Matt Hewson

I'm a DPhil (PhD) student at Merton College, Oxford University. I'm mainly interested in epistemology and formal epistemology, though I hold some other interests in ethics, decision theory and the philosophy of language.

I'm in the middle of reorganising this webpage. My PhilPeople page is here. You can email me at matthew [dot] hewson [at] philosophy [dot] ox [dot] ac [dot] uk.


1) Accurate Believers Are Deductively Cogent. Noûs. 2021 (online-first).

This paper argues that the standard accuracy frameworks for outright belief are flawed, and that remedying their faults gives rise to considerably more stringent epistemic norms than has been thought.

[Published version].

2) Indicative Conditionals and Epistemic Luminosity (with James Ravi Kirkpatrick). Mind. 2021 (online-first).

We examine a recently discussed puzzle connecting indicative conditionals and the question of whether one always knows what one knows.

[Published version].

3) Accuracy Monism and Doxastic Dominance: Reply to Steinberger. Analysis. 2020.

Given the standard dominance conditions used in accuracy theories for outright belief, epistemologists must invoke epistemic conservatism if they are to avoid licensing belief in both a proposition and its negation. Florian Steinberger (2019) charges the committed accuracy monist — the theorist who thinks that the only epistemic value is accuracy — with being unable to motivate this conservatism. I show that the accuracy monist can avoid Steinberger’s charge by moving to a subtly different set of dominance conditions. Having done so, they no longer need to invoke conservatism. I briefly explore some ramifications of this shift.

[Pre-print]. [Published version].

Work in progress

These papers are in varying stages of preparation; please email me if you'd like a copy.

4) Accuracy epistemology and doxastic logic

This paper explores some formal questions about how accuracy frameworks for outright belief should be combined with doxastic logic. Amongst other questions, it looks at whether there are accuracy-centred constraints on various kinds of higher-order belief.

5) Accurate updating

I look at some problems that arise for theories of updating given the constraints that a) the theory uses a philosophically sophisticated conception of evidence and b) adherents of the theory want updates to maximise expected accuracy.

6) A paper on norms of implicature [with Lukas Lewerentz]

We look at some issues to do with norms of implicature.