What is the Ockham Society?

The legend of pre-Gettier epistemology holds that the majority of historical philosophers subscribed to a Justified True Belief (JTB) account of knowledge. This picture has been convincingly overturned in recent years (Dutant, Antognazza). However, there is also a legend of post-Gettier epistemology. This says that epistemology in the second-half of the 20th century involved a series of disparate attempts to define knowledge, each of which failed for more-or-less idiosyncratic reasons. For some, this narrative supports a pessimistic counterinduction against the prospects of any successful analysis of knowledge. This, in turn, clears the way for the increasingly-prominent Knowledge-First programme in epistemology.

I argue that this legend is seriously inaccurate. In particular, at least three major post-Gettier approaches to the analysis of knowledge can be reconciled into a single Gettier-proof account: S knows that P if and only if S believes that P on the basis of P itself. The key ingredient for this analysis is Timothy Williamson’s principle that every true proposition is evidence for itself. The surprising conclusion is that, far from being a series of failed attempts to analyse knowledge, almost every post-Gettier approach succeeds.

Theories of logical pluralism defend that there is more than one admissible logic. In this talk, I argue against the two-level logical pluralism in Ferrari and Orlandelli (2019). I also contend that it is incompatible with the co-determination logical pluralism in Dicher (2016). To accomplish this goal, I first introduce the two theories of logical pluralism from the perspective of proof-theoretic semantics. Particular attention shall be given to Belnap’s notion of harmony. Satisfying harmony will serve as an indispensable premiss of any admissible logic for all views discussed in this talk. I carve out the underlying theories of inference rules for both, the two-level view and the co-determination approach. By contrasting these, I argue that the former is incompatible with the latter. Additionally, I introduce a way of reconciling both views in the form of a refined two-level pluralism. Finally, I offer an alternative reading of the co-determination thesis and argue for a meaning-variant form of logical pluralism in the absence of compositionality.

It is no secret that the history of philosophy has largely excluded women. Irigaray 2012 has argued that the traditional narrative of the development of philosophy is one which has internalised a longing for a world without woman. This narrative tells us that master teaches disciple like father teaches son, and so the truth itself is passed on from man to man in a genealogical way. But, crucially, this genealogy does not involve sexual reproduction, and so has no need for woman. Thus philosophy itself is propagated without the need for woman, it is the ideal child of man. This is exemplified in the Theaetetus, where Socrates is described as a midwife of the ideas (i.e. the children) of men (149a – 151d). This traditional narrative begins with the pre Socratics, but few feminists have studied them in this light. Here, I turn to Parmenides, whose rejection of change was not only hugely influential in the early history of philosophy, but also, I will argue, rooted in this longing for a womanless world.

I will argue that Parmenides’ rejection of change is, essentially, a rejection of woman. In my arguments, I draw on the works of Songe-Moller 2002, Irigaray 2012, and Fischer 2014. I will also address the objections put forward by Cherubin 2019, who defend Parmenides from charges of misogyny. Finally, I also consider the purpose and value of feminist analyses of canonical texts.

Accurate perception of the particulars of a situation––what I refer to as moral qualities––is a necessary condition for moral deliberation and temporally prior to the application of maxims or principles. But what makes such moral perception accurate, such that it can ground right action? I argue that it is a function both of the moral properties themselves, which constitute the situation, and their being represented in perception. But in order to be able to accurately represent moral properties, we must develop the appropriate disposition. Aristotle argues that a virtue is a disposition governing choice, and further, that they are a kind of knowledge; but I go on to argue that virtues are also dispositions directly tied to what we can possibly see and understand in a particular situation, and that they represent the accuracy conditions of moral perception.