

# Knowledge and Reality Reading List

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This is James Read's reading list for Knowledge and Reality.

If you have any questions, comments, or suggestions, please email me at the above address.

## Vacation reading

Over the vacation, please have a look at:

1. E. J. Lowe, *A Survey of Metaphysics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
2. Robert Audi, *Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge*, third edition, London: Routledge, 2010.

# 1 Sensitivity and safety

Can knowledge be analysed in modal terms? If so, how?

## Core reading

1. Duncan Pritchard, "Sensitivity, Safety, and Anti-Luck Epistemology", in J. Greco (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism*, 2011.
2. Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and Matthias Steup, "The Analysis of Knowledge", in E. N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2017. **Section 5.**
3. Robert Nozick, "Knowledge and Scepticism", in *Philosophical Explanations*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981.
4. Saul Kripke, "Nozick on Knowledge", in *Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers Vol. 1*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
5. Rachel Briggs and Daniel Nolan, "Mad, Bad, and Dangerous to Know", *Analysis* 72(2), pp. 314-316, 2012.
6. Christoph Kelp, "Knowledge and Safety", *Journal of Philosophical Research* 34, pp. 21-31, 2009.
7. Duncan Pritchard, "Safety-Based Epistemology", *Journal of Philosophical Research* 34, pp. 33-45, 2009.

## Further reading

1. John Turri, "Unreliable Knowledge", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* XC(3), pp. 529-545, 2015.

## 2 Epistemic contextualism

**What is the difference between contextualism and subject-sensitive invariantism about knowledge? Which is better supported by the linguistic evidence? Does either provide a satisfactory response to scepticism?**

### Core reading

1. Keith DeRose, "Solving the Skeptical Problem", *Philosophical Review* 104(1), pp. 1-52, 1995.
2. David Lewis, "Elusive Knowledge", *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 74(4), pp. 549-567, 1996.
3. John Hawthorne, *Knowledge and Lotteries*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. **Chs. 2 and 4.**
4. Keith DeRose, "The Problem with Subject-Sensitive Invariantism", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 68(2), pp. 346-350, 2004.
5. Jonathan Schaffer, "From Contextualism to Contrastivism", *Philosophical Studies* 119, pp. 73-103, 2004.

### Further reading

1. Timothy Williamson, "Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and Knowledge of Knowledge", *The Philosophical Quarterly* 55(219), pp. 213-235, 2005.
2. Patrick Rysiew, "Epistemic Contextualism", in E. N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2016.
3. Jennifer Nagel, "Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Thinking About Error", *Philosophical Quarterly* 60, pp. 286-306, 2010.
4. Jennifer Nagel, "Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Changing Stakes", *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 86, pp. 279-294, 2008.
5. Michael Blome-Tillmann, "Knowledge and Presuppositions", *Mind* 118(470), pp. 241-294, 2009.
6. Jason Stanley, *Knowledge and Practical Interests*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. **Chs. 5 and 6.**
7. Keith DeRose, *The Case for Contextualism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

### 3 Paradoxes of confirmation

What is the relation of the ravens paradox to Goodman's new riddle of induction, and how do they both relate to Hume's original problem of induction? Ought the ravens paradox and the new riddle to be solved in the same way?

#### Goodman's paradox

1. Nelson Goodman, *Fact, Fiction, and Forecast*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979. **Ch. 3.**
2. Richard G. Swinburne, "Grue", *Analysis* 28(4), pp. 123-8, 1968.
3. Frank Jackson, "Grue", *Journal of Philosophy* 72(5), pp. 113-131, 1975.
4. W. V. Quine, "Natural Kinds", in N. Rescher (ed.), *Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel*, pp. 1-23, Dordrecht, 1970.

#### The ravens paradox

1. Carl G. Hempel, "Studies in the Logic of Confirmation I", *Mind* 54(13), pp. 1-26, 1945.
2. Branden Fitelson and James Hawthorne, "How Bayesian Confirmation Theory Handles the Paradox of the Ravens", in E. Eells and J. H. Fetzer (eds.), *The Place of Probability in Science*, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 284, pp. 247-275, 2010.

#### Further reading

1. Simon Blackburn, *Reason and Prediction*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973. **Ch. 4.**
2. William Talbott, "Bayesian Epistemology", in E. N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2008.
3. Richard G. Swinburne, "The Paradoxes of Confirmation: A Survey", *American Philosophical Quarterly* 8(4), pp. 318-330, 1971.

## 4 Possible worlds

Does there exist a plurality of real but non-actual possible worlds?

### Core reading

1. David Lewis, *Counterfactuals*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1973. **Ch. 4, §1.**
2. David Lewis, *On the Plurality of Worlds*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1986. **Chs. 1-3.**
3. Robert Stalnaker, "Possible Worlds", *Noûs* 10, pp. 65-75, 1976.
4. Gideon Rosen, "Modal Fictionalism", *Mind* 99, pp. 327-354, 1990.
5. Theodore Sider, "Reductive Theories of Modality", in M. Loux and D. W. Zimmerman (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics*, pp. 180-208, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

### Further reading

1. Stuart Brock, "Modal Fictionalism: A Response to Rosen", *Mind* 102(405), pp. 147-150, 1993.
2. Alvin Plantinga, "Two Concepts of Modality: Modal Realism and Modal Reductionism", in M. Davidson (ed.), *Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
3. Philip Bricker and Joseph Melia, "Modality and Possible Worlds", in T. Sider, J. Hawthorne and D. W. Zimmerman (eds.), *Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics*, Oxford: Blackwell, 2013.
4. William Lycan, "The Trouble with Possible Worlds", in M. Loux (ed.), *The Possible and the Actual*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1979.
5. Michael J. Loux, *Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction*, third edition, London: Routledge, 2006. **Ch. 5.**
6. Alvin Plantinga, "Actualism and Possible Worlds", in M. Loux (ed.), *The Possible and the Actual*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1979.
7. Takashi Yagisawa, *Worlds and Individuals: Possible and Otherwise*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. **Chs. 1-2.**
8. Boris Kment, *Modality and Explanatory Reasoning*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. **Chs. 4-5.**
9. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, "Modal Realism and Metaphysical Nihilism", *Mind*. 113, pp. 683-704, 2004.
10. Francesco Berto and Mark Jago, *Impossible Worlds*, Oxford University Press, 2019.
11. Jonathan D. Jacobs, "A Powers Theory of Modality: or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Reject Possible Worlds", *Philosophical Studies* 151(2), pp. 227-248, 2010.

## 5 Causation

**What, if any, is the correct analysis of causation?**

### Core reading

1. E. J. Lowe, *A Survey of Metaphysics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. **Chs. 9-10.**
2. J. L. Mackie, "Causes and Conditions", *American Philosophical Quarterly* 2, pp. 245-264, 1965.
3. Bas C. van Fraassen, *The Scientific Image*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980. §§2.5-2.6.
4. David Lewis, "Causation", *Journal of Philosophy* 70, pp. 556-567, 1973.
5. David Lewis, "Causation as Influence", *Journal of Philosophy* 97, pp. 182-197, 2000.
6. Peter Menzies, "Counterfactual Theories of Causation", in E. N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2014.

### Probabilistic causation

1. Wesley C. Salmon, "Causality: Production and Propagation", in P. Asquith and R. Giere (eds.), *Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association* 2, pp. 49-69, 1980.
2. David Lewis, "Postscripts to 'Causation'", in *Philosophical Papers, Volume II*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.
3. Christopher Hitchcock, "Do All and Only Causes Raise the Probabilities of Effects?", in J. Collins, N. Hall, and L. Paul (eds.), *Causation and Counterfactuals*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004.

### Further reading

1. Dorothy Edgington, "Causation First: Why Causation is Prior to Counterfactuals", in C. Hoerl, T. McCormack and S. R. Beck (eds.), *Understanding Counterfactuals, Understanding Causation*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
2. Tim Maudlin, "Causation, Counterfactuals, and the Third Factor", in J. Collins, N. Hall and L. A. Paul (eds.), *Causation and Counterfactuals*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004.
3. Christopher Hitchcock, "The Intransitivity of Causation Revealed in Equations and Graphs", *Journal of Philosophy* 98, pp. 273-299, 2001.
4. John W. Carroll, "Nailed to Hume's Cross?", in T. Sider, J. Hawthorne and D. W. Zimmerman (eds.), *Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics*, Oxford: Blackwell, 2013.

5. James Woodward, *Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
6. Michael Strevens, "Against Lewis's New Theory of Causation: A Story with Three Morals", *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 84, pp. 398-412, 2003.
7. Sungho Choi, "Understanding the Influence Theory of Causation: A Critique of Strevens", *Erkenntnis* 63, pp. 101-118, 2005.
8. Jonathan Schaffer, "Causal Contextualism", in M. Blaauw (ed.), *Contrastivism in Philosophy*, London: Routledge, 2013.

## 6 Time and tense

Is time unreal?

### Core reading

1. John M. E. McTaggart, "The Unreality of Time", *Mind* 17, pp. 457-474, 1908.
2. D. H. Mellor, *Real Time II*, London: Routledge, 1998. **Chs. 1, 7.**
3. E. J. Lowe, *The Possibility of Metaphysics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. **Ch. 4.**
4. Robert Le Poidevin, "Lowe on McTaggart", *Mind* 102(405), pp. 163-170, 1993.
5. Kit Fine, "The Reality of Tense", *Synthese* 150(3), pp. 399-414, 2006.
6. Eric Olson, "The Rate of Time's Passage", *Analysis* 69, pp. 3-9, 2009.

### Further reading

1. Michael Dummett, "A Defence of McTaggart's Proof of the Unreality of Time", *Philosophical Review* 69, pp. 497-504, 1960.
2. Judith Jarvis Thomson, "McTaggart on Time", *Philosophical Perspectives* 15, pp. 229-252, 2001.
3. Arthur Prior, *Past, Present, and Future*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967.
4. D. H. Mellor, "The Unreality of Tense", in R. Le Poidevin and M. Macbeath (eds.), *The Philosophy of Time*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.
5. Donald C. Williams, "The Myth of Passage", *Journal of Philosophy* 48, pp. 457-472, 1951.
6. Dean Zimmerman, "The Privileged Present: Defending an 'A-Theory' of Time", in T. Sider, J. Hawthorne and D. W. Zimmerman (eds.), *Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics*, Oxford: Blackwell, 2013.
7. J. J. C. Smart, "The Tenseless Theory of Time", in T. Sider, J. Hawthorne and D. W. Zimmerman (eds.), *Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics*, Oxford: Blackwell, 2013.
8. Josh Parsons, "A-Theory for B-Theorists", *Philosophical Quarterly* 52(206), pp. 1-20, 2002.



## 7 Time travel

**“Backwards time travel is impossible, because it entails contradictions.” Discuss.**

### Core reading

1. David Lewis, “The Paradoxes of Time Travel”, *American Philosophical Quarterly* 13, pp. 145-152, 1976.
2. Nicholas J. J. Smith, “Time Travel”, in E. N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2018.
3. Paul Horwich, *Asymmetries in Time: Problems in the Philosophy of Science*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987. **Ch. 7.**
4. Nicholas J. J. Smith, “Bananas Enough for Time Travel?”, *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 48(3), pp. 363-389, 1997.
5. Jenann Ismael, “Closed Causal Loops and the Bilking Argument”, *Synthese* 136, pp. 305-320, 2003.

### Further reading

1. Frank Arntzenius, “Time Travel: Double Your Fun”, *Philosophy Compass* 1/6, pp. 599-616, 2006.
2. Theodore Sider, “Time Travel, Coincidences and Counterfactuals”, *Philosophical Studies* 110, pp. 115-138, 2002.
3. Theodore Sider, “Travelling Through A- and B-Time”, *The Monist* 88, pp. 329-335, 2005.
4. Jack Johnson, *Probability and Coincidence in Time Travel Scenarios*, M.Phys.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 2019.
5. Simon Keller and Michael Nelson, “Presentists Should Believe in Time Travel”, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 79, pp. 333-345, 2001.
6. John Earman, “Time Travel”, in J. Earman, *Bangs, Crunches, Whimpers and Shrieks*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
7. Frank Arntzenius and Tim Maudlin, “Time Travel and Modern Physics”, in E. N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2009.
8. Chris Smeenk and Christian Wüthrich, “Time Travel and Time Machines”, in C. Callendar (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
9. John Earman, Chris Smeenk and Christian Wüthrich, “Do the Laws of Physics Forbid the Operation of a Time Machine?”, *Synthese* 169, pp. 91-124, 2009.

## 8 The problem of universals

What is the problem of universals, and what is the best solution to it?

### Core reading

1. E. J. Lowe, *A Survey of Metaphysics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. **Ch. 19.**
2. David H. Armstrong, *Universals: An Opinionated Introduction*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989.
3. Michael J. Loux, *Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction*, third edition, London: Routledge, 2006. **Chs. 1-2.**
4. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, "What is the Problem of Universals?", *Mind* 109(434), pp. 255-273, 2000.
5. Christopher Daly, "Tropes", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 94, pp. 254-261, 1994.

### Further reading

1. Bertrand Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy*. **Ch. 9.** (Many editions available.)
2. George Bealer, "Universals and Properties", in S. Laurence and C. Macdonald (eds.), *Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1998.
3. Frank P. Ramsey, "Universals", in D. H. Mellor (ed.), *Philosophical Papers*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 3-33, 1990.
4. Nelson Goodman and W. V. O. Quine, "Steps Towards a Constructive Nominalism", *Journal of Symbolic Logic* 12, pp. 105-122, 1947.
5. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, *Resemblance Nominalism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
6. Keith Campbell, "The Metaphysics of Abstract Particulars", *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 6, pp. 477-488, 1981.
7. Peter Simons, "Particulars in Particular Clothing: Three Trope Theories of Substance", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 54(3), pp. 553-575, 1994.
8. Anna-Sofia Maurin, *If Tropes*, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2002.
9. Jerrold Levinson, "Why There Are No Tropes", *Philosophy* 81(4), pp. 563-580, 2006.