

Social Attitudes and Value Change

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- ▶ Post-Materialism
- ▶ Environmental attitudes
- ▶ Liberalism
- ▶ Left-Right
- ▶ Relationships between different kinds of attitudes
- ▶ Partisan Dealignment
- ▶ Conclusions

Post-materialism

Post-materialists are more concerned about quality of life, the environment, democracy, and human rights. Materialists care mainly about economic growth and security.

Post-materialism is measured by asking survey respondents to rank the following possible goals in order of priority for their country.

1. Maintaining order in the nation
2. Giving the people more say in important government decisions
3. Fighting rising prices
4. Protecting freedom of speech

If you prefer items 2 and 4 to items 1 and 3 then you are post-materialist.


Inglehart's theory of the Rise of Post-materialism

Inglehart argues that there has been a rise in post-materialism in the post-war period in the following way.

- ▶ People have a hierarchy of needs—survival, security, belonging and then self-actualization (Maslow)
- ▶ So what's important depends on economic conditions.
 - ▶ Good times produce post-materialist attitudes.
- ▶ Childhood experience is particularly important because of *socialization*.
- ▶ Hence post-materialism increases by a process of generational replacement.

Inglehart, 2008: Post-materialism higher in richer countries


FIGURE 4
MATERIALIST/POST-MATERIALIST VALUES BY GNP/CAPITA



Note: 1 = 100% materialist; 2 = materialist and post-materialist evenly balanced; 3 = 100% post-materialist; GNP per capita in thousands, 1995 (PPP estimates) $r = .64$.

Inglehart, West Eur. Pol. 2008

FIGURE 2
COHORT ANALYSIS: % POST-MATERIALISTS MINUS % MATERIALISTS IN SIX
WEST EUROPEAN SOCIETIES, 1970–2006



Youngest cohorts the most liberal but not the most postmaterialist in recent surveys from Europe and Canada: Shorrock (Pol & Soc, 2018)




Figure 4. Lowess Curves for the Average Position for Abortion, Divorce, Homosexuality, Housewife, and Postmaterialism for Cohorts Born 1925–85.

Note: N=47,435. Higher values on the *abortion*, *divorce*, and *housewife* scales indicate more liberal values.

Source: Combined EVS (1989–2010) and WVS (1995–2012).

Inglehart, 2008: Switch from Post-materialism to Survival values


TABLE 1
ORIENTATIONS LINKED WITH SURVIVAL VS. SELF-EXPRESSION VALUES

Item	Correlation
SURVIVAL VALUES emphasise the following:	
<i>Materialist/Post-materialist Values</i>	.87
Men make better political leaders than women	.86
R. is not highly satisfied with life	.84
A woman has to have children to be fulfilled	.83
R. rejects foreigners, homosexuals and people with AIDS as neighbours	.81
R. has not and would not sign a petition	.80
R. is not very happy	.79
R. favours more emphasis on the development of technology	.78
Homosexuality is never justifiable	.78
R. has not recycled something to protect the environment	.76
R. has not attended a meeting or signed a petition to protect the environment	.75
A good income and safe job are more important than a feeling of accomplishment and working with people you like	.74
R. does not rate own health as very good	.73
A child needs a home with both a father and a mother in order to grow up happily	.73
When jobs are scarce, a man has more right to a job than a women	.69
A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl	.67
Government should ensure that everyone is provided for	.69
Hard work is one of the most important things to teach a child	.65
Imagination is not of the most important things to teach a child	.62
Tolerance is not of the most important things to teach a child	.62
Leisure is not very important in life	.61
Scientific discoveries will help, rather than harm, humanity	.60
Friends are not very important in life	.56
You have to be very careful about trusting people	.56
R. has not and would not join a boycott	.56
R. is relatively favourable to state ownership of business and industry	.54
SELF-EXPRESSION VALUES take opposite position on all of above	

The original polarities vary; the above statements show how each item relates to this values

Inglehart, 2008: Cohort effects for survival values

FIGURE 5
SELF-EXPRESSION VALUES BY BIRTH COHORT, 1981–2006



Note: Mean scores on self-expression values dimension combined data from France, Britain, W. Germany, Italy and Netherlands.

Supposed implications of increased postmaterialism

As a result of old materialist cohorts being replaced by young postmaterialists, Inglehart claims there has been a *culture shift* witnessed by . . .

- ▶ Rise of New Social Movements, e.g. Peace movement, environmentalists, anti-trade.
- ▶ Growth of 'post-materialist' parties, e.g. Greens, ?Radical-right?
- ▶ With the diminution of the working class, adaptation of left-wing parties to represent postmaterialists (new-left).

Critiques of Inglehart's Post-materialism thesis I

Regarding the nature of Post-materialism

- ▶ Looking at US, NL and W Germany, Brooks and Manza (1994) found no evidence that people can be classified as either post-materialist or materialist, as Inglehart claimed, rather they have mixed values, some more materialist some more post-materialist.
- ▶ Both the theory and measure confuse issue dimensions with issue salience.
 - ▶ Theoretically, caring less about (i.e. *salience* of) one issue does not necessarily mean you should take a particular *position* on another issue.
 - ▶ But there is a logic to the idea that those who are less concerned about personal material gains will be more concerned about human rights.
 - ▶ So, post-materialism—materialism is really an issue dimension and its relative salience compared with economic left—right is a separate question, perhaps to be assessed with analysis of predictive power.

Critiques of Inglehart's Post-materialism thesis II

- ▶ The so-called post-materialist issues are non-materialist liberal values and some materialist values are primarily authoritarian (e.g. Flanagan 1987, de Graaf and Evans 1996).
 - ▶ Post-materialism and self-expression measures might be primarily measuring liberalism/authoritarianism, and we see similar cohort replacement effects for these values (Tilley, PolStud. 2005)

Regarding the process of change of values

- ▶ The change in values observed with the post-materialism question is best explained by rising education and the severity of war-time experience, not formative affluence (de Graaf and Evans 1996, also c.f. Tilley 2005).
- ▶ Post-materialism is very sensitive to current economic conditions and so not solely due to cohort replacement.

Critiques of Inglehart's Post-materialism thesis III

Regarding the relationship between post-materialist and new social movements

- ▶ Supposedly post-materialist New Social Movements are often concerned with the achievement of “materialist” goals, and the post-materialists are not less likely to see the state as a relevant means to achieving their aims (Brooks and Manza, 1994).
- ▶ Green party voters (in Germany), although highly educated, are not economically secure, but despite this they support the Greens for post-materialist reasons (Betz, CPS 1990).

Dalton, 2013: Post-materialism increasing?

Figures in the table don't fit the title

The percentage of postmaterialists is generally increasing in advanced industrial societies.

COUNTRY	1973	1990	1999	2007
Belgium	38	38	—	—
Canada	—	29	30	—
Denmark	19	32	—	—
France	33	27	—	35
Germany (West)	13	36	43	30
Great Britain	18	19	—	25
Ireland	15	23	—	—
Italy	16	33	—	—
Japan	—	31	28	—
Netherlands	35	39	—	—
Norway	—	17	20	26
Spain	—	37	29	—
Sweden	—	31	29	—
United States	24	21	23	—

Sources: 1973 European Communities Study; for first U.S. time point: 1974 Political Action Study; 1990–91 World Values Survey; 1998–2002 World Values Survey; for 1999 German time point: 1995–98 World Values Survey; 2005–08 World Values Survey.

Environmentalism experienced a decline in Britain

Not what you'd expect given the post-materialism thesis

Table 6.2 Views on public concern about the environment, 1993–2010

	1993	2000	2010
We worry too much about the future of the environment and not enough about prices and jobs today	%	%	%
Agree	36	35	43
Neither	13	13	20
Disagree	48	50	34
People worry too much about human progress harming the environment	%	%	%
Agree	30	28	35
Neither	18	22	25
Disagree	47	46	36
<i>Base</i>	1261	972	928

Source: Taylor (BSA, 2012)

Social Bases of Environmentalism in Britain

Table 6.9 Concern about the dangers to the environment, by demographic group, 2000 and 2010⁴

	% "Extremely dangerous" or "very dangerous" to the environment					
	Air pollution from cars			Rise in world's temperature caused by climate change		
	2000	2010	% change	2000	2010	% change
Age						
18–34	51	34	-18	52	48	-3
35–54	54	27	-27	49	48	-1
55–64	58	29	-29	56	43	-13
65+	56	21	-35	47	28	-19
Educational attainment						
Degree or higher	62	39	-23	61	63	1
Below degree level	53	26	-27	49	42	-7
No qualifications	51	25	-26	47	28	-19
Household income (quartiles)⁵						
Lowest quartile	59	27	-32	52	37	-15
2nd lowest quartile	53	28	-26	48	36	-11
2nd highest quartile	57	31	-26	55	50	-5
Highest quartile	47	27	-20	49	52	3
Party identification						
Conservative	45	21	-24	40	38	-2
Labour	60	32	-28	54	49	-5
Liberal Democrat	61	36	-25	56	55	-1
All	54	28	-26	50	43	-7

Source: Taylor (BSA, 2012)

Education as main predictor of climate beliefs: Britain 2010

Table A.2 Logistic regression on whether people think that a rise in the world's temperature caused by climate change is dangerous to the environment

	Coefficient	Standard error	p value
Sex (male)			
Female	0.103	0.146	0.483
Age (18–34)			0.090
35–54	0.153	0.198	0.442
55–64	0.064	0.240	0.789
65+	-0.474	0.257	0.065
Household income quartiles			
(lowest quartile)			0.975
Second lowest quartile	-0.141	0.230	0.540
Second highest quartile	-0.085	0.232	0.715
Highest quartile	0.021	0.247	0.933
Education (Degree)			0.000
Higher education below degree	-0.146	0.263	0.579
A level or equivalent	-0.440	0.250	0.079
O level or equivalent	** -1.021	0.232	0.000
No qualifications	** -0.956	0.268	0.000
Party identification (Conservative)			0.131
Labour	0.358	0.192	0.062
Liberal Democrat	0.359	0.233	0.123
Other party	0.015	0.204	0.941
Constant	0.257	0.329	0.435

Base: 847

* significant at 95% level

** significant at 99% level

Education and Age differences similar magnitude: Britain 2016

Table 4 Average scores for how good or bad people think the impact of climate change will be on people across the world, by age and education level

Mean of extremely bad (0) to extremely good (10)	Highest education level			All
	GCSE or Lower	Intermediate	Degree	
All	4.0	3.6	2.9	3.5
<i>Unweighted base</i>	590	724	507	1821
Age Group				
18-34	3.8	3.4	2.4	3.2
<i>Unweighted base</i>	90	185	113	388
35-64	3.9	3.7	3.0	3.5
<i>Unweighted base</i>	215	361	295	871
65+	4.3	3.8	3.6	4.0
<i>Unweighted base</i>	267	174	91	532

Source: European Social Survey wave 8 (2016), British respondents aged 18+

Source: Fisher et al (BSA 2018)

Table 13 Level of worry about climate change, by party identification

		Extremely worried	Very worried	Somewhat worried	Not very worried	Not at all worried	<i>Unweighted base</i>
All	%	6	19	45	22	6	1858
Party identification							
Conservative	%	3	15	47	28	5	548
Labour	%	6	23	48	17	4	512
Liberal Democrats	%	6	29	51	9	2	130
Scottish National Party	%	5	22	44	25	3	57
Green Party	%	28	23	40	11	-	53
UKIP	%	4	9	35	40	8	114
None	%	6	17	42	23	10	414

Source: European Social Survey wave 8 (2016), British respondents aged 18+

Source: Fisher et al (BSA 2018)

Attention raising protest helped increase climate concern

Kirby (BJPIR, 2022)




Figure 4. Trends in attention, 2018–2019.

Mainly stable climate change attitudes in the US




Figure 1

Trends in American public opinion on climate change, 1989–2016. Source: Survey data compiled by Bowman et al. (2016).

Source: Egan and Mullin (AnRevPolSci 2017).

Increasing partisan polarisation of US climate change attitudes 1989-2016: Egan and Mullin (AnRevPolSci 2017).





Figure 2

Polarization in American public opinion on climate change, 1989–2016. Source: Gallup.

Increasing partisan polarisation of US climate change attitudes 2001-22: Egan and Mullin (PS 2023).

Figure 2

US Public Opinion on Climate Change



Top panel: Opinion on the existence, cause, and threat of climate change, 2001-2022. Source: Gallup. Bottom panel: Prioritization of climate change among 13 public problems, 2007-2022. Source: Pew Research Center.

Also social polarisation of environmentalism in US

Table 1. The Demographic Correlates of Environmental Concern

Independent Variable	1990		2000		2010	
	Slope Coefficient	Standard Error	Slope Coefficient	Standard Error	Slope Coefficient	Standard Error
Age ^a	0.00	0.006	0.01	0.008	-0.01	0.008
Education ^b	0.01	0.087	-0.24**	0.093	0.06	0.115
Income ^c	-0.09	0.087	-0.06	0.083	-0.21**	0.069
Race ^d	-0.55	0.392	0.26	0.353	1.29***	0.358
Gender ^e	-0.46	0.246	-0.36	0.248	-0.91**	0.285
Party identification ^f	0.37*	0.156	0.51**	0.170	0.96***	0.205
Political ideology ^g	0.15	0.140	0.55**	0.176	1.27***	0.207
Constant	13.22	0.767	13.91	0.836	9.14	1.015
Mean on additive scale	13.75		14.25		11.84	
Number of cases	895		915		894	
R ²	.021		.052		.159	

Source: Guber (AmBehavSci, 2012)

Partisan polarisation particularly strong for global warming




Figure 3. Distance between party identifiers on concern for various national problems, 2010. “Next, I’m going to read you a list of problems facing the country. For each one, please tell me if you personally worry about this problem a great deal (3), a fair amount (2), only a little (1),

Partisan polarisation has increased faster than on other issues: Egan and Mullin (AnRevPolSci 2017).




Figure 3

Partisan polarization in Americans' federal spending priorities, 1988–2012, scaled from zero (no polarization) to one (maximum polarization). Source: American National Election Studies Cumulative File.

Polarisation increases the more people think they know




Figure 4. Concern for global warming among partisan identifiers, by level of understanding. "I'm going to read you a list of environmental problems. As I read each one, please tell me if you personally worry about this problem a great deal, a fair amount, only a little, or not at all. First, how much do you worry about global warming?"

Guber (AmBehavSci, 2012)

- ▶ This may be due to increasing awareness of partisan cues.
- ▶ Congressman Bob Inglis lost a Rep. primary after advocating climate change mitigation.

Democrats talking about climate change in the media increased climate scepticism, among Republicans and so overall. Merkle and Stecula (BJPS 2020)




Figure 2. Potential polarizers in the news, quarterly data 2001–2014

Note: (A) Democratic, and Republican cues in news coverage; (B) Uncertainty framing; (C) Economic cost framing; (D) Salience of coverage.

Table 2. Predictors of aggregate climate change skepticism


	Aggregate climate skepticism		GOP climate skepticism
	Quarterly 1	Annually 2	Quarterly 3
Democratic cues	0.02* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)
Republican cues	0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)
Uncertainty frames	-0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)
Cost frames	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Media salience	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00** (0.01)
Climate index	-0.11 (0.08)	0.21* (0.12)	-0.06 (0.10)
Oil prices	0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)
Unemployment rate	0.23*** (0.07)	0.08 (0.06)	0.31*** (0.08)
DV _{t-1}	0.06 (0.17)	0.65*** (0.14)	-0.11 (0.14)
Constant	-2.43***	-1.31	-2.56***
N	55	28	54
R ²	0.72	0.89	0.60

Note: robust standard errors in parentheses, *p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01

Increasing partisan polarisation of US legislators 2007-21: Egan and Mullin (PS 2023).

Figure 1

Roll-Call Voting Scores on Climate-Change Legislation in the US House of Representatives, 2007–2021



Source: League of Conservation Voters

More climate conscious states have more climate change policies: Egan and Mullin (AnRevPolSci 2017).




Figure 4

The relationship between state climate change opinion and policy (with best-fit regression line). Sources: Number of climate-change policies adopted by state, Center for Climate and Energy Solutions (2014); share of state residents believing in anthropogenic climate change, Howe et al. (2015). Overlapping states have been slightly adjusted on the plot for clarity.

Politicisation of Climate change also in Europe:

Fisher et al (ElecStud, 2022)

Table 2

Left-right position, human climate change belief, and climate change worry, by party family.

Left-right mean ^a		% climate change mainly or entirely human		% very or extremely worried about climate change	
Communist	2.6	Green	67	Green	56
Left-Socialist	2.7	Protest	62	Left-Socialist	52
Green	3.6	Left-socialist	60	Communist	50
Social Democrat	3.7	Communist	56	Protest	39
Ethnic	4.6	Not Eligible to vote	56	Social Democrat	38
Not Eligible to vote	4.8	Social Democrat	49	Ethnic	38
Pensioners	4.9	Other	48	Christian	34
Did not vote	4.9	Ethnic	47	Not Eligible to vote	33
Other	5.0	Liberal	46	Other	32
Liberal	5.2	Christian	45	Liberal	30
Christian	5.3	Did not vote	44	Did not vote	27
Protest	5.4	Conservative	39	Conservative	26
Agrarian	5.6	Pensioners	39	Populist-Right	20
Conservative	6.6	Populist-Right	35	Pensioners	17
Populist-Right	6.8	Agrarian	31	Agrarian	15
Average	5.0	Overall	47	Overall	32

Note:

^a scale ranges from 0 (left) to 10 (right). Data weighted to country population size

Rising Liberalism from affluence or education?

- ▶ de Graaf and Evans (1996) argued post-materialism due to rising education not formative affluence
- ▶ Kalmijn and Kraaykamp (BJS 2007) argue that class divisions stable but education divides wider in more affluent societies.
- ▶ Stubager (2008) and Surridge (2016) reject cognitive model (c.f. Pinker) and argue education makes people more liberal by socialisation
 - ▶ But issues of selection bias into (field of) education.

Table III: Overview of results of the hypothesis tests Conducted

Main explanation type	Sub-type	Central variables	Hypothesis	Result
Direct effects	Psychodynamic model	Mastering	H1	(+)
		Linear educational effect	H2a	-
		Non-linear educational effect	H2b	+
	Cognitive model	Educational field	H3	+
		Cognitive sophistication ¹	H4	-
Allocation effects		Income	H5	-
		Class	H6	(+)

Notes:


¹ Tested by means of the content of education variable.

+: Hypothesis not rejected; -: Hypothesis rejected; (+): Hypothesis not rejected, but the effect is not as strong as expected.

But Tilley (2005) shows controlling for education and class do little to moderate large cohort effects in liberalism in Britain.

Liberalism in Britain: Tilley (2005)

Figure 1: Mean Scores on Libertarian-authoritarian Scales by Age-group



Source: British Election Surveys, October 1974–2001.

Looks like age effects but article argues there are generational as well as lifecycle effects: marriage and children reduce liberalism.

Within-individual causal effect of higher ed: Scott et al (ElecStud, 2022)






Fig. 5. Estimated treatment effects of university attendance on political values.
N (TWFE and REWB) = 1520, N (MI REWB) = 15874, M = 75.

Gender Egalitarianism in Britain: Allen and Stevenson (BSA, 2023)

Figure 2 Attitudes to men's and women's roles in relation to working and caring, 1984-2022³




Liberalism in Britain: Attitudes to Homosexuality



Source: Swales and Attar Taylor (BSA 2017). Homosexual acts legalised in 1967 for over 21s in E&W (Scotland 1980).

Strong period and diminishing cohort effects over the last twenty years in attitudes to homosexuality in Britain

Figure 3 Proportion saying same-sex relationships are “not wrong at all”, by generation cohort, 1983-2016




Source: Swales and Attar Taylor (BSA 2017).

Andersen and Fetner (POQ 2008) find something similar for Canada and the US.

Big cohort, small period and no ageing effects on attitudes to premarital sex in Britain


Figure 2 Proportion saying premarital sex is “not wrong at all”, by generation cohort, 1983-2016



Source: Swales and Attar Taylor (BSA 2017). Also religious gaps have narrowed dramatically. Education effects relatively weak.

Big cohort differences on social distance in Britain


Figure II: *Percentage who mind having an ethnic minority in-law by birth cohort*



Source: Storm et al (BJS 2017). Trend caused partly by more education but education effects smaller in later cohorts.

Stability and no cohort effects on attitudes to abortion in Britain since mid 1990s


Figure 5 Proportion saying abortion should be allowed by law if the woman does not wish to have the child, by generation cohort, 1983-2016



Source: Swales and Attar Taylor (BSA 2017). Also note there is no gender gap.

Stable liberal attitudes to euthanasia in Britain


Figure 6 Proportion saying voluntary euthanasia should be allowed for a person who has a painful incurable disease, 1983-2016



Source: Swales and Attar Taylor (BSA 2017). Also note there is no education gap.

Broadly stable illiberal attitudes on criminal justice in Britain

Figure 1 Proportions expressing liberal attitudes to the law, 1985-2016



Source: Clery and Mead (BSA 2017).

Attitudes to transgender rights becoming less liberal?


Curtice and Ratti (BSA, 2022)

Table 5 Views about whether transgender people should be able to change the sex on their birth certificate, 2016-2021³

	2016	2019	2021
	%	%	%
Agree	58	53	32
Neither agree nor disagree	18	21	28
Disagree	22	24	39
<i>Unweighted base</i>	974	3224	3112

Correlates of illiberal attitudes on state power on security in Britain

Figure 3 'Role of government' score, by age, highest educational qualification and related attitudes



- Keep people under video surveillance in public areas
- Monitor emails and other info exchanged on the Internet
- Collect info on anyone living in Britain without their knowledge
- Collect info on anyone living in other countries without their knowledge
- Detain people for as long as want without trial (in time of suspected terrorist attack)
- Tap people's phone conversations (in time of suspected terrorist attack)
- Stop and search people in the street at random (in time of suspected terrorist attack)

Source: Clery and Mead (BSA 2017).

Change in Left-Right in Britain: Bartle (BJPS, 2010) I




Fig. 2. Relationship between preferences for government activity, Europe and left-right self locations

Scale is a combination of economic survey items on taxation, spending and state activity but also abortion, nuclear power and post-materialism.

Change in Left-Right in Britain: Bartle (BJPS, 2010) II




Fig. 3. Changes in preferences for each government, 1951–2005

Partial support for government reaction theory, but changes under the three governments between 1950 and 1974 in the wrong direction (perhaps due to rising affluence under first Con gov).

Change in Left-Right in Britain: Bartle (BJPS, 2010) III

TABLE 4 *Predicting Change in Preferences (Error Correction Models)*

Variable	Economics	Size of government	Both sets	Removing inflation
Unemployment				
Short-term	-0.09 (0.33)		-0.52 (0.45)	-0.68 (0.38)
Long-term	0.15 (0.09)		0.41** (0.16)	0.47** (0.14)
Inflation				
Short-term	-0.03 (0.09)		0.05 (0.10)	
Long-term	-0.09 (0.08)		-0.09 (0.10)	
Average income tax				
Short-term		0.00 (0.24)	0.38 (0.26)	0.39 (0.25)
Long-term		-0.13 (0.14)	-0.38* (0.16)	-0.40** (0.15)
Gov't expenditure				
Short-term		-0.37 (0.25)	0.07 (0.30)	0.18 (0.27)
Long-term		0.02 (0.15)	-0.17 (0.21)	-0.25 (0.18)
Error correction	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.17 (0.11)	-0.39** (0.12)	-0.38*** (0.11)
Intercept	5.55 (4.32)	10.11 (10.33)	32.38*** (12.68)	34.62*** (11.90)
<i>N</i>	55	51	51	51
Adjusted <i>R</i> ²	0.16	0.01	0.18	0.20

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.00$.

Left-Right, Liberal-Authoritarianism, and Welfare Support in Britain: Perrett (BJS 2021)




FIGURE 1 Left-wing, liberal, and pro-welfare opinion over time.

(1) Points represent the percentage of individuals who responded "Agree strongly" or "Agree" to each of the left-right items and the second and final two welfare items, and "Disagree strongly" and "Disagree" to each of the libertarian-authoritarian items and the remaining welfare items. Percentages calculated for survey-years that fielded at least five items from one of the three issue domains, over those respondents who answered at least one item across the three sets of survey items. (2) Percentages weighted to take account of differing selection probabilities and non-response bias, as per National Centre for Social Research guidelines. (3) Analytic sample $n = 86,369$. Left-Right $n = 84,686$; Libertarian-Authoritarianism $n = 82,248$; Welfare $n = 71,656$. The number of observations varies across individual panels within domain. Source: British Social Attitudes surveys, 1986–2018




FIGURE 2 Overall trends in the means and variances of positions along three ideological dimensions. (1) Estimated values from hierarchical IRT models predicting the mean and variance of positions along three ideological dimensions as a function of quadratic year spline terms. (2) Ribbons represent 95% asymptotic confidence intervals. (3) Estimates of the individual item discrimination parameters for these models are shown in Figure A2. (4) Left-Right $n = 84,686$; Libertarian-Authoritarian $n = 82,248$; Welfare $n = 71,656$. Source: British Social Attitudes surveys, 1986–2018




FIGURE 3 Trends in mean ideological positions by political interest, education, and social class.




FIGURE 7 Trends in alignment between positions along three ideological dimensions.

(1) Points represent Pearson's correlation coefficients between the individual-level estimates of positions along each of the ideological dimensions for each year, from models predicting mean positions for the overall sample. (2) The size of each point is proportional to the number of respondents over which the correlation was computed. (3) Trend lines produced by locally estimated scatterplot smoothing. (4) $n = 68,858$. Source: British Social Attitudes surveys, 1986–2018

Policy Ideology in European Mass Publics, 1981-2016

- ▶ Caughey et al (APSR 2019)

- ▶ Three domains of conservatism:


1. *Economic*: size and scope of government and egalitarianism.

Divided into,

- ▶ *Absolute*: “questions that ask about policy values or outcomes directly”
- ▶ *Relative*: “those that ask about the direction of change relative to current policy” (supposedly more like the policy mood of Bartle et al (BJPS 2010))


2. *Cultural*: “postmaterial and cultural issues such as gender equality, abortion, gay rights, environmental protection, and libertarianism versus authoritarianism”
3. *Immigration*: including nationalism and national identity.

FIGURE 1. Opinion Trends on Illustrative Survey Questions for Four Countries



Note: The horizontal axis indicates the proportion of respondents in the country who were more conservative than average on that question.

FIGURE 2. Trends in Mass Conservatism by Gender, Age Group, and Issue Domain



Note: Triangles and lighter color indicate women; circles and darker color indicate men.

FIGURE 3. Economic Conservatism and Mood within Countries Over Time





FIGURE 4. Social and Immigration Conservatism within Countries Over Time



Note: Within each plot, countries are ordered by their conservatism. Each country's time series begins in the first biennium with survey data from that country. Subsequent biennia without survey data are indicated with hollow circles.

Partisan Dealignment: Dalton *Citizen Politics* I


Partisan Identification is a long-term, affective, psychological identification with one's preferred political party.'

Party identification is influenced by socioeconomic conditions and developed largely by socialization and strengthens with age.

Party id is a cue for evaluating policies, events, candidates and issues and mobilizes people at elections.

There has been a, largely undisputed, decline in party identification, which, Dalton claims, is strongly linked to a decline in the strength of cleavage politics.

The percentage of party identifiers has been trending downward.



Sources: United States, 1952–2008, American National Election Studies; Great Britain, 1964–2010, British Election Studies; Germany, 1972–2009, German Elections Studies (Western Germany only 1990–2009); France, Eurobarometer Surveys (1975, 1978, 1981, 1986, 1988), European Election Studies (1994, 1999, 2004, and 2009).

Causes of dealignment

- ▶ Cognitive mobilization: Voters better equipped to evaluate policies for themselves, partly due to greater information availability (media) and educational attainment.
 - ▶ Problem: In Europe, the most educated and informed are most likely to have strong identification.
- ▶ Social mobility: People in different class positions from their parents have weaker party id.

Those who are *dealigned* are more likely to abstain or be volatile in their vote choice, express their opinions outside the electoral arena, be critical of political parties or democratic institutions.

Critiques of Dealignment Theory

- ▶ There is no such thing as party identification.
 - ▶ Whilst Americans register as partisans for primaries, Europeans do not. Moreover their parties can change often (e.g. France and Italy).
 - ▶ Strength of party id tracks strength of preference so it is not a long-term identity, but a proxy for strength of party preference.
- ▶ Not dealignment but realignment (Evans, and Manza and Brooks).
- ▶ The party system is frozen not the cleavage structure, nor the relationship between the cleavage and the vote. (Mair 1997).
- ▶ Climate change attitudes show increasing partisan polarisation, and plenty of partisan perceptual biases in other areas.

So What?

If Inglehart and Dalton are right the responsible party model of democracy is in crisis.

- ▶ Turnout is declining.
- ▶ Increasing criticism of the democratic process.
- ▶ Declining trust in politicians and institutions.
- ▶ Ideological distance is narrowing due to greater competition over the dealigned median voter.

For some, this amounts to a change in political culture.

Related to these issues are the effects of media and interest group growth on parties, especially organization and campaign activities.