Political Culture, Social Capital and Democracy

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Political Culture

- Social Capital
- Evidence for the effects of Political Culture and Social Capital on Democracy

Conclusion

Political Culture Defined

Political Culture refers to the pattern of beliefs and assumptions ordinary people have towards the world, as these pertain to politics. (Tepperman)

- Not the same as ideology, but more diffuse and less goal directed.
- Relatively stable over time and reproduced by political socialization.
- Long thought to be important for the functioning of states.
 - E.g. Gibbon thought the main reason for fall of the Roman empire was a decline in civic virtue.

Typology of Political Culture from *The Civic Culture* (Almond and Verba, 1963) I

- Political culture is made up of cognitive, affective and evaluative orientations towards the political system.
- Three basic kinds of political culture
 - Parochial: No cognitive orientations toward the political system
 - Subject: Cognitive orientations toward the output aspects of the system
 - Participant: Cognitive orientations toward both the input and output aspects of the system
- These cultures are congruent with traditional, authoritarian and democratic systems respectively.
- Congruence is indicated by positive affective and evaluative orientations in the appropriate areas:

there is a scale from alienation, through apathy to allegiance.

The Civic Culture is an allegiant participant political culture.

Typology of Political Culture from The Civic Culture (Almond and Verba, 1963) II

Pioneering work in cross-national survey research on five countries characterized them as:

- Italy: Alienated
- Mexico: Alienated and Aspiration
- Germany: Political detachment and subject competence
- US: Participant Civic Culture
- Britain: Deferential Civic Culture
- Falls short of making a claim that political culture causes democratic stability, but says ...
- "A stable and effective democratic government ... depends upon the orientations that people have to the political process—upon the political culture."

Indicators of British Political Culture?

Figure 8.4. Support for British values is generally high, although somewhat lower in the case of tolerance and helping fellow Britons



Source: 2011 Citizenship Survey (obey the law, treat with fairness, and treat races equally, England and Wales); 2014 British Social Attitudes Survey (important to understand reasoning, to help people in Britain and to help people in the rest of the world, Great Britain); 2005 World Values Survey (support for democracy, United Kingdom)

From Heath (2018) Social Progress in Britain

Norris (*Critical Citizens*, 1999) argues that there has been declining trust in government and people are less satisfied with the way democracy works in their country in developed countries in recent decades.

But people still think that democracy is the best form of government.

And Norris (2011) argues that there is really no systematic trend in satisfaction with democracy

Diffuse Support

Object of Support	Summary of Trends
Political Community	High levels of support.
Regime Principles	High levels of support.
Regime Performance	Varied satisfaction with the workings of the regime.
Regime Institutions	Declining confidence in government institutions; low levels of support in many newer democracies.
Political Actors	Mixed trends in trust in politicians.



People less likely to think politicians care: Dalton (2014)



http://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/daltonpresentation.pdf

Trend in Britain ambiguous



Figure 8.12. The feeling of disconnect from politics is long-standing

Source: 1974 Political Action Survey (PA), British Social Attitudes Surveys (BSA), British Election Surveys (BES)

From Heath (2018) Social Progress in Britain

Confidence in parliaments lower post-financial crisis than it was in 1980: Dalton and Welzel (2014)



Source: WVS 1981 and wave 6 (2010) or 5 (2005).

http://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/daltonpresentation.pdf

Political trust matters in party because it affects policy support across various domains (Hetherington and Husser, AJPS, 2012)



Figure 1. Trends in average levels of democratic support over time

Note: "Regime democracy": evaluation of "having a democratic policial system" as a good or bad way of governing a country. "Trust institutions: "summary index of trust in national partitiament, brittice system and ruit service. Regime: strong leader" evaluation of "having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections" as a good or bad way of governing a country.

- Some cross-national variation but generally support for democracy high, trust in political institutions middling and support for strongman authoritarianism low.
- Not many trends overall and following slides show little cohort or period trends
- No sign of Europeans tiring of democracy
- Data: European Values Surveys
- Source: Wuttke et al (BJPS 2020)



Figure 2. Period and cohort effects on democratic regime preferences

Note: the figure shows predicted mean values for period and cohort effects derived from GAM analyses using an observed value approach with simultaneous confidence intervals. For the cohort plots in blue, smoothing splines are overlaid on the yearly predictions displayed in the background. Red dots represent period effects, showing predicted mean levels in the respective survey year.

Source: Wuttke et al (BJPS 2020)



Figure 3. Period and cohort effects effects on trust in democratic institutions

Note: the figure shows predicted mean values for period and cohort effects derived from GAM analyses using an observed value approach with simultaneous confidence intervals. For the cohort plots in blue, smoothing splines are overlaid on the yearly predictions displayed in the background. Red dots represent period effects, showing predicted mean levels in the respective survey year.

Source: Wuttke et al (BJPS 2020)



Figure 4. Period and cohort effects on authoritarian regime preferences

Note: the figure shows predicted mean values for period and cohort effects derived from GAM analyses using an observed value approach with simultaneous confidence intervals. For the cohort plots in blue, smoothing splines are overlaid on the yearly predictions displayed in the background. Red dots represent period effects, showing predicted mean levels in the respective survey year.

Source: Wuttke et al (BJPS 2020)

Young Europeans are more, not less, satisfied with the way democracy works in their country



Figure 1. Evaluations of democracy among Europeans since 2002. ESS waves 1-8, (N=353,998).

Source: Zilinsky (Res&Politics 2019)

Countries vary in how divided beliefs about efficacy of voting are by educational attainment



Figure 8.16c. Japan is the laggard in political disenchantment

Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (UK 2015; Italy 2006; Canada 2011; France and USA 2012; Germany and Japan 2013; Sweden 2014)

From Heath (2018) Social Progress in Britain

Correlates of political culture; back to Norris

Norris argues that institutional confidence is influenced by,

- extent of political rights and civil liberties
- electoral system
- centralization of the state
- economic development
- being a supporter of the governing party
- some socio-demographic characteristics

Dalton and Welzel (2014) *The Civic Culture Transformed: From Allegiant to Assertive Citizens*

Domain	Allegiant Citizens	Assertive Citizens
Value priorities	Output priorities with an emphasis on order and security limit input priorities that might emphasize voice and participation; materialist/protective values predominate	Input priorities with an emphasis on voice and participation grow stronger at the expense of output priorities with an emphasis on order and security: postmaterialist/emancipative values prevail over materialist/ protective values
Authority orientations	Deference to authority in the family, at the workplace, and in politics	Distance to authority in the family, at the workplace, and in politics
Institutional trust	High trust in institutions	Low trust in institutions
Democratic support	Support for both the principles of democracy and its practice (satisfied democrats)	Strong support for the principles of democracy but weak support for its practice (dissatisfied democrats)
Democracy notion	Input-oriented notions of democracy as a means of voice and participation mix with output-oriented notions of democracy as a tool of delivering social goods	Input-oriented notions of democracy as a means of voice and participation become clearly dominant
Political activism	Voting and other conventional forms of legitimacy-granting activity	Strong affinity to nonviolent, elite-challenging activity
Expected systemic consequences	More effective and a	ccountable governance?

TABLE 1.1. Aspects of Allegiant and Assertive Citizenship

Note: For an operationalization of allegiant and assertive citizens, see Table 12.1 (p. 293).

Does civic culture underpin civic participation?

John et al. (Pol Stud, 2011) consider whether different forms of civic participation are linked to the kinds of social attitudes expected by civic culture theory.

The following table shows that:

- People who lobby their politicians (individually or collectively) are less trusting of institutions and less likely to think those in their neighbourhood would act to solve a social problem (low neighbourhood social norms).
- Fondness for and identification with your neighbourhood increases participation.
- i.e. you are more likely to do something about a local problem if you care about your neighbourhood and think your neighbours and local government are unlikely to do anything about it.
- This is somewhat at odds with civic culture theory but makes sense.

	Estimate (S.E.)						
	CB1 (influence institutions individually)	CB2 (collective civic)	CB3 (citizen governance)	CB4 (community voluntarism)			
Trust (trust in government institutions)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.13*** (0.04)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)			
Norms (neighbourhood social norms)	-0.24* (0.12)	-0.11 (0.14)	-0.24 (0.10)	-0.10 (0.10)			
Morals (moral motivations)	+0.01 (0.03)	+0.05 (0.03)	+0.03 (0.02)	+0.07*** (0.02)			
Affect (neighbourhood affect)	+0.23* (0.16)	+0.24* (0.19)	+0.33* (0.13)	+0.22* (0.13)			
Age	+0.26**** (0.00)	+0.17*** (0.00)	+0.15*** (0.00)	+0.12*** (0.00)			
Gender (female vs. male)	+0.00 (0.03)	+0.04 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.03)	+0.06** (0.03)			
Education	+0.32*** (0.02)	+0.29*** (0.02)	+0.21*** (0.02)	+0.33*** (0.01)			
Ethnicity (white vs. non-white)	+0.04 (0.06)	+0.09*** (0.08)	+0.01 (0.05)	+0.04* (0.05)			
Deprivation (IMD score)	+0.02 (0.00)	+0.05* (0.00)	+0.03 (0.00)	-0.09*** (0.00)			
Married or cohabiting (vs. other)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)	+0.00 (0.03)			
Skilled (vs. professional)	-0.01 (0.04)	+0.00 (0.04)	+0.01 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)			
Partly or unskilled (vs. professional)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	+0.00 (0.04)	+0.01 (0.04)			
Class not defined (vs. professional)	+0.02 (0.07)	+0.02 (0.08)	+0.02 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.05)			

Table 2: Estimates of the Structural Equation Model of Civic Behaviour

Notes: Model-fit test: N = 6,664 (with 2,531 missing on covariates); d.f. = 567; $\chi^2 = 2,938.599$ (p < 0.001); CFI = 0.919; TLI = 0.936; RMSEA(ε_a) = 0.025.

Power analysis using RMSEA: $c_5 = 0.05$, where ε_5 is the null value of RMSEA and ε_4 is the alternative value of RMSEA. MacCallum et al. (1996) provide detailed formulae describing the u of the RMSEA in power analysis. The power analysis shows that the minimum sample size (N) that our model of civic behaviour requires to obtain power equal to 0.80 is as follows: $\alpha = i$, n = 90, $\alpha = 0$, n = 119, $\alpha = 00$, n = 153.

*Two-tailed p-value significant at 0.05; **two-tailed p-value significant at 0.01;***two-tailed p-value significant at 0.001.

Social Capital

Concept goes back to Coleman and Bourdieu.

According to Putnam (Bowling Alone), Social Capital ...

- is defined as "The features of social life—networks, norms, and trust—that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives."
- is an important factor influencing the quality of democracy, economic performance, health, etc.
- comes in different varieties
 - Bonding: within groups
 - Bridging: between groups
- is not always a good thing
 - e.g. power elites have high levels of social capital
- is measured by a mixture of
 - public engagement (e.g. voting, political action)
 - inter-personal association (e.g. socializing, volunteering)
 - inter-personal trust
- Note that there is an important debate as to whether trust is supposed to flow from associational membership. The reverse causal direction seems more plausible though.

Trends in Social Capital in the USA

In Bowling Alone Putnam argued that social capital has been declining since mid 20th century in the US mainly due to the demise of the peculiarly civic war-time generation, but also TV and some other factors.

In his 2020 book The Upswing Putnam argued that social capital trends are part of a broader rise in collectivism (socially, economically and politically) in the first half of the 20th century followed by decline back to individualism in the second half.



Age, Period and Cohort effects on Social Capital in the US: Schwadel and Stout (2012) I

- 1. "informal association with neighbors declined across periods while informal association with friends outside of the neighborhood increased across birth cohorts
- 2. formal association was comparatively stable with the exception of relatively high levels of formal association among the early 1920s and early 1930s birth cohorts
- 3. trust declined considerably across both periods and cohorts, though the oldest cohorts are less trusting than those born in the 1920s through the 1940s"

So a complex pattern, with up then down cohort patterns for trust and fairness supporting Putnam and Garrett (The Upswing 2020) but not the social interaction cohort trends.

Nonetheless still some worrying trends for social capital theorists.



Figure 1: Estimated Age, Period and Cohort Effects on Frequency of Evenings With Neighbors, Frequency of Evenings With Friends Outside the Neighborhood and Frequency of Evenings With Relatives Figure 2: Estimated Age, Period and Cohort Effects on View That People Are Helpful, People Are Fair and People Can Be Trusted



Social Capital Trends in Britain





Source: Citizenship Survey and Community Life Survey (CLS) (England), British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and UK Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS), 1959 Civic Culture Study, European Values Surveys (EVS), British Social Attitudes Surveys (BSA)

From Heath (2018) Social Progress in Britain



Figure 8.11. There is perhaps some evidence of a slight long-term decline in social trust

Source: British Social Attitudes Surveys (BSA), World Values Survey (WVS), 1959 Civic Culture Survey

From Heath (2018) Social Progress in Britain

Recent up tick in BSA measure of interpersonal trust

Table 1 Social trust, 1998-2017

	1998	2004	2007	2008	2014	2017
Level of trust	%	%	%	%	%	%
People can be trusted	47	46	45	45	47	54
Cannot be too careful dealing with people	49	51	51	51	48	42
Unweighted base	807	853	906	1986	1580	1595

Source: Li et al (BSA 2018)



Figure 8.13. There are long-standing educational divisions in civic engagement, plus recent ones in turnout

Source: UK Household Longitudinal Study Wave 3 (2012); European Values Survey (1981); Civic Culture Study (1959). The UK Household Longitudinal Study and European Values Survey include

From Heath (2018) Social Progress in Britain



% "People can usually/always be trusted" in BSA 2017. Source: Li et al (BSA 2018)

VALUES SURVEY DATABANK

Selected countries/samples: Argentina [1999], Australia [1995], Austria [1999], Belgium [1999], Canada [2000], Czech Republic [1999], Chile [2000], Demmark [1999], Filanda [2000], France [1999], Germany West [1999], Great Britain [1999], Hungary [1999], Ikeland [1999], India [2001], Ireland [1999], Italy [1999], Japan [2000], Mexico [2000], Netherlands [1999], Nigeria [2000), Norway [1996], Portugal [1999], South Africa [2001], South Korea [2001], South Core [2001], South Africa [2001], South Africa [2001], South Korea [2001], South Korea [2001], South Core

BASE=41331		Most people can be trusted				
Weight [with split ups]		Most people can be trusted	Can't be too careful			
	Denmark	66.50%	33.50%			
	Sweden	66.30%	33.70%			
	Norway	65.30%	34.70%			
	Netherlands	59.80%	40.20%			
	Finland	58.00%	42.00%			
	Japan	43.10%	56.90%			
	Iceland	41.10%	58.90%			
	India	41.00%	59.00%			
	Switzerland	41.00%	59.00%			
	Australia	39.90%	60.10%			
	Canada	38.80%	61.20%			
	Ireland	35.80%	64.20%			
	United States	35.80%	64.20%			
	Spain	34.00%	66.00%			
	Austria	33.90%	66.10%			
Country/region	Germany	32.90%	67.10%			
	Italy	32.60%	67.40%			
	Belgium	30.70%	69.30%			
	Great Britain	29.70%	70.30%			
	Republic of Korea	27.30%	72.70%			
	Nigeria	25.60%	74.40%			
	Czech Republic	23.90%	76.10%			
	Chile	22.80%	77.20%			
	France	22.20%	77.80%			
	Hungary	21.80%	78.20%			
	Mexico	21.30%	78.70%			
	Argentina	15.40%	84.60%			
	South Africa	11.80%	88.20%			
	Portugal	10.00%	90.00%			
	Turkey	6.80%	93.20%			
	Total	32.70%	67.30%			

Share of people agreeing with the statement "most people can be trusted", 1993 to 2014

The survey question was "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?"

Possible answers were "Most people can be trusted", "Don't know" and "Can't be too careful".







Figure 8.16a. Sweden shows the highest level of generalized trust

Source: International Social Survey Programme (2008 and 2014, pooled, Canada did not participate in these rounds)

From Heath (2018) Social Progress in Britain

Group membership: quality not quantity

- Skocpol (2003) and Putnam (2002) argue that important change is from membership of democratic organizations to cheque book membership.
- Theiss-Morse and Hibbing (AnRevPolSci 2005) argue that membership of voluntary organisations is a poor foundation for good citizenship because:
 - People join homogeneous groups
 - Civic participation does not lead to political participation
 - Not all groups promote democratic values
 - Groups don't teach what good citizens need to know: democracy is messy, inefficient and conflict-ridden

Effects of Political Culture and Social Capital

General Hypothesis: Culture/social capital influences political and social outcomes, especially the quality of democracy, governance, or economic performance.

Those who believe in the importance of culture/social capital do not all agree on what aspects of culture are relevant and what outcomes they influence and how.

General Problem: Which is the correct causal direction?

Some want to argue both ways

e.g. culture influences growth and growth influences culture.

Cultural evolution of religions (Henrich, 2020, Chpt 4)

- Small and ancient societies tend to have more personal, local and less moral gods
- Big gods facilitated development of big societies
 - stronger moral codes; free will with (afterlife) punishment
 - moral universality
 - promotion of altruism, especially within group
 - development of credibility enhancing displays: prayers, taboos, rituals, sacrifices, and martyrdom
- Societies with big gods have better within group cooperation, and competitive advantage.
- So big gods lead to big societies, and ultimately strong nations, because big gods produce more within-group social capital.



Church marriage policy ultimately leads to democracy (Henrich, 2020)



FI GU RE 12.1. The relationship between the prevalence of cousin marriage and the quality of national-level democratic institutions. Countries with more cousin marriage have weaker democracies.

Related argument in Fukuyama (2014).

Acemoglu and Robinson (AnRevPolSci, 2022) I



Figure 1

Varieties of Leviathans: Despotic (*blue*), Absent (*red*), and Shackled (*yellow*). The two axes represent two key dimensions of how a polity is organized (abstracted from several other relevant aspects for simplicity). The vertical axis represents the capacity of state institutions and the ability of these institutions and the elites in charge of them to impose their will and control over society. The horizontal axis shows the capacity of society, which represents the ability of society to organize (e.g., by solving its collective action problems) and to have its voice heard (either via institutionalized means or by protests and other noninstitutionalized actions).

Acemoglu and Robinson (AnRevPolSci, 2022) II

Culture helps explain:

- Why each governance outcome is self-reinforcing and self-legitimising, and so ...
- Why economic growth in Despotic Leviathan countries (e.g. China) will not automatically bring democratic institutions (and a change to Shackled Leviathan).
- But cultural change is necessary and possible to achieve that.
- Nice theoretical framework but untested and unclear how it can be tested.

Acemoglu and Robinson (APSR, 2023) I



Acemoglu and Robinson (APSR, 2023) II



American Exceptionalism

Almond and Verba's results concur with a tradition pointing to a existence of a particularly democratic political culture in the US. Other examples include:

Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America)

- Democracy in America is successful because of a participatory culture and a belief in equality.

Seymour Martin Lipset (Continental Divide, 1963)

- Canadian culture is more statist, deferential to leaders, collectivist and conservative
- US is more independent, distrustful of government, individualistic, liberal and progressive.
- Reasons for the difference are historical
 - American Revolution led to a migration of British loyalists northward and a divergence in political history.

Effects of Social Capital on Democracy: Paxton

Paxton (ASR, 2002) finds evidence from her cross-lagged panel study that social capital influences the quality of democracy and democracy influences social capital.



Figure 2. Four-Wave Cross-Lagged Panel Model of Social Capital and Democracy: International Nongovernmental Organizations

* Errors in the variable equations are intercorrelated at every time point.

Norris (2011) Democratic Deficit I



FIGURE 1.1. General model of democratic deficits.

Norris (2011) Democratic Deficit II

Central Argument:

- 1. Trendless fluctuations in system support (not decline)
- 2. Satisfaction with democratic performance generally lower than democratic aspirations (the Democratic Deficit)
- 3. Gap is due to:
 - growing public expecations (from education)
 - negative media coverage
 - falling government performance
- 4. but it is ameliorated by income and social trust
- 5. the democratic deficit reduces political participation (contrary to John et al. (2011)) and voluntary law compliance (i.e. more alienation than radicalisation).
- 6. democratic aspirations increase democratisation

Remarks on Norris (2011) Democratic Deficit

- Table 11.3 uses temporal ordering but does not control for prior levels of democracy
- The dependent variable is referred to as 'democractization' but is a measure of the average level of democracy between 1995-2008, rather than a measure of change
- So the correlations could be due to endogeneity problems

Dalton and Welzel (2014): Assertive not allegiant culture improves democracy

TABLE 12.2. Country-Level Regressions Examining the Effects of Allegiant Culture and Assertive Culture on Accountable Governance and Effective Governance

Dependent Variable								
Accountable Governance 2009				Effective Governance 2009				
Predictors	M1-2	M1-2	M1-3	M1-4	M2-1	M2-2	M2-3	M2-4
Constant	0.13 (1.7)*	0.32 (4.5)***	0.16 (4.1)***	0.03 (0.7)+	-0.17 (-2.2)**	-0.01 (-0.2)	0.15 (3.7)***	-0.06 (-1.0) [†]
Allegiant Culture	0.05 (0.4) [†]	-0.14 (-1.2) [†]		0.00 (0.1)†	0.49 (4.0)***	0.36 (3.5)***		0.15 (1.6)†
Assertive Culture	0.91 (11.0)***		0.49 (3.6)***	0.20 (2.6)**	0.99 (12.1)***		0.20 (1.5)†	0.45 (4.8)***
Knowledge Economy		0.18 (2.5)**	0.14 (1.8)*			0.29 (4.6)***	0.16 (2.2)**	
Democratic Tradition		0.16 (3.3)***	0.12 (2.5)**			0.12 (2.9)**	0.14 (3.0)***	
Global Linkage		0.01 (1.8)*	0.00 (0.6)			0.01 (2.4)**	0.01 (2.6)**	
Lagged DV 1995				0.79 (11.9)***				0.61 (9.2)***
Adj. R ^a	0.58	0.68	0.70	0.84	0.64	0.81	0.76	0.82
N (countries)	89	82	85	88	89	82	85	87

Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with their T-values in parentheses. Test statistics for heteroskedasticity (White test), multicollinearity (variance inflation factors), and outliers/everseque cases (DFFT) reveal to volution of ordinary least squares assumptions. Allegiant and assertive culture are measured over 1995-2005, all control variables at the start of the observation period, in 1995.

 ${}^{\dagger}p> {\rm 0.10.} \ {}^{\circ}p< {\rm 0.100.} \ {}^{\circ}{}^{\circ}p< {\rm 0.050.} \ {}^{\circ}{}^{\circ}{}^{\circ}p< {\rm 0.005.}$

Problem: no economic and democratic tradition controls in the Lagged DV (dependent variable) model, so unclear if effects of culture are significant after accounting for both prior governance levels and economic (etc) controls.

Public support helps democracy survive (Claassen, AJPS 2019)

Theory:

- Following Lipset (1959) and Easton (1965), principled and diffuse (as opposed to output oriented specific) support for democracy helps legitimize and stabilize democratic regimes.
- Public support for democracy promotes democratization and reduces democratic backsliding
- Measurement of public support for democracy with various survey questions like the following:
- Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion? (AfroBarometer)
 - Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government
 - Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one
 - For someone like me, it does not matter what kind of government we have.

FIGURE 3 Simulated Long-Run Effects of Support on Democracy



Note: Simulated effects are estimated using coefficients from Table 1, Models 1 and 2. The solid lines indicate the mean simulated effect; the shaded regions indicate the 95% confidence intervals of these simulated effects.

Source: Claassen (AJPS 2019)

- Dependent variable: V-Dem scores
- Support for democracy measures from 14 survey projects from 150 countries back to 1988

FIGURE 3 Simulated Long-Run Effects of Support on Democracy



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- Dependent variable: V-Dem scores
- Support for democracy measures from 14 survey projects from 150 countries back to 1988

	Dependent Variable: Level of Democracy					
	Pooled OLS		System GMM			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		
Democracy _{t-1}	1.141*	1.142*	1.091*	1.095*		
	(.080)	(.080)	(.079)	(.083)		
Democracy ₁₋₂	163*	164°	203*	200°		
	(.080)	(.079)	(.051)	(.050)		
Support _{t-1}	.267*		.881*			
**	(.094)		(.366)			
Support _{t-1} , democracies only		.318*		.810°		
		(.108)		(.344)		
Support _{t-1} , autocracies only		.090		.917		
		(.210)		(.672)		
Log GDP per capita $_{t-1}$.015	001	.388*	.366*		
	(.123)	(.130)	(.174)	(.186)		
GDP per capita growth _{t-1}	.007	.007	016	014		
	(.017)	(.017)	(.020)	(.021)		
Regional democracy _{t-1}	.008	.008	.055*	.051		
	(.005)	(.004)	(.028)	(.030)		
Percent Muslim	002	002	014	013		
	(.003)	(.003)	(.009)	(.009)		
Resource dependence _{t-1}	367	373	-1.196	-1.128		
	(.244)	(.242)	(.683)	(.694)		
Intercept	.647	.765				
-	(.947)	(.998)				
N observations	2,435	2,435	2,435	2,435		
N countries	135	135	135	135		
N instruments			122	124		
Residual standard error	3.056	3.055				
Adjusted R ²	.986	.985				
Wooldridge AR(1) test (p-value)	.769	.882				
Hansen test (p-value)			.438	.469		
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test (p-value)			.560	.546		

TABLE 1 Models of Support and Democracy

Note: Pooled OLS models include Beck-Katz panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors for system GMM models incorporate the Windmeijer correction. Democracy is measured using the V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index and is scaled from 0 to 100. Support is standardized.

*p<.05.

Satisfaction with Democracy in rich countries I



Figure 5. Satisfaction with democracy as conditional relationship between policy distances and interest in politics. Notes: Black lines represent predicted values. Grey lines represent 95 per cent confidence intervals.

Source: Stecker and Tausendpfund, EJPR 2016.

Level of interest matters more than degree of representation.

Satisfaction with Democracy in rich countries II

Reher shows that as well as policy matching voters' preferences (policy representation), people also care about whether elites (politicians and the media) are talking about what the voters care about (**priority congruence**).



Source: Reher, EJPR 2014.

Both policy congruence and perceptions of responsiveness higher in older better quality democracies.

Social capital \rightarrow populist right support \rightarrow decline in satisfaction with democracy

- Community pub closure increases UKIP support by 4.3 points, and even more so for more for the poor. (Bolet, CPS 2021)
- Fahey et al. (ElecStud 2022) show Brexit and AfD success led to decline in satisfaction with democracy among mainstream voters without any rise in satisfaction among populist-right voters. This is not just a sore losers effect but a negative reaction to populist right success specifically.





Source: Fahey et al. (ElecStud 2022)

Conclusion

- Political Culture is about attitudes and orientations towards the political system
- Social Capital is about social interaction and trust
- They are different but there is evidence that Social Capital affects Political Culture
- There is debate about whether (the positive aspects) of both are declining
- There are claims that (certain kinds of) each lead to better quality democracy.
- They are difficult to test rigorously but Paxton (2002) and Claasen (2019) do a good job.