02 (4)	−.10 (6)	−.17 (8)
Switzerland	−.60 (10)	−.57 (10)	−.31 (10)	−.30 (9)
Austria	−.47 (8)	−.42 (8)	−.18 (9)	−.30 (10)
Average	−.19	−.10	.09	.08

NOTE.—Higher scores indicate more inclusive policies. Countries are listed in the order of their degree of inclusiveness in 2008. Figures in parentheses indicate rank orders.

Conséquences for Immig. Rights: Koopmans et al (2012) III

The rise of the radical-right helps to explain slowdowns and reversals of immigrant rights.

TABLE 8
Results of Stepwise Regressions of Levels of Immigrant Rights, 1990–2008

	All Immigrant Rights	Individual Equality Rights	Cultural Difference Rights
EU membership	NS	NS	NS
Strength of judicial review	NS	NS	NS
1980 level of rights	.596 (.000)	.558 (.000)	.786 (.002)
Share of immigrant-origin voters	.042 (.001)	.039 (.002)	.042 (.002)
Vote share of right-wing populist parties ...	−.011 (.029)	−.011 (.058)	−.011 (.034)
Left-party government incumbency	NS	NS	NS
Economic growth	NS	NS	NS
Constant	−.004 (.961)	.002 (.977)	.056 (.615)
Adjusted R^2	.74	.75	.66
N	30	30	30

NOTE.— Unstandardized regression coefficients and significance levels; NS = not significant.

Conclusion

- ▶ Racial prejudice typically in long term decline but with persistent hostility to Muslims particularly.
- ▶ Anti-immigrant sentiment seems to be driven by a mixture of economic and cultural factors
- ▶ Radical-right voters are distinctive for their anti-immigrant attitudes.
- ▶ The electoral success and coalition potential of the radical-right has grown in recent years,
- ▶ not necessarily as a result of increasing intolerance to immigrants or ethnic minorities,
- ▶ but more likely as a result of complex mix of institutional, economic and party-competition factors.