

IPP-QM-4: The measurement problem

James Read¹

¹Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, UK, OX2 6GG

MT24

The course

1. Basic quantum formalism
2. Density operators and entanglement
3. Decoherence
4. The measurement problem
5. Dynamical collapse theories
6. Bohmian mechanics
7. Everettian structure
8. Everettian probability
9. EPR and Bell's theorem
10. The Bell-CHSH inequalities and possible responses
11. Contextuality
12. The PBR theorem
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14. Pragmatism and QBism
15. Relational quantum mechanics
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Today

Quantum 'interpretation'

The measurement problem

Initial responses to the measurement problem

Contemporary presentations of the measurement problem

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- ▶ What does this really mean?

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- ▶ But other so-called ‘interpretations’ involve modifying or supplementing the formalism of ‘standard’ QM.
- ▶ In this sense, ‘interpretation’ is broader than just correlating a physical theory with the world, for it also involves *changing* the formalism of the theory.
- ▶ It’s good to be aware of this, but we’ll follow the canon in using ‘interpretation’ in this broader sense.

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- ▶ We don't see macroscopic superpositions, so are they somehow stopped from developing? Does this have anything to do with observing? Etc.
- ▶ Let's see how this pans out in more detail...

Measurement basics

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- ▶ What is a measurement?
- ▶ An interaction between object system and measuring apparatus such that the apparatus is left in some definite state telling us something about the system measured.

Initial propositions

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Together, these imply that one can (and should) describe the measuring apparatus quantum mechanically. So going forward:

1. assign states ('pointer states') to apparatus,
2. describe the behaviour of apparatus according to quantum rules,
3. insist that measurement be accurate and repeatable.

Quantitative presentation of measurement problem

- ▶ Measurement an interaction between two systems: need rules for dynamics. Recall: quantum dynamics given by *unitary* operators \hat{U} ($\hat{U}^\dagger \hat{U} = \hat{1}$): length-preserving and linear.

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- ▶ If a subsystem begins in an eigenstate $|a_i\rangle$ of the observable \hat{A} to be measured, then post-measurement the pointer state $|r_j\rangle$ of the apparatus will be correlated to that value of the observable:

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(NB: We should really have $f(|a_i\rangle)$ on the RHS here, since measurements generally disturb the state—i.e., the projection postulate is false.)

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- ▶ So the apparatus just ends up being in a superposition too!
- ▶ So how to deal with these (decohered—see previous lecture) macroscopic superpositions?
- ▶ We need to get from a superposition ‘and’ to disjunction ‘either/order’—*but how??*

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Initial responses: collapse/consciousness?

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Both of these responses are by now widely acknowledged to be very bad...



(John Stewart Bell FRS, 1928–90)

Bell's 'Against 'Measurement'' (1989)

Here are some words which, however legitimate and necessary in application, have no place in a formulation with any pretension to physical precision: system, apparatus, environment, microscopic, macroscopic, reversible, irreversible, observable, information, measurement.

The concepts 'system', 'apparatus', 'environment', immediately imply an artificial division of the world, and an intention to neglect, or take only schematic account of, the interaction across the split. The notions of 'microscopic' and 'macroscopic' defy precise definition. So also do the notions of 'reversible' and 'irreversible'. Einstein said that it is theory which decides what is 'observable'. I think he was right—'observation' is a complicated and theory-laden business. Then that notion should not appear in the formulation of fundamental theory. Information? Whose information? Information about what?

On this list of bad words from good books, the worst of all is 'measurement'. (Bell 1989, p. 215)

Bell's 'Against 'Measurement'' (1989)

What exactly qualifies some physical system to play the role of 'measurer'? Was the wavefunction of the world waiting to jump for thousands of millions of years until a single-celled living creature appeared? Or did it have to wait a little longer, for some better qualified system...with a Ph.D.? If the theory is to apply to anything but highly idealised laboratory operations, are we not obliged to admit that more or less 'measurement-like' processes are going on more or less all the time, more or less everywhere? Do we not have jumping then all the time? (Bell 1989, p. 216)

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'Complementarity'.

This hardly sounds promising, but let's consider these views in a bit more detail in any case.

Heisenberg-type views

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Difficult to make sense of this view...

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- ▶ We can ascribe determinate properties to quantum mechanical systems.
- ▶ But only in the context of a given experimental scenario.
- ▶ Given different contexts, we ascribe different (classical) properties, but not at the same time.
(e.g. position/momentum, or colour/hardness are 'complementary' observables).

More on Bohr

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- ▶ But in QM, the post-measurement joint state of the object-plus-apparatus is *entangled*.
- ▶ Only in such cases can we ascribe classical quantities to systems: one is permitted to speak of e.g. an electron’s having a definite momentum only in a specified experimental context.

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- ▶ He does not say that one cannot ascribe reality to quantum phenomena, only that one cannot ascribe an “independent reality” to the phenomena or to the “agencies of observation.”
- ▶ His point is that, since the object and the apparatus form an entangled pair, they cannot be understood separately.
- ▶ Bohr did not assert that one describes “classically” all of and only that which stands on the instrument side of the cut. Instead, Bohr asserted that one describes “classically” those degrees of freedom of both instrument and object that are coupled in the measurement.

Modern prospects for Bohr-type views

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Bohr insisted that the formalism can only be interpreted by specification of a (classically defined) context of measurement. But there are now plenty of examples of causal spacetime explanations for the phenomena that Bohr considered (as given in all the major realist schools today, whether pilot-wave theory, GRW theory, or the Everett interpretation); and we have in decoherence theory technology for obtaining approximately classical descriptions from quantum ones that evade Bohr's strictures entirely. (Saunders 2005, pp. 24-25)

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(Note the suppressed premise: only one outcome occurs.)

Maudlin's trilemma, version 1 (problem of outcomes)

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1. The wavefunction of a system is *complete*, i.e. the wavefunction specifies (directly or indirectly) all of the physical properties of a system.
2. The wavefunction always evolves in accordance with a linear dynamical equation (e.g. the Schrödinger equation).
3. Measurements of, e.g., the spin of an electron always (or at least usually) have determinate outcomes, i.e., at the end of the measurement the measuring device is either in a state which indicates spin up (and not down) or spin down (and not up).

Maudlin's trilemma, version 2 (problem of statistics)

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2. The wavefunction always evolves in accordance with a linear dynamical equation (e.g. the Schrödinger equation).
3. Measurements situations which are described by identical wavefunctions sometimes have different outcomes, and the probability of each possible outcome is given (at least approximately) by Born's rule.

Notes on Maudlin

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- ▶ Muller (2023) contends that Maudlin’s presentation can be sharpened, and that in fact there are *six* measurement problems of quantum mechanics. I won’t go into this further but I recommend his article to you.

Wallace on the measurement problem

Rather than seeing the measurement problem as a clash between two different kinds of dynamical process (i.e., dynamical evolution and collapse), Wallace (2012) says that we should see it as a clash between two different ways of thinking about the quantum state of some subsystem after decoherence. These are:

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- ▶ Let's try now to be a bit more systematic about possible responses to the problem.
- ▶ We'll begin by distinguishing *anti-realist* from *realist* responses to the problem.

Scientific realism and anti-realism

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Anti-realism is the denial of scientific realism. (Note: van Fraassen himself is a scientific anti-realist!)

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- ▶ **Metaphysical realism:** There is a mind-independent world which has mind-independent properties.
- ▶ **Semantic realism:** A set of statements has truth-values and has these truth-values independently of our beliefs, desires and tastes.
- ▶ **Epistemic realism:** Truths about the domain can be known, and we do indeed know some of these truths.

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Anti-realist approaches deny one or more of these.

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- ▶ The verification principle: (crudely) 'the meaning of a proposition is in the method of its verification'.
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▶ **Operationalism**

- ▶ Physical quantities are defined by the means by which they are measured.
- ▶ "Time is what is measured by clocks" Never said by Einstein. "Temperature is what is measured by thermometers" (Schroeder, 1999).
- ▶ Bridgeman is the figurehead (see excellent SEP article).

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▶ **Constructive empiricism**

- ▶ “*Science aims to give us theories which are empirically adequate; and acceptance of a theory involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate.*” (van Fraassen 1980, p. 12, emphasis in original)
- ▶ Note: constructive empiricists are still committed to the literal interpretation of scientific theories (even if one is ultimately agnostic about the non-observational parts of the theory in question).

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Question: Which of Psillos’ three realist sub-commitments do each of these anti-realist approaches deny, and why?

Classifying approaches to quantum mechanics

- ▶ Sometimes, as we'll see later in this lecture course, it isn't even clear whether an approach to/interpretation of quantum mechanics is a realist or anti-realist one! (Consider e.g. QBism, to be discussed in lecture 14.)

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- ▶ For now, I want to turn to approaches to the measurement problem which are *obviously* realist in nature.

Realist approaches to the measurement problem

▶ **Collapse**

- ▶ Orthodoxy: Dirac/von Neumann.
- ▶ Consciousness: Wigner/von Neumann.
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Next time: dynamical collapse theories!

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